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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 TOKYO 002875 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/15/08 
 
INDEX: 
 
(1) Japanese diplomacy left in the lurch (Asahi) 
 
(2) Japan should offer due contributions to North Korea's 
denuclearization (Asahi) 
 
(3) Inside story on delisting of North Korea: Secret deal to delist 
the North on Oct. 10 suspected; President made decision after 
judging that the North showed cooperative stance (Sankei) 
 
(4) U.S. removal of DPRK from terror blacklist creates ripple effect 
on Japan-U.S. alliance (Yomiuri) 
 
(5) Three weeks since Aso cabinet inaugurated; Kantei staff members 
set in full motion (Sankei) 
 
(6) Rocky road ahead of post-Kyoto Protocol framework: Can Japan's 
proposal obtain support at cabinet-preparatory meeting for COP14? 
(Asahi) 
 
(7) TOP HEADLINES 
 
(8) EDITORIALS 
 
(9) Prime Minister's schedule, October 13 (Nikkei) 
Prime Minister's schedule, October 14 (Nikkei) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Japanese diplomacy left in the lurch 
 
ASAHI (Page 1) (Full) 
October 15, 2008 
 
Prime Minister Aso on October 11 was told by U.S. President Bush 
that the U.S. would remove North Korea from its list of state 
sponsors of terrorism. He was out of town on business at the time. 
He was not with a secretary, who is temporarily dispatched from the 
Foreign Ministry, or an interpreter. He replied to the call from the 
president, using the cell-phone of a secretary dispatched from the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). The delisting of 
North Korea that day was absolutely a bolt out of the blue for the 
Japanese government. 
 
The telephone conversation between the two leaders lasted for about 
10 minutes from 11:30 p.m. on the afternoon of the 11th (Japan 
time). Secretary of State Rice had signed a paper to endorse the 
decision to remove that nation from the blacklist about three hours 
before that phone call. President Bush's phone call came 30 minutes 
before the formal announcement of the decision was made. 
 
Aso was staying in Hamamatsu City in order to attend the national 
convention of members of the Japan Junior Chamber to be held on the 
12th. A certain senior Foreign Ministry official stated: "There will 
be no removal today. The U.S. cannot possibly do that without 
telling Japan beforehand." 
 
Aides to the prime minister became busy around 11:00 p.m. When the 
prime minister was having chats with previous JC chairmen at a hotel 
lounge, his secretary's cell phone rang. It was a call from the 
Foreign Ministry, asking whether there was a telephone that could be 
 
TOKYO 00002875  002 OF 011 
 
 
connected to a phone call from President Bush. The secretary had to 
tell them the number of his own cell phone. 
 
When he was told that President Bush was calling, the prime minister 
excused himself from the drinking party and went to another room 
through the backdoor of the lounge. Telephone conversations between 
chiefs of states are usually held at places with secure facilities, 
such as the Kantei, with the presence of a senior Foreign Ministry 
official in charge or a special interpreter. However, the telephone 
conversation that day took place with a speaker attached to the cell 
phone and a government official present serving as an interpreter, 
while taking notes. A person who was present at the telephone 
conversation said, "Since we did not expect such a phone call, we 
were in a flurry. Since there happened to be two officials who had a 
good command of English, there were no problems." Winding up the 
telephone talks with the president, the prime minister went back to 
the party in the lounge. 
 
(2) Japan should offer due contributions to North Korea's 
denuclearization 
 
ASAHI (Page 8) (Full) 
October 13, 2008 
 
By Hajime Izumi, professor at Shizuoka Prefectural University 
 
The U.S. delisted North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. The 
U.S. must have come to this judgment that continuing the 
negotiations on the North Korea nuclear issue was indispensable, 
even if it meant the Bush administration would have to make 
concessions to the North. North Korea then agreed to allow experts 
to access to all declared nuclear facilities, but mutual consent 
will be needed for undeclared sites. Washington certainly yielded 
with concessions to Pyongyang. 
 
