VZCZCXRO8383
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #3561/01 3161312
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 111312Z NOV 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0309
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003561 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: THE SADRIST PROGRAM FOR KARBALA 
 
BAGHDAD 00003561  001.5 OF 003 
 
 
(U)  This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle 
accordingly.  Not for Internet distribution. 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: The PRT obtained in early November a copy 
of an Arabic-language pamphlet titled The General Program of 
the Martyr al-Sadr Office in Karbala, signed by Shaykh 
Muhannad Abd al-Hussein al-Karbala'i, Manager of the al-Sadr 
Office in Karbala, and dated 2008.  We have sent a scanned 
copy of the pamphlet to the Political Section in Baghdad. 
PRT translation follows.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Begin Translation:  "In the name of God, the Most 
Merciful and Compassionate.  To all faithful people in 
Karbala, whether affiliated with the al-Sadr Party or not: 
Because Karbala is a holy city, it is sensitive and special. 
In my opinion, anyone working here should bear in mind the 
following:  1) Karbala's history and origins, 2) The present 
reality of this city and its problems, 3) The future of this 
city in terms of security and economics." 
 
¶3. (SBU) "I was asked by the headquarters of al-Sadr in Najaf 
to run the al-Sadr Office in Karbala.  I prepared for this by 
undertaking a study on the background of the active members 
of the al-Sadr Party and their relationships to persons in 
Karbala, as well as their weaknesses with regard to the 
current circumstances.  I presented this study to the 
headquarters in Najaf as a practical guide for the people of 
Karbala as well as for the members of the al-Sadr Office 
here." 
 
¶4. (SBU) "I summarize the findings of my study as follows: 
1) Misinterpretation of the principles and aims of the 
al-Sadr Party, including by party members themselves, is a 
central reason for the deterioration of the party's 
situation.  This has been exacerbated by some people 
allegedly belonging to the al-Sadr Party.  2) In my view, the 
al-Sadr Office in Karbala should be administered by locals 
who know best the suffering and problems of the people.  The 
manager ought to run the Office for at least two years and 
should not be replaced or interfered with during this time." 
 
¶5. (SBU) "Before I identify the current and future principles 
and aims of the al-Sadr Office, I wish to explain the 
following:  Everyone should understand that we must let go of 
past events between the al-Sadr Party and others.  I do not 
hold any negative views toward any religious or governmental 
entities.  We are ready for reconciliation and for working 
together on behalf of the community of Karbala." 
 
¶6. (SBU) "The Current and Future Principles and Aims of the 
al-Sadr Office in Karbala:  1) We must rehabilitate the 
members of the al-Sadr Office, inspired by the principles of 
our forefathers among the holy people, so that we may 
consider them as guides in our daily lives. 2) We must form a 
living, attentive vision of the field of work that derives 
from a profound understanding of the basic, ideological 
foundations and missions of present and former religious 
leaders.  This requires understanding the concept and 
elements of stability and constancy, thus distinguishing them 
from the state and executive agencies.  The misuse of power 
by some security and executive agencies does not justify 
individual acts or threats against the state's foundations of 
stability and growth.  3) The al-Sadr Office is open to 
everyone and shares with them the country's broad national 
and religious ties.  We ought to realize that the main 
problem facing us as Muslims and Iraqis is the occupation, 
and the rescheduling of the withdrawal is a top priority.  We 
must resolve our disputes with local entities and others so 
that we can achieve this ultimate goal." 
 
¶7. (SBU) "4) People should be treated fairly and impartially 
under the law, enabling them to retain their dignity and 
enhancing the stability and security of society.  5) We will 
fight all deviations within the al-Sadr group, including its 
various ideological, administrative, financial, and social 
permutations.  6) We urge the undertaking of community action 
to awaken public service workers and assisting them in 
reclaiming their lost rights.  7) We will interact with all 
open-minded persons in all sectors of Karbala society.  We 
shall make the al-Sadr Office an umbrella for all, with the 
only thing distinguishing al-Sadr members from others being 
the members' fear of God.  This can be achieved by following 
the ideology of the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) and his 
followers, including the late al-Sadr, and by serving the 
people with humanity." 
 
