VZCZCXRO6529
RR RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1409/01 3261054
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211054Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1208
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0342

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 DUSHANBE 001409 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KIRF KISL TI
SUBJECT:  WHERE IS THE GOVERNMENT OF TAJIKISTAN'S RELIGIOUS POLICY 
GOING? 
 
REF: (A) 07 Dushanbe 1531 
 (B) 08 Dushanbe 887 
      (C) 07 Dushanbe 1772 
 
¶1. (U) This is a resubmission of 08 Dushanbe 1408 with a subject 
heading. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary: Tajik officials have continued to impose 
limitations on personal conduct as part of the government's 
restrictive religious policy.  Officials have also continued to 
crack down on religious groups that they consider to be "threats to 
national security."  At the same time, the government has attempted 
to portray itself as the protector of Islam.  Superficial actions, 
such as dedicating 2009 to the religious figure Hanafi, have done 
little to convince Tajiks that their government actually respects 
religion and rights of religious expression, and imams with no 
connections to the government appear to be gaining influence.  End 
summary. 
 
CONTROLLING RELIGIOUS LIFE 
 
¶3. (SBU) EmbOffs spoke to some of those who attended the early 
October meeting of the Council of Ulamo, Tajikistan's supreme 
religious authority.  Most of the imams in the country attended, as 
did representatives of the Ministry of Culture's Department of 
Religious Affairs and the law enforcement community.  One of the 
government representatives announced a new set of rules that imams 
were expected to enforce: members of the Salafi sect are prohibited 
from praying in mosques in Tajikistan; no one under the age of 18 
may attend a mosque during school hours; no new mosques will be 
registered (no time period was given); and no meals may be served at 
mosques.  He announced that the government would form "commissions" 
that will inspect the country's mosques and other public 
facilities. 
 
 
¶4. (U) In recent weeks, EmbOffs have spotted these commissions - 
which include representatives from the Presidential Administration, 
the General Prosecutor's Office, the Council of Ulamo and law 
enforcement - in Dushanbe, warning people in markets and shops not 
to wear clothes that have religious significance, and telling 
business owners that employees should not be allowed to wear hijabs 
or beards.  Istravshan Ministry of Interior officials initially 
refused to give Domullo Mu'monkhon, the imam of a mosque in 
Istravshan, a passport until he shaved his beard.  Mu'monkhon had 
been chosen to participate in an Embassy-sponsored exchange program 
for religious figures; they ultimately relented, but only after a 
few weeks of wrangling. 
 
¶5. (U) The local media have reported on efforts to enforce unwritten 
public dress codes.  Sabohat Qilichbekova, a Dushanbe shopkeeper, 
told a reporter for Najot newspaper that one of these commissions 
visited her store and told her not to sell "modern Islamic-style" 
clothes.  A Radio Liberty correspondent reported that the Council of 
Ulamo considered "foreign-made" hijabs unsuitable for women, who 
should instead wear traditional Tajik headscarves; one of the 
Council's members was quoted as saying, "imported hijabs do not meet 
Islamic standards...they seem to be too tight." 
 
¶6. (SBU) In addition to policing a dress code, Tajik authorities 
have stepped up their attempts to control, monitor and restrict the 
activities of the Salafis.  In mid-October, the Khatlon prosecutor's 
office called for the sect to be banned; around the same time, 
Council of Ulamo representatives publicly called for Salafis to 
renounce their beliefs or stay away from mosques.  On October 17, 
Amonullo Ne'matzoda, the Head of the Council of Ulamo, announced in 
a sermon at the Central Mosque that Salafis are not welcome in 
Tajikistan's mosques, and he called on imams throughout the country 
to prevent Salafis from praying in their mosques.  Ne'matzoda 
Qto prevent Salafis from praying in their mosques.  Ne'matzoda 
justified his comments by equating the Salafis with Wahhabism; he 
said the religious differences the Salafis and Wahhabis introduced 
were some of the main causes of the civil war.  He warned that the 
Salafis threaten to split religious society in two.  The Salafis who 
were in the Central mosque at the time appeared to ignore 
Ne'matzoda; they simply remained in the mosque and continued to 
pray.  After the service, Ne'matzoda spoke to the Salafis in 
private. 
 
¶7. (U) The increased attention on the Salafis comes shortly after 
government officials took action against the Jehovah's Witnesses. 
In late September, a military court ruled against the group, who 
were challenging a government ban on their activities (reftel A). 
During monitoring of the trial, EmbOffs noted that the testimony of 
representatives of the Customs Service, Committee on National 
Security, and Ministry of Culture were remarkably similar, as if 
they had been coached about what to say.  The Committee on National 
Security representative said that "sects like the Jehovah's 
Witnesses threaten the country's national security"; the Ministry of 
Culture's lawyer said that the Jehovah's Witnesses needed to be 
"mindful of the interests of the nation"; and Adolat Jalolova, the 
 
