Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08BRASILIA1486, BRAZIL WILL OPEN AN EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08BRASILIA1486.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08BRASILIA1486 2008-11-14 18:04 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Brasilia
VZCZCXRO1484
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHBR #1486/01 3191804
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141804Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2900
INFO RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 7200
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0387
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 5921
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 7586
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0705
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0149
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0965
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8688
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6861
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3046
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2018 
TAGS: PREL ETRD PARM PHUM BR KN ZO
SUBJECT: BRAZIL WILL OPEN AN EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston, reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  Brazil will open an embassy in Pyongyang 
next year, and has already selected an experienced diplomat 
as ambassador, an Itamaraty official told poloff on November 
4.  Downplaying the opening's significance, the diplomat said 
the timing was "spontaneous" but fulfills a long-standing 
commitment, and Brazil's agenda with North Korea can be 
expected to remain "minimal," although Brazil hopes to 
increase mineral ore exports.  Brazil consulted with the 
Republic of Korea in 2003 about its relations with Pyongyang, 
and they do not have any concerns, the diplomat said.  Brazil 
intends to have a minimal but positive role in region, and is 
not interested in nuclear or military cooperation with the 
DPRK.  The opening of an embassy in North Korea should be 
seen within the context of President Lula's broader foreign 
policy emphasis on South-South relationships, which has led 
Brazil to open a large number of one- and two-diplomat posts 
in the developing world.  End summary. 
 
Timing Was "Spontaneous" But Commitment Was Longstanding 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (C) Brazil will open an embassy in Pyongyang in the first 
half of 2009, and has selected an experienced diplomat to be 
ambassador, according to First Secretary Ricardo Portugal, 
Korea desk officer at the Brazilian the Ministry of External 
Relations ("Itamaraty"), who said he could not reveal the 
ambassador-designate's identity.  Portugal said the exact 
timing of the decision was "spontaneous," but fulfills a 
longstanding Brazilian commitment to open an embassy in 
Pyongyang dating from the establishment of bilateral 
relations in 2001.  Brazil decided about a year ago to open 
the Pyongyang embassy, but the GOB announced it only last 
September 30 in the Diario Oficial, Portugal said.  Asked 
whether the timing was related to the U.S. decision to remove 
DPRK from the state sponsors of terrorism list, Portugal said 
it was not, but the USG decision "was a demonstration that 
the Brazilian decision to open an embassy now was correct." 
In addition, he said, in Brazil's view the six-party talks 
have been going well and there has recently been a relaxatin 
in regional relations.  Portugal said Brazil cosulted with 
Republic of Korea officials in 2003 efore the first senior 
Brazilian visit to North orea and they did not have any 
concerns. 
 
Brazlian Goals 
- - - - - - - - 
 
3.  (C)  Brazil an North Korea have a "minimal" relationship 
with lttle trade and a "superficial" political relationsip, 
and Brazil will keep its role in the regiona affairs of 
northeastern Asia "minimal," Portuga said.  The chief 
utility of good relations withthe DPRK, he said, is its 
support in multilateralfora such as the UN, especially for 
Brazil's topforeign policy goal of a permanent UNSC seat. 
Brzil also hopes to increase mineral ore exports to he 
DPRK.  Another area Brazil hopes to develop i science and 
technology cooperation such as coopeative agreements in 
agricultural technology. 
 
razil Has No Nuclear or Military Interest, Support UN 
Non-Proliferation Position 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (C)  Portugal refuted a press report (O Estado de S. 
Paulo, Oct. 27, 2008, p. A5) that Brazil seeks nuclear 
cooperation or exchange with the DPRK, nor does Brazil have 
any interest in military cooperation or exchanges with North 
Korea.  He also said the article's claim that Brazil expects 
to help in a governmental transition in the DPRK was 
completely untrue.  Brazil adheres to UN positions on 
non-proliferation, is a signatory to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and favors the denuclearization of 
North Korea, Portugal said, adding that Brazil's position on 
the Korean peninsula is "similar to China's."  Brazil's 
positions on North Korean human rights violations have not 
changed and Brazil has consistently voted for UN human rights 
resolutions on North Korea, Portugal concluded. 
 
 
BRASILIA 00001486  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
Young Relationship, Minimal Agenda 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
5.  (C)  Brazil's official relationship with the DPRK dates 
to 2001, when diplomatic relations were established, but 
senior contacts have been infrequent.  North Korea has had an 
embassy in Brasilia since at least February 2004, and the 
current DPRK ambassador has been in Brasilia since 2005.  In 
2003 a senior Brazilian diplomat, Ambassador Affonso Celso de 
Ouro Preto visited Pyongyang, and two years elapsed before 
the next senior Brazilian visit to Pyongyang, when Luiz 
Augusto Castro Neves, the Brazilian Ambassador to China, paid 
a call in 2005.  In March 2008, Itamaraty Under Secretary 
Roberto Jaguaribe met with the North Koreans in Pyongyang. 
Portugal noted that Brazil's 2003 contacts with the DPRK 
occurred when the USG also had more contacts with North 
Korea, including Secretary Madeleine Albright's visit to 
Pyongyang.  He said Brazil and the DPRK signed a "very 
generic" Economic-Commercial MOU in 2003 but it was not in 
effect and Brazil had not ratified it because the Civilian 
Household in the Presidential Palace "had some problems with 
it."  The GOB recently sent it to the Congress for 
ratification, he noted.  Portugal emphasized that Brazil has 
a minimal agenda with the DPRK, will play a minimal role in 
regional affairs, and will maintain a "positive attitude" in 
the region. 
 
6.  (C) Comment: The opening of an embassy in North Korea 
should be seen within the context of President Lula's broader 
foreign policy emphasis on South-South relationships.  This 
has involved efforts both to strengthen relationships with 
major players like China, India, South Africa, and Iran, and 
to broaden relationships beyond the traditional Latin 
American and Lusophone countries to include a greater number 
of African, Asian, and Middle Eastern countries.  This latter 
objective, which has led Brazil to open a large number of 
one- and two-diplomat posts in the developing world, has been 
the subject of debate among Brazil's foreign policy elite, 
many of whom question the value of dispersing Brazil's 
limited diplomatic resources in countries in which Brazil has 
minimal interests.  End comment. 
SOBEL