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UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000898 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL  SESSION, 
OCTOBER 14-17, 2008 (EC-54) 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 569 
     ¶B. STATE 108991 
     ¶C. THE HAGUE 891 
     ¶D. THE HAGUE 896 
 
This is CWC-51-08 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Like the Dutch weather, the sunshine and 
progress of Executive Council 53 in June (Ref A) 
returned to more typical dark clouds and rain in 
Executive Council 54, October 14-17.  Despite daily 
meetings, lobbying, and a small group of key 
delegations meeting to try and find compromise, the 
week ended with no agreement on the Budget and 
Program of Work for 2009.  The Iranian delegation, 
still without an ambassador, held up a large number 
of agenda items starting with the agenda itself, and 
keeping the U.S. 90-day report hostage until midnight 
on Friday evening.  The Iranian obstructionist drama 
reached a climax on Wednesday during the discussion 
of the Director-General's Note on the Secretariat's 
readiness for a challenge inspection, when the 
tolerance of the rest of the Council for Iranian 
tactics hit its limit. Delegation after delegation 
spoke of the need to carry on the business of the EC, 
backed by the Secretariat's pronouncements on 
procedure.  Several delegations called for a vote, 
with only China and South Africa arguing for a "bit 
more time" to resolve Iran's issues (and save its 
face). 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  While the Iranians  eventually allowed 
most agenda items to move forward, including the 
challenge inspection report, they introduced or 
insisted on report language on an unusually large 
number of issues, most likely a sign of their 
strategy ahead for the Conference of States Parties 
when the Budget must be approved.  The final item on 
the agenda which the Iranians blocked until the very 
end of the Council was the U.S. 90-day destruction 
report, with Iran insisting on adding unacceptable 
new reporting requirements for future facilities. The 
U.S. delegation succeeded in gutting that proposal, 
but only after other Council members objected to 
discrimination against a single member state (the 
U.S.) and the Director-General (DG) himself spoke to 
the past nature and factual basis required for the 
90-day destruction reports. 
 
