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S E C R E T TOKYO 002980 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT INR A/S FORT AND EAP/J 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2016 
TAGS: PINR PREL CH KN GG PK RS JA
SUBJECT: INR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FORT CONSULTS WITH 
JAPANESE COUNTERPARTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4(b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a visit to Tokyo October 7, INR 
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort consulted with counterparts 
from MOFA's Intelligence and Analysis Service, the Prime 
Minister's Cabinet and Intelligence Research Office (CIRO), 
the Ministry of Justice's Public Security Information Agency 
(PSIA), and with uniformed and civilian officials at the 
Ministry of Defense.  Discussions focused on Japan's views of 
recent events in Georgia, the health of Kim Jong-il and the 
stability of North Korea, the state of the Chinese economy 
and society, Pakistan, and cyber security.  The Director of 
CIRO also discussed his efforts to develop the capabilities 
of the Japanese intelligence community.  A/S Fort was 
accompanied by INR analysts John Merrill and Gregory Knight, 
who provided briefings on North Korea and China.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
MOFA INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS SERVICE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Director General Jiro Kodera, A/S Fort's direct 
counterpart, shared Japan's perspectives on the following 
topics: 
 
-------------- 
Russia/Georgia 
-------------- 
 
¶3. (C)  Japan believes that, from Russia's standpoint, recent 
military operations against Georgia were a success, achieving 
three of four strategic objectives Moscow had set:  retaining 
influence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; destroying Georgia's 
military; and damaging Georgia's economy in order to create 
internal instability.  Its fourth objective, regime change, 
was not realized.  Kodera termed Georgia's experience as 
""disastrous"" due largely to serious miscalculations made by 
President Saakashvili concerning Russia's intent to resist 
Georgian attempts to assert territorial claims and the West's 
willingness to come to Georgia's aid.  As a consequence, 
Georgia will now find it almost impossible to regain control 
of the two breakaway regions or to move forward on accession 
to the EU and NATO.  However, Kodera believes the 
consequences for Russia could prove equally dire, both in 
terms of soured relations with the West and being tainted 
with a ""bad guy"" image that will be difficult to shake. 
 
¶4. (C) Looking ahead, Kodera predicted that Russia would be 
ready to move back into any of its former territories if it 
felt there were a chance of success.  The key for the West, 
he said, is to avoid creating openings for Moscow by giving 
the impression that it lacks concern.  Russia is realistic, 
he believes, and will not move into former territories if it 
sees that the cost, particularly in terms of public backlash 
in the West, is too high.  Further, he thinks that reluctance 
to incur further international criticism will prevent Russia 
from moving on Ukraine. 
 
¶5. (C) In Japan's view, the recent experience in Georgia 
shows that Prime Minister Putin is clearly in charge.  Kodera 
described Putin as more assertive, aggressive and emotional 
than President Medvedev, who he characterized as more 
reserved.  Putin remains essentially expansionist with regard 
to the former Soviet republics and is willing to sacrifice 
the well-being of the Russian people to regain ""lost"" 
territory, Kodera observed, adding that Russians tend to be 
less assertive towards their neighbors when they perceive 
their international prestige to be at stake.  He opined that 
Russia's ""DNA"" has yet to change from one that focuses on an 
authoritarian, security-oriented government preoccupied with 
outdated notions of spheres of influence. 
 
-------- 
Pakistan 
-------- 
 
¶6. (C) With regard to Pakistan, Kodera said that his main 
focus continues to be on terrorism.  He blamed the country's 
ingrained anti-Americanism and a worsening economic situation 
for the lack of progress in rooting out Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). 
He wondered whether the two organizations weren't actually 
becoming better organized and supported, pointing to the 
recent attack on the Islamabad Marriott Hotel.  He agreed 
with A/S Fort's assessment of the situation and said that 
there is a need for the Pakistanis to shift away from the 
political system and structure that has historically 
prevailed in the tribal areas. 
 
----------- 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶7. (C) Japan's concerns about North Korea, Kodera said, 
relate mostly to Kim Jong-il's health and a range of 
succession issues - including the potential for a dynastic 
succession versus some form of temporary collective 
leadership, sources of legitimacy for a new leadership, and 
China's preferences in the matter including how strongly it 
intends to press them.  Kodera and his colleagues were very 
interested in U.S. views on the possibility that Chang 
Song-taek would play a leading role in a future government 
and whether he might lead an effort to modernize the country 
as a North Korean version of Deng Xiaoping.  INR analyst John 
Merrill briefed Kodera on our views of the North Korean 
leadership situation and on Kim Jong-il's leadership style. 
A/S Fort cautioned that it is difficult to speculate on what 
might come to pass, given the dearth of information available 
to analysts. 
 
