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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 003593 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2018 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK
SUBJECT: ZARDARI TO PETRAEUS: "DEFEAT IS NOT AN OPTION" 

Classified By: Anne W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) 

¶1. (C) Summary. During a November 3 meeting with CENTCOM 
Commander Petraeus, President Zardari repeated his commitment 
to fight terrorism, saying "defeat is not an option." He 
renewed his request for U.S. economic support, indicated he 
could support some unilateral U.S. military actions if they 
were worth the price of negative reactions, and outlined 
various plans to combat extremism and improve the economy. 
General Petraeus noted that "your success is our success" in 
the fight against extremism and said he would work to ensure 
that the short-term gains of U.S. strikes would not be 
outweighed by their consequences. Zardari reported he 
planned to visit Kabul in the coming months. End Summary. 

¶2. (C) On November 3, Ambassador and CENTCOM Commander 
General Petraeus met with President Asif Zardari. Also 
attending were Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia 
Richard Boucher, Office of Defense Cooperation Pakistan Rear 
Admiral Michael LeFever, Polcouns (notetaker), Chief of Army 
Staff General Kayani, and Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir. 

¶3. (C) Petraeus noted that he had deliberately made 
Pakistan his first overseas stop after taking command of 
CENTCOM. He had received from General Kayani a good layout 
of Pakistan's campaign strategy against extremist militants 
and praised Pakistan's success in enacting a joint 
parliamentary resolution against extremism. Zardari said that 
"we intend to finish the job; defeat is not an option." The 
militants, said Zardari, want my job and the state is 
literally now at stake as the lives of 180 million Pakistanis 
depended on success in the fight. Petraeus agreed on the 
importance of obtaining public support for the campaign 
against terrorism. The effort would require combined 
political, economic, military and diplomatic engagement. 
"Your success is our success," he said. 

¶4. (C) Petraeus described how some of the lessons American 
forces learned in Iraq were applicable in Pakistan. Zardari 
noted that Pakistan had been fighting militancy from before 
9/11; Benazir Bhutto long ago had warned Washington about the 
dangers of Osama bin Laden. She had negotiated with 
Washington to return and build a democratic government that 
could better take on the war. Petraeus noted that he had met 
over dinner with members of the parliament, including some 
opposition leaders. 

¶5. (C) Zardari said his government had taken ownership of 
the terrorism issue and was working to increase public 
support, but this was not a one day/one generation war. He 
needed new laws to normalize procedures for those arrested 
and spoke of the Saudi model that provided a kind of 
terrorist detoxification program after a detainee admitted 
guilt. Petraeus recalled the way the Saudis overcame an 
existential threat four years ago by using a comprehensive 
approach that included intelligence, moderate religious 
education, mosque overhauls, and funding to root out 
extremists. Zardari said he wanted to borrow from that 
model, and modify it according to Pakistani customs. 

¶6. (C) Saying Pakistan was a rich country in resources but 
needed short-term help due to the international economic 
situation, Zardari urged U.S. support through the Friends of 
Pakistan to sustain the country while he created a middle 
class and fought extremism. The Taliban, he said, can outpay 
my soldiers and he needed to compensate persons displaced by 
the fighting. He was seeking to pay one thousand rupees each 
to Pakistanis displaced by the current fighting in Bajaur, 
but did not have adequate resources to reach all the 
displaced, and it was snowing already in the mountains. 
Zardari identified poverty, refugee camps and madrassahs as 
ongoing problems that bred extremism. 

¶7. (C) Zardari said he needed help from Pakistan's oil-rich 
neighbors and was going to Saudi Arabia to ask for resources. 
He also had asked China for assistance with steel mill 
construction and other projects. Zardari expressed dismay 
that time had run out in the U.S. Congress before it could 
enact the Biden/Lugar assistance bill, but said Pakistan 
would engage with the new Congress with a "road show" to 
convince them to open up U.S. markets that would create jobs. 
What was needed, said Zardari, was a Marshall Plan to "help 
us help ourselves. If we slip, we go back to zero." 

ISLAMABAD 00003593 002 OF 002 



¶8. (C) In an oblique reference to U.S. unilateral military 
actions, Zardari suggested that the U.S. work collectively 
with the Pakistani Army to be more interactive and coordinate 
operations across the Afghan border. Petraeus noted that he 
had "received the same message" repeatedly all day. Zardari 
said "we can agree to disagree;" Petraeus responded that the 
two sides were closer than it seemed. He would work to 
ensure that the short-term gains of strikes would not be 
outweighed by their consequences. Zardari said he did not 
mind paying the price for high-value targets, but it did not 
appear that Osama bin Laden had been in our sights lately. 
Pakistan,s security forces were fighting, and he was working 
to build popular support for Pakistan's war. The Marriott 
bombing had helped to reinforce the message. Hopefully, he 
said, Pakistani forces can push the militants into the 
mountains where the GOP could act against them. 

¶9. (C) Zardari said he was also working on building 
"regional ownership" of the extremism problem. He was 
building good will with India and wanted to increase trade. 
He wanted to convince Indian leaders they needed ownership of 
problems in Afghanistan because Pakistan and India cannot 
solve the Kashmir issue if Indian intelligence can take 
advantage in Afghanistan. Zardari plans to visit Kabul on an 
official tour in the coming months; he said he recently met 
with the Indian Prime Minister, who he thought was not 
particularly well-informed on Indian intelligence activities 
in Afghanistan. Zardari thought that perhaps the UK could 
help with this initiative. 
PATTERSON 

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