VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0860/01 2881214
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141214Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2078
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000860 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR OCTOBER 6-10, 2008 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 849 
     ¶B. THE HAGUE 280 
 
This is CWC-46-08 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Consultations continued at what is, for the 
OPCW, a rapid pace with three budget meetings, and 
facilitations on Articles VII, X, XI and 
universality.  None made much progress, but the 
budget discussions reached a climax with new 
documents proposing a 531,540 Euro adjustment that 
would require an increase in assessments and sentdelegations frantically seeking guidance from 
capitals.  The Host Country Committee met twice, with 
more progress achieved in three days than in many 
months. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) 
held its regular meeting and an emergency budget 
meeting after the new documents were distributed to 
plan responses and tactics.  The Permanent Five 
members of the Security Council met to discuss 
universality and current issues. 
 
---- 
WEOG 
---- 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) 
meeting on October 7 focused on the state of budget 
negotiations, preparations for the upcoming Executive 
Council (EC) session, and the selection of 
facilitators for the industry cluster.  Amb. Javits 
cautioned against micromanagement of the Technical 
Secretariat (TS) by becoming too involved in the 
drafting of key performance indicators (KPIs), and 
expressed U.S. support for an extra meeting of the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB).  Swiss budget 
facilitator Martin Strub agreed that delegations 
should avoid focusing only on KPIs, and noted that 
the money freed up by a decrease in projected 
destruction activities was likely to dominate 
following consultations.  Dutch, German, and UK 
delegations spoke up in favor of maintaining the 
balance between Chapter I and II in the budget; 
France spoke in favor of the Office of Special 
Projects (OSP) retaining the flexibility to 
effectively respond to the Director-General (DG). 
 
¶4. (SBU) With regard to preparations for EC-54, 
delegations discussed Iranian efforts to remove the 
item on Enhancement of Other Chemical Production 
Facility (OCPF) Declarations from the agenda.  Sweden 
reminded the group that the item was not "inserted," 
as Iran claims, but legitimately placed on the agenda 
by EC-53, and that Iran would actually need consensus 
to remove it.  Italian delegate Giuseppe Cornacchia 
informed delegations of his recent conversation with 
Iran, after which he believes Iran will drop its 
request in exchange for a fuller discussion of the 
OCPF issue.  Delegations also discussed Iran's last 
minute mention of a possible change in its Schedule 1 
Facility Agreement (from "Agreement" to 
"Arrangement"), which it evidently intends to attempt 
at this EC.  (In a separate conversation with the TS, 
Delrep learned that the Secretariat is also confused 
as to the reason and timing of this request.)  The 
group also learned that the African Group intends to 
request membership on the Advisory Body for 
Administrative and Financial Matters (ABAF) for 
Morocco, Algeria, Kenya and South Africa, as there 
are currently no African experts on the ABAF.  (Del 
note:  Delrep learned later that the African Group 
had sent nomination letters to the DG for four 
Qhad sent nomination letters to the DG for four 
candidates -- all of whom are delegates based in The 
Hague -- to be approved at EC-54.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) Surkau briefed the group on the results of a 
lunch she hosted for regional group coordinators, and 
noted that despite South Africa and Pakistan's 
emphasis on the importance of finding facilitators 
from all of the regional groups, there had been no 
objections voiced to the candidatures of Giuseppe 
Cornacchia (Italy) and Diana Gosens (Netherlands) for 
industry cluster facilitations.  She also mentioned 
the fact that Poland had been raised as another 
possible candidate for a future facilitation. 
Germany noted that there are still more topics in the 
industry cluster that bear further discussion, 
including the third selection criterion for OCPFs and 
Schedule 1 and 2 inspection frequency. 
 
¶6. (U) On the topic of other consultations, Surkau 
mentioned the fact that Article VII facilitator Said 
Moussi continues to steer delegations toward a 
decision.  Italy also noted Cuba's apparent 
unwillingness to work further on elaborating a 
concept for an Article XI workshop.  Under any other 
business, France briefed the group on the Vilnius 
Seminar on Sea-dumped Munitions. 
 
¶7. (SBU) On October 9, Surkau convened a special WEOG 
meeting to discuss budget developments, as well as to 
provide an update on industry cluster facilitations. 
On the latter point, Surkau announced that Marthinus 
Van Schalkwyk (South Africa) had expressed his 
interest in facilitating consultations on OCPF 
enhanced declarations.  While Gosens had originally 
volunteered for this role, she agreed to step aside 
in favor of having a non-WEOG facilitator.  (Del 
note: Gosens told Delrep that she would consider 
taking on a different facilitation after January.) 
 
