VZCZCXRO9432
PP RUEHAP RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMJ RUEHPB RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #5948/01 3041935
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301922Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU PRIORITY 7584
RUEHBD/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN PRIORITY 7653
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 115948 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM PREL
SUBJECT: PSI: OPERATIONAL EXPERTS GROUP MEETING IN PARIS, 
FRANCE (SEPTEMBER 25-26, 2008), PART 1 OF 2 
 
REF: STATE 115935 
 
SUMMARY 
¶1.  The seventeenth Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI) Operational Experts Group (OEG) meeting took 
place in Paris, France on September 25-26, 2008. 
Delegations from the 20 OEG countries participated. 
Information contained in this cable is provided for 
Posts' information and is not to be passed to host 
governments. 
 
OBJECTIVES AND ACTION REQUEST 
 
¶2. REFTEL provides a non-paper to pass to host nation 
governments of all PSI-endorsing states to keep them 
abreast of developments in the PSI community. Posts 
are requested to provide assessments of what PSI 
outreach activities (including exercises, table top 
exercises emphasizing a national response plan for 
WMD-related interdiction, commodity identification 
training, etc.) might provide value-added 
capacity-building effects to the host country. 
Email replies to POC are acceptable, following 
delivery of REFTEL non-paper. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
¶3.  Meeting Summary: France hosted the seventeenth 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational 
Experts Group (OEG) meeting in Paris on September 
25-26, 2008.  Delegations from the 20 OEG countries 
participated - Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, 
Singapore, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the 
United States.  The meeting built upon the momentum 
generated at the PSI 5th Anniversary meetings in 
Washington, DC on May 28-29, 2008 and focused on 
developing concepts for the future of the OEG and PSI. 
New this time, France organized break out groups on the 
Future of the OEG, Coordinating Outreach and Exercises, 
Relations with Industry, and Media Strategy.  Of note, 
France added a plenary session on law enforcement issues 
after the U.S. and other countries requested that this 
subject area receive more attention than earlier agenda 
drafts allowed. Detailed information on the agenda and 
related discussions can be found in the Chairman,s 
Statement in paragraph 18 below. 
 
¶4.  Delegation:  The U.S. delegation was led by Richard 
Douglas, OSD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Counternarcotics, Counterproliferation, and Global 
Threats. The delegation included representatives from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy and 
General Counsel), the Department of State (ISN), 
U.S. African Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. 
European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern 
Command, U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of 
Homeland Security (Legal, Customs and Border 
Protection, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement), 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Office 
of Naval Intelligence. 
 
¶5.  Introduction: Mr. Michel Miraillet, Under Secretary 
of Defence for Policy (France), welcomed PSI Operational 
Experts to Paris on September 25, 2008.  Mr. Miraillet 
emphasized the importance of raising awareness and 
providing tools to all PSI countries so that they are 
equipped to help prevent proliferation, and he called 
upon OEG countries to enhance the effectiveness of PSI. 
The OEG meeting was chaired by Camille Grand, Director 
of the Foundation for Strategic Research. 
 
¶6.  Future of the OEG: New Zealand chaired a discussion 
on the Future of the OEG in an effort to ensure its 
continued value and sustainability. The U.S. delegation 
pursued its interest in further regionalization of PSI 
activities, provided that communication among OEG 
countries could be maintained. Regarding frequency of 
OEG meetings, the group was comfortable with an annual 
OEG and more frequent regional meetings. 
 
¶7.  Coordinating Outreach and Exercises:  The U.S. 
chaired a discussion on the relationship between 
outreach activities and exercises, recognizing that 
 
STATE 00115948  002 OF 007 
 
 
a degree of coordination among OEG countries would 
improve the effectiveness of these activities and 
help prevent saturation among PSI partner countries. 
The group made three proposals to the OEG plenary 
to improve coordination. 
 
¶8.  Relations with Industry: The UK chaired a 
discussion on relations with industry, reflecting a 
widely-shared view that building relationships with 
industry - particularly the export and transport 
industries - is an effort worth pursuing. 
 