¶3. (U) In a surprising denouement, the Council 
session concluded at midnight with a series of 
accolades for Ambassador Javits, begun by the EC 
Chairperson and echoed by regional group 
representatives and other delegations around the 
room, ending in applause for his last Council 
session. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The dynamic highlights of this EC are 
detailed below, followed by a review of the actions 
taken by the Council, and reports on sidebar meetings 
held by the U.S delegation.  A full listing of the 
agenda items deferred and reports noted can be found 
in the official OPCW Report for EC-54.  The October 
13 meeting of donors to the Russian destruction 
program and the EC's destruction informals, as well 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary Staley's meetings and a 
meeting with the Libyan delegation are reported in 
separate telegrams (refs C and D).  End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
NO DEAL ON THE BUDGET 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Budget facilitator Martin Strub 
(Switzerland) patiently continued negotiations during 
the EC lunch break throughout the week.  By Friday 
(October 17), most delegations were either supporting 
or resigning themselves to the position led by the 
U.S. delegation against raising member states' 
assessed contributions for 2009.  At week's end, the 
original draft budget document from June was the only 
one under discussion, with the income lost from 
revised Article IV and V payments to become a 
reduction of some 530,000 Euros from the 75 million 
Euro total.  By Strub's analysis, the single major 
issue left on the table was the increase in the 
number of inspections of Other Chemical Production 
Facilities (OCPFs), with Western European and Others 
Group (WEOG) members insisting on the minimum of ten 
additional inspections the DG had put in the original 
budget draft, and some Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 
states insisting on no/no increase in inspections 
over the 2008 level. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Strub told WEOG that China and India opposed 
the increase in OCPF inspections on principle; other 
NAM members appeared to be more flexible, apparently 
seeing what they might add to the International 
Cooperation and Assistance programs following a 
decrease in inspection funding.  Others, most notably 
South Africa, appeared to be jockeying for leverage 
without a clear objective or national position.  The 
Cuban delegation had indicated to some WEOG delegates 
that there was no agreed NAM position on the OCPF 
issue. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Strub invited a small group of the most 
interested delegations (U.S., UK, China, India, Iran, 
and others) to meet on October 17 as soon as the 
council adjourned its morning session.  While 
Ambassador Javits proposed a possible compromise, it 
did not gain traction.  At an emergency WEOG meeting 
later in the afternoon, Strub made a plea for 
compromising on OCPF numbers to try and isolate Iran. 
(Iranian attendance at budget meetings was spotty all 
week with old issues raised as ongoing concerns, such 
as the key performance indicators, and the required 
cost of living increase that the TS had repeatedly 
stated it could absorb.)  U.S. Delrep and other WEOG 
reps argued that isolating Iran would not work, as 
Iran did not see the end of the EC as a real 
deadline, having argued there was "no rush" to 
conclude the budget before the CSP.  There was broad 
agreement in WEOG that any concessions made early in 
an effort to compromise would just be pocketed by 
Iran and other NAM members blocking any final 
negotiations and agreement before the CSP. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) When the EC formally reconvened at 20:00 
hours the evening of October 17, Strub informed the 
Chairperson that no agreement had been reached on the 
draft budget and it would have to be deferred to 
another (special) EC session. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
IRANIAN OBSTRUCTION/ COUNCIL CONFRONTATION 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶9. (U) In terms of Iranian behavior, EC-54 saw what 
many WEOG colleagues later termed a "return to 
normal".  The Iranian delegation deferred almost 
every agenda item on the first pass, although it 
Qevery agenda item on the first pass, although it 
later agreed to note or approve all except a few 
documents that were then deferred to EC-55.  At 
times, however, it was difficult to discern whether 
actions fell under the category of obstructionism or 
confusion.  Both were evident.  With no Ambassador to 
replace previous Iranian Ambassador Ziaran, the 
delegation was noticeably lacking in leadership and 
coherence.  Iran often appeared to defer items simply 
 
because of an inability to grapple with the substance 
or lack of internal agreement among their nine-man 
delegation.  Internal dynamics aside, Iran returned 
to center stage at this Council session. 
 
¶10. (U) A noticeable change, however, was Iran's 
increasing isolation and lack of support from 
otherwise vocal members of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM).  On the Director General's Note on Challenge 
Inspections, Iran made the tactical mistake of 
clearly stating that it would be "unable to note this 
item until appropriate report language had been 
developed in order to retain its leverage."  After a 
number of interventions across the regional groups 
that expressed outrage at this procedural game- 
playing, Mexican Ambassador Lomonaco asked the Chair 
whether any other delegation shared Iran's view, and 
if not, whether the Council might consider a vote. 
To avoid breaking from the long-established tradition 
of consensus, South Africa and China finally 
intervened to request more time, but exasperation 
with Iran was unmistakable.  Cuba also intervened, 
but in a way that indicated Iran was acting without 
the support and consensus of the NAM. 
 
¶11. Even during Iran's final push to trap the U.S. 
with unacceptable report language on 
"operationalization" of destruction facilities, a 
topic that would normally enjoy widespread NAM 
engagement, interventions were entirely in support of 
a more reasonable approach, further highlighting 
Iran's isolation.  In general, Iran was inconsistent 
in its final position on various issues and report 
language.  If the Iranian delegation's only "must- 
have" was a public confrontation with the U.S., they 
met their goal, but at increasing cost to their 
credibility. 
 