¶8. (C) Kodera agreed that China will play little role in the 
succession process, although there is clearly a split within 
the North Korean military between generals who fought 
together with China and those who take a more nationalistic 
view.  Kodera does not think China will risk a blow to its 
international prestige -- particularly within the Non-Aligned 
Movement -- by attempting to intervene in a North Korean 
succession. If it were to do so, it would only be under cover 
of some form of ""international cooperation."" China repeatedly 
assures Japan, said Kodera, that there will be a smooth 
transition but it is difficult to tell if this is merely 
self-serving talk.  China could send troops to stabilize 
North Korea if faced with chaos on its border but would 
likely couch the move as a form of humanitarian assistance to 
deflect accusations of meddling or of harboring territorial 
ambitions. 
 
¶9. (C) Kodera admitted to having few insights on Kim's 
current condition but said he thought he might be recovering 
and would soon return to ""invitational diplomacy"" and restart 
the Six-Party Process.  He lamented that Japan's own ""quiet 
negotiations"" with Pyongyang were not going well at all and 
hoped that Kim would recover enough to direct a promised 
re-investigation into the fate of Japanese citizens abducted 
by the DPRK.  Japanese economic assistance provides a strong 
incentive to the DPRK to fulfill its pledge on abductions, 
but Japan is also demanding simultaneous resolution of the 
nuclear and missile issues, Suzuki noted.  Sequencing is very 
important, Kodera observed.  Japan is ready to extend 
assistance upon denuclearization, but may not be able to meet 
DPRK expectations.  Looking beyond denuclearization, 
negotiations over sales of missile technology could be 
another stumbling block, he noted, since it is one of the 
only means for North Korea to secure hard currency.  Japan is 
unlikely to change its policy on humanitarian assistance to 
the DPRK, even in the event of a serious famine, but might 
participate in a multilateral approach through one of the 
many international organizations it helps support, such as 
UNICEF or UNDP.  Aid to North Korea remains an extremely 
sensitive issue in Japan, Kodera noted, and hardliners in the 
Diet had become more prominent since the end of the Koizumi 
Administration in 2006. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
CABINET AND INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH OFFICE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (S) CIRO Director Hideshi Mitani briefed A/S Fort on 
progress being made within the Japanese intelligence 
community and his major priorities for the future.  Mitani, 
who has been in his position for roughly two and a half 
years, was recently reappointed and is now serving as 
Director under his third prime minister.  He said that he is 
very proud of Japan's new Community Intelligence Officer 
(CIO) program, which is modeled after our National 
Intelligence Officer system.  Japan has five CIOs and they 
have recently begun to issue national intelligence estimates 
(NIEs).  So far, Mitani is quite pleased that despite the 
small size of his operation, the quality of the analysis 
provided is quite high.  He is happy that more of his staff 
is now coming from MOFA, but pointed out that his oldest and 
most experienced CIO is from the private sector. 
 
¶11. (S) Mitani also reviewed the makeup of the Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC).  The JIC is comprised of 
representatives from CIRO, MOFA, the Ministry of Defense, the 
National Police Agency (NPA), and the Ministry of Justice's 
Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) -- who make up the 
""core JIC"" -- and, more recently, representatives of the 
Customs Service, the Coast Guard, the Finance Agency, and the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), which is 
interested in gathering intelligence to prevent the theft of 
Japanese trade secrets.  Taken together, he referred to the 
whole group as the ""expanded JIC.""  One role the JIC plays is 
to approve all NIEs before they are distributed. 
 
¶12. (S) With regard to ongoing priorities, Mitani said his 
first one is to assure the passage of legislation to protect 
national security information.  The fate of this bill, he 
explained, depends on the outcome of domestic politics which, 
at this point is difficult to predict.  His second priority 
is the establishment of a human intelligence collection 
capability.  The decision has been made to go very slowly 
with this process as the Japanese realize that they lack 
knowledge, experience, and assets/officers.  A training 
process for new personnel will be started soon.  A/S Fort 
agreed that it is prudent to go slowly and urged that a few, 
highly capable people be selected at first, rather than 
rushing things. 
 
¶13. (S) A/S Fort urged Mitani to think about how Japan might 
be able to cooperate with us in the field of cyber security. 
Mitani replied that he has discussed this with Ambassador 
Schieffer and, as a result, his Information Technology Center 
will soon begin to collaborate with the National Security 
Agency.  He noted that while Japan has the knowledge and 
experience to play a major role in this field, the challenge 
is to educate the public and politicians about why this is 
important. 
 
