VZCZCXRO9548
PP RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNAG RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #3033/01 3042254
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 302254Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8416
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/USDOT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5//
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMHBA/COMPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI
RHMFIUU/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI//CC/PA//
RHMFIUU/USFJ //J5/JO21//
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUAYJAA/CTF 72
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 3050
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 0692
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 4475
RUEHNAG/AMCONSUL NAGOYA 8757
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 1265
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6119
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2116
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2341

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 003033 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/30/08 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Prime minister made three miscalculations about Lower House 
dissolution due to support rates and stock prices (Nikkei) 
 
(2) DPJ in total war against ruling coalition as wind of Diet 
dissolution stops blowing (Sankei) 
 
(3) JCP's new election strategy seen to favor DPJ (Asahi) 
 
(4) Interview with UNVIE DCM Pyatt: U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement 
beneficial both on political and environment fronts (Hokkaido 
Shimbun) 
 
(5) Japan should rebuild its diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation 
(Sankei) 
 
(6) Column -- Japan's Renaissance: Japan without a strategy faces a 
crisis in the Japan-U.S. alliance (Shukan Shincho) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Prime minister made three miscalculations about Lower House 
dissolution due to support rates and stock prices 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Abridged slightly) 
October 30, 2008 
 
Prime Minister Aso Taro will hold a press conference today in which 
he is expected to announce that he will not dissolve the Lower House 
for a snap general election anytime soon. He had three options for 
dissolving the Lower House: at the beginning of the current Diet 
session, after a supplementary budget clears the Diet, and after the 
enactment of a bill extending the Indian Ocean refueling activities 
law. The prime minister seems to have missed the chance due to 
sluggish support ratings and tumbling stock prices. With a decline 
in the effectiveness of the "dissolution card," the Aso 
administration might lose momentum. 
 
Early dissolution plan failed 
 
The prime minister had a secret meeting with New Komeito 
Representative Akihiro Ota in Tokyo on Oct. 26. In the session, Ota 
urged Aso to call a general election at an early date, saying: "Even 
if the election is put off, we don't have a winning strategy." Aso 
did not give his nod in approval, insisting, "I must give priority 
to economic stimulus measures." 
 
His initial plan was quite different. "Seeking the people's verdict 
is my first mission," Aso wrote in his contribution to a monthly 
magazine after being elected LDP president on Sept. 22. The 
statement alluded to dissolving the lower chamber at the outset of 
the current extraordinary Diet session. Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda 
resigned, assuming that his successor would dissolve the Lower House 
by taking advantage of the momentum of the LDP presidential race. 
Aso, who was serving as LDP secretary general under the Fukuda 
administration, must have been acutely aware of such a strategy. 
 
Aso's first miscalculation was support ratings. Opinion polls 
conducted shortly after his cabinet's inauguration showed 
unexpectedly low rates. The Aso cabinet was also hit hard by the 
resignation of Land and Transport Minister Nariaki Nakayama over his 
 
TOKYO 00003033  002 OF 011 
 
 
harsh comments on the Japan Teachers Union and others. This prompted 
Aso to adopt the new strategy of raising popularity independently to 
create a chance for the dissolution. 
 
Priority given to supplementary budget 
 
The prime minister then decided to play up his efforts to prop up 
the economy and dissolve the Lower House after additional stimulus 
measures reflecting his policy identity cleared the Diet. 
 
Aso's economy-first policy ended up tying his own hands. On Oct. 10, 
the Nikkei Stock Average fell below the 9,000 level for the first 
time since June 2003. "A party in power is different from an 
opposition party," Aso snarled on the same day at the DPJ which had 
been pressing him for an early dissolution. Stock prices rallied at 
one point after the G-7 meeting of finance ministers and central 
bank governors but again plummeted later on. 
 
November 30 plan fizzled 
 
On the night of Oct. 16, after the supplementary budget was enacted, 
Prime Minister Aso asked Finance and Financial Services Minister 
Shoichi Nakagawa, Administrative Reform Minister Akira Amari, and 
others, "What do you think of calling the election on November 30?" 
Sometime between late October when the refueling legislation is 
expected to clear the Diet and early November was the last chance to 
dissolve the Lower House in a way not to negatively affect the 
compilation of a fiscal 2009 budget. 
 