------------------------- 
ARTICLE VII CONSULTATIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶8. (U) On October 7, Said Moussi (Algeria) held a 
meeting to discuss the recently-issued Article VII 
annual report.  Legal Advisor Santiago Onate provided 
an overview of the report and highlighted that 96% of 
States Parties have designated a national authority. 
Germany, Italy and Russia expressed moderate 
satisfaction with Article VII progress but said that 
more needs to be done; Russia stated that Article VII 
obligations should be linked to other articles, such 
as being a prerequisite for Article XI benefits. 
 
¶9. (U) Iran said that, due to the report's length and 
its release so close to the EC, it would not have 
enough time to review it fully and suggested 
deferring its consideration.  Iran then raised its 
objection to the specific mention of the "EU strategy 
against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction," arguing that the specific EU program 
need not be named since no other donor's program was 
listed.  The TS and several EU delegations defended 
the reference; France pointed out that the EU is 
specifically mentioned as a donor due to its not 
being a member state. 
 
¶10. (U) As he had done during the previous 
consultation, Moussi again asked how to move forward 
to the EC and the CSP, specifically looking for 
support for a decision on Article VII implementation. 
In a change from their previous noncommittal 
QIn a change from their previous noncommittal 
positions, Germany and France both spoke in favor of 
a decision in order to enhance Article VII's 
visibility.  Russia also supported having a decision. 
With most other delegations remaining agnostic, Iran 
was the only delegation to oppose a decision. 
----------------------- 
ARTICLE X CONSULTATIONS 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (U) On October 7, facilitator Victor Smirnovsky 
(Russia) convened a meeting to discuss Article X 
(Assistance and Protection).  The Secretariat was, as 
in past meetings, largely unable to explain its 
activities to the satisfaction of delegations.  The 
first agenda item was a TS presentation on its 
participation in TRIPLEX 2008, a disaster response 
exercise held in Norway and Sweden (slides forwarded 
separately to Washington).  The German and Russian 
delegations both noted that the scenario was not 
specifically within the mandate of Article X, and 
asked whether the Secretariat might not be able to 
develop or participate in a more targeted exercise. 
 
¶12. (U) The Secretariat also introduced the DG's 
latest report on Article X Implementation, with the 
facilitator noting that this additional report (the 
second this year) was published in response to the 
CSP-12 mandate to conduct "intensive deliberations." 
Iran asked a number of specific questions, almost 
none of which were answered by the Secretariat.  To 
counter possible Iranian assertions that the Council 
has not worked enough on this issue since CSP-12, 
U.S. Delrep expressed appreciation for the 
comprehensive report and noted that the Secretariat 
is clearly continuing work in this area, and that its 
capacity building efforts enhanced State Parties' 
abilities to respond to a CW scenario.  Delrep also 
asked the Secretariat for a preliminary assessment of 
its excursions to "inspect" SP offers of assistance 
under Article X, the value of which a number of 
delegations have questioned.  Assistance and 
Protection Branch Head Gennadi Lutay said that it was 
too early to make any assessment, but that the visits 
had been very useful. 
 
¶13. (U) Iran noted that the Secretariat still has not 
responded to its suggestion that a list of needs or 
shortfalls in the area of assistance and protection 
be compiled.  Previous facilitator Jitka Brodska 
(Czech Republic) then introduced the Czech non-paper 
on Article X.  She noted that the paper focuses on 
the fact that the OPCW's main contribution in terms 
of cooperation with other organizations is expertise, 
and also emphasized that none of the elements in the 
paper were new concepts, nor did they represent a 
financial obligation.  She expressed her delegation's 
hope that this paper might be used as a basis for 
further deliberations, in accordance with CSP-12 
language.  Delrep and others thanked the Czech 
delegation for its contributions and noted again that 
this shows that substantive work is already being 
done, and that the OPCW is usefully pursuing its 
mandate in this area.  Iran suggested that the area 
of assistance for victims be explored further, and 
went on to the last agenda item, which was its 
proposal to establish a victims network. 
 