I visited Washington in late September. While staying there for 
about one week, I met officials and policymakers in the Bush 
administration to exchange views. Around that time, it was reported 
that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was suffering serious health 
problems. Through the discussions, I keenly felt that it would be 
extremely undesirable from the viewpoint of the U.S. for Kim to 
become incapacitated. 
 
The Bush administration fears that if Kim became unable to make 
policy decisions, Pyongyang might terminate its nuclear negotiations 
with the U.S. Seeing North Korea resuming operation of its Yongbyon 
reactor in September, the U.S. was even more wary of such a 
possibility. 
 
In response to Washington's delisting, North Korea has resumed steps 
to disable its nuclear reactor. With this development, prospects are 
in sight for the second phase of the disabling of existing nuclear 
facilities to be on the threshold of completion by the end of the 
year. 
 
After hearing the news that Washington had de-listed North Korea, 
views could be heard in Japan deploring that the nation had lost 
influential leverage to use in resolving the issue of North Korea's 
past abductions of Japanese nationals. People are worried about 
future developments in negotiations on the abduction issue. But it 
is necessary to cool-headedly recognize the following two points. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002875  003 OF 011 
 
 
The first point is that even during the period when the U.S. 
included North Korea's insincere attitude in dealing with the 
abduction issue among the reasons for its recognition of North Korea 
as a state sponsor of terrorism, there was no progress on the 
abduction issue. This shows that the delisting will not have a 
negative impact on Japan's efforts to resolve the abduction issue. 
 
The second point is that the U.S. Senate approved on Sept. 22 a bill 
amending the North Korean Human Rights Act. The bill includes a 
provision mandating North Korea to seriously address the abduction 
issue. By amending the law, the special envoy for human rights was 
empowered, with the position's status upgraded to the rank of 
ambassador. A part-time position was also promoted to a full-time 
position. The amended law also requires approval from the U.S. 
Senate for appointments to the post, involving the Congress more in 
the selection of a special envoy. 
 
The North Korean Human Rights Act will remain in force after the 
Bush administration leaves office. The legislation guarantees the 
U.S. will continue to work on North Korea to take action in 
resolving the abduction issue. We should not forget the U.S. 
commitment to helping Japan settle the issue. 
 
For the next administration, no matter who becomes president, Barack 
Obama or John McCain, the first priority task to tackle in dealing 
with North Korea's nuclear program will be removing to outside the 
country some 8000 spent fuel rods from which about 8 kilograms of 
plutonium can be extracted. 
 
If the rods are left in North Korea, that country could produce one 
or two nuclear weapons. There is even the possibility that the 
products might be sold to terrorists. 
 
The spent fuel also could enable the North to conduct several 
nuclear tests through which it might master the technology needed to 
produce a miniaturized nuclear weapon. In such a case, once the DPRK 
can produce a miniaturized warhead, its possession of nuclear-armed 
missiles would take on a touch of being a real possibility. North 
Korea already has deployed Nodong missiles with a range that covers 
all of Japan. If Nodong missiles are replaced by nuclear-tipped 
missiles, Japan will be exposed to a serious military threat. 
 
If fuel rods are removed from North Korea, Japan's safety will be 
largely ensured. It is estimated that 300 million dollars, or 
approximately 30 billion yen, would be needed for this task. To 
carry out this feat would surely contribute to Japan's security, I 
think Japan should be willing to foot the bill. 
 
The Japanese government has persisted with the stance of not 
offering energy and economic aid to North Korea before progress is 
made on the abduction issue. The U.S., China, South Korea, and 
Russia have already extended energy aid worth approximately 150 
million dollars, or about 15 billion yen, but Japan has offered 
nothing to the North. 
 
Removing fuel rods from North Korea is not assistance to North Korea 
but a means of reducing the nuclear threat to Japan. 
 
Needless to say, Japan should continue efforts to move negotiations 
on the abduction issue forward. But the security issue should be 
considered separately from the abduction issue. It is conceivable 
that Japan will be pressed to take such a stance once the 
 
TOKYO 00002875  004 OF 011 
 
 
denuclearization process is on the right track, as a result of the 
delisting decision. 
 