¶9.  EU role in PSI:  France, as current President of the 
EU, included two agenda segments on the EU's involvement 
in PSI. First, France invited Mr. Andreas Strub from the 
Council of the European Union to discuss the EU's 
approach to counterproliferation. Second, Poland 
introduced the concept of a Regional OEG meeting for EU 
member countries. During the ensuing discussion, the 
following conclusions were drawn: 1) While the EU 
provides a complementary and supportive operating 
framework for PSI, decisions to participate in any 
specific interdiction action remained with EU member 
states' national governments, and 2) Poland's proposed 
Regional OEG would be welcomed and should include all 
European PSI countries, not only EU member states. 
It should be noted that the U.S. conveyed its position 
on this issue to France and Poland prior to the OEG 
meeting, was satisfied with the conclusions reached 
in Paris and will continue to look for ways that 
international organizations can play complementary 
roles with PSI. 
 
¶10.  German-hosted PSI web-based portal:  Germany 
presented an updated concept for a web-based PSI portal 
that was first introduced at the London OEG in February 
¶2008. Germany asked for volunteers to participate in a 
small working group to further refine the portal 
concept and develop business rules for its use. The 
U.S. volunteered for this effort, recognizing the 
important role that a portal will play in strengthening 
the PSI community and providing all PSI partners with 
access to key PSI documents and points of contact. 
Some delegations expressed reservations with granting 
portal access to all PSI partners. Germany noted that 
it would consider all comments back in its capital, 
with the objective of confirming the access policy 
soon. The U.S. strongly supports providing all PSI 
partners with access to OEG and PSI documents, 
noting the OEG's responsibility to work on behalf 
of all PSI partners. 
 
¶11.  U.S.-hosted OEG meeting with regional 
participation: The U.S. will host the next OEG meeting 
with regional participation from Western Hemisphere 
countries on May 12-14, 2009 in Miami, Florida. 
The purpose will be three-fold: 1) to convene a full 
OEG meeting to review key issues and action items from 
the Paris OEG meeting, 2) to explore region-specific 
issues related to WMD proliferation and interdiction 
with non-OEG PSI partners in the Western hemisphere, 
and 3) to conduct outreach to countries in the region 
that have not yet endorsed the PSI. 
 
¶12. FOR ANKARA: On September 26, the U.S. delegation 
held a bilateral meeting with the Turkish delegation, 
led by Ms. Elif Comoglu Ulgen, Head of Department in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegation 
thanked Turkey for its cooperation on prolifertion 
related issues, recognizing the proliferation 
challenges posed by its geography. The U.S. encouraged 
Turkey to host a PSI OEG or Regional OEG meeting in 
the future; Ms. Ulgen responded that the MFA senior 
leadership was waiting to see whether other OEG 
partners would volunteer. 
 
¶13. FOR BUENOS AIRES: Members of the U.S. delegation 
approached Coast Guard LCDR Rogelio Pellegrino to 
discuss how Argentina might assist with planning for 
the U.S.-hosted Miami OEG meeting scheduled for May 
12-14, 2009, including by providing translation 
assistance and by encouraging attendance among 
Western Hemisphere countries. 
 
¶14. FOR CANBERRA:  On September 24, the U.S. held a 
bilateral meeting with Australia, led by Mr. Murray 
Perks, Assistant Secretary of Security Policy and 
Programs in the Department of Defence. Australia favors 
a customized approach to regional PSI outreach, noting 
that Asia-Pacific countries are more receptive to a PSI 
 
STATE 00115948  003 OF 007 
 
 
message that a) emphasizes the links between security 
and trade, rather than a more narrow emphasis on 
stopping illicit WMD-related shipments, and b) places 
PSI in a broader context of related nonproliferation 
initiatives, e.g. UNSCR 1540. Australia reported that 
Mr. David Ritchie, Deputy Secretary in the Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, returned from the PSI 5th 
Anniversary meeting with the intention that Australia 
will host a PSI event, perhaps an exercise, in the 2010 
timeframe. There were no confirmations or additional 
details provided during the OEG meeting. 
 
¶15. FOR LONDON: On September 24, the U.S. held a 
bilateral meeting with the UK, led by Mr. John Noble, 
Director and PSI Operational Lead in the Ministry of 
Defence. This was Mr. Noble's first OEG meeting as Head 
of Delegation.  The UK supports finding ways to increase 
the operational focus and efficiency of OEG meetings, 
as well as an emphasis on industry outreach. 
 