--------------------- 
END GAME - U.S./ IRAN 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (U) Having hinted for weeks that a confrontation 
on the U.S. destruction program was inevitable, Iran 
did not disappoint.  Beginning with questions and 
insinuations at the destruction informals about the 
"lack of transparency" the U.S. displayed by refusing 
to provide start-up dates for its facilities at 
Pueblo and Blue Grass, Iran carried on throughout the 
week but, true to form, refused to come forward with 
report language on the U.S. 90-Day Destruction Report 
until Thursday evening.  Despite Iranian requests to 
solve the issue bilaterally (i.e. in a backroom 
deal), the issue was aired, discussed, and eventually 
resolved, on the Council floor on Friday at U.S. 
insistence.  Tactically, this served U.S. interests, 
as it only increased the Council's already 
significant exasperation with Iran.  Support for the 
U.S. came from more corners than usual, despite some 
agreement with the substance of the Iranian 
complaint.  The Council ended at midnight Friday, 
having devoted approximately six hours over two days 
to this particular discussion. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) Del comment:  Although eventual 
incorporation of very general language in the chapeau 
above all of the 90-Day reports may quiet the 
Iranians for the next several sessions, Del expects 
this line of questioning to continue.  Although Iran 
was isolated this time, it is likely only a matter of 
Qwas isolated this time, it is likely only a matter of 
time before others begin to press the U.S. for more 
detailed information on the status of the two 
facilities that will bear primary responsibility for 
running the U.S. destruction program well past the 
2012 deadline. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
EC-54 OPENING SESSION AND GENERAL DEBATE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) Chairperson Oksana Tomova (Slovakia) formally 
opened EC-54 on October 14 thirty minutes late after 
the prior Bureau meeting discussed at length Iranian 
insistence on deletion of the agenda item on OCPF 
declarations.  The Bureau's compromise solution was 
to expand the original item to include the cluster of 
industry issues.  Iran proposed that change from the 
floor, which the Council accepted as it adopted the 
agenda, much too many delegations' relief after 
several weeks of Iranian opposition to the draft 
agenda. 
 
¶15. (U) In his Statement, Director General (DG) 
Rogelio Pfirter congratulated A State Party for the 
complete destruction of its entire chemical weapon 
stockpile, to which the EC broke into applause. Of 
note in his long review of OPCW activities, Pfirter 
expressed optimism that Lebanon would accede to the 
treaty in short order.  He indicated that he had sent 
a letter to the Secretary General (SG) of the Arab 
League recently asking the SG for his full support in 
helping to bring the remaining Arab states outside of 
the convention in as members.  He also announced the 
appointment of Marc Vogelaar, former Dutch Ambassador 
to the OPCW, as a special consultant on universality 
matters at no cost to OPCW (courtesy of the Dutch 
government).  Pfirter concluded his remarks with an 
announcement that he had tasked the Technical 
Secretariat (TS) to prepare two papers on the 
Scientific Advisory Board following the 
recommendations of the Second Review Conference, and 
a paper on incapacitating chemicals for law 
enforcement purposes. 
 
¶16.  (U) The General Debate included group statements 
from French Ambassador Jean-Francois Blarel on behalf 
of the European Union, Cuban Ambassador Oscar de los 
Reyes Ramos on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and 
China, and South African delegate Marthinus van 
Schalkwyk on behalf of the African Group.  Japan, 
China, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Russia, the U.S., 
Spain, Iran, India, Korea, Brazil, Tunisia and Libya 
gave national statements.  A key theme in nearly all 
the speeches was praise for A State Party's 
completion of destruction on time, along with the 
importance of CW destruction to the treaty.  Several 
statements included support for the OPCW as a forum 
to help prevent the spread of chemical terrorism, 
most notably the NAM statement -- for the first time. 
 
¶17. (U)   Several of the NAM statements called for 
the full implementation of Article XI, and for the 
improved sharing of technology and equipment.  Russia 
strongly linked implementation of Article XI with 
full implementation of Article VII as a precursor. 
Most statements voiced approval for the zero nominal 
growth budget before the Council.  South Africa, in 
contrast, argued that a lack of budget increase 
hampered the activities of the OPCW.  The only strong 
difference in the national statements was on OCPF 
inspections.  The EU and U.S. called for an increase 
in these inspections, while NAM delegates urged 
improvement in site selection for the inspections 
first. 
 