¶8. (SBU) "The Internal and External Challenges of the 
Program:  The internal problems have to do with the al-Sadr 
Party itself.  1) Misconception of the principles of the 
al-Sadr Office by some followers produced a poor 
understanding of the ways and methods of translating these 
principles into reality.  This prompted some followers of 
 
BAGHDAD 00003561  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
al-Sadr to obey God in terms of civil disobedience and to 
neglect the directives and orders of the Marja'iya. 2) 
Infiltration of some bad people into the al-Mahdi Army hurt 
the reputation of this force as these people misused its name 
and power.  Their apparent aim was to destroy the reputation 
of the al-Sadr Party.  3) The former leaders of the al-Sadr 
Party in Karbala failed to implement a fruitful plan and a 
productive vision aimed at a stable future for al-Sadr 
followers and Shias in general.  They did not balance 
stability, social harmony, and the objectives of the al-Sadr 
Party on the one hand with the national interest on the 
other." 
 
¶9. (SBU) "The External Challenges: 1) There has been a 
negative perception of the al-Sadr Party stemming from the 
bad deeds done by some in the al-Sadr group.  These left a 
bad impression on the part of the general public and may have 
been done deliberately or as a result of narrow views.  2) 
There is a weak public understanding of the principles and 
foundations of the al-Sadr Party that has resulted in poor 
communications between the Party and the community.  This has 
clouded perceptions and led to misunderstanding of the 
general trend.  3) The ideological and other priorities of 
some entities in Karbala have conflicted with the stability 
and growth of the al-Sadr Party.  These have been advanced to 
suit the majority interests at the expense of the al-Sadr 
Party." 
 
¶10. (SBU) "Before I detail our program, I wish to mention 
that we have chosen a good staff for the al-Sadr office in 
Karbala.  It consists of skilled professionals selected from 
universities as well as the best non-sectarian and rational 
clerics.  My project focuses on studying the following:  1) 
Religion.  A) We should pay no attention to what happened 
previously in Karbala and encourage people to forget the 
tragic results.  B) Dialogue should include all faiths and be 
aimed at minimizing differences, thus enabling all to freely 
exchange views.  C) Citizens should work together to sign a 
Charter of Honor that would put pressure on the local 
government to do what is right.  D) Karbala should establish 
a Hawza and support it by hiring lecturers, promoting Islamic 
subjects, and supporting the students morally and 
financially.  E) The Shia Office should be strengthened by 
hiring active clerics in mosques and husayniyas.  Their role 
is to educate and to give advice." 
 
¶11. (SBU) "2) Politics.  A) The Provincial Council members 
should be active, well-known, decent, and neither secular nor 
sectarian.  They ought to be a representative sample in both 
their religious views and attitudes toward their national 
responsibilities, and they would indicate this by signing the 
Charter of Honor which will facilitate peace among all 
parties.  B) The judiciary must be independent and never 
beholden to any party or religious interests. 
 
¶12. (SBU)  "3) Tribes.  A) A tribal desk should be 
reestablished within the al-Sadr Office to focus on 
identifying leaders able to resolve disputes.  B) The tribes 
should be patriotic.  They belong to Iraq.  C) The tribes 
should take a more active role in society and thereby support 
reconciliation and enhance security.  D) The tribes in 
Karbala should back the provincial government and be ready to 
serve the people.  E) The tribes should play a lead role in 
advancing justice and equality and should serve as bridges 
enabling their members to strengthen ties and exchange views 
with other tribes." 
 