Aso issued instruction after instruction to no avail, and the key 
Nikkei index briefly fell below the 7,000 line on Oct. 24. In a news 
conference on Oct. 25, after the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), Aso had 
to declare: "I am going to prioritize the international role over 
the domestic political situation." 
 
When the key index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange fell below its 
post-bubble low on Oct. 27, the prime minister said: "I don't 
fluctuate between optimism and pessimism." The day before, he had 
begun secretly indicating to party leaders that he would forgo the 
dissolution plan for the time being. 
 
(2) DPJ in total war against ruling coalition as wind of Diet 
dissolution stops blowing 
 
SANKEI (Page 5) (Full) 
October 29, 2008 
 
With Prime Minister Taro Aso's decision to delay a dissolution of 
the House of Representatives and snap election, the main opposition 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) yesterday shifted its approach from 
a cooperative stance to a confrontational one. Since the House of 
Councillors Foreign and Defense Affairs Committee refused to take a 
vote on a bill amending the new Antiterrorism Special Measures Law 
to extend by one year the Maritime Self-Defense Forces' refueling 
mission in the Indian Ocean, the passage of the legislation before 
the end of October is now not possible. Although the committee 
launched deliberations on a bill revising the Financial Functions 
Strengthening Law to wipe away financial unrest, there is no 
prospect for the legislation to be enacted. The DPJ appears to be 
heightening its pressure on the government and ruling coalition by 
taking advantage of the divide Diet. The Diet has rushed into a 
dense fog with no exit in sight. 
 
TOKYO 00003033  003 OF 011 
 
 
 
In yesterday's Upper House committee meeting, Masahisa Sato, a 
member of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), who headed the 
first MSDF unit to Iraq, said: 
 
"Among those attending this committee session, Prime Minister Aso 
and I have been the only ones who visited Baghdad to give words of 
encouragement to a Grand Self-Defense unit. If you don't know about 
the actual situation, you won't be able to make any changes in the 
policy." 
 
Sato's remarks only gave the DPJ an excuse to prolong 
deliberations. 
 
In an informal meeting of the committee directors, directors from 
the opposition camp protested vehemently, with one director saying: 
 
"Since we don't know about the MSDF's refueling mission in the 
Indian Ocean, we will ask that MSDF officers, who are now deployed, 
to be called back to testify before the Diet as unsworn witnesses." 
 
If such comes to fruition, it will take at least one week for MSDF 
officers to return home. If they take a sea route, it would take 
them about three weeks to return home. A ruling coalition director 
sighed as he said: "The opposition intends to prevent taking a vote 
at any cost." 
 
The DPJ initially agreed with the ruling camp to hold a second vote 
on the refueling bill on Oct. 31 in the Lower House after it voted 
it down in the Upper House on the 29th. However, the largest 
opposition party has now hardened its stance, since the ruling bloc 
is now delaying Lower House dissolution. Diet Affairs Committee 
Deputy Chairman Jun Azumi said: "Our party has now assumed a 
confrontational stance (against the government and ruling camp)." 
 
DPJ Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka said in a meeting 
on the 28th of the party's Lower House members: "We have changed 
neither our policy nor strategy. The party has essentially entrusted 
the Upper House with the matter." He was not altogether displeased 
with the ruling camp's dismay. He told reporters: 
 
"The fact that the government and ruling coalition are unreliable is 
reflected in the stock prices. (The markets) do not trust a 
government unless fundamental measures are compiled by it." 
 
He spoke indirectly the need for a dissolution of the Lower House. 
The DPJ's confrontational stance is increasingly become stronger in 
the Lower House, as well. On the afternoon of Oct. 28 in a Lower 
House plenary session, Masaharu Nakagawa, a DPJ member, stated: 
 
"Market players have completely given up on the Prime Minister. This 
means the same as if a no-confidence motion against the cabinet was 
passed. In order to break the present political deadlock, the Prime 
Minister should ask for the people's vote of confidence on his 
government and its policies by dissolving the Lower House and 
calling for a snap election." 
 