¶14. (U) Iran asserted that the OPCW should lead any 
international humanitarian effort in response to a CW 
attack, and again raised the prospect of longer term 
assistance, even indicating that some small financial 
burden might be incurred.  The Iranian delegation 
suggested that the TS come up with a paper 
Qsuggested that the TS come up with a paper 
elaborating the needs of victims, to which the 
facilitator later responded that Iran itself might be 
in the best position to provide such expert 
information.  Germany and the UK noted that perhaps a 
Secretariat analysis of gaps in existing emergency 
response capabilities might be more useful, to 
provide a better sense of whether or not the 
Secretariat and States Parties have everything they 
need to respond effectively.  The consultation ended 
with no discussion of report language for the EC, nor 
any sense of what following consultations might 
consider. 
 
----------- 
P-5 MEETING 
----------- 
 
¶15. (SBU) On October 8 UK Ambassador Lyn Parker 
hosted his Chinese, Frnch, Russian and U.S. 
counterparts and their delegations as part of a 
series of occasional meetings by the Permanent Five 
(P-5) members of the UN Security Council.  The 
traditional topic for these meetings, Universality of 
the Convention, brought little news.  The group 
discussed whether bilateral inquiries might help 
speed up Iraq's final steps toward accession. On 
Lebanon, the French delegation reported that the 
Director-General had indicated there is regional 
pressure on the new President and had invited Amr 
Moussa of the Arab League to visit The Hague.  France 
urged bilateral efforts with Lebanon.  Russian 
Ambassador Gevorgian noted that it is a "delicate 
matter" requiring consultation with Moscow.  There 
was general agreement that Egypt, Israel and Syria 
are not likely to move toward accession any time 
soon, but that if Lebanon and Iraq join, there will 
be more pressure on the three hold-outs. 
 
¶16. (SBU) On North Korea, Chinese Ambassador Zhang 
noted that there is no reference to chemical weapons 
in the ongoing Six Party talks and that those talks 
are at a sensitive point now.  He advised that 
pressure from the P-5 would probably be less helpful 
than efforts to make the OPCW more attractive to the 
North Korean government as being in their national 
interests.  Gevorgian replied that the recent 
completion of South Korea's destruction of their CW 
stockpile might help in that regard.  He also asked 
whether former Dutch ambassador to the OPCW, Marc 
Vogelaar, newly appointed consultant to the DG on 
North Korea, had contacted any of the other 
delegations.  Amb. Javits said Vogelaar had also 
called on him; the others had not been contacted. 
Amb. Javits said the issue is timing, that the Six 
Party talks now had an emphasis on the nuclear 
issues, and adding chemical weapons now would not be 
productive, but might be possible at a later date. 
 
¶17. (SBU) None of the delegations thought that 
Somalia or Burma were prospects for membership yet. 
No one had any update on Angola.  Amb. Javits 
reported that he had heard from the Foreign Minister 
of the Dominican Republic, which has adopted 
legislation and appears close to signature.  He had 
not heard anything new from the Bahamas but noted 
that he had made CWC accession a priority for the 
U.S. Ambassador, an old friend. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The discussion of "Any Other Business" 
proved far more lively.  Amb. Javits raised the 
hostility of Iran to UNSCR 1540 and non-proliferation 
that is turning up at every meeting as Iran tries to 
expunge both terms from OPCW documents.  Gevorgian 
expressed his view that the Second Review conference 
had stepped back from the Organization's earlier 
activities on counter-terrorism and non- 
proliferation.  He said the Organization needs to 
come back to where it was before.  French Delegate 
Annie Mari defended the Second RevCon Report language 
citing all UN resolutions, and reported on the 1540 
Seminar planned by the Clingendael Institute and the 
EU's additional day at the National Authorities 
QEU's additional day at the National Authorities 
meeting that would include a lunch-time speaker on 
¶1540.  She asked for ideas for the Open-ended Working 
Group on Terrorism, which she chairs, particularly 
whether others thought the seminar on non- 
proliferation held in Paris in March would be useful 
to extend to a wider group. 
 
Amb. Javits noted that we need to work from the 
Convention and how it contributes to counter- 
terrorism efforts, and use OPCW as a forum for ideas 
without appearing to be trying to make it a counter- 
terrorism organization.  He added that it is a big 
organization that can do several things at the same 
time -- disarmament, non-proliferation, and 
contribute to counter-terrorism.  Gevorgian agreed 
completely with that view.  Delrep cited chemical 
security as a possible avenue to pursue.  Amb. Javits 
added that the chemical industry and associations 
should be involved.  Parker agreed that an industry 
lead would be helpful.  Zhang noted that for many 
countries, destruction is still the main purpose of 
the convention and that there are widespread concerns 
about non-proliferation.  States' initiatives on 
seminars, etc. would be useful but the OPCW should 
not play the organizing role.  UK and Chinese 
delegates noted that activities under Articles X and 
XI contribute to counter-terrorism, but Li Hong, the 
Chinese Deputy Perm Rep who chairs the Article XI 
consultations, noted that language used to describe 
these activities may cause concern among some states. 
 
