Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08ANKARA2031, TALAT ON CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS: GLASS IS HALF-FULL

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08ANKARA2031.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ANKARA2031 2008-11-24 07:22 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ankara
VZCZCXRO7645
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHAK #2031/01 3290722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240722Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8096
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002031 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT ON CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS: GLASS IS HALF-FULL 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat 
portrayed the status of ongoing Cyprus negotiations in 
realistic yet optimistic terms in a November 20 speech in 
Ankara.  Talat was clear in pointing out the trouble spots 
where negotiations have to date accomplished little, and 
agreed with comments made by several observers that 
additional international pressure on the Greek Cypriots would 
be necessary to push the pace of talks forward more quickly. 
However, perhaps recognizing the pessimistic outlook toward 
the talks shared by many Cyprus watchers in Turkey, Talat 
noted progress had been made and pushed back on those who 
argued that only international community threats to recognize 
an independent "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" would 
work in forcing Christofias and the Greek Cypriots to get 
serious about negotiations.  END SUMMARY 
 
2. (SBU) Talat spoke before a small invited audience of 
diplomats, journalists, and think-tankers November 20 at the 
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) in 
Ankara.  The talk, billed as a roundtable discussion on 
"Cyprus Negotiations: Where Do We Stand?", and follow-on 
question and answer session was in English, but Talat made 
prefatory remarks in Turkish, primarily aimed at a small 
gaggle of Turkish television cameras allowed in for the 
opening few minutes.  In those remarks, Talat noted that 
talks are ongoing, that there has been some progress, that 
much work remains to be done, and that ultimate success is 
possible if there is flexibility on both sides.  He also took 
the occasion to criticize an MOU signed recently by the ROC 
and Russia in which both promised to enhance bilateral 
relations, saying that such "unilateral agreements will not 
help the negotiations process." 
 
3. (SBU) Once the cameras had been removed from the room, 
Talat provided a brief synopsis of what it had taken to get 
comprehensive settlement negotiations re-started.  He claimed 
that the international community's stance toward Kosovo's 
independence and a February statement made by then Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, accusing the West of a 
double-standard in pressing for Kosovar independence but not 
insisting on an independent Turkish Cypriot state, had been 
helpful in getting the Greek Cypriot public to question the 
anti-settlement approach of former President Tassos 
Papadopoulos and had helped to bring about the surprise 
election of Demetris Christofias. 
 
4. (SBU) Talat lamented that despite lengthy pre-election 
talks between Christofias' AKEL party and T/C counterparts on 
the Annan Plan and how comprehensive settlement negotiations 
could move forward quickly were he to be elected, the new ROC 
President had backtracked following his election and refused 
to accept Annan as the starting point for a new round of 
negotiations.  Talat attributed this to Papadopoulos' 
demonization of Annan.  However, the practical effect for the 
current round of talks had been that while the G/C side 
insists it is not bound by Annan and believes itself free to 
offer up new ideas on a host of issues on which agreement had 
been reached in the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriots 
nonetheless act as if the Turkish Cypriots are indeed bound 
by Annan and accuse the T/C side of backtracking or taking a 
hard-line approach if Talat puts forward new proposals 
himself.  As Talat described it, both sides refer to Annan at 
times, when it suits their positions, but talks are also 
covering ground outside the parameters of Annan. 
 
5. (SBU) Talat also provided an overview of the substance of 
the talks, noting the parties had engaged in discussions on 
power-sharing and governance and had reached some 
"semi-agreements."  He said there had been agreement on the 
"main subject" but some aspects remain on the table.  He said 
the discussion on competencies was over for now, adding that 
there remain "big differences over executive powers." 
Acknowledging problems remain in reaching agreement on the 
workings of the federal legislature and the GC/TC numerical 
division, Talat nonetheless characterized the differences 
with regard to the legislature as being "not big."  He also 
claimed the two sides were close to agreement with regard to 
the judiciary.  In short, Talat said there really has been 
progress, but from his standpoint the pace of progress 
remains unsatisfactory. 
 
6. (SBU) The Greek Cypriots continue to refuse to accept the 
implementation of any formal timetable for negotiations, 
without which it will be nearly impossible to move talks 
forward sufficiently to maintain momentum.  Talat expressed 
hope that the international community, and the UNSYG's 
Special Advisor, understand the need to bring greater 
pressure in order to achieve progress, but had been 
discouraged by actions in recent months which he claimed had 
had just the opposite effect.  He specifically pointed to the 
 
ANKARA 00002031  002 OF 002 
 
 
June 2008 UNSCR that accepted the UNSYG's report in which 
language was changed with regard to the isolation of the 
Turkish Cypriots, and to bilateral MOUs signed by both Russia 
and the UK with the ROC, as examples of actions that lead 
Greek Cypriots to conclude there is no penalty for 
maintaining the status quo.  Subsequent ROC actions that 
contribute to or worsen the isolation of the Turkish 
Cypriots, including ROC insistence on preventing foreign 
leaders from meeting with Talat in his office in the north, 
only serve to further undermine the negotiating atmosphere. 
He said it seems clear the Greek Cypriots feel no compulsion 
to move quickly and, in fact, likely would prefer to see 
negotiations drag on to the end of 2009, under the 
misconception that Turkey's EU accession process and its 
commitments under the Ankara Protocol to open ports to 
Cypriot vessels will force the Turkish side to make 
concessions.  In the meantime, Turkish Cypriots are in a 
hurry because every day "we lose a little more ground 
economically."  Talat said he believes the international 
community will "begin to intervene at some point," noting 
there is no guarantee of that but there have been "some 
indications." 
 
7. (SBU) Responding to questions regarding the possibility 
that international recognition of Kosovo and Russian 
recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia might provide the 
Turkish Cypriots greater leverage, Talat made clear he did 
not cite Kosovo as an example for the Cyprus situation.  He 
had noted it merely as having served as a "fearful reminder" 
to the Greek Cypriots that independence for the north could 
occur.  He emphasized that he has "no other ideas beyond a 
negotiated settlement" in resolving Cyprus' long-standing 
division. 
 
8. (SBU) COMMENT: While expressing frustration at the pace of 
the talks, Talat was decidedly more optimistic about the 
ultimate success of the negotiations than his Turkish 
audience. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
SILLIMAN