VZCZCXRO8021
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN
RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHVL #0824/01 2771507
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031507Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2894
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 VILNIUS 000824 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY MINSK SENDS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO
SUBJECT: BELARUS: DEMOCRATIC FORCES ON PRACTICAL TRACK AFTER FLAWED 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
 
REF: VILNIUS 804 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The GOB did its critics and the opposition a huge favor by 
failing to deliver on promises of improved conditions for the 
September parliamentary elections.  It is entirely possible that the 
flawed conduct of the elections and exclusion of all opposition 
members from the next parliament will lead to even greater 
consolidation of Belarus' democratic forces.  In the post-election 
period, the opposition is wary of positive steps that might be made 
by the U.S. and/or EU, but recognizes that such steps would be 
temporary and would be tied to the August 2008 releases of the last 
political prisoners -- and other possible concrete steps by the GOB 
-- rather than the failed elections.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The conduct of Belarus' September 2008 parliamentary 
elections served to repudiate those persons inside and outside 
Belarus who were convinced that there would be significant 
improvements over previous polling.  In particular, the classic 
obstruction of any true observation of the vote count confirmed that 
promises of improved electoral conditions were not met.  (Foreign 
and domestic observers, in all but a few cases, were kept at least 
two meters from the tables where ballots were counted, and what 
little line-of-sight view existed was blocked by electoral 
commission members as they stood shuffling ballots.  This was 
documented by the OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission and seen 
by the Embassy's two accredited observers as well.)  The absence of 
any opposition members in the parliament -- rumors had indicated 
perhaps five or six more pliable politicians might be planted by the 
regime -- has been seen as a further blow to the idea that 
Lukashenka was prepared to make overtures to his political 
opponents. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) For its part, the opposition seems to be dealing with the 
situation fairly well.  The complete defeat of all of their 
candidates has strengthened their unity; importantly, they have at 
last learned the futility of boycotting the polls.  In a October 1 
meeting with Charge, PAO, EUR/UMB Belarus desk officer Joe Wang, and 
DRL officer Rozina Damanwala, several opposition party leaders from 
the United Democratic Forces (UDF) noted that participating through 
the entire electoral process gave them 1) the opportunity to observe 
and report concerns and 2) maximum possibilities to demonstrate 
their existence and commitment to the Belarusian electorate. 
Furthermore, given anecdotal indications that despite the official 
results the opposition candidates actually received a large number 
of votes, the UDF leaders believe that the GOB is reeling from the 
knowledge that so many Belarusians voted for opposition candidates. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) During the October 1 meeting, former political prisoner 
and 2006 presidential candidate Alyaksandr Kazulin -- just back from 
pre-election meetings in the U.S. including a luncheon with 
President Bush -- described his plans to work with the UDF and to 
travel jointly with former presidential rival Alyaksandr Milinkevich 
to selected European capitals.  (Comment: This is an important 
development, as Kazulin had avoided collaborating with the UDF in 
the 2006 presidential elections.  End comment.)  Belarusian 
Christian Democracy chair Paval Sevyarynets advocated quick 
expansion of the UDF to include the "European Belarus" coalition of 
Mikola Statkevich and others; most participants felt that trying to 
bring the entire opposition together too precipitously would not 
have positive results. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) UDF leaders, Kazulin in particular, exulted to us that 
certain EU member states and diplomats who had predicted 
satisfactory electoral conditions had been wrong in their optimism. 
They are wary of the fact that EU responses to the August 2008 
releases of the last three political prisoners -- including Kazulin 
himself -- would follow flawed elections.  However, the UDF leaders 
seem to recognize that EU moves -- like the steps taken to date by 
the USG to suspend some sanctions for six months -- would likely 
only be temporary and would require renewal.  They also confirmed to 
us their support for continued dialogue by the U.S. and EU with the 
GOB. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) It would not serve much purpose for the UDF and other 
opposition forces to seek a sudden consolidation of effort. 
Personality differences are strong; some factions have expressed 
interest in joining the UDF but only if at least one existing 
partner -- Sergey Kalyakin's Communist Party is most frequently 
cited -- is forced out.  Kazulin has particular credibility and 
impact with UDF colleagues and others as well, including the "Malady 
Front" youth movement that consistently advocated an electoral 
boycott; if he chooses to exercise his authority, he could 
potentially become the central figure of the democratic opposition 
and bring others on board.  However, with presidential elections not 
 
VILNIUS 00000824  002 OF 002 
 
 
expected until 2011, there is no compelling reason to rush the 
process. 
 
Comment Cont'd 
-------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) As a separate matter, we note with pleasure that the UDF 
finally recognized that participation in the elections is warranted 
(as we had strongly advocated in a number of public statements 
before the elections).  Post will work with the strongest advocates 
of the boycott, especially Malady Front, to refresh our mutual 
understanding. 
 
MOORE 
CLOUD