VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0849/01 2821500
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081500Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2066
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY

UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000849 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: WRAP-UP FOR SEPTEMBER 29 TO OCTOBER 6, 2008 
 
REF: (A) THE HAGUE 0825 (B) THE HAGUE 0826 
 
This is CWC-45-08 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (U) Budget deliberations reached a peak on October 3 when 
several Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries attacked the 
program plan and budget for the Office of Special Projects, 
specifically its mandate for counter-terrorism, 
non-proliferation, and outreach to other organizations.  The 
earlier meeting (September 29) focusing on the budget for the 
Director General's (DG) office, the Deputy Director General's 
(DDG) office and the Administrative division saw far less 
heated discussion.  The budget facilitator agreed to hold at 
least two more sessions in the week before the EC. The 
industry cluster meeting, as expected, was largely 
organizational, but delegations agreed to find new 
facilitators among the various regional groups to move 
discussion forward on the issues:  low concentrations, Other 
Chemical Production Facilities (OCPF) site selection, and the 
Technical Secretariat's (TS) proposals on enhanced OCPF 
declarations. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Western European and Others Group (WEOG) met 
September 30 to discuss ongoing budget negotiations and the 
outlook for Executive Council (EC) 54.  That same day, Delrep 
and UK delegate met with the Legal Advisor to discuss 
questions on Libya's conversion deadline (July 2008) and its 
documents before the EC. 
 
¶3. (U) On October 6, the EC Chairperson held informal 
consultations on the preparations for EC 54.  Notable among 
the few issues raised were Iran's objection to inclusion of 
the agenda item on OCPF declarations, its call for "factual 
corrections" to the annual EC report of activities, and its 
announcement that it would be submitting a "facility 
arrangement" for a previously agreed facility agreement.  All 
three statements raised questions and opposition from other 
States Parties. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
BUDGET: EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATION 
AND MEDIUM-TERM PLAN 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (U) On September 29, Martin Strub (Switzerland) held a 
consultation on the proposed budgets for the offices of the 
DG and DDG and for the Administration Division. 
Consideration of the budget for the Office of Special 
Projects (originally scheduled for September 25) was again 
postponed due to Krzysztof Paturej's (Director, OSP) absence; 
Strub announced that Paturej would present his budget 
immediately preceding the second wrap-up session scheduled 
later in the week. 
 
¶5. (SBU) After no comments or questions on the DG's and DDG's 
budgets, Administration Director Ron Nelson gave a thorough 
overview of his budget.  Some of the highlights covered 
staffing changes, budgeting for an external consultant on 
implementation of IPSAS (International Public Sector 
Accounting Standards), contracting out completion of 
long-overdue administrative directives and ending the use of 
external psychological assessment in the recruitment process. 
 
¶6. (U) The DDG touched on Key Performance Indicators (KPIs), 
a recurring theme during budget consultations.  He admitted 
that they need continual development and shared his 
expectation that the KPIs in the 2010 budget will be more in 
Qexpectation that the KPIs in the 2010 budget will be more in 
line with results-based budgeting.  South Africa responded 
that some measure of redrafting is necessary for the 2009 
budget, pointing out that the document is still a draft and 
that the most egregious examples of KPIs that say nothing 
need to be fixed. 
 
¶7. (U) The DDG also addressed IPSAS implementation, 
reiterating that the OPCW's projected costs are lower than 
many other international organizations due in part to 
existing infrastructure being flexible and stable enough to 
meet IPSAS requirements.  Nelson noted that aside from the 
money budgeted directly for IPSAS, indirect costs included 
three staff in his division who are working full-time on 
IPSAS implementation. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Turning to the Mid-term Plan, Nelson briefly 
presented it before the facilitator opened up the floor for 
comments.  Iran launched into the document, reiterating that 
it finds the prolific use of "non-proliferation" 
unacceptable.  It stated that policies should not be resolved 
through the budget process and that trying to do so might 
hold up approval of the budget.  Following Iran, discussion 
was dominated by India and South Africa raising editorial 
comments and proposed changes.  The DDG responded thoroughly 
to the barrage of comments and said that the TS would 
consider them, though he noted that the document reflected 
the Secretariat's assessment and required no action by the EC. 
 
