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RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 6142
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3622
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 4539
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 116428 
 
SIPDIS 
UNVIE FOR IAEA 
GENEVA FOR CD DELEGATION 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2018 
TAGS: AORC AS BR CA CH EG ENRG FR ID JA KNNP MNUC NZ
PARM, PGOV, PREL, SF, UNGA, ZB, SW, NPT, IAEA 
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL 
MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY FIRST 
COMMITTEE 
 
REF: 1. STATE 103725 
 
Classified By: Amb. Marguerita D. Ragsdale.  1.5 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  On the margins of the UN General 
Assembly,s First Committee meeting in New York, ISN/MNSA 
Director Marguerita Ragsdale, joined by Deputy Director Scott 
Davis, held informal bilaterals on Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT)  issues October 13-15 with Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Egypt, France, Indonesia, Japan, South Africa, 
Sweden, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Zimbabwean 
Chair of the 2009 NPT next Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). 
Ambassador Ragsdale reiterated long-standing U.S. NPT 
priorities, such as strengthening Treaty compliance, and 
expressed U.S. concerns about the increasing politicization 
of nonproliferation issues seen at recent PrepComs and the 
2008 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General 
Conference (GC) that could carry over into upcoming NPT 
meetings.  Concerns expressed by  interlocutors also included 
the Middle East, as well as the effect of the U.S.-India 
Civil-Nuclear agreement on the NPT; some averred that NPT 
Parties should have modest ambitions for the third (2009) 
PrepCom, citing the setting of the agenda for the 2010 Review 
Conference as the only decision that is essential in 2009. 
The Chairman of the PrepCom, Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiki 
of Zimbabwe, has very little experience with NPT issues and 
is being engaged by many NPT Party representatives, including 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries, in an effort to 
acquaint him with relevant issues.  In a statement before the 
First Committee, the Philippines representative reiterated 
his government,s intention, announced in June 2008, to 
nominate a candidate for President of the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference (RevCon).  END SUMMARY 
 
U.S. PERSPECTIVES 
 
¶2. (C )  Ambassador Ragsdale began each meeting with an 
overview of the U.S. outlook for the remainder of the NPT 
review cycle, focusing on the period up to the PrepCom, which 
will take place May 4-15 in New York.  She noted we do not 
expect several key U.S. NPT priorities to change in the 
coming year, in particular our focus on the importance of 
Treaty compliance, dissuading Parties from withdrawing from 
the NPT, international cooperation on the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy, and further explanation of our strong record 
of action to achieve the goals of the NPT,s provisions on 
nuclear disarmament.  Ambassador Ragsdale pointed out that 
the recent IAEA GC appeared to confirm an increased 
politicization of nuclear nonproliferation issues, 
particularly in the Middle East, that we are concerned could 
carry over to the 2009 and 2010 NPT meetings.  She also 
reiterated U.S. views on modifying the procedures  for 
selection of chairs and presidents of NPT meetings and the 
imbalanced scale of assessments for member states, funding 
of  the expenses of those meetings.  Specific comments from 
interlocutors are included below, with several expressing 
concern about the Treaty and its review process, as well as 
eagerness for U.S. leadership and flexibility. 
 
NPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST 
 
¶3.  (C)  Ambassador Ragsdale told Egypt,s UN Permanent 
Representative (PermRep), Ambassador Maged Abdulaziz, that 
the United States hoped politicization of the IAEA GC could 
be avoided next year.  Abdulaziz was clear that Egypt,s main 
goals are implementing the NPT,s 1995 Resolution on the 
Middle East and persuading Israel to join the NPT.  He said 
that the Resolution was the main reason Egypt accepted the 
indefinite extension of the NPT and that some Egyptians are 
now asking why their country joined the Treaty, given that 
Israel has not joined after many years.  He expressed 
pessimism about the future of the NPT review process, partly 
based on what he described as the U.S. position not to accept 
all elements of the 1995 and 2000 RevCon agreed documents. 
He opined that the United States is not really affected by 
the issues in the 1995 Resolution, which explains why the 
U.S. does not view it as a priority.  Ragsdale noted the 
emphasis the U.S. has placed on the 1995 resolution and 
specifically the proposal by ISN Deputy Assistant Secretary 
 
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Hayward that Egypt, Israel and possibly other partners 
participate in a technical cooperation workshop.  Davis 
provided further details on the workshop, which would bring 
together Egyptian, Israeli, and American scientists to 
discuss technical cooperation relevant to building confidence 
on regional security (Reftel).  Abdulaziz asked figuratively 
"what,s in the workshop for me" and added that Cairo has not 
decided on the matter.  Abdulaziz noted that Egypt will chair 
the NAM beginning in July 2009. 
 