¶16. FOR OTTAWA: On September 24, the U.S. held a 
bilateral meeting with Canada, led by Mr. Claude 
LeBlanc, Director for Arms and Proliferation Control 
Policy in the Department of National Defence. This was 
Mr. LeBlanc's first OEG meeting as Head of Delegation. 
Canada reported on the VIII Conference of Defence 
Ministers of the Americas (CDMA), meeting in Banff, 
Canada, 2-6 September 2008, noting that Uruguay showed 
interest in PSI. Canada was in agreement with the U.S. 
that there would be value in establishing a more 
regular schedule of future OEGs, so that countries 
could have a firm basis for planning their 
participation. Canada agreed to assist the U.S. with 
the Miami OEG meeting to be held May 12-14, 2009. 
Finally, Canada noted that they are considering hosting 
a PSI exercise in 2011. 
 
¶17. FOR WARSAW: On September 24, the U.S. held a 
bilateral meeting with Mr. Lukasz Zielinski, Head of 
Nonproliferation Division in the Security Policy 
Department of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Poland's new Head of Delegation, Mr. Marek Szczygiel, 
Deputy Director of the Security Policy Department of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was not able to attend. 
Poland is interested in exploring ways for the European 
Union to be more involved in PSI but remains committed to 
keeping the OEG as a group of nations. During the OEG 
meeting, Poland presented a proposal to host a Regional 
OEG meeting for European Union countries in June 2009. 
Several countries, including Norway, Turkey, and the U.S. 
commented on the value of a European OEG that would be 
inclusive of all countries in the region regardless of 
their affiliation with the EU. Poland also intends to 
host a regional exercise with Central and East European 
countries in Hungary sometime in 2009. 
 
¶18. FOR WELLINGTON: On September 24, the U.S. held a 
bilateral meeting with the New Zealand delegation, 
led by Ambassador Dell Higgie, Ambassador for 
Counter-Terrorism, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade. The U.S. congratulated New Zealand on the 
successful execution of PSI Exercise Maru on 
September 15-19 in Auckland. The exercise showcased 
law enforcement and customs aspects of WMD-related 
interdiction and made good progress in conducting 
outreach in the Asia-Pacific region. New Zealand 
supports the idea of inviting non-endorsing 
countries to observe OEG meetings to emphasize the 
transparency among PSI partners. New Zealand offered 
to publish a PSI newsletter as a means of improving 
communication among all PSI partners between OEG 
meetings and exercises. New Zealand also offered to 
draft a sample PSI national response plan for small 
countries, as a way of translating the PSI Model 
National Response Plan for countries with limited 
capacity to do it on their own. Both offers were 
welcomed by the U.S. 
 
¶19. Begin Chairman's Statement: 
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE OPERATIONAL 
EXPERTS GROUP MEETING PARIS, FRANCE September 
25-26, 2008. PART 1 OF 2 
 
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Operational 
Experts Group (OEG) met in Paris, France, from September 
25th to 26th, 2008. Twenty OEG countries were present - 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom and the United States. The European Union 
 
STATE 00115948  004 OF 007 
 
 
attended the OEG by invitation. 
 
Welcoming Remarks 
 
¶20. After the Chairman of the meeting, Camille Grand, 
Director of the Foundation for Strategic Research, 
welcomed the PSI Operational Experts to Paris, Michel 
Miraillet, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy 
(France), underlined in his opening presentation the 
PSI's importance as a tool, aside from the existing 
strict legal framework, to prevent the proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, their means of delivery, 
and related materials. In our globalised world, 
Mr Miraillet emphasised the PSI's objective of 
developing and increasing the awareness in order to 
prevent illicit activities which might lead to 
proliferation. He further stressed the significance of 
providing a unified front, at national and multinational 
levels, to face of the risk of proliferation. Given the 
difficulty of establishing the actual end-use of 
suspected goods, Mr Miraillet highlighted the need to 
reach out to all relevant actors, including private 
players involved in the shipping industry. He 
underscored the interest of organizing events to raise 
awareness - Guistir is a recent example -, aimed at 
involving countries with little knowledge of the PSI 
but in strategic locations in terms of WMD proliferation 
networks. Mr Miraillet's final remarks focused on PSI 
interception achievements and the need to increase 
sharing information on these real cases to enhance the 
overall efficiency and credibility of the PSI. Above 
all, he reminded participants of France's interest in 
engaging more and more the Initiative towards efficiency 
driven activities. 
 
