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Viewing cable 08THEHAGUE825, CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 54TH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08THEHAGUE825 2008-10-02 09:17 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy The Hague
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTC #0825/01 2760917
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020917Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2030
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
UNCLAS THE HAGUE 000825 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR, 
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP> 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (ROBERTS AND DENYER) 
NSC FOR FLY 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL CWC
SUBJECT: CWC: SCENE-SETTER FOR OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 54TH 
SESSION, OCTOBER 14-17, 2008 
 
REF: A. THE HAGUE 569 
     B. THE HAGUE 755 
     C. THE HAGUE 799 
     D. THE HAGUE 776 
 
This is CWC-044-08 
 
1. (U) This is an action request -- see paragraphs 18, 21 
and 27. 
 
------------------------ 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) After the success of the last Executive Council 
(EC) session (ref A), delegations' hopes are high that this 
EC will continue the refreshingly productive trend.  The 
budget is the biggest item on the agenda, again with a 
positive model from last year when, for the first time in 
many years and only the second time in the OPCW's history, 
the budget was passed by EC-50 before the Conference of 
States Parties (CSP).  This year's draft budget is nearly a 
carbon copy of last year's budget, and consultations had 
been free of fireworks until discussions on the Office of 
Special Projects (OSP) on October 1.  The biggest issue is 
the proposed increase in the number of Other Chemical 
Production Facility (OCPF) inspections, with China and some 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries opposing the increase, 
while Western Group nations are in favor.  Iran, as always, 
and South Africa, to a lesser extent, are the wild cards in 
negotiations and could hold up agreement on the budget to 
bargain for something else. 
 
3. (SBU) The report from the EC representatives' visit to 
the Russian destruction facility at Shchuchye will be 
distributed late, but there seems to be much less 
controversy surrounding this visit, and the draft report, 
than the first visit to the Anniston destruction facility 
in the U.S. in October 2007.  The Shchuchye verification 
plan and facility agreement are on the agenda; both should 
be approved unless another delegation takes issue with 
them.  Libya's verification plan and facility agreement for 
the initial stage of loading chemical weapons for transfer 
at the Rabta facility will also be on the agenda, but less 
likely to provoke questions than the passing of the 
deadline (July 2008) for the conversion of its production 
facility. 
 
4. (SBU) The first U.S. facility agreement for a Schedule 1 
industrial site may face questioning due to being the first 
of its kind.  Other industrial issues that may generate 
debate are the enhancement of OCPF declarations and 
biomedical sampling. 
 
5. (SBU) The long list of routine reports to the Council on 
administrative and financial issues should go through 
without controversy, but some may invite deferral due to 
late distribution. 
 
6. (U) More detailed review of specific agenda items 
follows. 
 
--------------------- 
DESTRUCTION DOCUMENTS 
--------------------- 
 
7. (U) On CW destruction related documents, the Russian 
Federation's facility agreement and verification plan for 
Shchuchye will be considered, as will Libya's facility 
agreement and verification plan for the reloading of their 
CW stockpile into new containers prior to movement to the 
future destruction facility at Rabta (the first phase of 
Libya's CW destruction operations).  Del has heard no 
comments on either of the two sets of documents, with the 
exception of an inquiry from the UK delegation, which is 
Qexception of an inquiry from the UK delegation, which is 
prepared to accept the Shchuchye documents but wanted to 
know whether the U.S. had any concerns.  Del will canvas 
other delegations to learn if they have any concerns. 
 
 
8. (SBU) Related to this is the fact that Libya has now 
passed its deadline for the conversion of its former CW 
production facility at Rabta.  In previous discussions, 
Legal Adviser Santiago Onate noted that the deadline had 
not technically been passed, although Libya had clearly 
indicated it would be unable to complete conversion by July 
2008.  However, the deadline now has passed, and UK 
colleagues in particular have shared their concerns that 
delegations wishing to cause trouble could now focus on 
this.  Del has also recently learned that London is 
inclined to ask for a CSP decision that establishes a new 
deadline for the Libyans.  This is not in keeping with the 
precedent set by Russian and Indian failure to meet 
conversion deadlines, and Del will continue to work with 
the UK and inform Washington of developments in their 
position.  The German delegation also noted its view 
recently that the conversion deadline should not be allowed 
to pass without some expression of concern. 
 