However, the DPJ's do-or-die resistance could be a double-edged 
sword. If the DPJ unnecessarily prolongs deliberations on the bill 
to strengthen financial functions, stock prices will further drop, 
just like it did in the U.S. after it issued its financial 
stabilization measure. As a result, the DPJ could be criticized by 
 
TOKYO 00003033  004 OF 011 
 
 
the public. Should the opposition further delay deliberations on the 
new antiterrorism bill, it will give an excuse to the Prime Minister 
to put off dissolution until late December, when Article 59 of the 
Constitution can be applied on the legislation. (Article 59 allows 
for a bill to be sent back to the Lower House if rejected by the 
Upper House or if the bill has not been voted on within 60 days 
after being presented to the upper chamber.) This is the reason that 
Seiji Suzuki, chairman of the Diet Affairs Committee of the LDP 
caucus in the Upper House, simply backed down in a meeting with his 
DPJ counterpart Susumu Yanase, just saying: "Let's leave it to those 
who are in charge." 
 
However, there is a possibility that Aso will be pressed to make a 
decision on calling for a vote of confidence of the people, if the 
Upper House passes a no-confidence motion against the Prime Minister 
because of market turmoil caused by confusion in the Diet. Which 
side -- the ruling bloc or the opposition -- will the public support 
then? The psychological war is still long from over. 
 
(3) JCP's new election strategy seen to favor DPJ 
 
ASAHI (Page 4) (Full) 
October 29, 2008 
 
The next House of Representatives election will be in effect a fight 
between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party 
of Japan (DPJ). However, there will be a major change in it from 
past contests. Based on the Japanese Communist Party's (JCP) new 
policy of ending its conventional practice of fielding a candidate 
in all single-seat constituencies, it will halve the number of 
candidates running in the election. Citing the need to address the 
ongoing financial crisis, Prime Minister Aso has decided to delay a 
general election to next year. But since many of the votes that 
would have ordinarily gone to the JCP are expected to go to the DPJ 
due to the JCP's new election strategy, observers see this gloomy 
expectation as another reason for Aso's decision to delay the 
election. 
 
In the previous general election in 2005, LDP candidate Takashi 
Sasagawa, chairman of the Executive Council, won a 7th term in the 
Gunma No. 2 district. Sasagawa garnered 99,919 votes, followed by 
DPJ candidate Takashi Ishizeki with 98,497 and JCP candidate 
Yoshiyuki Fujikake with 12, 832. The JCP has decided not to field a 
candidate in this district in the next general election. If 20 
PERCENT  of the votes for the JCP are cast for Ishizeki, Sasagawa 
would be defeated. 
 
The number of candidates sponsored by the JCP in single-seat 
districts was 299 in the 1996 general election, 300 in 2000, 300 in 
2003, and 275 in 2005. The party in the past always aimed to field 
one candidate in every one of the 300 single-seat districts, but 
only two of its candidates won a Lower House seat in the 1996 
election: the Kyoto No. 3 and in Kochi No. 1 districts. JCP's share 
of the total votes cast was less than 10 PERCENT , and the party had 
to forfeit deposits (3 million yen per person) it had paid for 223 
candidates in 2005. 
 
Given the heavy financial burden on it, the JCP last September 
devised a new formula for fielding candidates in single-seat 
constituencies: (1) A candidate should be fielded in a district 
where the JCP attained at least 8 PERCENT  of the votes in the 
proportional representation bloc in the Upper House election in 
 
TOKYO 00003033  005 OF 011 
 
 
2007; (2) on active, powerful candidates should be fielded; and (3) 
at least one candidate in each of the 47 prefectures should be 
fielded. As of Oct. 28, the party has announced the names of 147 
approved candidates for the next general election, but the number is 
expected to be around 150 in the end. The JCP intends to let its 
members vote for the candidate of their choice in districts in which 
the party is not fielding a candidate. A party source said: "If 
asked, I will reply to our members, 'I suggest you vote for the DPJ 
candidate,' although I will not eagerly recommend them to do so," 
adding: "The view that the change of government is necessary is 
gaining influence among our supporters." 
 
In the by-election in the Yamaguchi No. 2 district for a Lower House 
seat this April, which was a one-on-one fight between the LDP 
candidate and the DPJ candidate, more than 90 PERCENT  of the 
supporters for the JCP voted for the DPJ candidate, according to an 
exit poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun. The dominant view among 
those affiliated with the JCP is that 60 to 70 PERCENT  of the votes 
that would go to the JCP will likely be cast for the DPJ in the next 
general election. If 70 PERCENT  of the votes originally intended 
for the JCP go to the DPJ, what would happen? 
 
