VZCZCXYZ0011
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBU #1552/01 3181407
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADX0FA73A1 MSI6726 611)
P 131407Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2456
INFO RUCNMER/MERCOSUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNNSG/NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS BUENOS AIRES 001552 
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - PARAGRAPH MARKINGS 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PREL KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY AORC AR
SUBJECT: ARGENTINA SHARES CONCERNS OVER PROPOSED NSG RESTRICTIONS OF 
ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS WITH VISITING DOE 
NNSA ADMINISTRATOR D'AGOSTINO 
 
REF: Buenos Aires 1449 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Vice Foreign Minister Victorio Taccetti told 
visiting DOE NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino November 7 that 
the GOA was ready to work for an agreement under paragraph 6 of the 
draft criteria-based guidelines for the transfer of enrichment and 
reprocessing technology (ENR), but that the GOA was troubled by 
paragraph 7.  The GOA could not accept restrictions on its right to 
receive and develop new ENR knowledge and technologies. 
Nonetheless, Taccetti's advisor Rafael Grossi suggested consensus on 
language would be possible.  MFA Nuclear Affairs (DIGAN) Director 
Elsa Kelly, also constructive and cordial with Administrator 
D'Agostino, voiced sharper concern about paragraph 7, saying that it 
was "not fair, nor rational."  She suggested that the USG share with 
the GOA any progress made in talks with Canada, which has also 
expressed concern about paragraph 7.  Administrator D'Agostino 
emphasized in these meetings and separate meetings with nuclear 
regulators and managers that the USG appreciated the responsible and 
constructive role played by Argentina in the management of nuclear 
technology and materials.  He also pledged to provide the GOA with 
revised text on paragraph 6 (Embassy provided to the MFA on November 
12).  National Commission for Atomic Energy (CNEA) President Norma 
Boero emphasized that Argentina needed to sustain a small-scale 
reprocessing program to preserve its knowledge and capabilities for 
future spent fuel disposition.  Asked about the Megaports Initiative 
by D'Agostino, Taccetti reiterated past GOA concerns about the 
confidentiality of any information collected; he also noted that the 
continuing disagreement between relevant national agencies over 
control of port security had prevented GOA forward movement.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2. (U) Thomas D'Agostino, Administrator for the Department of 
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), visited 
Argentina November 6-7 for consultations related to a proposal for 
criteria-based restrictions on the transfers of enrichment and 
reprocessing (ENR) technologies at the November 19 Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) meeting.  D'Agostino was accompanied by Adam Scheinman, 
NNSA Assistant Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation and 
International Security and by Captain (USN) Peter Hanlon, NNSA 
Executive Staff Director and Military Advisor.  Mr. D'Agostino was 
received by Vice Foreign Minister Victorio Taccetti and separately 
by Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for International Security, 
Nuclear and Space Affairs (DIGAN) Elsa Kelly on November 7. 
Officials from the National Commission on Atomic Energy (CNEA) and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (ARN) participated in the meeting 
with Kelly, and CNEA President Normal Boero received D'Agostino at 
her headquarters.  Charge d'Affaires accompanied D'Agostino to the 
meeting with Taccetti, and Embassy ESTH Counselor and 
Political-Military Officer (notetaker) attended all meetings. 
 
Reserving a Right to Enrichment and Reprocessing 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Administrator D'Agostino thanked Taccetti for Argentina's 
solid record of cooperation on non-proliferation issues, most 
recently its collaboration in shifting from highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU).  D'Agostino said that his visit 
was motivated by a commitment to consult and to seek Argentina's 
support on criteria for the transfer of nuclear technology and 
materials through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).  The USG, he 
said, did not want Argentina and Brazil's position on the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Additional Protocol (AP) to prevent 
agreement in the NSG on criteria for control of enrichment and 
reprocessing (ENR) technology.  Assistant Deputy Administrator 
Scheinman then briefed on efforts to reach consensus within the NSG, 
noting Brazil's concerns about the AP as a criteria and Canada's 
concerns under paragraph 7.  He described the effort to fortify what 
was already standard commercial practice, that of a "black box" 
through which purchasers of technology would benefit from the use 
but not gain insights into the workings of the technology. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Taccetti expressed concern about the final point, saying 
that "Argentina is a compliant country.  We don't want to be 
receivers of a technology we don't manage."  In the subsequent 
meeting, Ambassador Kelly was even more direct, saying that "we are 
not going to curtail our development of technology.  It is not fair, 
nor rational."  She argued that enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies were clearly dual-use, and that they were "not 
necessarily proliferating."  At the CNEA, President Boero elaborated 
further on the rationale relating to reprocessing, arguing that 
Argentina hoped to have five nuclear power plants in operation by 
2025, creating increasing burdens for the storage of 
plutonium-bearing spent fuel.  Given that there might be real future 
risks to shipping plutonium long distances, it would be better to 
have a country like Argentina with the capacity to reprocess its own 
and neighboring countries' fuel.  This was a technology that Brazil 
was not interested in pursuing, so Argentina, which "was not new to 
reprocessing technology," would fill that role.  Argentina, Boero 
emphasized, was not talking about moving to a commercial-scale 
NNSA ADMINISTRATOR D'AGOSTINO 
 
effort for many years. 
 