DUSHANBE 00001409  002 OF 003 
 
 
principle of a local high school said she "hates this sect because 
they can split our nation and break our families apart."  During a 
break in the proceedings, Saidbek Mahmadulloev, from the Ministry of 
Culture, told EmbOff that after finishing the Jehovah''s Witnesses 
case, they would start a campaign against the Salafis. 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) The government continues to monitor NGOs that it suspects 
of surreptitiously conducting religious activities.  A Dushanbe 
court has indefinitely suspended the activities of ORA 
International, a non-denominational Christian relief and development 
organization based in Germany, and the authorities deported the 
NGO's U.S. citizen director in October.  Official documents cite 
violations of NGO registration provisions as the reason for 
government action, and ORA employees have denied involvement in 
religious activities. 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Government officials also continue to interfere with the 
property rights of religious organizations.  Earlier in the year, 
the authorities demolished Tajikistan's only synagogue (reftel B). 
The City of Dushanbe has now manipulated the court system to deprive 
the Grace Sun Min Church, of property that it lawfully purchased 
almost a decade ago.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has contacted 
the Church to inform its U.S. citizen pastor that his visa may not 
be renewed.  The Grace Sun Min case appears to involve a primarily 
financial - as opposed to anti-religious - motive, but it 
demonstrates that religious organizations are especially vulnerable 
to the whims of local officials.  Repeated attempts by the Embassy 
to advocate on behalf of the Church have fallen on deaf ears. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT CREDIBILITY: A BALANCING ACT 
 
 
¶10. (U) The government has attempted to portray itself as the 
protector of Islam in Tajikistan, but many see these attempts as 
superficial.  While the government posits the Council of Ulamo as 
the country's independent religious authority, many view it as 
beholden to the government.  The local media have published the 
comments of Abdullo Rahnamo, an expert on religion at the Center for 
Strategic Research, a government think tank, that the Council has 
"always been close to the government and supported government 
policies." 
 
¶11. (SBU) In September, President Rahmon proclaimed that 2009 would 
be the year of Abu Hanifa an-Nu'man, the founder of the Hanafi 
school of thought.  Observers interpreted the move as an attempt to 
appease religious figures who were skeptical of the government's 
religious policy.  However, it appears as though the government 
intends to celebrate Imam Hanafi in a secular way.  Abdughaffor 
Kamolov, a radio journalist, told EmbOff that the Chairman of the 
Committee on TV and Radio has ordered media outlets to produce 
programs about Hanafi, but that the programs should stress his 
Central Asian origins (while he was born in Iraq, his father came 
from Kabul), not his religious contributions; journalists should not 
interview religious figures whose beards or clothes emphasize a 
religious identity. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Corrupt officials have alienated many in the religious 
community, further challenging the government's credibility in 
implementing its religious policy.  In August, Murodullo Davlatov 
was replaced as the head of the Department of Religious Affairs. 
Davlatov was known as a corrupt administrator who alienated 
religious figures; he came under particular scrutiny following 
allegations of corruption in the 2007 Hajj (reftel C).  According to 
a retired imam who had served on the Council of Ulamo, Ne'matulloh 
Amonzoda was pressured into removing his nephew, Saymuddin, as the 
QAmonzoda was pressured into removing his nephew, Saymuddin, as the 
Council of Ulamo's Head of International Relations, for 
misappropriating Council of Ulamo materials.  Saymuddin reportedly 
had used proceeds from selling donated good to build a luxurious 
house. 
 
WHO DO PEOPLE REALLY LISTEN TO? 
 
¶13. (SBU) As public skepticism about the government's role in 
religious affairs continues, imams with no apparent government 
connections appear to be coming more influential.  EmbOffs have 
visited mosques throughout the country, met with members of the 
religious community, and spoke to producers who distribute religious 
DVDs and CDs.  Three imams who appear to be particularly popular are 
Nuriddin Turajonzoda (also known as Eshoni Nuriddin), the imam 
khatib of the Friday praying mosque in the village of Turkobod (in 
Vahdat); Mirzo Ibronov (also known as Hoji Mirzo), the imam-khatib 
of the Friday praying mosque in Kulob; Rahim Nazarov (also known as 
Mullo Abdurahim), the imam-khatib of the Qazoqon mosque in Dushanbe. 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Turajonzoda is 56 years old and comes from a prominent 
family (one of his brothers is a former Deputy Prime Minister and a 
 
DUSHANBE 00001409  003 OF 003 
 
 
current senator); Ibronov and Nazarov are in their mid-40s.  Each of 
these imams attracts thousands of people to their mosques, and all 
include criticisms of the government in their sermons.  Tajik 
newspapers regularly turn to them for commentary on religious 
issues, particularly during religious holidays.  CDs and DVDs of 
their sermons are available throughout the country. Many young 
Tajiks are sending each other video messages of Turajonzoda saying, 
"Taking off our sisters' and daughters' hijabs is like taking off 
the President's daughter's underwear."  Ibronov and Nazarov in 
particular have attracted a large number of young people to their 
mosques by modernizing their messages.  Ibronov has a wide following 
in Russia as well; he often travels there to meet with religious 
officials. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Comment:  The government continues to try to sell the idea 
that it is the protector of Islam in Tajikistan, but it lacks 
credibility when continuing to reduce religious space.  The 
popularity of imams such as Turajonzoda, Ibronov, and Nazarov 
suggests that as the government squeezes, religious sentiment is 
shifting toward those seen as independent from the government.  It 
remains to be seen how far the government will go in restricting 
personal conduct as it continues to try to control religious life. 
As one local publication commented, efforts to ban the hijab have 
not reduced womens' desire to wear the hijab, but instead have 
strengthened its appeal. Pressure on the Salafis likewise might only 
increase the group's popularity.  The poor treatment afforded 
religious groups, from the Grace Sun Min Church property rights case 
to the ban on new mosques, attracts the critical attention of 
religious freedom defenders abroad and complicates Tajikistan's 
relations with Islamic and other countries.  End Comment. 
 
JACOBSON