Among the 153 constituencies in which there is no JCP candidate for 
now, the DPJ candidate is expected to beat the LDP candidate in 
seven constituencies - Gunma No. 2 district; Hokkaido No. 3 
district; Aichi No. 5, 6 & 8 districts; Hyogo No. 11 district; and 
Yamaguchi No. 2 district - according to a tentative calculation 
worked out based on the outcome of the 2005 general election. 
 
According to a calculation based on the 2003 general election, the 
DPJ candidate would defeat the LDP candidate in 12 districts - 
Hokkaido No. 5 district, which is former Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Nobutaka Machimura's electoral district; Miyagi No. 3 district; 
Ibaraki No. 3 district; Saitama No. 9 & 13 districts; Chiba No. 13 
district; Gifu No. 3 district; Aichi No. 10 & 13 districts; Hyogo 
No. 5 & 12 districts; and Okayama No. 2 district. In Aichi No. 9 
district, in which former Prime Minister Kaifu ran in the 2003 
election, the LDP candidate and the DPJ candidate is expected to run 
neck-and-neck in the next election. 
 
The JCP's new election strategy has made senior members of LDP 
headquarters nervous. One member grumbled: "Of the votes for the 
JCP, 80 PERCENT  would go to the DPJ. JCP's new policy will 
inevitably affect election results in the districts where the LDP 
and DPJ candidates had an evenly matched contest in past elections. 
We cannot do anything, because we are unable to approach supporters 
of the JCP." 
 
(4) Interview with UNVIE DCM Pyatt: U.S.-Indian Nuclear Agreement 
beneficial both on political and environment fronts 
 
HOKKAIDO SHIMBUN PRESS (Page 3) 
October 29, 2008 
 
India is a nuclear weapons state, and yet it has not yet joined the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The U.S. has lifted a ban on 
nuclear exports to that nation, by signing the U.S.-Indian Nuclear 
Agreement (UINA). The signing of such a pact by the U.S. has invited 
criticism from various countries as applying a double standard. This 
newspaper interviewed Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Geoffrey Pyatt 
of the United States Mission to International Organizations in 
Vienna (UNVIE) , who promoted the talks between the two countries. 
 
TOKYO 00003033  006 OF 011 
 
 
 
Interviewer Tomoya Ishii 
 
-- The U.S. came under fire as having undermined the NPT. 
 
"We are in an age in which close cooperation with India, an immense 
nation, is indispensable in settling issues that the world faces, 
including terrorism by Islamic extremists. India hinted at a stance 
of refusing to cooperate on such issues as the climate change issue, 
seeking the abolition of international sanctions over nuclear power, 
by claiming such as an impediment to the building of a cooperative 
system. 
 
"India is expected to become the third largest economic power in the 
world, following the U.S. and China, by around 2025. It is consuming 
a great deal of energy, and yet it still depends on fossil fuels. 
The ratio of nuclear power generation in that country is only 2 
PERCENT . The U.S. thought it would be beneficial both on the 
political and environment fronts, if it cooperated with that nation 
by supplying energy to it." 
 
-- Isn't it the U.S. aim to take part in India's nuclear power 
business, which is worth about 15 trillion yen? 
 
"Since India is not an autocratic state, the construction of nuclear 
facilities will not progress as fast as expected. However, some U.S. 
companies are eager to advance into India. The accord signed this 
time will open the door to business in India. Assisting India by 
supplying energy will supposedly boost opportunities for foreign 
companies to sell such products as electronic products to 300 
million people in the mid-income bracket." 
 
-- Isn't it the case that the Bush administration rushed to sign the 
pact in an effort to make strengthened relations with India his 
diplomatic achievement with an eye on the rise of China? 
 
"The talks with India started during the previous Clinton 
administration. In India, there are arguments for and against the 
idea of increasing targets of inspection by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA). However, the Singh administration indicated a 
stance of accepting stronger IAEA inspections, so the U.S. held out 
hope that it will join the NPT in the future. 
 