¶19. (U) Amb. Javits noted the importance of early 
identification of good Asian and African leaders for 
the Conference of States Parties in December, as 
those groups would hold the Chair and the Committee 
of the Whole.  Li Hong reported that the Asian group 
would be meeting to discuss candidates. 
 
¶20. (U) Gevorgian asked about the Vilnius conference 
on sea dumping, which UK, Chinese and French 
delegates present had attended.  Li Hong stated that 
the chairman's summary from the conference noted the 
importance of the issue and that it should be 
monitored, but without giving any specific role to 
OPCW. 
 
¶21. (U) The final item of other business was a 
Russian question for the Host Country Committee later 
that day on the banking crisis and Dutch government 
plans to safeguard diplomatic missions' accounts, as 
well as the OPCW account.  Gevorgian noted that some 
embassy accounts in Brussels had been frozen with the 
collapse of Fortis Bank. (Del note:  ABN-AMRO, which 
holds the OPCW's accounts and had been bought by 
Fortis last year, was partially nationalized by the 
Dutch government this past week along with Fortis' 
other Dutch holdings.) 
 
-------------------- 
BUDGET CONSULTATIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶22. (U) On October 8, two new papers were introduced 
by the Deputy Director-General (DDG) at the meeting: 
the Budget Supporting Information Paper outlining the 
Secretariat's proposals for the calculated 531,540 
Euro adjustment to the draft budget due to the 
revised estimates of Article IV and V inspection 
reimbursements, and the Draft Decision and 
Corrigendum containing all of the changes to the 
budget resulting from the consultations to date as 
well as the new 531,540 Euro adjustments (both papers 
faxed and scanned to ISN and IO).  The DDG 
highlighted a mandatory 5% cost of living increase 
for all staff triggered at the end of September by an 
International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) 
decision.  The TS plans to absorb the 2008 increase 
Qdecision.  The TS plans to absorb the 2008 increase 
this year, and most of the increase for 2009, but 
proposed that 250,000 Euro of the 531,540 adjustment 
be put toward these unexpected Verification and 
Inspection staff costs.  He then outlined the new 
inspectors' training programs and new ICA programs 
for Africa that the TS included in the proposal, 
along with funding for a second meeting of the 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB).  The entire package, 
he emphasized, stayed within zero nominal growth, but 
would include a slight increase in assessments to 
member states (0.8% above initial 2009 projected 
rates or 0.6% above 2008 rates). 
 
¶23. (U) Among the few questions asked by delegates, 
the Iranians questioned whether one equipment 
training program was double-funded with already 
purchased equipment; the TS responded that the new 
costs were just for the training, which had not been 
previously budgeted.  Iran also asked about the staff 
cost increases and the requirement to pay them.  The 
DDG explained the requirement at length.  Delrep 
inquired whether the SAB funding included anything 
for the temporary working groups and whether the 
training and ICA programs were in priority order. 
The DDG responded that the SAB funding is only for 
one meeting, not the temporary groups, and that there 
is no particular priority established for the 
programs but all are new, not otherwise budgeted. 
 
¶24. (U) During a follow-up meeting on October 9, the 
DDG defended the TS's revised budget proposal, saying 
that the DG had chosen to maintain the budget at 75 
million Euro despite the reduction in Article IV/V 
inspections and the subsequent loss in income from 
Article IV/V reimbursements.  He said that the 
revisions -- and the overall budget -- reflected the 
DG's judgment call but conceded it was up to member 
states to approve it.  Germany pointed out the excess 
or windfall presented by the TS was actually a 
shortage that had to be made up by increased 
assessments.  In response to India's question on how 
the new projects in the revision were chosen, the DDG 
admitted that they were of lower priority to those in 
the original draft budget but still added value to 
the OPCW's work. 
 
