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Viewing cable 08ABUDHABI1265, USTR SCHWAB PROMOTES BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08ABUDHABI1265 2008-11-06 06:33 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Abu Dhabi
VZCZCXRO4287
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHAD #1265/01 3110633
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 060633Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1708
INFO RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 8016
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001265 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ARP AND EEB 
STATE PLEASE PASS USTR (MOWREY, BUNTIN) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETRD ECON EFIN PGOV AE
SUBJECT:  USTR SCHWAB PROMOTES BILATERAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN 
UAE 
 
ABU DHABI 00001265  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab 
visited the UAE October 21-23 for a series of discussions with 
government officials and representatives of Dubai's private sector. 
She reiterated the United States' strong commitment to an open and 
dynamic trade relationship with the UAE, particularly reinforcing 
with the private sector that the U.S. remains "open for business," 
despite the current financial crisis.  She acknowledged difficulties 
(some of which were raised by various UAE private sector reps) 
preventing the conclusion of a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 
including Emirati reluctance to take on commitments to liberalize 
aspects of the UAE's investment regime (particularly with respect to 
the energy sector).  However, Amb. Schwab urged using the existing 
"TIFA-Plus" channel to formalize agreements or other bilateral 
arrangements in those areas which had progressed under the FTA 
talks.  UAEG officials agreed to revisit the possibilities for 
bilateral action under TIFA-Plus.  They also described remaining 
political hurdles to an EU-GCC FTA, despite efforts by the French EU 
Presidency to conclude the negotiations. End Summary. 
 
U.S. Firms Upbeat 
----------------- 
 
2. (SBU) USTR Schwab began her visit to the UAE in Dubai with a 
series of discussions with U.S. companies with a significant 
regional presence, including General Motors, General Electric, and a 
roundtable with executives from a variety of U.S. firms.  The 
messages she heard were consistent:  Dubai remains a dynamic and 
profitable environment for U.S. companies, but there exist 
significant challenges.  Those cited repeatedly included the U.S.'s 
Section 911 taxation laws (which have the effect of making Americans 
non-competitive for overseas jobs), difficultly complying with the 
GCC's unique standards requirements and the region's disadvantageous 
Commercial Agency laws, which often impose strict penalties on 
foreign firms for ending their relationships with local agents, even 
when contracts have reached their expiration dates. 
 
3. (SBU) The American representatives were eager to hear about the 
prospects for conclusion of a U.S./UAE FTA.  They described 
widespread commercial successes in the UAE, in many cases confiding 
that their local/regional divisions were more profitable at the 
moment than their U.S.-based operations.  Nonetheless, it was clear 
that U.S. business is eager to see formalized an improved bilateral 
trade relationship as a means of protection against the 
deteriorating global financial outlook.  USTR Schwab cautioned that, 
while much progress had been made in the FTA talks, the "last ten 
percent is always the most difficult" in FTA negotiations and it was 
not clear the UAEG was prepared to make the concessions necessary to 
finalize the agreement.   She assured them, however, that the U.S. 
was prepared to memorialize progress already made in the 
negotiations through a series of individual agreements and 
arrangements, where possible, that could be concluded within the 
existing Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) "TIFA-Plus" 
consultative mechanism. 
 
Dubai Private Sector More Circumspect 
------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) USTR Schwab also met with board members from the Dubai 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (DCCI), Dubai's most important 
private sector organization representing 108,000 members across all 
sectors.  The DCCI leaders were less enthusiastic than their 
American counterparts about the benefits of a formal free trade 
relationship with the U.S.  It became evident in the discussion 
that, in the eyes of DCCI, the private sector had not been 
sufficiently consulted throughout the FTA negotiations and could not 
be expected to implement what the UAEG had negotiated on its behalf. 
 Board members described their own narrow objectives vis-a-vis trade 
with the U.S. as expanding the UAE's market share and its 
investments in the U.S. (Note: Despite USTR Schwab's repeated 
assurances that the U.S. is open for business with the UAE, there 
remain obvious scars from the 2006 Dubai Ports World debacle and 
lingering concern that politics could, again, jeopardize legitimate 
investment decisions to the detriment of the overall bilateral 
relationship.  End Note) 
 