International General Overview 
 
¶21. In the context of the PSI's fifth anniversary, the 
United States presented the successful results of the 
Senior-Level Meeting, at the end of which was issued the 
Declaration of Washington, and of the PSI Outreach 
Workshop. The key priorities for the future were set out: 
to focus on regional PSI activities and outreach 
workshops, especially to encourage further state 
endorsements; to seek to strengthen communication 
channels among counterpart government agencies in PSI 
partner states; to continue work to strengthen relevant 
international law and frameworks. Japan mentioned the 
importance non-proliferation was given at the last G8 
Summit and presented its priorities during its G8 
Presidency. Italy stated that non-proliferation 
will stay high in the agenda during its Presidency. 
 
¶22. The discussion emphasised the turning point the PSI 
is at and the evolving challenges it faces. One of OEG 
members' objectives is to send a clear message to 
proliferators: the PSI is active, it works. It is 
changing proliferators' behaviour. Participants 
expressed their wish for more universal support for 
the PSI. They underlined the usefulness of outreach 
activities and regional meetings. Involving more 
countries, encouraging them to adhere to the Paris 
Principles, implies examining their regional role. 
Dispelling misunderstandings fits into these outreach 
activities. Last, participants stressed the necessity 
of continuing PSI exercises and increasing 
intergovernmental cooperation. 
 
EU Combat against Proliferation Approach 
 
¶23. The Representative from the European Union, 
Mr. Strub, explained which PSI-related issues are 
dealt with at EU level in Europe, and how the 
European Union is playing a role. Mr Strub reminded 
participants of three levels at which the EU is acting 
and can be involved in PSI activities. First, the EU 
provides an appropriate legal basis of relevance to 
PSI activities. It transposes UNSCR sanctions at EU 
level and goes a step further by implementing its own 
set of sanctions. It has established a legal regulatory 
framework in areas where states have transferred 
authority to the European Union (eg, dual-use control 
regime). It sets out best practices for Member States 
(eg, customs regulations). Second, the EU offers 
capacity building and institutional support in 
implementing PSI Interdiction Principles - the Joint 
Research Centre develops operational tools in areas 
such as the surveillance of maritime traffic and 
container screening. Third, EU institutions contribute 
to the fight against proliferation through assistance 
 
STATE 00115948  005 OF 007 
 
 
and outreach efforts to third countries, and this 
includes inserting a WMD clause in cooperation 
agreements with third parties. 
 
¶24. Poland offered a perspective on how the European 
Union could be involved in the PSI. While the PSI 
should be stronger and more universal, it should also 
be more efficient and effective. As participants 
already stated the need of regional OEGs, Poland 
reminded delegations of the unique framework the EU 
provides. It recalled its proposal to host a regional 
OEG which could be partially dedicated to EU issues. 
This OEG could include EU institutions and agencies. 
Such a forum will facilitate the reflection on how 
the EU's activities fit into the PSI and exploring 
ways to strengthen it further. 
 
¶25. The EU is committed to the fight against 
proliferation, as its 2003 WMD strategy illustrates. 
France outlined the objectives of the French EU 
Presidency in order to fight proliferation. Those 
priorities are threefold. First, address the 
proliferation crises with a special emphasis on Iran 
and North Korea. Second, strengthen non-proliferation 
regimes and tools (NPT, CTBT, Multilateral Nuclear 
Approaches, MTCR, suppliers groups, HCOC). Third, 
implement concrete actions to prevent and counter 
proliferation by identifying trends and the best ways 
of dealing with proliferation. The EU is currently 
working on a new action plan against proliferation. 
 
¶26. Participants recognised the EU's added value in PSI 
activities. Partners expressed wide support for the 
Polish initiative of hosting a regional operational 
Experts Group meeting in 2009. Countries expressed an 
interest in the EU perspective while emphasising the 
necessity of also examining PSI issues in other regions 
and their specificities. With regards to practical 
cooperation, the EU contributes to provide the legal 
framework, reinforces capabilities, facilitates 
information sharing and exchanging best practices for 
EU members. It was recalled that while operating within 
the framework provided by the EU, EU member states act 
on a national, bilateral or multilateral basis when 
dealing with real cases. 
 