¶25. (U) Iran argued that not enough money was 
allocated to ICA and that the entire 531,540 Euro 
should be used for ICA.  Iran also asked why the TS 
had not raised earlier the ICSC-mandated increase in 
staff costs and said that the TS's first priority 
should be to cover obligations (such as the increased 
staff costs) before proposing extra programs. 
Reiterating his previous points, the DDG insisted 
that the TS will use administrative efficiencies to 
cover the estimated 1.9 million Euro staff cost 
increase. 
 
¶26. (U) Delrep stressed that, given the current 
global financial crisis, the U.S. could not accept an 
increase in assessed contributions; the UK, Germany 
and Italy also noted that increased assessments would 
be difficult to accept domestically.  In response to 
a question by South Africa, the DDG said that the 
proposed increase in assessment would be minimal, 
ranging from 5 to 160,000 Euro.  The UK insisted that 
the adjusted 531,540 Euro should remain in Chapter 1 
(Verification activities) and noted that the TS's 
proposal does not address the UK's desired increase 
in OCPF inspections above the additional 10 
inspections proposed in the draft budget.  A number 
of WEOG delegations intervened in support of keeping 
the money in Chapter 1 and the need to maintain a 
greater part of the budget for Chapter 1 rather than 
Chapter 2 to reflect the Organization's focus on 
QChapter 2 to reflect the Organization's focus on 
disarmament.  In contrast, NAM delegations supported 
more funding for Chapter 2, specifically ICA 
programs, with many questioning the basis for Chapter 
1's primacy over Chapter 2 and asserting that the 
"four pillars" of the Convention are equal in 
importance.  (Del note: This latter position 
contradicts the NAM'S drumbeat on the primacy of 
destruction throughout the Review Conference 
process). 
 
¶27. (U) Japan suggested -- as it did last year -- 
that the budget should be reduced instead of re- 
programming the 531,540 Euro and asked what the 
effect would be on future budgets as well as on the 
balance between chapters.  The DDG said that a 
reduction in the budget would not affect future 
budget proposals; he also said that a reduction would 
result in a slight shift to Chapter 2 (50.13%) over 
Chapter 1 (49.87%). 
 
¶28. (U) At the end of the meeting, Iran insisted that 
there is no reason to "rush" with budget 
negotiations, that the budget only needs to be 
finalized by the CSP.  Responding to delegations' 
requests, facilitator Martin Strub (Switzerland) 
agreed to re-convene budget consultations on October 
14 with a view to meeting every day during the EC's 
2-hour lunch break. 
 
¶29. (U) At a working dinner hosted by EC Chair Amb. 
Oksana Tomova (Slovakia) on October 9, Amb. Javits 
reinforced that the U.S. could not accept an increase 
in member states' annual assessed contributions.  He 
stressed that he could not change his instructions on 
this and that in the current economic situation, the 
OPCW, like all other international organizations 
should be exhibiting prudent financial management as 
will governments around the world. 
 
------------------------ 
ARTICLE XI CONSULTATIONS 
------------------------ 
 
¶30. (U) On October 9, facilitator Li Hong (China) 
convened a meeting to discuss further the proposed 
Article XI workshop.  Despite expectations that Cuba 
would follow up on its proposal for the workshop by 
chairing a task force to develop plans for the 
workshop, Li indicated that the task had been left to 
him; he circulated a draft paper that he prepared, 
building on the initial Cuban proposal. 
Acknowledging that his draft paper likely contained 
many substantive and stylistic errors, Li presented 
it as a work in progress that was meant to spark 
discussion.  Essentially, the consultation became the 
very task force that had been considered during the 
previous consultation: delegates brainstormed, using 
Li's paper as a basis for discussion, and agreed to 
provide reactions and further ideas to Li before the 
next consultation for inclusion in the next draft of 
the working paper. 
 
¶31. (U) Many delegations spoke in favor of the 
proposed interactive approach for the workshop. 
Several delegations, including Mexico, argued that 
the workshop should focus on developing concrete 
measures on Article XI implementation.  A number of 
delegations also raised costs and funding: the 
Netherlands asked for a break-down of Li's estimated 
costs, and Japan suggested that funding could come 
from the 531,340 Euro "gold mine" unveiled by the TS 
on October 8.  Li informed delegations that the 
workshop concept needed to be approved by the EC 
before it could be considered for funding and he 
indicated his intent to present the idea during his 
report to EC-54. 
 
