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PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHHM
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1087
RHMFIUU/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEHDT/AMEMBASSY DILI 3629

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DILI 000288 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MTS, PACOM FOR POLADS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI TT
SUBJECT: TIMOR-LESTE: IDP REINTEGRATION ON TRACK DESPITE CHALLENGES 
 
DILI 00000288  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Since April 2008, the Government of Timor-Leste's 
Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS) has closed 33 of 54 
internally displaced persons (IDP) camps erected after over 
100,000 people fled their homes during the 2006 
political-military crisis.  The GOTL and NGOs estimate that over 
50,000 IDPs have been resettled, and progress is ongoing.  The 
lingering presence of the camps for over two years after the 
crisis posed one of the toughest challenges to the Parliamentary 
Majority Alliance (AMP) government led by Prime Minister Xanana 
Gusmao since its formation in August 2007.  However, the GOTL 
has successfully implemented a community reintegration program 
for IDPs in partnership with NGOs and international 
organizations based on subsidies of up to $4,500 per family. 
The GOTL's effort is shaping up as a success story; criticism 
from the opposition has been very restrained.  Notwithstanding 
current progress, government and NGO interlocutors observed that 
serious challenges remain, including the continuing absence of a 
land law guaranteeing property rights.  End summary. 
 
 
AMP Rises To IDP Challenge - At Its Own Pace 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The Ministry of Social Solidarity's Secretary of State 
for Natural Disasters and Social Assistance Jacinto Rigoberto de 
Deus reported to Poloff on October 30 that 33 IDP camps have 
been closed since April 2008, and "guaranteed" that most of the 
remaining 21 camps will be closed by year's end.  He also 
praised the partnership of NGOs who continue to assist the 
government to carry out the resettlement policy, and singled out 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and 
CARE for helping the government tackle "this urgent issue in a 
timely and smooth manner." 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The solution is based on payment of subsidies of up to 
$4,500 to registered IDP families who have presented evidence 
that their previous homes were damaged or destroyed.  In 
crafting this policy, Rigoberto stressed the government's first 
priority was "to close down the most politicized and problematic 
camps, such as at Jardim (Dili Port), the Dili airport and the 
national hospital." These camps were sites of political violence 
in August 2007 following President Jose Ramos-Horta's 
announcement of the new government. 
 
Outstanding Challenges: Money, Security, Land 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Secretary of State Rigoberto underscored that the 
programs' success to date "does not mean all issues are resolved 
as we will need more funds allocated (by the government) in the 
2009 budget."  He noted that over 16,000 families remain 
registered in the ministry's IDP database as claiming government 
subsidies.  He also expressed concern that the approaching rainy 
season would pose problems for those still living in camps, and 
stressed that the enactment of a land law guaranteeing property 
rights remains essential to avoid future land disputes which 
could create the conditions for further displacements. 
Representatives from the above noted NGOs expressed the same 
concerns to Embassy officials, adding that another lingering 
question remains what will take place after government subsidies 
are spent by the end of the year.  Nevertheless, all 
representatives praised the government for tackling one of its 
highest priorities and toughest challenges with speed and 
efficiency given its present resources. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The establishment of new National Police of 
Timor-Leste (PNTL) posts in several neighborhoods where 
residents returned contributed significantly to reducing and 
preventing community tensions previously predicted by government 
critics.  However, it remains to be seen whether conflicts will 
re-ignite if the new posts are not kept open permanently. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Despite the progress, some questions remain on the 
long term benefits of the government's resettlement program. 
For instance, while families received between $2,500 to $4,500 
to leave the camps and rebuild their homes, many of these faced 
communities which objected to their return, thereby requiring 
community dialogue and mediation assistance from the Ministry of 
Social Solidarity and its partner NGOs.  Some of the subsidy 
 
DILI 00000288  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
funds have been paid to communities to accept returning 
residents, thereby reducing the amount of funds available to 
rebuild homes.  Some observers have expressed concern that IDPs 
may return to the Dili camps if they use their subsidy money for 
purposes other than building or repairing their homes.  They 
may, for instance, be pressured by relatives to share the money. 
 Unemployed youth not attached to a family unit as defined by 
the government also posed a problem since only a percentage of 
these received up to $200 to abandon the camps. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The potential for old tensions to flare up remains.  A 
tent erected by the Ministry and NGOs in Dili's neighborhood of 
Becora for community reintegration dialogue was burned down last 
September by hostile residents not welcoming to returning IDPs, 
allegedly due to "east versus west" rivalries. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) More significantly, the absence of secure property 
rights and land titles in Timor-Leste exacerbates the 
displacement problem.  Several residents in government/NGO 
operated transitional housing have reported to Embassy officers 
that they moved routinely around Dili and the districts prior to 
the 2006 crisis, therefore underscoring the question of where 
exactly those residents should return after leaving the camps. 
In addition, Secretary of State Rigoberto acknowledged that many 
residents have simply moved in with relatives throughout Dili 
and the districts. 
 
A Dili-Centric Approach 
----------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The overwhelming majority of camps currently being 
closed are in Dili, and very little attention has been paid by 
the GOTL to IDPs outside the capital.  There are still at least 
six camps in Baucau with an estimated 160 families (1,000 
residents).  Local authorities and the Ministry have instructed 
donors not to supply IDPs in Baucau with food or water, since 
this would fuel jealousy on the part of other local residents. 
The city of Ermera has approximately 150 families (700 
residents) living in transitional housing.  Also, the GOTL has 
yet to tackle the tense Metinaro camp outside of Dili, a 
stronghold of the FRETILIN opposition party with an estimated 
1,600 families (20,000 residents), which Rigoberto described as 
"our toughest challenge because it is very politicized." 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Secretary of State Rigoberto summarized that the 
government has taken the first steps towards resolving the 
"internationally visible problem of the IDPs within a short 
amount of time." However, he warned that "(national) water 
distribution and land law reform are critical to guarantee (long 
term) stability in Timor-Leste."  When asked by Poloff his 
assessment of the government's resettlement program to date, he 
concluded: "Now the tents are not there. People still need help, 
but they are no longer in tents." 
 
¶11.  (SBU) USAID is currently working with the government on a 
5-year, $10 million project to draft a land law and extend 
property rights. In addition, USAID's three most significant 
partners for crisis response (excluding food aid) were CRS, 
CARE, and NRC, all of which Rigoberto praised for their positive 
contributions to resolving the IDP situation. 
KLEMM