Better Safeguards, not NSG Controls 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Ambassador Kelly registered concerns that the NSG, 
comprised she said of many members with no indigenous technology, 
would vote to limit Argentina's development of nuclear technology. 
Restrictions on technology transfers would not stop would-be 
proliferators but would penalize those with a legitimate need to 
develop enrichment or reprocessing technology.  Instead, she said, 
better safeguards and controls were the key.  We needed to move 
toward the next generation of safeguards, which should be 
established multilaterally at the IAEA rather than through the NSG. 
 
 
¶6. (SBU) D'Agostino agreed with Kelly on the need for strengthened 
IAEA safeguards, and in that regard thanked Kelly for GOA 
participation in a recent meeting on DOE's Next Generation 
Safeguards Initiative in Washington.  He also emphasized that one of 
the criteria being proposed within the NSG was subjective, based on 
whether the technology in question made sense given a country's 
nuclear development plans and capabilities. 
 
Additional Protocol and Paragraph 6 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Both Taccetti and Kelly described Argentina's general 
comfort with the AP and reiterated that the GOA could move forward 
with the AP when Brazil was ready.  Taccetti reiterated that because 
Argentina and Brazil were joined by the IAEA in a "trilateral" 
safeguards mechanism (the ABACC), Argentina could not move forward 
without its partner.  Argentina was also relatively comfortable with 
mention of the AP under the criteria-based approach, but it would 
look to Brazil on this as well.  Administrator D'Agostino emphasized 
that the USG was working hard for consensus at the NSG, and that he 
hoped to provide the GOA with USG-approved language later in the day 
in a formulation of paragraph 6 that would assuage Brazil and 
Argentina's concerns as non-signatories of the AP by recognizing the 
possibility of implementing the AP or an equivalent through the 
existing regional safeguards arrangement.  He noted that the revised 
paragraph 6 would not impact Argentina or Brazil's respective fuel 
cycle programs and ensures that any future transfers they might make 
are to states that accept the highest nonproliferation standards. 
Such a decision could be taken now in the NSG as Argentina and 
Brazil resolve implementation issues associated with adherence to 
the AP, which remains a U.S. objective. 
 
¶8. (U) In all three meetings, D'Agostino invited Argentina to send a 
delegation of experts to the U.S. to see how the United States was 
implementing the AP.  The experts would be welcome to Oak Ridge and 
other facilities.  Taccetti agreed, saying that a visit by ARN and 
CNEA officials would be useful for Argentina. 
 
Bottom Lines on NSG Arrangement 
------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Taccetti was joined by Rafael Mariano Grossi, Director General 
for Political Coordination.  Grossi emphasized at the end of the 
meeting that Argentina and the United States were "not that far 
apart on the AP" and other issues, and that a NSG consensus should 
be possible if the U.S. could "accommodate our technical concerns." 
Kelly remained more cautious, emphasizing that Argentina would 
object to any attempt to codify a "black box" approach to sharing 
technology.  "We are not in agreement with this," she said.  She 
requested that the USG share with Argentina any progress made in its 
discussions with Canada on paragraph 7.  Although Canada and 
Argentina shared similar concerns, she said, they were not 
necessarily identical.  Administrator D'Agostino emphasized that the 
U.S. Government was willing to work with Argentina on language, 
prompting Kelly to lament that the USG often provided revised text 
where the words were changed but the meaning was still the same. 
Argentina, she reiterated, would not abandon its rights to develop 
ENR technology or to exchange information on such technologies with 
other responsible NPT members. 
 
India 
----- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Taccetti and Kelly shared once again their reservations 
about the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Arrangement.  Kelly, 
specifically, asked about USG views on the future of the NPT and 
whether other non-NPT states  would get special treatment. 
D'Agostino and Scheinman emphasized that the U.S. wanted to see a 
coherent and strengthened NPT.  Scheinman also said he saw little 
reason to expect that Israel or Pakistan would be considered for 
similar treatment at the NSG in the near or medium term. 
 
Megaports 
 
 
--------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) D'Agostino also raised the question of Argentine 
participation in the Megaports Initiative, noting how positive it 
would be to identify participation or at least forward movement by 
Argentina in documents prepared for the U.S. transition team. 
Taccetti said Argentina had wanted an agreement, but that he knows 
some in the GOA were concerned about how sensitive information would 
remain confidential following screening.  Grossi then emphasized 
that the main obstacle was an internal GOA one, centered on a 
dispute between the Coast Guard and Customs over which agency would 
be the responsible partner in such a program.  D'Agostino promised 
to follow up on the GOA confidentiality concerns while awaiting 
Argentina's resolution of the bureaucratic dispute. 
 
¶12. (SBU) This cable was cleared in draft by DOE/NNSA's Adam 
Scheinman and Peter Hanlon. 
 
WAYNE