¶4.  (C)  In her discussions on the 1995 resolution,s call 
for a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle 
East (MENWFZ), Ragsdale emphasized the U.S. view that 
progress in the peace process is needed before forward 
movement on such a zone,  but that we are very interested in 
working with Middle East states and others to reach the goals 
of the 1995 Resolution.  Swedish PermRep to the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD), Magnus Hellgren, averred that negotiations 
on a Middle East weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone could 
be expected without greater stability in the region, but that 
a final settlement of all Arab-Israeli conflicts may not be 
necessary before such a zone could be created.  The UK,s CD 
PermRep, Ambassador John Duncan, suggested that the Egyptians 
realize that the 1995 Resolution,s goals and adherence to 
the NPT by Israel are not attainable in the foreseeable 
future, and yet they are priorities of President Mubarak, 
which results in tension and infighting among Egyptian 
officials.  He added that the Egyptians are their "own worst 
enemy" on these issues and do not have a "bottom line" on how 
to proceed in addressing them. 
 
¶5.  (C)  French CD PermRep Eric Danon said the proceedings 
and outcome of the IAEA GC has created tension between Egypt 
and France.  France, as president of the EU, led EU efforts 
to negotiate a mutually acceptable IAEA GC resolution on 
safeguards in the Middle East.   Danon expressed concern 
about possible efforts by Egypt to seek a similar resolution 
at the upcoming 2009 NPT PrepCom.  Egypt,s role in creating 
stalemate at the 2005 RevCon was mentioned by several 
interlocutors.  South Africa,s United Nations PermRep, 
Leslie Gumbi, noted that it is only the security 
relationships created by the 1979 Camp David accords that 
keeps Egypt in the NPT and offered the view that Egypt could 
seek to &scupper8 the 2010 RevCon to express its 
displeasure with Israel,s absence from the NPT.  He also 
urged the United States to state publicly that Israel should 
join the NPT.  In reply to Ragsdale,s question about the 
possibility that Egypt might withdraw from the Treaty, based 
on comments to her from Ambassador Abdelaziz, Gumbi said 
Cairo may be posturing, but pointed out that few expected 
North Korea would withdraw before it actually did so. 
Canadian CD Ambassador Marius Grinius suggested to Ragsdale 
that Israel,s policy on nuclear matters is driven by its 
preference not to rely on others for its security.  Many 
interlocutors - including those from the NAM - recognized the 
disruptive role Iran has played in NPT meetings, primarily to 
divert attention from its non-compliance with its 
nonproliferation obligations.  Abdulaziz suggested that 
direct U.S.-Iranian contacts would reduce such Iranian 
obstructions, and Gumbi argued that U.S. decisions about 
engaging Iran will determine the role Iran plays in the NPT. 
 
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
 
¶6. (C)  New Zealand,s CD PermRep, Don McKay, said that the 
NPT is at risk of "death by a thousand cuts" and that 
polarization is getting worse, largely because 
non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) believe that the United 
States overemphasizes nonproliferation and treats nuclear 
disarmament as "ancillary."  Indonesian official Desra 
Percaya expressed a similar view and asked the United States 
to commit to the 2000 NPT RevCon,s "thirteen practical 
steps" to disarmament.  McKay strongly urged us not to focus 
so much on compliance at the expense of disarmament and 
opined that the international reaction to North Korea,s 
nuclear weapon test had been muted because the non-nuclear 
weapons states (NNWS) perceive that the nuclear weapons 
states (NWS) "do not take disarmament seriously." 
 