(3) Inside story on delisting of North Korea: Secret deal to delist 
the North on Oct. 10 suspected; President made decision after 
judging that the North showed cooperative stance 
 
SANKEI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly) 
October 15, 2008 
 
By Takashi Arimoto, Washington, and Makiko Takita, Foreign News 
Department 
 
A rumor is afoot among members of the Six-Party Talks that there was 
a secret deal between Washington and Pyongyang for the United States 
to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism on Oct. 10. 
There is no doubt that the United States rushed to delist the North 
in an effort to avoid a deterioration of the situation, such as 
another nuclear test by North Korea. However, Japan, in view of its 
abduction issue, objected to the delisting, saying that leaving an 
ambiguous situation would end up creating problems in the future. 
The matter has exposed once again a gap in views between the United 
States and Japan over the North Korean situation. The newspaper 
probed into what took place behind the scenes. 
 
The U.S. Department of State initially informed the press corps that 
it would hold a press conference at 9:30 a.m. Oct. 11 (10:30 p.m. 
Oct. 11, Japan time). The event was soon changed to 11 a.m. 
(midnight Oct. 12, Japan time). That was because priority was given 
to allow President George W. Bush time to inform Prime Minister Taro 
Aso of the decision to delist the North and seek his understanding 
over the phone. 
 
Around 8:00 p.m. Oct. 11, Japan time, U.S. Ambassador to Japan J. 
Thomas Schieffer informed the Japanese government with a sense of 
urgency that President Bush would like to talk to the prime minister 
on the phone. The hours generally coincided with the time when 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed a document to remove 
North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. 
 
According to a diplomatic source, the U.S. government had initially 
made arrangements to announce the delisting on Oct. 10. The U.S. 
plan was derailed by resistance coming from the Japanese government. 
In his telephone conversation with Secretary Rice on the morning of 
Oct. 10 (night of Oct. 10, Japan time), Foreign Minister Hirofumi 
Nakasone sought a cautious decision, saying that a draft agreement 
on verification, put together by Assistant Secretary of State (for 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs) Christopher Hill during his trip to 
North Korea earlier this month, contained some points that need to 
be confirmed. 
 
"We will continue talks" 
 
Before delisting the North, President Bush ordered Secretary Rice 
and others to obtain Japan's understanding. The President was aware 
of Japan's concern over the delisting via direct reports from 
Ambassador Schieffer. Speculation spread temporarily that given 
Japan's reluctance, the delisting would not take place on the 
weekend. Aboard the Air Force One for Florida on the afternoon of 
Oct. 10, White House Press Secretary Dana Perino, too, said: "We 
will continue talks with other Six-Party members." 
 
 
TOKYO 00002875  005 OF 011 
 
 
Developments began to unfold from the evening through the night of 
Oct. 10 (morning of Oct. 11, Japan time). According to a U.S. 
government source, President Bush decided to delist the North  after 
reaching the conclusion through additional exchanges of views via a 
New York channel -- a liaison route with North Korea with which the 
U.S. has no diplomatic ties -- that North Korea was exhibiting a 
posture to cooperate on the verification process. Secretary Rice 
informed the two presidential candidates -- Republican Senator John 
McCain and Democratic Senator Barack Obama -- of the President's 
decision to delist the North. 
 
A Six-Party Talks source made this comment about the announcement on 
the weekend: "To North Korea, Oct. 10, which marks the foundation 
day of the Korean Workers Party, carries great significance. There 
seems to have been a secret deal between the United States and North 
Korea on announcing the delisting on Oct. 10." The Washington Post 
mainly ascribed the delisting to widespread speculation that the 
North might conduct a second nuclear test. 
 
President Bush's series of words and actions point to the stance of 
placing high priority on relations with Japan. But in the end, the 
President accepted the policy course chosen by Secretary Rice and 
Assistant Secretary Hill who ultimately wanted to achieve diplomatic 
results by disabling the North's nuclear facilities. 
 
Rice did not show up at press conference 
 
Bearing the brunt of criticism from Japan which opposed the 
delisting, Assistance Secretary Hill at one point lashed out at a 
senior Foreign Ministry official: "Japan has been objecting to the 
delisting. Why don't you make your own list of state sponsors of 
terrorism? In such a case, can you designate Iran (a major oil 
exporter to Japan) (as a state sponsor of terrorism) ahead of other 
countries?" 
 
