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UNCLAS BOGOTA 004215 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM PTER ETRD SNAR CO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DECEMBER 8-9 VISIT TO COLOMBIA OF 
DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ROBERT S. 
MUELLER 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Your visit comes as Colombians watch with great 
interest the transition period to President-elect Barack 
Obama, and speculate on what the outcome might mean for 
U.S.-Colombia relations--especially prospects for 
Congressional passage of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Act (CTPA).  The GOC will seek to maintain and strengthen the 
historically strong--and bipartison--ties between the United 
States and Colombia.  The GOC and Colombian people hold 
strong positive views of the United States, and Colombia sees 
itself as an unwavering U.S. ally in an Andean region 
increasingly hostile to U.S. values and goals. 
 
¶2. (U)  Colombia in 2008 celebrated major victories in its 
fight against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC), continued strong economic growth, and an expansion of 
democratic governance.  Increased security has led to an 
economic boom that has reduced poverty by 20 percent since 
2002, cut unemployment by 25 percent, and attracted record 
levels of investment.  Almost 48,000 combatants, mostly 
paramilitaries, have laid down their arms and are 
participating in GOC reintegration programs.  The captures or 
kills of key FARC leaders, the bold rescue of 15 high-profile 
FARC hostages--including three Americans--and rising 
desertions have weakened Colombia's largest terrorist group. 
Still, serious challenges remain as Colombia consolidates the 
progress achieved to date.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
Successes of Democratic Security Policy 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (U) President Uribe's democratic security policy and free 
market economic reforms have created a more secure 
environment and spurred the economy.  Since 2002, homicides 
have decreased by 40% -- its lowest point in twenty years -- 
while kidnappings have declined by 76%.  GDP growth exceeded 
eight percent in 2007, but is expected to reach a maximum of 
five percent amid the slowing global economy and financial 
crisis in 2008.  Colombia's trade volume has grown more than 
65 percent since 2003.  The United States remains Colombia's 
largest trade partner (accounting for 34 percent of Colombian 
exports in 2007, and 26 percent of imports).  In 2007, 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) exceeded $9 billion, more 
than triple the amount of FDI in 2002. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The GOC has created an interagency body--created the 
Centro de Coordinacion de Accion Integral (CCAI)--to 
integrate military, police, and civilian programs in an 
effort to establish permanent GOC control over areas 
previously held by the FARC.  The USG provided $13.5 million 
to support CCAI activities in FY 2007, and plans to provide 
over $10 million to support CCAI activities in Meta 
Department, an area central to the fight against the FARC. 
CCAI programs suffer from interagency rivalries, but 
coordination has improved.  Though some human rights groups 
criticize CCAI for failing to involve local officials and 
civil society in its projects, the project in Meta enjoys 
strong local support. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
Challenges: Strengthening Economy, Security, Democracy 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Still, Colombia faces significant challenges as it 
consolidates the progress achieved to date.  Combating 
inequality, fighting narcotrafficking, and promoting 
social-economic development will require substantial 
resources and attention in the years ahead as U.S. assistance 
is set to decline.  The GOC will look for the continued 
partnership and support of the United States, and will also 
seek regional allies to help it address these issues. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In its relationship with the United States, 
ratification of the CTPA remains the Colombian government's 
highest economic priority.  Analysts estimate the agreement 
 
 
with the United States would add between one and two percent 
annual GDP growth to the local Colombian economy, adding new 
jobs and contributing to President Uribe,s goal of cutting 
the poverty rate from 45 percent to 35 percent by 2010. 
Colombia will also seek continued, but declining, U.S. 
security assistance as it achieves greater economic growth 
and social cohesion. 
 
------------------------------- 
Regional Alliances and Tensions 
------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Colombia continues to ponder its role in the 
region, but a more secure, prosperous Colombia will play a 
more assertive role in Latin America and the world.  Working 
with like-minded countries such as Mexico, Peru, and Chile, 
Colombia will seek to promote greater economic integration 
through the creation of a web of free trade agreements on the 
Americas' Pacific Coast.  Colombia will avoid ideological 
confrontation with its Bolivarian neighbor due to their 
extensive border and economic ties, but we expect Colombia to 
be a pragmatic advocate for enhanced regional security 
cooperation and strengthened democratic institutions in the 
region. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Relations with Venezuela have improved since a 
July 11 meeting between Presidents Uribe and Chavez, but 
Venezuelan support for the FARC--as evidenced in the 
computers found at Raul Reyes' camp--contributes to continued 
tensions.  Ecuador broke diplomatic relations with Colombia 
after the GOC's March 1 bombing of Reyes' camp in Ecuadorian 
territory, and has yet to resume ties. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Colombia also seeks to play a greater role in the 
international security architecture, as evidenced by its 
willingness to contribute troops to the NATO effort in 
Afghanistan and the Sinai Multinational Observer Force. 
Colombia also provides anti-narcotics training to police in 
the Caribbean and elsewhere, and Mexico is benefiting from 
Colombia's experiences fighting narcotraffickers.  We expect 
the GOC to make available the expertise developed in 
combating the FARC and narcotrafficking groups for 
international peacekeeping efforts and other international 
security activities in the years ahead, although financial 
constraints will remain an issue. 
 