¶7.  (C)  In outlining New Zealand,s perspective, Ambassador 
McKay asked why the nuclear-weapon states - especially the 
United States, France, and the United Kingdom - are 
"allergic" to institutionalizing transparency regarding their 
nuclear arsenals.  Characterizing the information that the 
NWS do offer as "drip feeding," he argued that NWS could get 
more credit for what they do, and push China toward greater 
 
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transparency in the disarmament realm, if the process is 
institutionalized.  McKay suggested that all states have a 
stake in the issue of the readiness of nuclear forces, and 
asked the United States to engage more with Russia on 
reducing alert levels, at least as a confidence-building 
measure.  Finally, he opined that legally-binding negative 
security assurances from the NWS to the NNWS would give the 
latter more incentive to remain in the NPT, since then they 
would have greater confidence that the former would not use 
nuclear weapons against them. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Both Australian CD PermRep Caroline Millar and 
Canadian CD PermRep Marius Grinius praised U.S. disarmament 
outreach efforts at the UN, the CD, and NPT meetings. 
Swedish CD PermRep Hans Dalgren said that among Sweden,s 
priorities are CTBT entry into force (as did Millar), as well 
as greater transparency and lower readiness of NWS nuclear 
forces.  Stating that "words can,t replace deeds," Brazil,s 
UN Mission First Secretary Jandyr Ferreira dos Santos asked 
how much more transparency NNWS could expect.  Ragsdale 
stated that the U.S. tries to be as transparent as possible 
within the bounds of protecting its national security 
information.  Brazil,s CD Counsellor Julio Laranjiera argued 
that the United States has reinterpreted the outcome of the 
1995 and 2000 NPT RevCons.  Ragsdale and Davis replied that 
it is the U.S. view that final documents reflect the 
intentions of Parties, but are not considered legally 
binding. 
 
¶9.  (C)  Millar noted that Australia will serve as CD 
President from June - August 2009 and urged the United States 
to be more flexible in the next CD session on  possible 
verification provisions in the proposed Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT).  Sweden,s Dahlgren called for similar 
flexibility.  Millar suggested that, if the CD cannot begin 
negotiations on an FMCT, presumably in the near future, at 
some point consideration should be given to negotiating the 
proposed treaty in another forum, such as the United Nations. 
 Canada,s Grinius questioned whether U.S. policy on the 
importance of verification in denuclearizing North Korea 
contradicts the U.S.  proposal for an FMCT without 
verification provisions.  (Ragsdale and Davis pointed out 
that the agreements and their contexts are very different.) 
Millar also took the opportunity to discuss the 
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Commission proposed by 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.  She said its purpose 
is to reenergize the NPT and that its distinction will be to 
bring together prominent individuals from both NPT and 
non-NPT states. 
 
ROLE OF THE P-5 
 
¶10.  (C)  The UK,s Duncan took a broad view of the NPT 
review process, stating that Parties need to "reenergize the 
NPT" and that tensions among them is apparent.  He called the 
P-5 statement, achieved at the second (2008) PrepCom, forms a 
"baseline to raise the game" but said a clearer view is 
needed of where the P-5 wants to go on the NPT.  Duncan 
stated his belief that, in spite of its aggressive new 
policies, Russia would not be "mischievous" within the NPT. 
Hellgren took note of the 2008 P-5 statement but expressed 
concern about the differences in content between the 2008 
statement and the statement by the P-5 in 2000, particularly 
on the "thirteen steps."  China,s CD PermRep Wang Qun 
pointed out that the P-5 and NAM have very different 
perspectives of the NPT world and that the P-5 need to 
collaborate, adding that the group should try to agree on 
another statement at the third (2009) PrepCom.  (Comment: 
Wang displayed a surprising lack of enthusiasm for the P-5 
statement at the 2008 PrepCom, indicating at that time only 
that "we can live with it."  End comment)  Wang also said the 
United States has the leading role in the NPT, especially 
given the importance of negotiations with Russia on nuclear 
weapons reductions.  Japan,s CD PermRep Ambassador Sumio 
Tarui suggested that the P-5 should focus in 2009 on 
addressing the outstanding Middle East issue. 
 
PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 
 
¶11. (C)   Duncan pointed out that NPT Parties focus more on 
civil nuclear energy by "pulling together" various proposals 
for multilateral measures to ensure reliable access to 
nuclear fuel.  His deputy, Fiona Paterson, said she expects 
that Iran will focus on asserting its rights to peaceful uses 
in NPT meetings as part of its effort to divert attention 
from its noncompliance.  Japan,s Tarui cited peaceful uses 
 
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as an issue on which NPT Parties might be able to reach 
consensus in upcoming meetings.  Sweden,s Dahlgren described 
his country,s NPT priorities as centered on multilateral 
fuel cycle efforts and acceptance of the IAEA Additional 
Protocol as the nuclear "safeguards standard."  Brazil,s CD 
PermRep Luiz Filipe de Macedo was cautious about multilateral 
fuel cycle proposals and said Brazil,s reaction to them is 
influenced by his countries plans for joint facilities with 
Argentina.  Indonesia,s Percaya offered the perspective, 
which is widespread among NAM states, that such proposals 
would restrict their ultimate access to nuclear energy. 
China,s Wang said the nuclear "have-nots" are not happy with 
the several multilateral fuel cycle proposals that have been 
put forward, because of the view that they are discriminatory. 
 
¶12. (C)  Some interlocutors, including Egypt,s Abdelaziz, 
expressed concerns about the implications of the U.S.-India 
nuclear cooperation agreement.  Abdelaziz envisioned a 
similar request from Israel to the U.S. for cooperation and 
technology exchange.  Tarui said that, as a result of the 
agreement, some now see the world in a new era he 
characterized as "beyond the NPT."  Zimbabwe,s Chidyausiki 
opined that the agreement is a problem for the NPT and that 
China might now accept nuclear cooperation with Iran in its 
wake.  Macedo said he expects unspecified consequences of the 
India deal for the NPT, and Percaya said Indonesia "regrets" 
the agreement.  Ragsdale replied that it would strengthen the 
nonproliferation regime overall and is a recognition that 
India has acted responsibly as a possessor of nuclear 
technology and weapons. 
 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
 
¶13.  (C)  The question of achievable objectives for the 2009 
PrepCom was prominent in the discussions between Ambassador 
Ragsdale and her interlocutors, with a spectrum of views 
about how much can be expected in May.  Tarui said getting 
the necessary procedural decisions (agenda and timetable) is 
a priority for Japan.  Chidyausiki and China,s Wang 
suggested modest ambitions and argued that the PrepCom will 
be fortunate to agree on an agenda for the RevCon.  (COMMENT: 
 This is an important, matter given that a stalemate over the 
agenda at the 2005 RevCon resulted in Parties losing over two 
weeks of valuable discussion time in the four week event. 
The prospect of another such debacle is much dreaded by NPT 
players.  END COMMENT)  McKay and Hellgren also said they 
believe it could be difficult in the 2009 PrepCom to get 
agreement on an agenda for the 2010 RevCon.  Gumbi pointed 
out that the agenda in 2005 was not "exhausted" and could 
form the basis for discussion in 2010.  His South African 
colleague Johann Kellerman agreed that the 2005 agenda could 
be used in 2010, because it is the "practical" solution. 
China,s Wang was less optimistic that the 2005 agenda could 
be accepted for 2010.  Percaya did not want Parties to get 
their expectations for the 2009 PrepCom too high but was 
optimistic about getting agreement on the agenda (as was 
Wang).  Jandyr Ferreira dos Santos made perhaps the most 
sensible comment on the agenda question: "Delegations will 
raise what they want to raise, regardless of the agenda." 
 