---------------- 
INDUSTRY CLUSTER 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (U) On September 29, Algerian Ambassador Benchaa Dani (EC 
Vice-Chairperson for Industry Cluster) chaired a primarily 
procedural meeting of the Industry Cluster to discuss 
facilitations.  Amb. Dani opened the meeting by noting that 
there are four issues ready for dscussion and asked for 
proposals for facilitator for each issue.  The DG gave an 
overview of the status of the four issues and agreed with 
Amb. Dani that appointing facilitators would be a step 
forward.  The four facilitations would cover: 
 
- low concentrations of 2A/2A*; 
- distribution and frequency of inspections; 
- enhancing OCPF declarations; and 
- OCPF site selection methodology, particularly the third 
criterion for the selection algorithm. 
 
¶10. (U) The DG explained that sampling and analysis (S&A) was 
not included in the issue list due to its mandate in the 
Convention.  However, he said that the TS is working on a 
paper on S&A, which it plans to release in late October in 
time for discussions in November.  Germany noted that there 
are still outstanding questions about S&A and that it looks 
forward to reviewing the paper and discussions. 
 
¶11. (U) A number of delegations highlighted their priorities 
for consultations, including site selection methodology 
(Italy, South Africa and the UK), low concentrations (Italy 
and China) and OCPF declaration enhancements (South Africa). 
India and Germany noted that a number of the issues are 
inter-linked but agreed on the need to separate them to 
facilitate the consultation process. 
 
¶12. (U) Dani stated his objective is to get agreement on 
facilitators during the EC.  He asked for regional groups to 
provide facilitator proposals by October 10 and announced 
that he will convene the Industry Cluster on October 16. 
 
---- 
WEOG 
---- 
 
¶13. (SBU) On September 30, Ruth Surkau (Germany) chaired the 
weekly Western European and Others Group (WEOG) meeting.  On 
budget negotiations, delegations held different views of the 
importance of the Mid-term Plan but generally agreed that the 
draft KPIs needed refinement to be made more concrete. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Following the industry cluster meeting, Surkau 
Q14. (SBU) Following the industry cluster meeting, Surkau 
reported that she would be hosting a lunch for the regional 
group coordinators and would discuss possible facilitators 
for the industry issues.  Diana Gosens (Netherlands) and 
Giuseppe Cornachia (Italy) volunteered to be facilitators, 
Gosens for OPCF declarations and Cornachia for low 
concentrations (2A/2A*).  Surkau noted that the split among 
issues also needs to be decided -- how many facilitators are 
needed?   The Spanish delegate, who had previously 
facilitated OCPF, stated that splitting the issues is the 
only way to make progress.  Cornachia reported on the 
Florence Conference with UK delegate Wolstenholme.  Several 
delegations that had not participated in the Florence 
meetings asked if there was a paper that could be shared. 
Cornachia replied that the Conference had agreed not to 
publish anything, as it was an informal meeting.  He agreed 
to share a summary with WEOG members, not for broader 
distribution. 
 
¶15. (U) On EC 54, delegations had little to say, noting 
missing documents and lack of instructions from capitals. 
They generally agreed that there could be an agenda fight 
with Iran on OCPF declarations.  Germany and UK cited Libya's 
passing of its conversion deadline; both expected to have 
instructions to raise concern in the Council over the missed 
deadline, possibly in report language.  UK delegate also 
raised the Russian objection at EC 53 to the Portreath 
facility, the first to pass the 10-year mark after 
conversion.  Russia has not clarified its objections to the 
TS document but might well defer it again.  Surkau asked if 
WEOG support would be helpful.  Amb. Burkart (Germany) 
thought perhaps delegations could force the Russians to state 
their problem with the TS paper. 
 
---------------------------------- 
BUDGET: OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (U) On October 1, budget facilitator Martin Strub 
(Switzerland) held the last in his scheduled round of 
consultations on the budget.  Having been postponed twice 
previously, Krzysztof Paturej (Director, Office of Special 
Projects) presented OSP's budget, noting that the 2009 
proposal was basically the same as the 2008 budget but that 
some activities were modified based on the outcome of the 
Second Review Conference (RevCon). 
 
¶17. (SBU) Turning to the familiar theme of KPIs, India 
questioned a number of OSP's KPIs and program objectives and 
repeatedly asked where OSP's mandate for its activities comes 
from.  Paturej explained that OSP's planned activities for 
2009 copy those already authorized in the 2008 budget but 
said that they were described in more detail in the 2009 
budget.  India also questioned OSP's interaction with 
stakeholders, saying that States Parties need to discuss the 
issue of outreach to stakeholders. 
 