¶18. (U) Iran used its statement to highlight a "grey 
Q18. (U) Iran used its statement to highlight a "grey 
area" in how States Parties were addressing 
destruction, namely that the two major possessors-- 
the U.S. and Russia -- did not have a detailed 
timeline to complete their destruction efforts.  It 
also called for intensified consultations regarding 
Article XI and for additional efforts to assist 
States Parties under Article X, including the need 
for help regarding terrorist threats or other 
 
threatened use of CW.  Iran concluded by stating that 
the number of OCPF inspections must be treated as a 
policy issue and be intricately linked to overall 
Industry Cluster policies.  India echoed that view. 
Brazil took a middle road, stating that the OPCW 
should not move away from a zero-growth budget and 
that the OCPF methodology should be improved, but not 
just by increasing the number of inspections. 
 
¶19. (SBU) India reiterated that it had destroyed more 
than 97% of its stockpile and that it was on target 
to complete destruction by the April 2009 deadline. 
Libya reported that it has established a national 
committee to oversee implementation and that it has 
passed national legislation.  It also highlighted 
that it had held a national conference to education 
stakeholders regarding the Convention. 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
VERIFICATION PLANS AND FACILITY AGREEMENTS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶20. (U) After evident confusion on the part of the 
Iranian delegation, Libya's Facility Agreement and 
Verification Plan were approved, as were changes to 
the U.S. Verification Plan and Facility Agreement for 
the Recovered Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility. 
Del met bilaterally with Iran to answer questions on 
the new U.S. Schedule 1 Facility Agreement, which 
initially stemmed from a lack of Iranian 
understanding of the purpose of several accompanying 
documents (comparison with Model Facility Agreement 
and corrigendum), but then turned to more pointed 
questions about a paragraph on sampling and analysis 
drafting to take into account the requirements of 
Condition 18.  Despite U.S. explanations and the fact 
that this language was consistent with the U.S. 
Schedule 2 Facility Agreement, Iran deferred 
consideration of the agreement to EC-55. 
 
¶21. (U) A number of questions also arose on Iran's 
Schedule 1 Facility Agreement, changes to which were 
distributed during the EC week.  Several delegations 
asked for legal clarification as to the difference 
between "agreement" (title of the previously approved 
document) and "arrangement" (title of the revised 
version), as well as between "shall" and "will" in 
Farsi.  The Legal Advisor offered assurances that the 
document's legal standing had not been diminished. 
The U.S., supported by Germany, requested additional 
information from the Iranian government and deferred 
the item to EC-55. 
 
------------------------------ 
CONVERSION -- LIBYA'S DEADLINE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶22. (U) Despite concerns that Libya's missed 
conversion deadline could attract attention, this 
subject escaped with little discussion.  Germany 
expressed concern, noting that missing deadlines was 
not good for the integrity of the Convention, and 
urging Libya to speed up the conversion of Rabta. 
 
¶23. (SBU) A rather confusing DG Note issued without 
warning just prior to the EC added nothing to the 
dialogue and caught the Libyans themselves by 
surprise, a fact that Libyan rep Hesnawy intended to 
discuss personally with the DG.  The Note, EC- 
54/DG.17, is titled to refer to the Completion of 
Conversion of Production Facilities in general, but 
QConversion of Production Facilities in general, but 
the content deals only with Libya.  The Note lays out 
Libyan progress and steps taken and states in the 
final paragraph that the Note has been provided to 
"facilitate the decision of States Parties on 
appropriate measures to be applied."  A similar paper 
 