When he met in May a delegate to the United States that included 
members of the Association of the Families of Victims of Kidnapped 
by North Korea, Hill also said emotionally: "There is an Iran Air 
office near the U.S. Embassy Tokyo. In Iran, U.S. diplomats were 
held hostage. An old friend of mine was one of them. He still 
suffers from mental anguish from the experience. What do you think 
of that?" 
 
There is concern in the United States that the decision to delist 
the North would adversely affect its relations with Japan. 
 
In the Oct. 11 press conference on the delisting, Special Envoy for 
the Six-Party Talks Sung Kim urged North Korea to take action to 
resolve the abduction issue, while indicating, "We have continued 
intensive talks with all participants (in the Six-Party Talks), 
especially with Japan." Neither Secretary Rice nor Assistance 
Secretary Hill showed up at the news conference. 
 
(4) U.S. removal of DPRK from terror blacklist creates ripple effect 
on Japan-U.S. alliance 
 
YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 15, 2008 
 
The U.S. government's removal of North Korea from the list of states 
sponsoring terrorism is having a lasting effect on Japan, since the 
timing was unexpected. Voices of concern about the impact on the 
 
TOKYO 00002875  006 OF 011 
 
 
Japan-U.S. alliance are being raised one after another, with even 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama 
saying, "It revealed that the United States does not necessarily 
attach too much importance to Japan." 
 
Foreign Minister Nakasone, speaking in the Upper House Budget 
Committee on Oct. 14, rebutted such views: "It is not true that the 
United States carried out a decision without regard for our wishes." 
He intends to make another appeal on such issues as the importance 
of the abduction issue when he meets Secretary Rice in Abu Dhabi on 
Oct. 18. 
 
So far, Japan has been tossed back and forth as the U.S. and North 
Korea engaged in diplomatic tactics.  At the time of the nuclear 
crisis of 1993, there was even talk within the Clinton 
administration of air-striking North Korea, but with the signing of 
the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and the DPRK in 1994, the 
second Clinton administration strengthened its conciliatory posture 
toward that country, and then Secretary of State Albright even 
visited Pyongyang. The U.S. greatly swung back and forth. There was 
no progress on missiles, an issue of concern to Japan. 
 
During the first term of the Bush administration, the 
neoconservatives, who wanted regime change in North Korea, were 
influential, and a hard-line stance stood out. But during the second 
term, the hard-line stance petered out when the administration 
became mired in Iraq policy. There was a strong impression that 
results on the North Korean front were being sped up. 
 
During this period, not only was the abduction issue left 
unresolved, North Korea proceeded to deploy mid-range ballistic 
missiles, and the security environment around Japan continued to 
worsen. The Tokyo Foundation, in a recently announced set of 
security proposals, pointed out: "North Korea over the past 10 years 
has improved its missile capabilities and has come close to the 
stage of being able to use them to launch nuclear weapons. The scale 
of destruction would be exponentially greater than before." 
 
Japan's basic strategy of comprehensively resolving the nuclear, 
missile, and abduction issues has as its greatest aim to make sure 
that the United States and China - powers that have the strongest 
influence on North Korea - will not be able to ignore the abduction 
issue. In that sense, at the point when the abduction issue was 
folded into the framework of the Six-Party Talks, Japan's strategy 
was halfway toward reaching its goal. 
 
The U.S. government has stressed that sanctions against North Korea 
still remain, and urged Japan not to exaggerate the importance of 
the delisting steps. The U.S. also stressed that there has been no 
change in the importance of resolving the abduction issue.  It is 
true that once its name was removed from the terror blacklist, North 
Korea announced that it was resuming the work of disabling its 
nuclear facility, and there has been a bit of progress on the 
abduction front. 
 
