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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000764 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG FOR GMKEEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL CD SU LY
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SE WILLIAMSON TO LIBYA 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Your trip to Libya comes one month after Secretary 
Rice's historic visit marked a new chapter in Libya's 
re-engagement with the West and nearly two months after a 
U.S.-Libyan agreement to settle outstanding claims for 
compensation for attacks including the Lockerbie bombing of 
¶1988.  In recent years, Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi has 
rebranded himself as a leader of Africa and a mediator in 
African affairs.  He is personally invested in peace in Chad and 
Sudan.  Libya's diplomatic effort is led by Dr. Ali Treiki, a 
career diplomat and former foreign minister with over 40 years 
of experience. 
 
QADHAFI'S LEADERSHIP ASPIRATIONS 
 
¶2. (SBU) Libya celebrated 39 years of the "Al-Fateh" revolution 
last month.  Since taking power in a bloodless coup in 1969, 
Qadhafi has pursued policies ranging from support for terrorism, 
rebellion, and insurgency to forging diplomatic bonds throughout 
the Arab and African spheres.  The Sirte Declaration of 
September 1999 is touted here as the genesis of the African 
Union and a platform for the future "United States of Africa." 
Domestic propaganda celebrates Qadhafi as the father and guide 
of closer integration on the continent.  Despite his leadership 
aspirations, the Leader is open to an international solution for 
Darfur.  During her visit, the Secretary told Qadhafi that the 
U.S. wants to cooperate with Libya to secure peace in Africa and 
particularly in Sudan. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Resolving the conflict in Darfur is also strategically 
important for Libya.   Regime security depends, in part, on 
regional security.  Senior GOL officials have made it clear that 
they are concerned that al-Qaida and associated groups could 
gain a foothold in ungoverned areas like Darfur.  They worry 
about a potential "belt of terrorism" running from Somalia in 
the east to Mauritania in the west.  A secure Sudan would bisect 
that belt, but if Chad and Sudan are unable to control their 
territories, Libya fears its own desert south will be vulnerable 
to terrorist infiltration. 
 
LIBYA'S POINT-MAN ON DARFUR, SUDAN, CHAD 
 
¶4. (SBU) Dr. Ali Treiki personally leads the GOL's diplomatic 
engagement on African issues.  Treiki is a career diplomat who 
has served multiple times as PermRep in New York and as foreign 
minister.  He now handles the Africa portfolio within the 
Foreign Ministry, but sits in the Prime Minister's office -- 
possibly a sign of his unique status within the GOL, as he is 
said to report directly to the Leader, and not to the Foreign 
Minister.  Treiki will leave Libya in the spring or summer of 
next year to take on the presidency of the UN General Assembly 
for 2009. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Treiki is supportive of the UN-AU peace process in 
principle, but worries about the effectiveness of AU troops in 
the region.  He sees reconciliation between Chad and Sudan as a 
prerequisite to peace in Darfur and has hosted meetings between 
both sides to reach an end to hostilities.  Treiki is willing to 
pay lip service to the Dakar Process and the efforts of the 
Contact Group in order to maintain cordial African relations. 
He has expressed doubt about the effectiveness of Arab League or 
Qatari intervention.  He sees tri-lateral engagement between 
Libya, Chad, and Sudan as the most promising approach, given 
these governments' direct stake in the outcome.  He views last 
month's agreement to exchange ambassadors between N'Djamena and 
Khartoum as a first step toward Chadian-Sudanese cooperation 
that will include a bilateral peacekeeping force to monitor the 
border.  Treiki recently told us that Libya strongly opposes the 
ICC indictment of President Bashir, believing this will only 
harden Bashir's stance on Darfur. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Libya's previous attempts to broker peace under 
Treiki's guidance have not yet borne fruit.  The Darfur peace 
conference held in Sirte in 2007 disbanded after key rebel 
groups failed to attend.  An intra-Chadian reconciliation 
conference held at the same time and attended by President Deby, 
Bashir, and Chadian rebels resulted in an agreed ceasefire. 
That ceasefire proved to be shortlived, however, and rebels 
resumed their attacks against the government in February 2008. 
Chadian intra-rebel talks held in Tripoli last spring and 
observed by the EU and UN also fizzled. 
 
 
TRIPOLI 00000764  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) Treiki enjoyed a good relationship with your 
predecessor and appreciates working with the United States.  He 
thinks Libya is best positioned to bring peace to Darfur because 
of its proximity to the conflict, but he is open to effective 
foreign cooperation.  However, he believes the situation in 
Sudan is an African problem that demands an African solution and 
will prefer to work within the framework of a resurrected Sirte 
agreement. 
 
MANAGING PERCEPTIONS IMPORTANT FOR COOPERATION 
 
¶8. (SBU) Qadhafi's desire to be viewed as a leader defines the 
parameters under which Libya can coordinate efforts in Sudan. 
He has railed against Western colonization in Africa and raised 
his concerns on AFRICOM with the Secretary.  Treiki will need to 
balance the Leader's interest in success in Sudan with the need 
to show independence and leadership. 
STEVENS