Capability Building / Technical Assistance / Updates 
 
¶27. Singapore presented an analysis of technical 
verification capabilities, based on PSI member feedback. 
It identified strengths and areas for improvement. The 
OEG member states as a whole are strongest in 
verification of missile-related, biological- and 
chemical-related items verification. Gaps lie in 
verification capabilities of nuclear-related items. 
Gaps also lie in laboratory verification and providing 
expert witnesses, while OEG is stronger in 
identifying items. 
 
¶28. Denmark informed the Group on FATF's efforts to 
prevent proliferation finance. The  FATF's mandate was 
extended in 2008 to include the analysis of financing 
aspects of WMD proliferation. FATF's approach is based 
on recommendations on the implementation of UNSC 
resolutions. It seeks to provide tools for implementing 
those resolutions on the financing aspects based on a 
typology process (threat assessment, methods and 
measures, identification of policy issues). Denmark 
underlined that the main PSI challenge in this regard 
is information and intelligence sharing with financial 
institutions and industry. Fight against WMD 
proliferation financing thus represents a new line 
of approach. 
 
¶29. Germany gave a presentation on the PSI internet 
website project: - www.psi.diplo.de -. At the moment, 
the website contains practical information, contact 
details, an archive of previous meetings and exercises. 
An access can be requested by all PSI members who will 
be provided with Login ID and password. Germany suggested 
improvements to the website including increased 
participation, more content (PSI newsletter, search 
engine, "national areas", etc.) and better interactivity 
(discussion groups, information exchanges, video 
streaming from meetings, etc.). At a more practical 
level, Germany mentioned the possibility of creating a 
core group of interested states for the website's 
management and expanding administrators' rights. 
 
¶30. All participants underlined the importance of the 
 
STATE 00115948  006 OF 007 
 
 
work Germany has undertaken. Delegates discussed the 
development and use of the German website as a PSI 
information repository and outreach tool. Some countries 
noted the potentially sensitive nature of information on 
PSI activities and the necessity to reflect further on 
the conditions of access. Acknowledging the announcement 
made at the PSI 5th anniversary Senior level meeting in 
Washington DC on May 28th, 2008 to allow access to all 
PSI partners, delegations are asked to review the 
website's current content and notify Germany of any 
sensitive materials that should not be made available 
to all by November 15th, 2008. Additionally, Germany 
proposed that a small group of OEG delegates work 
together to developp business rules that would govern 
the use of the website. Several countries including 
the US volunteered to work with Germany in this small 
and open group. 
 
Real Case Debriefings 
 
¶31. The United States presented a 2008 case to illustrate 
the use of bilateral ship-boarding agreements supporting 
the implementation of PSI statement of Interdiction 
Principles, UNSCR 1540 and the 2005 SUA Protocol. Such 
agreements facilitate operations and encourage the 
development of internal procedures. The case described 
was related to a dual-use machine tools with a potential 
application in weapons of mass destruction and delivery 
systems development programs. It was provided by a North 
Korean entity working with brokers in Asian and Western 
European nations. The commercial merchant vessel 
transporting the goods was destined for a Syrian port. 
This case highlights that reciprocal boarding agreements 
are an important tool in operationalising the PSI, that 
a national coordination process for interdiction 
decisions is crucial and that there is a need to exercise 
and develop Standard Operating Procedures. It shows that 
PSI leverages the relationship and the capabilities of 
partners. It also underlines that interdictions options 
in port are significant but that it is also critical to 
act in a timely manner. 
 
¶32. Japan outlined a case that occurred in 2003. It was 
related to a company about to export stabilised direct 
current supplies that can be used to develop nuclear 
weapons and missiles. The material was destined for 
North Korea. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
had notified the company in 2002 that an export licence 
was required. Nevertheless, the company loaded three 
items on a ship destined for Thailand - without the 
required licence. These goods were intercepted in Hong 
Kong and further investigation highlighted that they 
were meant to be re-exported to North Korea. It was the 
first Japanese case of a company violating the catch-all 
regulation under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Act. Usually, exporters give up exporting the goods if 
notified. Consequently, the METI launched an on-site 
investigation of the company and requested that Hong 
Kong confiscate the items. METI issued the company 
with an administrative guidance to bring the goods back 
to Japan. The company complied at its own cost. The 
Japanese judiciary sanctioned the company and its CEO 
for this incident. Japan underlined the interdiction's 
success: it had a strong deterrent effect; information 
sharing and prompt action for cooperation by the 
relevant authorities allowed seizure of the cargo. 
 