¶18. (SBU) After a brief intervention of support by France, 
South Africa went paragraph-by-paragraph asking for more 
information and clarification on OSP's activities.  The U.S. 
and Italy both reiterated support for OPS's work but agreed 
that its KPIs need to be more specific and measurable.  South 
Africa intervened for a second time, specifically raising 
OSP's support for the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on 
Terrorism, criticizing most of OSP's KPIs and reiterating 
India's comments on interacting with stakeholders. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Despite Paturej's attempts to answer questions and 
his acknowledgement that OSP's KPIs need to be shortened and 
made more specific, Iran launched its attack noting that it 
shared South Africa's concerns and that it was not satisfied 
with Paturej's responses.  Iran stated it did not agree with 
Qwith Paturej's responses.  Iran stated it did not agree with 
OSP's focus on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism and 
said that OSP should focus on other activities, suggesting 
disarmament as an option.  Noting that the Second RevCon had 
not been able to resolve disagreement over UNSCR 1540, Iran 
said that OSP was not in a position to do so.  At the end of 
its intervention, Iran noted that it had too many points to 
raise and would save the rest for "informal informals." 
 
------------------------------ 
BUDGET: SECOND WRAP-UP SESSION 
------------------------------ 
 
¶20. (U) Following discussion of OSP's budget on September 29, 
budget facilitator Martin Strub (Switzerland) held his second 
wrap-up consultation to discuss outstanding issues on the 
entire draft 2009 budget.  Strub stated his intention to hold 
consultations throughout the week prior to EC 54 and 
introduced a paper prepared by the TS in response to 
questions raised during previous budget consultations.  The 
DDG noted that the TS is working on a corrigendum that will 
cover all corrections and will be released prior to EC 54. 
France, the U.S. the Netherlands, South Africa and the UK all 
expressed their support for the revised KPIs for the 
Policy-making Organs (PMO) in the TS's paper; however, all 
three said that the revised KPIs for International 
Cooperation and Assistance (ICA) still focused on measuring 
States Parties' performance rather than ICA's.  Japan also 
addressed KPIs, stating that they need to be as measurable 
and concrete as possible and noted that the KPIs for both ICA 
and OSP need to be improved. 
 
¶21. (U) After a discussion on how best to formulate KPIs, the 
DDG said that KPIs are important for the annual performance 
report and that they are refined over time.  Noting that it 
had been shared with the Advisory Body on Administrative and 
Financial Matters (ABAF), Delrep asked when the performance 
report would be released for general circulation; the DDG 
responded that it would be circulated soon.  The Netherlands, 
the UK and India all supported having an external audit of 
the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO), and the DDG responded 
the TS would try to do so within the proposed budget for 
¶2009.  South Africa noted its desire for a plan for future 
audits/reviews of OIO beyond the first one planned for 2009. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
UK/U.S. MEETING WITH OPCW LEGAL ADVISER ONATE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) On September 30, Delrep and UK delegate Karen 
Wolstenholme  met with OPCW Legal Adviser Santiago Onate to 
discuss possible outcomes of an EC discussion of the fact 
that Libya has missed its conversion deadline, and the TS 
approach to Libya's request to retain the protective berm at 
the Rabta former CWPF.  On the conversion deadline, UK Rep 
Wolstenholme noted that London still feels that a CSP 
decision establishing a new deadline might be the best 
approach, and that Germany had recently raised the topic as 
well.  Onate agreed that the situation has changed since the 
last meeting, in that Libya has actually missed its deadline, 
and said the DG would mention this in his statement to EC-54. 
 