¶14. (S) Mitani was interested in A/S Fort's views on North 
Korea and the health of Kim Jong-il.  He said the Japanese 
are skeptical about North Korean press reports that Kim is 
well, saying that a recent press release about Kim watching a 
soccer match says just that, that he ""watched"" the match, 
without specifically saying that he was there in person. 
Japan believes Kim is well enough to make decisions but is in 
the dark about how he is passing them along for 
implementation.  Mitani also said the Japanese had closely 
studied the book by ""Mr. Fujimoto,"" Kim's former Japanese 
sushi chef, which they think holds many keys to understanding 
Kim's behavior. 
 
---------------------------------- 
PUBLIC SECURITY INFORMATION AGENCY 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) Director General Toshio Yanagi of the Ministry of 
Justice's Public Security Information Agency (PSIA) told A/S 
Fort that his major areas of focus are on China and North 
Korea, as well as on collecting intelligence information to 
prevent terrorist attacks, with a major focus on the 
Southeast Asia region.  The major question with regard to 
China, now that the Olympics are over, is the country's 
evolving social and economic conditions. PSIA believes that 
widening income gaps, problems with agricultural production, 
and issues of corruption are having serious impacts on social 
and economic conditions and bear close watching.  Of the 
three, corruption may be the main destabilizing factor, said 
Yanagi.  Corruption plays a major role in ongoing power 
struggles and has also led to a situation where prominent 
state-owned companies have become family businesses packed 
with relatives of officials with sway.  A further major 
corruption scenario involves the taking of private land by 
officials who then sell it to developers.  These actions are 
serving to discredit the government and may lead to unrest. 
Another destabilizing factor is the immigration into the 
cities by rural farmers who are seeking better lives. 
 
 
¶16. (C) Another major issue that could potentially create 
rifts between the people and the government in China is 
pollution, according to Yanagi.  He said that the Chinese are 
anxious to receive Japanese technology for both pollution 
clean-up and for clean industry.  Beijing is seeking Japanese 
ODA and private investment, but Japanese businesses are wary 
of the Chinese, fearing that they will steal technology and 
become rivals of the Japanese firms who provided it in the 
first place.  So despite Chinese interest in forging closer 
relations with Japan, particularly in the steel, iron, and 
auto manufacturing sectors, there is very little technology 
transfer taking place. 
 
¶17. (C)  With regard to North Korea, PSIA is closely watching 
this year's harvest.  Japan does not believe the situation is 
as dire as it was in the 1990's, although they do not have 
enough information to formulate a solid opinion.  Yanagi said 
he thinks there are still over 300 food markets in operation, 
but that attempts to impose firm regulations on them are 
creating friction with the people.  PSIA, said Yanagi, also 
closely watches the volume of exports from China to North 
Korea for clues to understanding the situation in the North. 
The Japanese believe the North Korean economy is crippled by 
a lack of energy resources and crumbling, outdated 
infrastructure. 
 
¶18. (C)  PSIA does not believe North Korea will abandon its 
nuclear capabilities, said Yanagi.  Tokyo views that Kim 
Jong-il sees nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence, a card 
on the diplomatic table, and as a means to retain the support 
of his people.  He will not give these up.  Furthermore, 
while China also claims it would like to see a nuclear-free 
Korean peninsula, it cannot take actions that will 
potentially destabilize North Korea.  Finally, neither the 
North or China trusts each other, he concluded. 
 
------------------- 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE 
------------------- 
 
¶19. (C)  A/S Fort also visited the Ministry of Defense where 
he met separately with Defense Intelligence Headquarters 
Director Lt.Gen. Hokazono and Defense Policy Bureau Chief 
Takamizawa.  Hokazono commented on Taiwan-China relations, 
which he noted appear to be stable at this time.  He believes 
this is particularly impressive in light of the many 
challenges of the past year, including unrest in Tibet, the 
earthquake in Sichuan, and final preparations for the 
Olympics.  However, Japan watches this relationship very 
closely and is concerned that it could change at any time. 
With regard to North Korea, Hokazono echoed other officials 
in expressing concern for the health of Kim Jong-il and any 
potential instability this might cause, particularly due to 
the fact that the North has missile and nuclear capabilities. 
 He was very grateful for information shared by the U.S. on 
North Korea and on other issues as well. 
 
¶20. (C) Takamizawa, like Kodera, discussed Russia and 
Georgia, saying that the recent conflict raises serious 
questions about Russia's potential for misconduct in the 
future, so much so that some are debating whether Japan needs 
to reevaluate force structure plans.  A/S Fort also discussed 
with Takamizawa the role Japan might consider playing in 
protecting against cyberspace attacks. 
 
¶21. (C) This cable was cleared by Assistant Secretary Fort. 
SCHIEFFER