VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1487/01 3191836
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141836Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2902
INFO RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6863
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3048
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001487 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND PM/RSAT. OSD/WHA FOR DASD 
JOHNSON, SOUTHCOM FOR BGN FADOK 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018 
TAGS: BR PREL MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE NOVEMBER 20 BILATERAL DEFENSE 
WORKING GROUP 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston.  Reason: 1.5 (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY.  The revival of the Bilateral Working Group 
(BWG) with Brazil comes at an important time for our 
strategic partnership.  With Nelson Jobim as Defense 
Minister, Brazil has, for the first time, effective civilian 
leadership and a mandate to modernize its armed forces.  As 
Brazil completes its new defense strategy, it will be making 
key decisions, notably on the purchase of new fighter 
aircraft, that will affect the nature of our relationship for 
years to come.  While some Brazilian leaders still find it 
politically convenient to portray the U.S. as a potential 
adversary, most of the Brazilian military is well apprised of 
the potential benefits of partnership.  It has been over six 
years since the BWG last met, because of Brazilian 
indifference and lack of MOD staffing.  The BWG will provide 
an opportunity to highlight issues of mutual interest and set 
the stage for this to become a regular event as an important 
element of our strategy for expanding and strengthening our 
defense partnership.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C)  The relationship between the United States and Brazil 
is as productive and broad-based as it has ever been, the 
result of the excellent relationship between President Bush 
and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, new cooperation 
mechanisms on biofuels, business issues, and economic 
matters, and our shared goals of fostering hemispheric 
stability, promoting democracy, developing a consensus on 
next steps regarding climate change, and achieving a mutually 
satisfactory conclusion to the Doha round of WTO 
negotiations.  U.S.-Brazil cooperation on foreign policy 
issues is often limited by the GOB's unwillingness to speak 
out against anti-democratic actions in the hemisphere 
(Venezuela and Cuba), take key steps to address key issues 
such as nuclear proliferation and counterterrorist concerns, 
and expand its international leadership in meaningful ways. 
Operational cooperation on law enforcement issues, such as 
counternarcotics, container security, and intelligence 
sharing, are highlights of the bilateral relationship. 
Brazil's ethanol program has made it a global model for 
alternative energy and offers potential for bilateral 
cooperation on an important strategic issue. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) With approval ratings hovering near 80 percent, 
President Lula is more popular than at any other point since 
he took office in 2003.  Continuity and legacy are the 
guiding lights of Lula's second term.  Lula continues to 
shape his legacy as a friend of the poor and builder of a 
foundation for prosperity for the lower and middle classes 
through broad social welfare programs and a vast, new 
economic growth program of public works and growth 
incentives.  At the same time, Lula has failed to promote 
needed reforms to abolish a political culture of corruption, 
clientelism, and spoils. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  The United States and Brazil share the basic goals 
of fostering hemispheric stability, promoting democracy, 
preventing terrorist and drug transit activity, supporting 
international non-proliferation regimes, and have been 
working together to try to achieve a mutually satisfactory 
conclusion to the Doha round of WTO negotiations. U.S.-Brazil 
cooperation is often limited by the GOB's unwillingness to 
take action regarding threats to democracy in specific 
countries and to support aggressive action in multilateral 
forums on such issues as non-proliferation, human rights, and 
democracy.  Many Brazilian leaders also take a cautious 
approach to relations with the United States, sometimes 
falling back on shopworn Latin American leftist rhetoric 
about excessive U.S. influence. Brazil maintains an active 
dialogue with Venezuela and Cuba, has worked hard to restore 
relations with Bolivia, and has stood firmly on the principle 
of respect for sovereignty in responding to the dispute 
between Colombia and Ecuador, preferring to work through the 
Organization of American States.  The attainment of a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council has been a central 
goal of Brazil's foreign policy. 
 
¶5.  (U)  Brazilians are historically less attuned to 
development in the United States than many other Latin 
Americans are, but have recently shown a high degree of 
interest in events in the U.S., especially the Presidential 
election.  Expectations for the Obama presidency are high, 
particularly in terms of the U.S. relationship with Latin 
America.  President Lula has invited the President-elect to 
visit Brazil early in his administration.  In discussing the 
 
election with Brazilians, post has emphasized the continuity 
of interests on key foreign policy issues and the continuity 
of the fundamental interests -- regional stability, promotion 
of democracy -- that Brazil shares with the U.S. 
 
SECURITY ISSUES 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  At President Lula,s direction, Brazil is now 
completing a new defense strategy document to set an overall 
course on security issues.  While not yet published (due to 
interagency disagreements on several points), it is widely 
reported that the strategy will have three main elements: 
modernization of the armed forces, revitalization of defense 
industries and implementation of a new regime of national 
service.  We expect that an important result of the new 
strategy will be an increase in funding devoted to national 
defense, which has been under-resourced since the end of the 
military government over twenty years ago.  The resurgence of 
importance of the Brazilian military presents a unique 
opportunity to increase our bilateral cooperation and defense 
partnership.  Several issues will be key in determining the 
degree to which we will succeed in enhancing our partnership. 
 