"This pact is a special one only applied to India, which has 
maintained nonproliferation. Such a pact will not be applied to 
Pakistan, which has allegedly transferred nuclear technology to 
other countries, or North Korea and Iran, which are uncooperative 
toward nonproliferation efforts. The criticism that the U.S. has 
applied a double standard is not correct." 
 
(5) Japan should rebuild its diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation 
 
SANKEI (Page 11) (Full) 
October 30, 2008 
 
Masashi Nishihara, president of the Research Institute for Peace and 
Security (RIPS) 
 
The U.S.-India nuclear deal, signed by the U.S. Bush administration 
with India on Oct. 10, will extremely weaken the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, which was created as an outcome of efforts 
made by many countries after the international community signed the 
 
TOKYO 00003033  007 OF 011 
 
 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 that came into effect 
in 1970. 
 
The deal is based on the United States' decision to provide India, 
which refused to join the NPT and carried out nuclear tests in 1974 
and 1998, with nuclear energy technology to be used for peaceful 
purposes only. 
 
Though hesitatingly, Japan also accepted this deal as a member of 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This will cause Japan to lose its 
moral influence in its future diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation 
and leave a stain. I regret the weakness of Japan's diplomacy, which 
failed to hold out against the U.S.-India deal. 
 
India and Pakistan have not joined the NPT regime. The United 
States, Japan, and many other countries therefore implemented such 
sanction measures as prohibiting technology transfer to both India 
and Pakistan when the two countries carried out nuclear tests in 
¶1974. However, the situation changed completely after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks. The United States and other countries needed 
cooperation from India and Pakistan for the war on terror and called 
off their sanctions. At that point, the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime was already being undermined. 
 
The recent nuclear deal between the United States and India is an 
extension of that trend. According to the United States' account, 
India is the largest democracy on earth and has been treated as an 
exception to the NPT regime because it is a responsible nuclear 
power that has been without nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, all 
the 45 NSG members have confirmed it. Given this fact, we should say 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime has become hollowed out or has 
changed in nature. 
 
The United States approached India, a nuclear heretic. What lies 
behind that is the potential existence of huge commercial interests 
that can be expected by providing India with high-level nuclear 
energy technology for nuclear power generation. There is backing not 
only from U.S. businesses but also from such countries as Britain, 
France, and Russia attempting to make inroads into India's nuclear 
market. France, as well as the United States, entered into a 
cooperative pact with India in late September. The idealism of 
nuclear nonproliferation caved in to commercial interests. 
 
The United States has another expectation. That is a strategic 
calculation to constrain China and Russia by attracting India, which 
is a big democratic power. However, India is pushing ahead with its 
joint development of weapons and systems. As seen from this fact, 
India is tough, carrying through its nonaligned diplomacy. India is 
satisfied while thinking to itself that its nuclear policy has now 
been proved correct with the 45 NSG members' confirmation. India 
played up its deal with the United States as a diplomatic victory. 
Moreover, India takes the position that this agreement will not 
preclude future nuclear testing. 
 
In time, India is highly likely to get ahead of China-both in 
military power and in economic power. If that is the case, India 
would become a hegemonic power in South Asia. The international 
tendency of nuclear nonproliferation is being rocked because India 
is powerful as an exception to the NPT regime. North Korea and Iran 
would argue back and ask why only India is exceptional. In the 
future, it would be difficult to stop Brazil and South Africa from 
going nuclear. 
 
TOKYO 00003033  008 OF 011 
 
 
 
As mentioned above, Japan has now lost its moral force to advocate 
stepping up nuclear nonproliferation due to its acceptance of the 
U.S.-India nuclear deal in the NSG. In the meantime, the Diet 
avoided discussing Japan's diplomacy for nuclear nonproliferation. 
The negligence of politicians also led to its giving up of 
opportunities to display its international moral power. 
 
Japan has annually presented a resolution to the United Nations 
General Assembly First Committee for the total abolition of nuclear 
arms. Japan has now distorted its basic standpoint. This will 
greatly affect Japan on the diplomatic front. Is it possible for 
Japan to introduce such a resolution from now on while taking the 
same position? How will Japan develop its diplomacy toward the NPT 
Review Conference in 2010? 
 
Japan nodded to the U.S.-India deal under the condition that India 
freezes its nuclear testing. Accordingly, if and when India carried 
out a nuclear test, Japan should then take strict sanctions. 
However, I wonder if Japan, which is stressing its strategic ties 
with India, can really take strict measures against that country. 
 