However, the psychological impact of the delisting cannot be 
underestimated. A top official at the Foreign Ministry lamented 
yesterday: "The U.S. does not realize that very much." If confidence 
is shaken in the Japan-U.S. relationship, the threat from North 
Korea can only grow. It is therefore urgent that trust be rebuilt 
between the two countries. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002875  007 OF 011 
 
 
(5) Three weeks since Aso cabinet inaugurated; Kantei staff members 
set in full motion 
 
SANKEI (Page 4) (Full) 
October 13, 2008 
 
Three weeks will soon pass since the cabinet of Prime Minister Taro 
Aso was inaugurated. The Aso cabinet was initially deemed a 
caretaker government to prepare for a general election. Aso, 
however, has taken a stance of forgoing the dissolution of the House 
of Representatives and the calling of a snap election. The Prime 
Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) staff members, whom Aso 
picked on his own, will go into action on a full scale. The Sankei 
Shimbun has looked into Aso's policy image based on his selection of 
people to staff the Kantei. 
 
Surprise appointment of Kawamura as chief cabinet secretary 
 
The appointment of Takeo Kawamura as chief cabinet secretary was 
seen as a surprise. Kawamura is a Lower House member elected in the 
Yamaguchi No. 3 district. He is now serving his six-term in the 
Diet. It is unusual for a prime minister to pick his chief aide from 
another faction. Kawamura belongs to the Ibuki faction. Aso and 
Kawamura share only thing in common: they both belong to the 
educational policy clique in the Diet. The main reasons for Aso 
having appointed Kawamura are his personal channels to the 
opposition camp and his strong election base, allowing him to stay 
in Tokyo during the election campaign, according to a person close 
to Aso. However, one cabinet member pointed out: "Former Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, who is a longtime ally of Aso, proposed 
Kawamura. Abe and Kawamura hail from the same prefecture 
(Yamaguchi). 
 
Aso picked Jun Matsumoto and Yoshitaka Konoike to serve as deputy 
chief cabinet secretaries for political affairs. Matsumoto, who is a 
Lower House member elected in the Kanagawa No. 1 district, is now 
serving his third term in the Diet. Konoike, an Upper House member 
elected in Hyogo Prefecture, is in his third term in the Diet. 
Matsumoto is the closest aide to Aso. It is said that Aso listens to 
Matsumoto's opinions in a serious manner. The prime minister often 
has dinner with him. 
 
Aso and Konoike have known each other since they were members of the 
Japan Junior Chamber of Commerce (JJC). The two at one time have 
headed the JJC. 
 
Aso appointed former National Police Agency Director General Iwao 
Uruma as deputy chief cabinet secretary for administrative affairs 
in place of Masahito Futahashi, former administrative vice minister 
for the defunct Home Affairs Ministry. The post had been served by 
officials from the former Health and Welfare Ministry and the former 
Home Affairs Ministry. The appointment of a NPA official is an 
exceptional case, following Hiromori Kawashima as deputy chief 
cabinet secretary in the Tanaka and Miki cabinets. A source 
connected to the Kantei said: "The prime minister highly evaluated 
Uruma's effort to deal with such difficult issues as North Korea's 
abductions of Japanese nationals." 
 
Increase in secretaries unprecedented 
 
The increase in the number of secretaries to the prime minister is a 
major distinction. The secretaries to the prime ministerial used to 
 
TOKYO 00002875  008 OF 011 
 
 
be made up of one veteran secretary for political affairs and four 
secretaries for administrative affairs coming from the Finance 
Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, and the National Police Agency. Aso has now 
picked an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications as a secretary. 
 
Masakatsu Okamoto, former vice minister for policy coordination of 
the MIAC, served as director general of the Local Allocation Tax 
Division during Aso's tenure as minister for MIAC. It is said that 
Okamoto gained Aso's confidence during that time. Aso also picked 
Shunichi Yamaguchi, a Lower House member elected in the Tokushima 
No. 2 district and former postal rebel, secretary to the prime 
minister on revitalization of the local economy, as well as former 
Kitakyushu Mayor Koichi Sueyoshi as cabinet secretariat counsellor. 
 