 
¶23. (SBU) Onate recalled that the precedent set by Russia and 
India missing their conversion deadlines has essentially been 
inaction on the part of the Council.  He also noted that an 
overzealous approach to highlighting Libya's missed deadline, 
and establishing a new deadline through a decision, could 
easily become complicated by concerns about this setting a 
precedent for modifying deadlines (specifically 2012).  He 
did, however, offer that he could legally support the UK 
assertion that the Conference does have the authority to 
establish a new deadline, provided it remains within the six 
years from entry into force of the CWC for Libya.  Onate 
cautioned that any such approach could engender resistance on 
the part of Russia and India, who have no vested interest in 
Qthe part of Russia and India, who have no vested interest in 
additional Council/Conference attention on missed conversion 
deadlines. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Onate, Delrep and Wolstenholme also discussed the 
fact that language from Article VIII (paragraph 36) had been 
used in report language to address Albania's destruction 
delays, another case of delays in which the Convention did 
not provide for an extension request.  Wolstenholme suggested 
that, at a minimum, the UK and U.S. should consider 
acceptable report language in case the topic is raised. 
Delrep suggested that the essential elements of report 
language might be to express concern at the missed deadline, 
recall the Libyan national paper on the subject from 2007, 
and urge Libya to complete conversion without delay, but in 
no case later than the six years established in the technical 
change made when Libya joined the Convention.  Delrep 
reminded the UK that this would be a fall-back position, and 
that the U.S. preference would be not to raise the issue. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Delrep also explained U.S. concerns at the proposed 
"low key" Secretariat approach to removing the protective 
berm at Rabta from the list of specialized features to be 
destroyed, specifically that this could be perceived as a 
lack of transparency.  Delrep asked what the legal basis was 
for this approach, as a change of this sort is unprecedented. 
 Onate seemed unaware that the Secretariat intended to 
publish the change with other changes to the plan, and 
without an accompanying explanation.  He agreed that a 
ecretariat technical assessment would be useful in giving 
States Parties the appropriate level of confidence in the 
change, and will speak to Secretariat colleagues about the 
matter. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
Chairperson's Informals on Status of EC Preparations 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶26. (U) On Monday, October 6, EC Chairperson Oksana Tomova 
(Slovakia) chaired the preparatory informals for EC 54. 
Tomova began the meeting with the TS request to defer agenda 
item 9(g) Transfer Agreement between the OPCW Provident Fund 
and the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund.  No 
delegations commented and the agenda item was deferred to the 
next Executive Council.  In her trademark brisk style, Tomova 
then began an item-by-item review of the agenda.  The 
majority of items received no comments. 
 
¶27. (U) Iran noted that it would be submitting a "facility 
arrangement" to replace a previously approved facility 
agreement, to be added to agenda item 5 Facility Agreements. 
The U.S., France and Costa Rica inquired as to what this 
submission entailed, its legal basis, and when delegations 
would be able to review it. 
 
¶28. (U) For agenda item 5(l) Enhancement of OCPF 
declarations, Iran requested deletion of the agenda item as 
it has not yet been "thoroughly considered."  The Director 
General stated that the TS had made their findings available 
to the EC, as requested, and that the item should be 
considered.  The U.S., France, Germany, Japan and Costa Rica 
supported inclusion of the agenda item, with several 
delegations urging full discussion, including facilitations 
on OCPF declarations.  South Africa noted that, as with other 
items in the industry cluster, the issues need consultation, 
but the delegate did not express a view on deletion of the 
agenda item.  Iran insisted that they would take it to the 
EC, hinting at a possible agenda fight at the beginning of 
the Council.  Cuba recommended that delegations consult and 
move on. 
 
¶29. (U) U.S. Del noted questions on the Libyan verification 
plan that we would be working with the Libyan delegation to 
resolve before the EC, as well as the expected corrigendum 
for the U.S. Schedule 1 facility agreement.  The TS noted 
that the U.S. Schedule 1 document had been mis-labeled EC-53 
and should be EC-54.  Delrep also noted the late availability 
of the supplement to the 2007 Verification Implementation 
Report and the technical nature of its contents needing 
further study. There were no other comments or questions on 
any of these agenda items. 
 
¶30. (U) The Japanese delegate stated that his government 
would be offering an amendment to the Guidelines on Voluntary 
Qwould be offering an amendment to the Guidelines on Voluntary 
Contributions. 
 
¶31. (U) Iran stated that the Executive Council Report (agenda 
item 13) might require "factual corrections" without further 
specification.  For the TS, Secretary Khodakov stated that 
the report is a composite of earlier reports and that any 
factual corrections should be reported to the TS.  (Del note: 
 At EC 53, the Iranian delegation objected to any reference 
to UNSCR 1540 in the DG's report of activities.  We expect 
this intervention has a similar aim.) 
 
¶32. (SBU) In a private conversation following this meeting, 
Khodakov told Delrep that he is worried about Iran initiating 
a lengthy fight over approving the agenda at the beginning of 
the EC.  He said he would be meeting with the Iranian 
delegation but advised that "delegations" needed to speak to 
the Iranians as well. 
 
¶33. (U) Javits sends. 
CULBERTSON