In the meantime, another question is how Japan will respond if and 
when its nuclear-related businesses are asked by the United States 
to provide their technologies to India. In that case, Japan's 
technology transfer to India should be preconditioned at least on 
India's acceptance of the obligation to cut its greenhouse gas 
emissions. Japan should make diplomatic efforts to persuade the 
United States to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) after the next administration comes into office in January 
next year. That is because the United States' prompt ratification 
thereof can be expected to pressure India into halting its nuclear 
testing. 
 
Now is the time Japan should seriously consider what it should do to 
rebuild the weakened, deteriorated nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
One of the possible steps for that is to develop and spread 
technologies for nuclear nonproliferation around the world. 
 
(6) Column -- Japan's Renaissance: Japan without a strategy faces a 
crisis in the Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
SHUKAN SHINCHO (Pages 164-165) (Full) 
October 30, 2008 
 
By Yoshiko Sakurai, journalist 
 
In the evening of Oct. 19, four Chinese military ships transited the 
Tsugaru Strait from the Japan Sea to the Pacific. 
 
The four ships included a Russian-made Sovremenny-class destroyer, 
Chinese-made latest frigates Jiangkai I and Jiangkai II, and a 
refueling vessel. A Sovremenny-class destroyer is loaded with 
missiles that travel at two times the speed of sound which even the 
U.S. fears. It is difficult to detect by radar a missile that 
travels as low as six meters above sea level. 
 
In 2000, a Chinese ship conducting an intelligence-gathering 
operation passed the Tsugaru Strait from the Japan Sea to the 
Pacific and back. The vessel was probably engaged in gathering 
information on the radio waves used by the U.S. Armed Forces and the 
Japan Self-Defense Forces, in addition to the sea current, water 
 
TOKYO 00003033  009 OF 011 
 
 
temperature, and the topography of the seabed. 
 
After eight years, Chinese warships navigated through the Tsugaru 
Strait for the first time. The Chinese Navy's area of deployment has 
obviously expanded. 
 
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) believes that threat with no 
substance behind it is not threat at all, so a threat always has to 
be real. The PLA thinks the benefit of its naval-power buildup is 
that it enables China to pose a political threat to other countries 
just by navigating through the waters of the world. The PLA believes 
that, once it can successfully make other countries aware of the 
power of its Navy, China's political and diplomatic power will 
naturally increase. 
 
The PLA Navy with 260,000 personnel is comprised of three fleets of 
the North Sea, the East Sea, and the South Sea, each of which has 
waterborne ship units, submarine units, aviation units, ground 
battle units, and coastal artillery units, and has become a pillar 
to support the country's arms race into the space. 
 
U.S. Pacific Commander Keating testified before the Senate Military 
Committee on March 12 about the PLA Navy's tough attitude. According 
to the Commander, when he visited China, a PLA Navy key officer 
suggested the Pacific should be divided in two "with you (the U.S.) 
acquiring the area to the east of Hawaii and with us acquiring the 
area to the west of Hawaii." 
 
U.S. Ambassador to Japan Schieffer relayed this information to the 
Japanese press on the next day of Commander Keating's testimony. The 
Ambassador must have felt the deep message. 
 
The meaning (of the Ambassador's message) is that the situation may 
develop into the course described in China's scenario unless Japan 
builds up a strong foundation. It means a U.S. partner in Asia is 
not limited to Japan forever. 
 
U.S. displeasure 
 
Japan kept falling short of expectation in responding to the 
information conveyed by Ambassador Schieffer seven months ago, Jim 
Auer told me. Auer, a former U.S. Navy officer, served as Pentagon's 
Japan Desk director under Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. 
Auer has been described as Richard Armitage's right-hand man at the 
Defense Depart. In 1988, Auer retired to establish the Center for 
U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation at Vanderbilt University. He now 
serves as director of the center. Auer, a close observer of 
Japan-U.S. relations for 20 years, said: "The U.S.-Japan 
relationship is in a far serious condition than the Japanese people 
think." 
 