Aso also added two assistant deputy chief cabinet secretaries -- one 
for internal affairs and the other for foreign policy -- who are at 
the same level as administrative vice ministers. Chikao Kawai was 
replaced in less than two months by Keiichi Hayashi, then deputy 
vice-minister of the Foreign Ministry's Minister's Secretariat due 
to differences in foreign policies of former Prime Minister Yasuo 
Fukuda and Prime Minister Aso, according to some political 
observers. 
 
An aide to Aso said: "The prime minister was very fussy in selecting 
on his own the Kantei staff members." They are known as "Team Aso." 
The Kantei lineup thus was completely changed. Compared with the 
former Fukuda cabinet, the Aso cabinet's unity appears to be solid. 
A veteran LDP lawmaker commented: "I wonder if the Kantei staff 
members are all yes-men" Some in the LDP are concerned about the 
possibility of return of the likes of the former Abe cabinet, which 
was ridiculed for being a "cabinet of good friends." 
 
Lineup of Kantei staff members 
 
Prime Minister Aso 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura 
Deputy chief cabinet secretaries: Matsumoto 
Konoike 
Uruma 
Special advisors to the prime minister: Kyoko Nakayama (on the 
abduction issue) 
Shunichi Yamaguchi (on revitalization of local economy) 
Assistant deputy chief cabinet secretaries: Susumu Fukuda (Finance 
Ministry) 
Keiichi Hayashi (Foreign Ministry) 
Kyoji Yanagisawa (Defense Ministry) 
Secretaries to the prime minister Ichiro Muramatsu (Aso office) 
Masakatsu Okamoto (ex-Home Affairs Ministry) 
Masatsugu Asakawa (Finance Ministry) 
Kazuyuki Yamazaki (Foreign Ministry) 
Tadao Yanase (METI) 
Nobuyuki Muroki (NPA) 
 
(6) Rocky road ahead of post-Kyoto Protocol framework: Can Japan's 
proposal obtain support at cabinet-preparatory meeting for COP14? 
 
ASAHI (Page 6) (Full) 
October 11, 2008 
 
A cabinet-level preparatory meeting for the 14th session of the 
 
TOKYO 00002875  009 OF 011 
 
 
Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention (COP14) 
to be held in Poznan, Poland is set to be held on October 13-14. The 
Japanese government wants to stir up discussions on a framework 
designed to cut greenhouse gas emissions that would replace the 
Kyoto Protocol with a new proposal for mandating key developing 
countries, such as China and India, to set emissions reduction 
goals. 
 
The new proposal divides developing countries, which currently have 
no obligations to cut carbon emissions, depending on the stages of 
their economic development. Key developing countries will be asked 
to set efficiency goals with binding power -- one to be achieved by 
main industry sectors and the other to be achieved by those nations' 
economies as a whole. Remaining developing countries will be sought 
to submit action programs and to verify emissions reduction efforts 
on a regular basis. 
 
A certain Foreign Ministry officials proudly noted, "Japan has come 
up with a proposal, which no other country has been willing to 
articulate. You can't possibly stop global warming under the present 
conditions, in which none of the key developing countries have any 
obligations to make efforts to cut carbon emissions." 
 
China, which was made the target of the Japanese proposal, submitted 
a paper insisting that dividing developing countries into more 
detailed categories runs counter to the treaty. It is determined to 
oppose the proposal. It is also against the sector-specific 
approach, which Japan advocates, saying that such an approach should 
be for the sake of technology transfers from industrialized 
countries to developing countries and that it is unacceptable for 
such an approach to lead to setting reductions targets. 
 
Japan had also proposed that developing countries that are members 
of the OECD, such as South Korea, and countries with large GDPs, 
such as Singapore, should be categorized as developing countries. In 
response, South Korea and South Africa have come up with a proposal 
for a system of internationally approving developing countries' 
efforts to cut carbon emissions by registering their activities with 
the UN. Their proposal is noteworthy of attention as a new move. 
Singapore is also insisting that it should be allowed to make a 
voluntary pledge for emissions cuts, with consideration given to its 
conditions, such as that it is a small country and has high 
population density. 
 