------------- 
U.S. Hostages 
------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) An audacious Colombian military operation led to 
the rescue of three U.S. contractors and twelve Colombians 
held by the FARC.  The three Americans were captured by the 
FARC in February 2003 and were the longest held U.S. hostages 
in the world at the time of their rescue.  The Colombian 
government worked closely with us on hostage issues, and U.S. 
training of Colombian military personnel contributed to the 
operation's success.  The FARC continues to hold 25 Colombian 
"political" hostages, as well as an estimated 700 economic 
hostages.  The FARC is believed to hold a U.S. citizen who 
was kidnapped in Panama in April 2008, and perhaps a 
Colombian-American dual national kidnapped in 2003, though it 
has never provided proof of life. 
 
-------------------- 
Human Rights Record 
-------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The Uribe Administration continues to make 
progress on human rights cases involving military abuse or 
collaboration with criminal groups, but serious problems 
remain.  In October 2006, Defense Minister Santos named the 
first civilian -- and the first woman -- as director of the 
Military Criminal Justice System.  Santos has strongly backed 
initiatives to deter extrajudicial killings, changing 
promotion criteria to favor demobilization or capture of 
illegal fighters, and ordering military personnel to 
facilitate civilian investigations of all combat deaths. 
Still, human rights groups allege that security forces 
 
 
committed 955 extrajudicial killings over the last five 
years, and the GOC is investigating new allegations that the 
military recruited and murdered 23 young men from the Soacha 
area of southern Bogota in an effort to increase numbers of 
enemy "kills."  All members of the military and police 
receive mandatory human rights training. 
 
--------------- 
U.S. Assistance 
--------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) In January 2007 the GOC presented a Plan Colombia 
"consolidation strategy" pledging a Colombian investment of 
$78 billion through 2013.  The proposal emphasizes the 
importance of building social cohesion, and allocates 
substantial resources to help strengthen local governance, 
protect human rights, and assist displaced people, 
Afro-Colombians, and indigenous communities.  It also aims to 
reintegrate almost 48,000 demobilized ex-fighters and 
deserters and to promote Colombia's licit exports.  The GOC 
seeks funding from the United States and European countries 
to complement its own resources. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Under Plan Colombia, the USG has provided more 
than $5 billion in assistance, including $800 million in 
economic and social assistance.  USG security assistance 
combats drug trafficking and terrorism through training, 
equipment, and technical assistance.  It supports Colombian 
military aviation, essential for all programs - civilian or 
military - outside Colombia's major cities.  U.S. social and 
economic aid focuses on alternative development, displaced 
and other vulnerable communities, human rights and democratic 
institutions, and reintegration of demobilized fighters. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Drug Eradication and Interdiction 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU) Eradication of coca and poppy crops and 
interdiction of cocaine and heroin reached near-record levels 
in 2007.  President Uribe supports greater manual 
eradication, but recognizes that continued aerial eradication 
is also key.  He seeks a complementary approach using both 
methods.  In 2008, the Colombian National Police and military 
forces have set a brisk pace for cocaine, coca base and 
marijuana seizures, and are on pace to set a record.  We work 
with the Colombian government to maximize our scarce 
resources to achieve the eradication and interdiction 
targets.  We also continue our productive dialogue on how 
best to transfer key tasks from the USG to the GOC. 
 
----------- 
Extradition 
----------- 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Since taking office, President Uribe has approved 
over 750 extraditions to the United States.  The Colombian 
Government has already extradited 168 criminals to the United 
States in 2008, including 15 former-paramilitary leaders, 
breaking its 2007 record of 164 extraditions. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Demobilization and Peace Process 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Over 32,000 former paramilitaries have demobilized 
since 2002, and a further 16,000 have deserted from other 
illegal armed groups (about one-half from the FARC).  The 
Organization of American States (OAS) estimates there are 30 
new criminal groups numbering over 3,000 members.  The 
Colombian National Police have the lead in countering these 
new groups  Under the Justice and Peace Law (JPL) process, 
many former paramilitary leaders have confessed their 
participation in violent crimes.  To date, the JPL process 
has revealed the location of the graves of more than 1,200 
paramilitary victims and provided information on 3,600 
crimes.  Over 120,000 victims have registered under the JPL, 
with the GOC working on reparation measures.  The Supreme 
Court and the Fiscalia--with GOC support--continue to 
 
 
investigate politicians with alleged paramilitary ties; 70 
Congressmen, 28 mayors, and 14 governors have been implicated 
in the scandal. 
 
¶17.  (SBU) The National Liberation Army (ELN) negotiated with 
the Colombian government for over two years on a cease-fire, 
but ELN infighting and FARC pressure prevented a deal.  The 
ELN kidnaps civilians to fund its operations, but its 
military capability is declining.  Still, there are no 
negotiations underway between the GOC and ELN.  The FARC has 
rebuffed GOC overtures to engage in meaningful peace talks, 
most recently rejecting GOC negotiator Luis Carlos 
Restrepo,s July effort to establish direct talks. 
BROWNFIELD