9. (SBU) It is unclear at this time whether Libya intends 
to present a new national paper before EC-54.  However, the 
presentation of a paper prior to EC-55 (in February 2009) 
may be particularly important, given the Technical 
Secretariat's reluctance to provide a clear justification 
for the retention of the protective berm at Rabta when they 
change the designation of the sandbag wall from specialized 
to standard.  Del will also continue to work with the 
Technical Secretariat (TS), the UK and Italy to clarify 
what appears to be lingering procedural confusion as to how 
to handle the retention of the berm; however, Del does not 
expect this to be raised during EC-54 unless Libya refers 
to the issue during its presentation at the pre-EC 
destruction informals. 
 
----------------------- 
90-DAY PROGRESS REPORTS 
----------------------- 
 
10. (SBU) Del also expects the usual Iranian posturing on 
the U.S. 90-day update on destruction activities, during 
which Iran likely will refer to "legal difficulties" Tehran 
has with the fact that the start-up dates of the 
destruction facilities at Pueblo and Blue Grass have not 
been provided.  Although this was previously limited to 
consideration of the reports during the EC itself, it has 
recently crept into the question and answer period of the 
pre-EC destruction informals as well.  The Iranian 
delegation has gone as far as to provide a "friendly" 
warning to the Del that this will be a problem at the 
upcoming EC.  Del recommends that the U.S. insist upon 
equal procedural treatment of all 90-day reports, i.e. not 
giving in to Iranian requests to "receive" the U.S. report 
and "note" the others. 
 
---------------------- 
SHCHUCHYE VISIT REPORT 
---------------------- 
 
11. (U) Also under the subitem on progress made in meeting 
revised destruction deadlines, Del expects the report of 
the EC visit to Shchuchye to be listed.  The report was 
agreed on September 19 by the EC representatives who 
visited Shchuchye, after only two meetings and minimal 
discussion, largely thanks to balanced and thoughtful 
drafting by Senior Chemical Demilitarization Officer 
Gabriela Coman-Enescu.  The report has been provided to 
QGabriela Coman-Enescu.  The report has been provided to 
Russia; Del understands the Russian delegation will provide 
comments if necessary before EC-54.  However, given the 
fact that this will result in distribution to States 
Parties just before the EC, full consideration is likely to 
be deferred to EC-55.  Although it is possible that EC 
Chair Amb. Oksana Tomova (Slovakia) may schedule an initial 
meeting for interested delegations to discuss the report 
during the EC, it seems more likely she may only introduce 
the report and hold consultations after EC-54. 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
ARTICLE VII: NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
------------------------------------ 
 
12. (U) The 325-page annual report on Article VII 
implementation was released on September 29, and Article 
VII facilitator Said Moussi (Algeria) has scheduled a 
consultation on October 7 to consider the report and 
continue the previous consultation's discussion on whether 
to pursue a decision on Article VII at the CSP (ref B). 
WEOG delegations have expressed the desirability of report 
language on Article VII to balance any potential action on 
Articles X and XI, but did not feel a decision was 
necessary. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ARTICLE X: ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION 
------------------------------------ 
 