5. (SBU) DCCI aired a number of frustrations associated with doing 
business with the United States.  Notably, they complained about 
lengthy visa processing requirements (the Consul General explained 
the USG is constantly seeking ways to expedite and improve services 
for legitimate visitors); difficulties Arab travelers face at U.S. 
ports of entry;  the propensity of U.S. business to immediately take 
disputes to court; and the mixing of political and economic issues 
(one member gave the example of U.S. attempts to limit legitimate 
trade in non-controlled items with Iran as damaging to DCCI members' 
attempts to do business with U.S. firms). 
 
Minister of Trade Committed 
 
ABU DHABI 00001265  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
to Improving Trade Relationship 
------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) During their October 23 meeting, USTR Schwab and UAE 
Minister of Foreign Trade Sheikha Lubna Al Qasimi discussed ways to 
restore momentum to the stalled Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement (TIFA) "TIFA Plus" process.  Sheikha Lubna said that the 
UAE prides itself on being the largest export market for U.S. goods 
in the region and that this trade relationship must continue.  USTR 
Schwab encouraged the UAE to consider a series of bilateral 
agreements or other arrangements that would promote trade and 
investment ties.  Sheikha Lubna expressed interest in the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and said she would push 
the Ministry of Economy to join the ACTA negotiations as an active 
participant.  She also said that the UAE remains interested in 
concluding a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and a double taxation 
treaty with the United States and requested a model e-commerce 
agreement text for the UAEG to review.  Sheikha Lubna promised to 
follow up with others in the UAEG to encourage more active Emirati 
engagement in these areas. 
 
7. (SBU) Turning to the suspended US-UAE FTA negotiations, Sheikha 
Lubna said that the new Ministry of Foreign Trade (established in 
February 2008) still has difficulties convincing other UAE agencies, 
which retain the lead on some key trade and investment issues, to 
commit to formal FTA obligations with the United States.  Sheikha 
Lubna told USTR Schwab that "new thinking" and renewed U.S. trade 
promotion authority will be needed before the UAEG is ready to 
restart FTA negotiations.  In addition, she opined that it would be 
essential to convince stakeholders (such as banks and private sector 
entities) of the benefits of the FTA.  Sheikha Lubna and USTR Schwab 
agreed that both sides should engage the US and UAE private sectors 
to promote support for future efforts to liberalize bilateral trade 
and investment. 
 
EU-GCC FTA 
---------- 
 
8. (SBU) During USTR Schwab's meetings, UAE officials said the 
proposed EU-GCC free trade agreement would likely need a political 
push for conclusion.  Sheikha Lubna told USTR Schwab that the 
agreement had progressed rapidly of late thanks to a strong push 
from France, in its role as EU President, and particularly from 
French President Sarkozy.  Sheikha Lubna said Sarkozy had also 
written to GCC Secretary General Abdulrahman al-Attiyah, then sent 
Minister of State for Foreign Trade Affairs Anne-Marie Idrac to 
follow up with individual GCC member states. Sheikha Lubna said the 
strong ties between France and the current GCC president, Qatar, 
were also helpful. 
 
9. (SBU) Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash, in a 
separate meeting on October 23, was skeptical such a political 
decision would be forthcoming.  He described the EU negotiations as 
the "longest trade negotiations in history" and accused the EU of 
inserting at the eleventh hour a "political clause" on human rights. 
 Echoing the DCCI's earlier complaints about inserting non-trade 
issues into negotiations, Gargash said the GCC position wouldn't 
allow the UAE to accept such an insertion.  Given that human rights 
have become an almost required component of EU trade negotiations, 
Gargash was doubtful the agreement would be concluded. 
 
10. (U) This cable has been cleared by USTR Schwab's party. 
OLSON