The Japanese government is unhappy with President George W. Bush, 
who removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of 
terrorism, because the delisting means that the United States has 
recognized North Korea as a nuclear power, which means that Japan is 
exposed to the threat of nuclear attack from that country. Since 
there are other nuclear powers -- Russia, India and Pakistan - 
surrounding Japan, Japan, too, should prepare the environment for 
possessing its own nuclear weapons to protect its national security. 
There is a way to strengthen the Japan-U.S. alliance further that 
would help the U.S. nuclear umbrella function better. This can be 
achieved by Japan allowing the entry of nuclear weapons by changing 
 
TOKYO 00003033  010 OF 011 
 
 
the present three no-nuclear principles (neither make nor possess 
nuclear weapons, and not to allow their entry into Japan) into two 
no-nuclear principles. 
 
Meanwhile, Japan should continue its refueling and water supply 
mission in the Indian Ocean to support the war on terror in and 
around Afghanistan. Japan should allow the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 
to exercise the right of collective defense. Ultimately, it may be 
necessary for Japan itself to guarantee its own security. 
Eventually, Japan should press ahead with debate on whether it 
should possess nuclear weapons or not. 
 
When Auer was told there was such thinking in Japan, he noted that 
the thinking on the U.S. side was even more severe than that in 
Japan. Auer, being an American who knows Japan very well, stated: 
 
"I know that the Diet is discussing a bill to extend the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) refueling operation in the Indian Ocean. 
But frankly the situation has been created that the United States 
will not be able to directly receive oil that Japan will supply. The 
Japanese side has questioned whether the fuel the MSDF had supplied 
to be used for Afghanistan had been diverted for use toward Iraq, as 
well. Both countries are a part of the war on terror. The moves of 
U.S. warships depend on the situation. If it is said that the fuel 
should be used for Afghanistan alone, it will be very difficult to 
use it. That is why people are beginning to think in the United 
States that it is difficult to get along with Japan." 
 
In October 2007, (then) Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba questioned 
the United States whether the nearly 800 times that Japan provided 
refueling services were used for purposes other than the original 
intent. He promised in the Diet to investigate it. (Auer said that) 
even though the United States disclosed that information, it was 
displeased by the experience. 
 
Japan-U.S. alliance should be further strengthened 
 
Japan has continued to provide China with an incommensurable amount 
of official development assistance (ODA). Although the government 
has said that ODA is provided to support the people's livelihood, it 
has yet to question China how it has been used. What has been so far 
not been disclosed is that ODA has contributed to China's military 
buildup. Still, China opposed Japan's bid for a permanent UNSC seat 
and influenced leading Asian and African countries to do the same. 
China used its own ODA to manipulate those Asian and African 
countries. There is a possibility that China may have slipped in its 
own ODA to Asia and Africa, replacing Japan's aid, but Japan has 
never questioned China about it. When seeing such a situation from a 
viewpoint of national interests and an ally, there is a clear 
contradiction. The U.S. displeasure is understandable. 
 
The primary reason for the United States being unhappy with Japan is 
that no matter how hard the MSDF troops have worked, they have never 
fought alongside the U.S.-led multinational force. The MSDF's 
refueling mission is not a military operation; it is a commercial 
activity. The Ground Self-Defense Force's activities in the southern 
Iraqi city of Samawah were not military operations. It is only 
natural that the United States may conclude it should find more 
reliable ally if Japan always says it will not make any military 
contribution. 
 
That is how little Japan's refueling mission is appreciated. 
 
TOKYO 00003033  011 OF 011 
 
 
However, both Auer and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Thomas Schieffer - 
the one who informed Japan of China's proposal to the U.S. to share 
control of the Pacific -- are asking Japan whether it wants to 
become a dependable ally. If Japan has no intention to do so, there 
is even a possibility that the United States will change to another 
partner. That possibility will probably become stronger if 
Democratic candidate Barack Obama is elected president. 
 
Japan must make better efforts. The first matter to attend to is to 
effectively strengthen the alliance that is particularly vital to 
meet the threats from China and North Korea. In order to become a 
normal country, Japan should allow itself to use the right of 
collective self-defense. Japan then should approach the United 
States with confidence to query whether it is appropriate for China, 
which has a different set of values, to ever become the U.S.' ally. 
Japan should stress to the U.S. that there should be no other 
country but Japan qualified to be America's ally. 
 
SCHIEFFER