13. (SBU) Del expects more clarity on possible Article X 
developments following the next round of consultations, 
scheduled for October 7.  Consultations on September 18 
were informative, but far from conclusive (ref C).  The 
general assessment among delegations seems to be that Iran 
will not push for a decision on its victims network 
proposal, but both Iran and new facilitator Victor 
Smirnovsky (Russia) have recalled CSP-12 report language, 
which called for "intensive deliberations" and a report 
(and recommendations as appropriate) to CSP-13.  The Czech 
delegation has confirmed that the non-paper it recently 
circulated is an attempt to show that some work has been 
done since CSP-12 and to give delegations something other 
than the Iranian proposal to work with.  The facilitator 
has told Delrep he will work on report language for the EC, 
and possibly more extensive language for the CSP that 
demonstrates the "intensive" work that is occurring, in 
fulfillment of CSP-12 and Review Conference language.  The 
Iranian delegation may also wait until close to or during 
CSP-13 to float a last-minute proposal, as they did last 
year in an attempt to circumvent procedure. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
ARTICLE XI: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
14. (SBU) The facilitation on Article XI has moved slowly 
toward agreement on a workshop to develop concrete 
implementation measures.  Del sees this as the most 
probable outcome for the EC and CSP.  Iran's recent 
statement on a "dual track" (without further details on the 
second track) could hijack the consensus on a workshop.  As 
with Article X, a report is due to the CSP. 
 
------------ 
OPTIMIZATION 
------------ 
 
15. (U) On optimization, Del understands that the 
Secretariat will issue its annual report on the 
implementation of optimization measures at CW destruction 
facilities.  Policy Review Branch Head Per Runn noted that 
one of the conclusions delegations should draw from this 
year's report is the fact that no further reductions in 
inspector team size can be made without compromising 
verification. 
 
----------------- 
OCPF DECLARATIONS 
----------------- 
 
16. (SBU) During the Industry Cluster meeting on September 
29, the DG explained that this item had been put on the 
agenda to allow delegations to discuss the two June papers 
on enhancing OCPF declarations (EC-53/DG.11 and EC-53/S/5). 
Qon enhancing OCPF declarations (EC-53/DG.11 and EC-53/S/5). 
He admitted that delegations are unlikely to reach a 
decision on the papers but suggested that the EC would 
provide an additional forum in which to express views on 
enhancing declarations. 
 
17. (U) In the Bureau, EC Chair Tomova, the DG and Amb. 
Burkart (Germany) resisted Iranian efforts to remove this 
item from the agenda.  Iran will likely push to remove the 
agenda item again during the EC Chair's informal 
consultations on October 6 and possibly at the beginning of 
the EC when the agenda is adopted. 
 
18. (U) Del requests further guidance on the U.S. position 
on the two OCPF papers in order to fully engage in 
discussions on both proposals. 
 
------------------- 
BIOMEDICAL SAMPLING 
------------------- 
 
19. (U) The TS note on the OPCW's capability to analyze 
biomedical samples is also on the EC agenda.  The paper 
outlines plans for a "capability building" exercise in 
which laboratories that have some expertise in this field 
will be asked to provide samples to laboratories wishing to 
gain experience.  As the OPCW would need to provide some 
oversight and guidance, there are costs associated with 
acquiring additional equipment and capabilities.  Del 
expects other delegations may be inclined to defer 
consideration.  As this relates directly to the OPCW's 
capability to conduct an investigation of alleged use, Iran 
may take a particular interest in developing capacity in 
this area. 
 
20. (U) Verification Director Horst Reeps discussed 
biomedical sampling briefly during budget consultations 
(ref D).  He said that faced with either developing its 
internal capability at great expense or building up a 
network of qualified laboratories (similar to the 
designated laboratories), the TS had opted for the latter, 
more cost-effective option.  The draft 2009 budget includes 
EUR 98,000 for an external expert to advise on building up 
this network. 
 
21. (U) Del requests guidance as to whether Washington 
agrees with the general concept and projected costs. 
 
-------------------------------- 
OPCW CENTRAL ANALYTICAL DATABASE 
-------------------------------- 
 
22. (SBU) Del has also received and forwarded to Washington 
a draft paper from the TS on the addition of analytical 
data for non-scheduled chemicals in the OPCW Central 
Analytical Database (OCAD).  The TS hopes to circulate this 
note prior to EC-54, and OPCW Laboratory Head Gary Mallard 
has specifically requested U.S. feedback prior to 
circulation, if possible.  From conversations with the UK 
delegation and Mallard, Del understands London is very 
concerned that the approach outlined in the note closes the 
door on future additions to the OCAD and is still 
considering its position.  Based on initial reactions from 
Washington, Del has informed Mallard that the U.S. has 
serious reservations about the proposed approach and 
recommends the TS delay circulation. 
 