Japan during the COP14 meeting intends to call on all countries to 
agree on the long-term target of at least halving the total carbon 
emissions by the world by 2050, as agreed upon at the G-8 in 
Hokkaido. However, developing countries are insisting that 
industrialized countries should cut 25 PERCENT -40 PERCENT  by 2020 
and 80 PERCENT -95 PERCENT  by 2050. 
 
The goal the EU has put up is that industrialized countries should 
cut emissions 30 PERCENT  by 2020. Its stance regarding the 
post-Kyoto framework is that it is necessary for developing 
countries to take action to cut carbon emissions, Based on that 
stance, it has proposed a plan to compensate developing countries 
for their emissions reduction efforts, according to the degree of 
achievements. Its proposal does not include punishments, either. 
However, it has no new proposals. The U.S., where the Bush 
administration is in the closing days, has made only an abstract 
proposal that more discussions should be pursued on what the shared 
vision is. 
 
TOKYO 00002875  010 OF 011 
 
 
 
Japan has clearly confronted key developing countries with a 
distinctive proposal. Environment Minister Saito did not take part 
in the preparatory meeting because of Diet deliberations. How many 
countries will agree on Japan's proposal is unclear. 
 
 (7) TOP HEADLINES 
 
Asahi: 
NHK plans to return 10 PERCENT  of subscription fees to viewers 
starting in fiscal 2012 
 
Mainichi, Yomiuri and Nikkei: 
U.S. to inject 25 trillion yen into financial institutions, 
including nine major banks 
 
Tokyo Shimbun: Hachioji health office detects dichlorvos 30,000 
times the residue standard in beans from China 
 
Akahata: 
Medical insurance premiums to be withheld from pension benefits for 
6.25 million aged 75 and older today 
 
(8) EDITORIALS 
 
Asahi: 
(1) Stock prices bounce back 
(2) Death of MSDF member: Organization must be improved 
 
Mainichi: 
(1) Professional baseball world must not dampen high spirits of 
youths 
(2) Newspaper week: Door to information must be open 
 
Yomiuri: 
(1) Stock market rebound not end of crisis 
(2) Newspaper week: Newspapers must continue to serve as compass of 
times 
 
Nikkei: 
(1) Emergency concerted action must be highly effective 
 
Tokyo Shimbun: 
(1) Counties around world must reconfirm unity in taking steps to 
stabilize financial markets 
(2) Japanese doctor abducted in Ethiopia: Safety must come first 
 
Akahata: 
(1) U.S.-triggered financial crisis must not take toll on people 
 
(9) Prime Minister's schedule, October 13 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 15, 2008 
 
09:49 
Walked around his private residence in Kamiyama-cho. 
 
16:00 
Me with Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura, Pubic Relations 
Headquarters Chairman Furuya at LDP headquarters. Had photo session 
for and taped message for public relations. 
 
TOKYO 00002875  011 OF 011 
 
 
 
18:29 
Met again with Kawamura and Furuya. 
 
18:43 
Met with Finance Minister Nakagawa and Kawamura. 
 
19:47 
Met with secretaries at Imperial Hotel. 
 
22:49 
Returned to his private residence. 
 
Prime Minister's schedule, October 14 
 
NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
October 15, 2008 
 
07:32 
Met at Kantei with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Konoike. 
 
08:36 
Attended cabinet meeting in Diet building. 
 
09:01 
Attended Upper House Budget Committee session. 
 
12:03 
Met at Kantei with Economic and Fiscal Minister Yosano and Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Kawamura. 
 
13:00 
Attended Upper House Budget Committee session. 
 
16:50 
Met with Finance Minister Nakagawa and Kawamura. 
 
17:27 
Met at Kantei with Special Advisor Yamaguchi, followed by Deputy 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Uruma. 
 
18:28 
Met with BOJ Gov. Shirakawa. 
 
19:08 
Met with Uruma, followed by Foreign Ministry Economic Affairs Bureau 
chief Otabe and Finance Ministry International Bureau chief Tamaki. 
 
21:08 
Met with Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto and Assistant 
Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yamaguchi at the bar Majiri in 
Roppongi. 
 
23:20 
Returned to his private residence. 
 
SCHIEFFER