¶32. (U) During the meeting, Kumaresh Misra (Head, 
International Cooperation Branch) briefly presented 
the results of his branch's research into "Article XI 
literature" as had been requested by Iran at the 
previous consultations.  He reported that a search of 
Qprevious consultations.  He reported that a search of 
the external server yielded over 1,500 results 
amounting to hundreds of pages.  Iran insisted that 
the TS should publish a compendium of the entire 
corpus of documents but other delegations agreed that 
a more concise list of document titles would be 
sufficient.  Li stressed that the search should focus 
only on documents directly related to Article XI and 
not to the wider field of international cooperation 
and assistance. 
 
---------------------- 
HOST COUNTRY COMMITTEE 
---------------------- 
 
¶33. (SBU) At Amb. Javits' urging, EC Chair Tomova 
convened the Host Country Committee on October 8 to 
discuss its draft report before the EC and to get an 
update from the Dutch government on the draft 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to allow access to 
the OPCW Commissary.  The recently-appointed 
Ambassador for International Organizations at the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Rob Zaagman, 
attended the meeting but was unable to provide the 
expected update on the MOU.  Zaagman said that he had 
just received comments from the Customs Authority on 
October 7 and would provide them to the Committee 
shortly.  After most members of the Committee 
expressed their frustration and dismay at the Dutch 
government's delay in finalizing the MOU, Zaagman 
agreed to circulate the Dutch government's response 
to the draft MOU the next day and also agreed to meet 
with the Committee on October 10. 
 
¶34. (U) Committee members also raised the issue of 
parking, which previously had been discussed with the 
Deputy Mayor of The Hague in March (ref B), and 
requested Zaagman to follow up with the Municipality 
to provide a response.  Russian Deputy Perm Rep 
Konstantin Gavrilov asked Zaagman what the Dutch 
government was doing to protect diplomatic missions' 
bank accounts, mentioning that the Russian Mission to 
the EU in Brussels had had its account with Fortis 
Bank frozen recently.  Legal Advisor Santiago Onate 
noted that the DG already had been in contact with 
the MFA to ensure that the OPCW's bank accounts 
(including those used for its Provident Fund) would 
not be at risk; Zaagman promised to convey Gavrilov's 
concerns to the MFA's Director of Protocol. 
 
¶35. (U) The Committee met on October 10 to discuss 
the draft MOU.  As promised, Zaagman presented the 
Dutch government's response, and the Committee agreed 
in principle with the Dutch government's proposed 
amendments.  However, due to a number of Committee 
members raising points for clarification on the draft 
MOU, Onate and Zaagman agreed to work with members of 
the Committee to redraft these relatively minor 
technical points before concluding the MOU. 
 
-------------------------- 
UNIVERSALITY CONSULTATIONS 
-------------------------- 
 
¶36. (U) On October 10, facilitator Lee Litman (UK) 
convened his first consultation on universality. 
Malik Ellahi (Head, Government Relations) presented 
the annual report on universality (EC-54/DG.13) and 
gave an overview of recent developments.  Delegations 
welcomed Litman as the new facilitator for 
Universality and thanked out-going facilitator, Said 
Moussi (Algeria), for his work.  France noted that it 
is maintaining contact with Lebanon and encouraging 
it to finalize accession to the Convention.  A number 
of delegations called for raising the issue during 
high-level bi-lateral meetings and visits with non- 
member states and also stressed that coordination 
with the TS was necessary to complement its work. 
 
¶37. (U) Japan reported that it had demarched Burma, 
Q37. (U) Japan reported that it had demarched Burma, 
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to encourage them to attend 
the November meeting of Asian national authorities in 
Dhaka, Bangladesh.  Lebanon plans to send a diplomat 
based in Pakistan or India (as Lebanon does not have 
representation in Bangladesh) to the meeting; Burma 
will not send anyone to the meeting due to time and 
money constraints; neither Iraq nor Syria have 
responded to the demarche yet.  Ellahi shared that 
the TS had sponsored two Burmese officials to 
participate in a recent workshop on assistance and 
protection in Seoul, Korea; another two Burmese 
officials also had been sponsored to participate in a 
recent workshop for Asian customs officials.  Ellahi 
also announced that the TS will sponsor two Lebanese 
officials to attend the annual National Authorities 
Meeting in The Hague in November. 
 
¶38. (U) Litman noted that there will be a workshop 
for countries from the Mediterranean Basin/Middle 
East in Turkey in April 2009, funded by the EU. 
Litman also promised to circulate draft report 
language for the CSP in advance of the next 
consultation. 
 
¶39. (U) Javits sends. 
CULBERTSON