was not issued for India or Russia, both of whom have 
long since passed the deadline for conversion of 
their chemical weapons production facilities.  Delrep 
heard later from a member of the TS that this was a 
political step taken to satisfy "one or two" 
delegations. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
DESTRUCTION - 90 DAY AND SHCHUCHYE REPORTS 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶24. (U) Although Iran briefly deferred the Libyan 90- 
day report without explanation, their delegation 
eventually agreed to note this document and shifted 
its considerable attention to the U.S. report, as 
described above.  The Secretariat and States Parties 
alike vocally resisted the discriminatory treatment 
of one State Party's factual report.  Of note, the DG 
himself, in an attempt to separate Iranian concerns 
about the U.S. program from the noting of a factual 
report, suggested that a more appropriate forum for 
such discussions would be the discussion of the next 
EC visit to the U.S.  (Del comment: While helpful in 
the context of EC-54, this philosophy is likely to 
come back to haunt the U.S. and the Council when it 
comes time to prepare for and discuss the results of 
the visit next year to Pueblo and Umatilla.) 
 
¶25. (U) Earlier in the week, South Africa requested a 
consultation to discuss the report of the Shchuchye 
visit.  In a brief meeting on October 16, South 
Africa thanked the Russian delegation for their 
cooperation and the patience of all and proposed 
acceptable report language.  The report was noted in 
the afternoon session with far less controversy than 
the analogous report of the EC visit to Anniston in 
¶2007. 
 
--------------------------------- 
ARTICLE VII IMPLEMENTATION 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶26. (U) Said Moussi (Algeria), facilitator for this 
topic, made a brief report on the three consultations 
held since the previous EC meeting.  Luxembourg 
reported that their government had forwarded a "pre- 
draft" of their legislation to the TS on October 13 
for comments.  After the EC noted the DG's Note, Iran 
stated that they felt that the DG's Note expressed 
some "views" of the TS that may go beyond strict 
facts, and requested that consultations on that point 
be held. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
ARTICLE X ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶27. (U) Iran continued its efforts to keep this issue 
on the agenda and push for a primary focus on the 
needs and care of victims of CW use.  Russian 
facilitator Victor Smirnovsky reported to the 
Council; his list of consultations and activities 
illustrated the work that has been done on Article X 
since the agreement of the CSP-12 mandate for the 
Council to "conduct intensive deliberations to 
develop measures for emergency assistance, including 
with regard to the victims of chemical weapons." 
Iran proposed report language that veered far too 
close to establishing a mandate for care of current 
(Iranian) CW victims, but agreed fairly easily to 
more acceptable language.  On the Council floor, as 
the result of confusion over an edited version, Iran 
Qthe result of confusion over an edited version, Iran 
surprisingly agreed to the deletion of a key 
paragraph referring to their victims' proposal.  (DEL 
COMMENT:  As Iran has been discussing the concept of 
a victims' network since CSP-12 with virtually no 
progress, it is still not entirely clear what the 
 
Iranian delegation hopes to achieve on the issue this 
year.  Bargaining at CSP-13 is likely.  END COMMENT.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
ARTICLE XI ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶28. (U) Facilitator Li Hong (China) reported on 
recent consultations.  Cuba presented its earlier 
proposal, now a national paper, for a workshop to 
develop ideas on concrete proposals toward the full 
implementation of Article XI.  Of note, the paper 
states that due allocations within the 2009 budget, 
along with additional voluntary funding, would be 
needed.  This proposal received broad support during 
the consultations.  Iran, in turn, presented a 
competing proposal during the EC for the workshop, 
including measures to promote free trade in chemicals 
and identification of measures "to avoid hampering 
the economic development of States Parties." 
 
¶29. (SBU) Del Comment:  In WEOG meetings on the 
margins of the Council, several delegations expressed 
concern about funding the workshop if it might turn 
into an "Australia Group bashing."  Funding for the 
workshop remains one of the issues to be negotiated 
in the draft budget before its final approval. 
 
------------- 
UNIVERSALITY 
------------- 
 
¶30. (U) Facilitator Lee Litman (UK) gave a report 
early in the week on the consultation held in 
September.  Iran initially moved to defer the annual 
report to the next session of the Council, but later 
permitted it to be noted.  Iran insisted that 
language be included in the Council report on 
continuing consultations on universality.  The UK 
subsequently drafted language that was accepted by 
the EC for the report. 
 