¶14.  (C)  According to agreement among NPT Parties in 2000, 
the third PrepCom is meant to produce substantive 
recommendations to the RevCon.  However, considerable 
pessimism was expressed by interlocutors about prospects that 
it would do so in 2009 (the third PrepCom in 2004 did not 
agree on recommendations).  Citing Egypt,s actions in 2004-5 
as an example, Percaya pointed out that some delegations do 
not want a positive outcome unless they can prevail on 
certain positions.  Gumbi said he believed recommendations 
would be hard to achieve and involve lots of "wrangling," 
especially because PrepCom chairs "have little control" over 
proceedings.   Kellerman suggested that the process will be 
harder than in 2000, because more Parties will want to have a 
say in the outcome.  He offered the view that recommendations 
are not a precondition to PrepCom success (Chang agreed), and 
that perhaps a short declaration of principles could be made 
instead.  Tarui expressed hope for a similar outcome but said 
expecting too much would give Iran and possibly Syria more 
opportunity to "disturb" the PrepCom.  McKay,s deputy, 
Charlotte Darlow, averred that Parties could have agreed on a 
final document in 2005 if they had not lost so much time in 
the agenda fight.  Tarui and Hellgren both commented that a 
Chairman,s summary (not adopted by consensus) in lieu of a 
final document would have no value. 
 
¶15.  (C)  Concerns about the unlikelihood of recommendations 
 
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SUBJECT: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT): BILATERAL 
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coming out of next year,s PrepCom, combined with the chance 
that the U.S. elections would create ambiguity in U.S. 
policy,  led at least three interlocutors to suggest that a 
fourth PrepCom, probably in fall 2009, should be considered. 
Chidyausiki, Hellgren, and Millar raised the possibility. 
Millar said there is a sense among some that the third 
PrepCom is too soon after the U.S. elections, adding that a 
fourth PrepCom took place before the 1995 RevCon and worked 
well.  Tarui said he does not like the idea, and Ragsdale 
strongly resisted the notion of parties banking on such an 
outcome partly on grounds of cost (the U.S. would bear the 
largest share) and also on grounds that there would be no 
guarantee of a more productive outcome than in the 3rd 
PrepCom. 
 
¶16.  (C)  The selection of Chidyausiki of Zimbabwe as PrepCom 
Chairman has provoked considerable efforts by various NPT 
Parties and groups of Parties, including the NAM, to promote 
regional issues and concerns in their consultations with him. 
 The UK,s Paterson said she expected the Mason Group 
(Western countries) to meet with him (subsequently the 
meeting took place on October 22).  She also indicated that 
many NAM countries seem to realize they made a mistake in 
choosing Chidyausiki.  While affable and capable, they viewed 
him as lacking in experience on NPT matters.  Percaya said 
Indonesia is unhappy with Chidyausiki,s selection but has 
arranged for him to participate, with Indonesia, in NPT 
"training" at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in 
Monterey, CA.  Gumbi said that, as a fellow African state, 
South Africa has a special obligation to support the 
Zimbabwean. 
 
¶17.  (C)  Canada,s Grinius told us he hosted an October 10 
meeting at the Canadian Mission in New York to begin 
interactions between representatives of a few 
non-nuclear-weapon-state NPT Parties and Chidyausiki. 
(Participants included Canada, Brazil, Egypt, Honduras, 
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway.)  The 
meeting seems to have resulted from prodding from UN High 
Representative for Disarmament Sergio Duarte, from a concern 
about Chidyausiki,s ability to manage the PrepCom, and from 
a desire by these states to develop a working relationship 
with the latter in advance of the PrepCom.  Grinius said the 
group will probably meet at least one more time before the 
next PrepCom. 
 
¶18.  (C)  On October 13, the Philippines announced in the 
UNFC plenary that it would nominate Libran Cabactulan, 
currently its Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, as 
President of the 2010 RevCon.  This is the first nomination 
of which we are aware, but in accordance with NPT review 
cycle practice, the president will come from an Asian NAM 
country.  None of our interlocutors knew anything about 
Cabactulan.  Ragsdale indicated that the United States 
believes that the procedure for choosing the leaders of NPT 
meetings should be modified to make it more open to choices 
from all NPT Parties and that the scale of assessment should 
be modified to reflect current economic circumstances.  Few 
interlocutors commented on these points, although Wang may 
have seen the latter as suggesting an increased assessment 
for China.  He pointedly noted that he would report 
Ragsdale,s having raised the point to Beijing. 
RICE