¶13. (SBU) "4) Media.  A) All Party communications will be 
disseminated via the print and broadcast media.  B) The Party 
will undertake a series of speeches prompting the people of 
Karbala to reevaluate their current circumstances and to 
support those authorized to bolster the province's security. 
C) The Party periodically will issue ideological and cultural 
leaflets incorporating articles and detailed studies about 
the current life of Muslims in Karbala.  D) The Party will 
seek to match new thinking about religious society in Karbala 
with the reasons for the conflicts among the different 
ideologies, thereby helping to find solutions and maintaining 
an open-minded dialogue with others.  E) The Party will 
enable academicians to play a role in assessing the situation 
in Karbala and finding solutions to the province's political 
and religious crises.  F) The Party will use the local media 
to make people aware of the real situation in Karbala and to 
minimize the differences among ideologies." 
 
¶14. (SBU) "5) Security.  A) The Karbala security staff and 
others wielding governmental power should be independent and 
honest in discharging their duties.  Security forces should 
be neither sectarian nor secular.  B) The powerful provincial 
security agencies should work together with the Karbala 
government to achieve intelligence cooperation that will help 
to defeat terrorism." 
 
BAGHDAD 00003561  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶15. (SBU) "Now that I have identified the features of our 
program, I wish to address the followers of the al-Sadr Party 
concerning how we will fulfill our destiny and win the battle 
of self-correction.  Perhaps some in Karbala see this program 
as a tactic to rebuild the al-Mahdi Army and believe we 
intend to again dominate the city and oblige them to do our 
bidding, but our principles and ideologies are opposed to 
such ideas.  We are a humanitarian and ideological party and 
we strive to enlighten by following these examples in our 
work:  A) The Indian leader Ghandi was an example to 
humanity.  As he stated, he learned many lessons from Imam 
Husayn that helped him to win his struggle.  So, we as well 
as Ghandi consider Husayn's suffering the best way to achieve 
the real victory, and we regard this suffering as a guide in 
accomplishing our objectives.  B) We will undertake our 
self-correction patiently and logically to guarantee its 
endurance.  C) We will undertake our self-correction 
independently, relying on nothing and no one except Islamic 
instruction as a guide." 
 
¶16. (SBU) "Conclusion.  1) Objectivity and seriousness enable 
laws to be respected by the people, who will support the laws 
so long as they preserve civil rights and dignity.  First 
Recommendation:  To my brothers who are affiliated with the 
al-Sadr Party in Karbala.  The Islamic parties, al-Sadr 
included, have entered a sensitive and dangerous time.  This 
danger is embodied in the upcoming election and in our battle 
for self-correction.  I encourage my followers not to be 
disappointed because I believe it is likely that we will 
re-unite our Party." 
 
¶17. (SBU) "2) Second Recommendation:  To the people of 
Karbala.  The events that occurred in Karbala last year 
between the followers of the al-Sadr Party and the security 
forces left a bad impression about members of our Party. 
These events convinced people that al-Sadr followers are 
outlaws who seek violence.  I want to make clear the 
distinction between the good among the followers of al-Sadr 
and the bad, because some are attempting to create problems 
between al-Sadr followers and others." 
 
¶18. (SBU) "3) Third Recommendation: To the Governor of 
Karbala.  My brother, I hope you will reconsider your views 
about the al-Sadr Party in Karbala; you may have a mistaken 
impression because you have not received the truth from the 
hypocrites around you.  This is an auspicious time to rid the 
al-Sadr Party of Karbala of bad elements, and I support 
efforts to go after outlaws irrespective of their 
affiliations." 
 
¶19. (SBU) "4) Fourth Recommendation:  To the Karbala security 
forces.  My brothers, we can move from an era of tension to a 
new era of peace by cooperating with one another.  Such 
cooperation requires us to forget past events.  I am sure we 
all have some regrets about how we behaved before.  Thanks Be 
to God.  Sheikh Muhannad Abd al-Hussein al-Karbala'i, Manager 
of the al-Sadr Office in Karbala Province."  End Translation 
CROCKER