-------------------------------- 
INDUSTRY ISSUES AND OCPF PAPERS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶31. (U) After Iran changed the agenda item to reflect 
all industry issues, the EC discussion centered more 
on what should be addressed than anything substantive 
on industry.  Iran stated that more time was needed 
and that all industry issues should be treated 
equally; their delegate also referred to a "package" 
without further detail.  The Mexican Ambassador 
questioned Iran on what it expected on the new agenda 
item.  The UK and others noted the opportunity for 
the Council to discuss the two TS papers on OCPF 
declarations.  U.S. Delrep welcomed the two new 
facilitators for industry issues and suggested that 
report language reflect their appointment and the 
need for other facilitators to volunteer to lead 
consultations on frequency and site selection. 
The Chairperson requested that the Algerian 
Ambassador, as Vice Chair for the industry issues, 
coordinate report language; the Algerian delegate 
agreed to do so on behalf of her ambassador. 
 
¶32. (SBU) Negotiation of industry report language 
moved to the corridors but failed to progress in 
Ambassador Dani's absence.  On Thursday when Algerian 
delegate Said Moussi returned to The Hague, he began 
working with interested delegations privately to 
construct suitable language.  The Iranians worked to 
remove references to OCPFs and the two TS papers; 
Qremove references to OCPFs and the two TS papers; 
WEOG delegations insisted on welcoming the new 
facilitators by name for Schedule 2a/2a* low 
concentrations and OCPF declarations by name and 
urging the appointment of facilitators for other 
 
industry issues.  In the end, the report language 
reflected western views on the facilitations but had 
no mention of the two TS papers that initiated the 
original agenda item. 
 
-------------------- 
CHALLENGE INSPECTION 
-------------------- 
 
¶33. (U) As described above, Iran seized upon the DG's 
annual report on TS readiness to conduct a challenge 
inspection to make it painfully clear that it 
intended to hold virtually all documents hostage 
until it was guaranteed "appropriate" report 
language.  While isolated on process, Iran did 
receive support from several NAM delegations on the 
substance of calling for the resolution of the 
"unresolved issues" from the Preparatory Commission 
days.  Report language, while toned down from Iran's 
original proposal, eventually supported this.  Del 
anticipates few delegates will want to volunteer for 
a facilitation that is doomed to political stalemate 
and has been dormant since the previous facilitator 
left over a year ago. 
 
----------- 
ABAF ACTION 
----------- 
 
¶34. (U) After the Council noted the reports of the 
Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial 
matters, U.S. Delrep, supported by UK and Germany, 
requested the deferral of the entire slate of 
nominations for the ABAF to the next session.  Delrep 
noted the late letters of appointment and the need 
for independent financial experts, and requested 
resumes for all of the candidates. 
 
¶35. (SBU) Del comment.  In a private conversation 
later with OPCW Administrative Director Ron Nelson, 
he welcomed the move toward ABAF reform. 
 
¶36. (U) Currency exchange risk report:  Iran asked 
about the basis for the TS calculations included in 
this Note, to which the TS responded.  Iran then 
asked that this item be deferred to the EC meeting 
following the next ABAF meeting, a highly unusual 
intervention for a routine report.  Mexico asked what 
the practical consequences would be to this deferral, 
to which the DG said there would be no consequence as 
this is a report only and does not affect their 
current practices.  The item was then deferred to EC- 
¶57. 
 
----------------------------------- 
MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE EC: 
QUAD LUNCH -- DG SEARCH 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶37.  (SBU) During Amb. Javits' lunch in honor of DAS 
Ken Staley on October 15, the question of the 
succession of the Director General was raised.  The 
new French Ambassador asked when his term was done 
(July 2010) and agreed that it would be important to 
start a systematic search early.  UK Ambassador Lyn 
Parker agreed with U.S. Delreps that Amb. Tomova as 
current EC chair should become engaged early, and 
that it would be better for her to propose a process 
than to open it up for discussion.  Amb. Burkart, the 
German Vice Chair in the EC, agreed, and discussion 
turned to who might raise the issue with Tomova and 
when.  The group generally agreed that it would be 
ideal for Tomova to announce to the Conference of 
States Parties that she would be outlining steps 
early next year for nomination of candidates, to be 
followed by a letter as Chairperson setting out the 
process. 
 