¶7.  (C)  The first potential watershed in achieving a more 
robust defense relationship with Brazil will be the decision 
on a next generation fighter aircraft.  Boeing,s F18 Super 
Hornet is a finalist along with the French Rafale and Swedish 
Gripen.  A decision will be made in March 2009, with a final 
contract award in October of next year.  It would be 
difficult to overstate the significance of Brazil,s Air 
Force committing to a U.S. aircraft as its primary fighter 
for the next generation.  Boeing,s proposal combines cutting 
edge technology with a strong package of industrial 
cooperation.  While the Super Hornet is clearly Brazil,s 
best option both because of its capabilities and the 
advantages that interoperability with the U.S. military will 
bring, it is currently perceived as an underdog in the 
competition.  This is because of an effective disinformation 
campaign from a few members of the Brazilian press with an 
anti-U.S. agenda that has led most Brazilian decision makers 
to believe that the U.S. will not transfer superior military 
technology to Brazil.  Several Cold War era denials of 
military items (e.g. Harpoon missiles) and recent headaches 
with commercial exporters of military items (Honeywell gyros) 
seem to reinforce this perception.  While the BWG will not 
address the fighter purchase directly, the Brazilian side 
will view discussions of technology transfer in light of 
their imagined concerns about the fighter purchase. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  There are a number of areas with prospects for 
immediate cooperation.  Brazil is considering stationing 
police and navy officers at JIATF South.  The Brazilian 
military has participated in several major exercises, 
including UNITAS and PANAMEX with several more in prospect. 
Brazil has invited U.S. personnel to train at its jungle 
warfare school in Manaus, however, the high demands on U.S. 
special forces have prevented acceptance.  The Brazilian navy 
has shown interest in vessels for coastal patrol and in 
improving their maritime situational awareness capabilities. 
 
¶9.  (C)  We are in the process of pursuing information 
sharing agreements with Brazilian services -- potentially 
leading to a GSOIA.  Progress has been slow because of 
bureaucratic concerns, but Brazil is interested in 
continuing.  We should use the BWG to underline the 
importance of information sharing and its benefits for both 
sides.  However, it is post's view that making an information 
sharing agreement a precondition for the fighter sale will 
doom Boeing,s chances, and will do nothing to enhance the 
prospects of reaching an information sharing arrangement with 
Brazil. 
 
¶10.  (C) We have been stalled on our Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA) for almost a year because of the Ministry for 
External Affairs, failure to take action and the MOD,s 
unwillingness to burn political capital to push this.  While 
this situation is unlikely to change in the near term, we 
should remind the Brazilians that the DCA is important for 
future partnership, especially as it can shorten the process 
of approval for various future cooperative activities. 
Brazil has signed a large number of similar agreements this 
year, so ours will not be a precedent and could be seen in 
the context of normal friendly mil-mil relations. 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  The April announcement of the reactivation of the 
Fourth Fleet caught Brazil by surprise and provoked much 
negative commentary.  Even many Brazilians not prone to 
accept the wild-eyed theories of U.S. intentions to invade 
the Amazon suspect that the announcement, coming as it did on 
the heels of the announcement that Brazil had discovered more 
oil off the Brazilian coast, could not have been a 
coincidence.  While Brazilian military leaders now say they 
understand the reasons for the Fourth Fleet,s standup, 
President Lula has recently stated again that it poses some 
threat to Brazil.  Lula,s statement was pure domestic 
politics, and his advisors have assured us that he 
understands the true nature and purpose of the Fourth Fleet. 
Nonetheless, the episode both demonstrates and has heightened 
Brazilian sensitivities with regard to U.S. military actions 
in the region. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  In a similar vein, discoveries of oil off 
Brazil,s coast have been cited as justifications for 
increasing Brazil,s navy.  While the oil finds will almost 
certainly increase Brazil,s future prosperity, we should 
seek to turn the strategic dialogue in Brazil away from 
fantasies that another country--potentially the United 
States--would try to seize the oil fields to a productive 
discussion of energy security and the importance of 
maintaining freedom of the seas. 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  This is the first BWG in over six years, and it 
comes at an ideal time with stronger leadership in the MOD 
that is truly interested in building our defense partnership. 
 The best possible result will be agreement that such 
meetings should continue regularly as an ongoing dialogue. 
The BWG will be followed by a technology security dialogue 
which will look to establish a channel for regular 
information exchanges on technology to demystify U.S. export 
controls and a means to address specific export control cases 
without political involvement. 
SOBEL