------------------------ 
DRAFT PROGRAM AND BUDGET 
------------------------ 
 
23. (U) The budget is the most critical item on the agenda, 
with three main areas to be addressed after a month of 
consultations: the increase in OCPF inspections, the Office 
of Special Projects (OSP) and a number of key performance 
indicators (KPIs) that are not measurable and do not meet 
results-based budgeting standards. 
 
24. (SUB) This year's draft budget is nearly a carbon copy 
Q24. (SUB) This year's draft budget is nearly a carbon copy 
of last year's budget, and the consultations were free of 
fireworks until October 1 when several NAM states led by 
India (South Africa, Iran and Cuba) took aim at the OSP, 
particularly its counter-terrorism and non-proliferation 
activities.  An additional meeting on this issue has been 
 
scheduled for October 6.  Aside from the unknown NAM 
intentions on OSP, the thorniest issue will be the proposed 
increase in the number of Other Chemical Production 
Facility (OCPF) inspections, with China and some Non- 
Aligned Movement (NAM) countries opposing the increase, 
while Western Group nations are in favor. 
 
25. (U) Iran, as always, and South Africa, to a lesser 
extent, are the wild cards in negotiations.  Iran could, as 
it has in the past, hold up agreement on the budget to 
bargain for something else; South Africa already has hinted 
that it might follow this example.  Neither the Iranian nor 
South African delegations have previewed what they want; 
Del's best guess for Iran is that it might be their 
longstanding proposal for an Article X victims' network. 
NAM countries have been disorgnized of late and hiding 
behind South Africa's ative engagement but have scheduled 
meetings every day in the week before the EC.  The NAM 
could block the budget to eliminate the additional OCPF 
inspections or to press for another favored item, such as 
Article XI.  Del believes NAM holdouts to be less likely 
than Iranian mischief, but both are possible, pushing 
passage of the budget to a special EC before or during the 
CSP. 
 
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OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL MATTERS 
------------------------------------------ 
 
26. (U) Transfer agreement with the UN Pension Fund:  This 
draft agreement would allow contributors to the UN Pension 
Fund to transfer their contributions from the OPCW's 
Provident Fund back into the UN Pension Fund when re- 
joining the UN System after working at the TS.  Originally 
considered at EC-45 and deferred pending advice from the 
Advisory Body on Administrative and Financial matters 
(ABAF), the most-recent ABAF meeting in September concluded 
that the agreement was ready for EC consideration. 
 
27. (U) Del requests guidance on whether it may join 
consensus in recommending approval of the agreement by the 
CSP. 
 
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OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT AND EXTERNAL AUDITOR 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
28. (U) After drawn-out consultations on the 2007 OIO 
report following its deferral at EC-53 (ref A), delegations 
are expected to note the report without any objections. 
 
29. (U) After two consultations in September on the 
External Auditor's Report and the TS's responses to it, 
delegations are expected to note both reports without any 
objections. 
 
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HOST COUNTRY COMMITTEE 
---------------------- 
 
30. (SBU) The Host Country Committee will meet on October 8 
to discuss further developments in finalizing an agreement 
to govern access to the OPCW's commissary.  The Dutch 
delegation and the TS have informed the Del that the 
proposed agreement is pending approval from the Dutch 
Finance Ministry and that the agreement might be ready to 
be concluded by EC-54.  The U.S. Delegation has held up the 
report on the Host Country Committee's activities pending 
the meeting of the Committee.  Del recommends that the U.S. 
not/not request deferral of the late report. 
Qnot/not request deferral of the late report. 
 
31. (U) Javits sends. 
Culbertson