 
¶38. (SBU) Representatives at the luncheon also 
discussed the election of the leadership for the CSP, 
with the Asian Group to hold the new chair, and the 
African group to chair the Committee of the Whole. 
All agreed that some careful diplomatic maneuvering 
would be needed to avoid the Algerian Ambassador 
repeating his dismal performance as COW Chairman in 
the Review Conference and the unfortunate procedural 
vote in the CSP last year when Morocco disputed the 
election of the Sudanese Ambassador as Chairman of 
the Conference. No one had news of an Asian candidate 
for the Chairmanship but delegates will pursue 
discreet inquiries with Asian contacts. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
MEETING WITH OPCW CHIEF OF CABINET RICHARD EKWALL 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶39. (U) ISN/CB Director Bob Mikulak met Richard 
Ekwall for lunch on Friday, October 17.  Following up 
on Deputy Assistant Secretary Ken Staley's meeting 
with the Director General, Mikulak and Ekwall 
discussed terrorism and the evolution of the U.S. 
position. Ekwall responded positively to the idea of 
the OPCW being a forum for exchange of information 
and experience relative to chemical safety and 
security. 
 
¶40. (U) Ekwall confirmed that during the Director 
General's trip to New York on October 15, the DG met 
with representatives from non-States Party Egypt, 
Somalia and Israel, and Myanmar though not North 
Korea.  According to Ekwall, the tone was positive 
though it was apparent that there was no real change 
in attitude or the states' general positions. 
 
¶41. (U) A Seminar on Universality will take place in 
Istanbul, April 16-17, 2009. Ekwall and Mikulak 
discussed the necessity of having separate side 
meetings there with Israel, Egypt and Syria. 
 
¶42. (SBU) Finally, Mikulak raised the issue of the 
choice of the new Director General and Ekwall 
confirmed that he would be working on it.  Mikulak 
gave the U.S. view of how the process might best be 
accomplished. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
U.S./TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶43. (U) A DOD technical expert from Washington met 
with representatives from the Secretariat to discuss 
ongoing implementation issues.  Discussions resulted 
in resolution on the following:  verification 
approach for short term destruction operations at 
Blue Grass; verification during the processing of ton 
containers with high heels; an agreed approach for 
the analysis of HT; and modalities for upcoming 
quality review visits. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
INCLUSION OF NON-SCHEDULED CHEMICALS IN THE OPCW 
CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶44. (U) Two weeks prior to EC-54, OPCW Laboratory 
Head Gary Mallard (U.S.) requested U.S. feedback on a 
draft TS note on inclusion of non-scheduled chemicals 
in the OPCW Central Analytical Database (OCAD).  The 
note distinguishes between data on analytical 
derivatives, degradation products, and riot control 
agents.  Its goes on to recommend that only data for 
Qagents.  Its goes on to recommend that only data for 
scheduled chemicals and their analytical derivatives 
be used on Article VI inspections, which is a concern 
for future verification as it essentially excludes 
 
the possibility of checking for degradation products 
on an industry inspection.  Delrep worked with senior 
TS officials to ensure the draft was not distributed 
prior to EC-54, a move that was supported by the UK, 
which shares U.S. concerns on the draft.  On the 
margins of EC-54, ISN/CB Office Director Mikulak and 
Delrep met with Mallard to discuss the reasoning 
behind the TS approach. 
 
¶45. (U) Mallard explained that India has 
categorically refused the addition of any non- 
scheduled chemicals, including necessary analytical 
derivatives, to the OCAD and that the TS had 
attempted to separate the issues in order to have 
important degradation product data available for use 
in the event of a challenge inspection or 
investigation of alleged use.  The U.S. reiterated 
its concerns about the paper, and Mallard recommended 
that concerned delegations approach India to better 
understand its concerns and work toward a more 
acceptable solution. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DISCUSSION WITH THE TS ON SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶46.  (U) On the margins of the Council sessions 
Delreps Mikulak, Clagett and Denyer met with the TS 
to discuss sampling and analysis at Schedule 2 sites, 
drawing on guidance (Ref B).  Representing the TS 
were H. Reeps (Director, Verification Division), W. 
Kane (Head, Industry Verification Branch), P. Runn 
(Head, Planning Review Branch), V. Artos and A. Dolea 
(Senior Industry Officers) and B. Whelan, 
(inspector/analytical chemist who had been involved 
in a substantial fraction of the Schedule 2 
inspections in which sampling was carried out). Kane 
led the discussion from the TS side. 
 
¶47. (U) Delreps opened the discussions by indicating 
they were seeking to understand the reasons for the 
differences in views between the U.S. and the TS. 
Kane presented the TS view that sampling and analysis 
is one of the verification tools, provides assurance 
about the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals, 
is a unique tool and was intended to be used on all 
Schedule 2 inspections (per para 27 of Part VII of 
the CWC Verification Annex).  Runn added that 
sampling and analysis is strongly supported by the 
Director-General.  Delrep explained that the U.S. 
expects a rationale before sampling and analysis is 
undertaken, that it should be used only if it adds 
value since it is highly intrusive, and that the U.S. 
questions the necessity and practicality to use it on 
every Schedule 2 inspection. Further, the U.S. view 
is that decisions to use sampling and analysis should 
also take into account paragraph 20 of Part VII of 
the Verification Annex, which specifies that a 
variety of other factors are also relevant, and the 
Confidentiality Annex, which provides that the least 
intrusive methods should be used. 
 
¶48. (U) Kane and Runn countered that paragraph 27 is 
sufficient unto itself as a reason for doing sampling 
and analysis. Del asked about TS plans for doing 
sampling and analysis on every Schedule 2 inspection. 
Kane said the TS would approach this goal gradually. 
Reeps added that sampling and analysis would be 
QReeps added that sampling and analysis would be 
limited by budget, equipment and personnel restraints 
so that sites would be selected according to 
perceived risk; it would be unrealistic to plan to do 
sampling and analysis during every Schedule 2 
inspection.  Delreps also pointed out that 
confidentiality and safety concerns might limit an 
inspection team's ability to employ sampling and 
analysis and that decisions to employ this tool 
should address technical credibility.  Runn expressed 
 
concern that the host might conclude that the 
rationale provided by the inspection team might be 
judged inadequate, leading the host to refuse to 
allow sampling.  Delreps said that they did not 
envision such an outcome. 
 
¶49. (U) The TS also presented its preparations to 
cope with false positives and made clear that in 2009 
it should be possible to use an expanded database of 
reference spectra while still operating in a "closed" 
mode.  This would facilitate prompt resolution of 
unexpected results that might look like "false 
positives."  Delreps gave the TS an overview of U.S. 
regulations as they pertain to sampling and analysis. 
 
¶50. (SBU) Comment:  Perhaps the most important things 
to come out of the consultation was a clear 
indication that the TS is concerned that the U.S. 
would refuse to allow a sample to be taken if it 
judged that the "rationale" was inadequate.  Delreps 
explained the difference between rationale and 
justification in this context.  It was also apparent 
that differing views exist within the Verification 
Division on whether or not the goal should be to take 
samples during every Schedule 2 inspection.  Del 
recommends that the USG assure the TS that the U.S. 
does not intend to refuse to allow samples to be 
taken, while stressing that the TS needs to more 
clearly articulate under what circumstances sampling 
and analysis add value.  End Comment. 
 
 
¶51. (U) JAVITS SENDS. 
CULBERTSON