¶33. Canada and the Netherlands gave a presentation on a 
joint Netherlands-Canada intercept of a uranium analyzer 
shipped from Canada to Iran via Dutch territory. There 
were doubts about the consignee/end-user. The Dutch 
authorities, with interagency cooperation, stopped the 
shipment for further investigation. The item was not 
listed but sensitive, and as such was subject of the 
watch-list and of the EU Iran embargo  regulation. 
The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs imposed a 
catch-all provision on the Dutch freight forwarder and 
the goods were returned to Canada after establishing 
contact and cooperation with the freight forwarder and 
Canadian authorities. Once the goods were back in Canada, 
the Canadian Border Services Agency retained them and 
conducted intelligence and enforcement checks. Canadian 
authorities located the import and export documents - 
which indicated that the end-user was the Atomic Energy 
Organisation of Iran - and examined the shipment. It 
seized the goods and referred the case to the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, as required by law. This case 
is still under investigation. Information from the 
enforcement action provided usable evidence of linkage 
between AEOI and declared consignee. International and 
 
STATE 00115948  007 OF 007 
 
 
domestic cooperation was effective and essential in the 
successful interception and enforcement. It was also 
concluded that watch lists are useful but must be 
combined with a workable catch-all clause. 
 
¶34. Turkey presented its experience in terms of 
on-the-ground practices. It emphasised the need for 
control at origin, of adequate intelligence, of good 
international and interagency cooperation and of equal 
burden-sharing. Turkey also underlined the importance of 
transmitting interception requests in time. When Turkey's 
assistance is requested, or when Turkish authorities 
decide to intervene, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
conducts further investigation. Intelligence-sharing is 
critical before making a political decision. As an 
illustration, Turkey mentioned some cases that fell 
under UNSC resolutions. Turkish authorities consider 
outreach (industrial, bilateral and multinational) 
activities to be paramount. The presentation concluded 
on four priorities: universalisation, effective export 
controls, increased intelligence exchange and 
international cooperation. 
 
¶35. France and Greece jointly presented an interdiction 
involving a suspicious cargo transporting various goods 
ambiguously listed as "construction materials". The 
shipment included double base components that could be 
used for SCUD-type missiles and was en route from North 
Korea to a Middle-East country. The interception rested 
on the following legal foundation: the UNSCR 1718 (2006), 
the EU regulation 329/2007, the EU Controlled Military 
List and the elusiveness of manifest and packing list. 
France and Greece pointed out the interdiction's 
successes (what worked well) and the difficulties faced 
during the interdiction's four phases: alert, operations 
planning, operations management, and post-interception. 
They underlined the valuable experience this interdiction 
has been for the agencies involved and that both 
countries were working on identifying strengths and 
weaknesses to improve their respective national plans, 
capabilities and reaction mechanisms. The interdiction 
confirmed the value of a national response plan, Standard 
Operating Procedures, a strong legal basis for action, 
and good communication between PSI partners. But it 
showed the need to improve the relationship between 
authorities and industry, strengthen signatories' PSI 
commitments, focus outreach towards states that are key 
locations on the air or sea route towards areas of 
concern. 
 
¶36. The discussion confirmed the importance of sharing 
information, the necessity of finding the appropriate 
legal basis and the critical importance of bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation, without neglecting the 
national level. It was mentioned that countries 
increasingly deal with unlisted items, which impacts on 
the legal situation. Another challenge is the need for 
adequate intelligence and informing industry. Experience 
tends to prove that companies inform authorities of 
suspicious shipments or transactions when briefed. 
Participants expressed their keen interest in real 
case debriefings in future OEG meetings. 
 
END OF PART 1 OF 2 OF PSI OEG CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT 
 
POINTS OF CONTACT 
 
¶37.   Please slug responses for OSD GSA (Beth Flores) and 
State/ISN/CPI (Carlos Guzman). USG POC for PSI 
Operational Experts Group issues is Beth Flores, 
OSD/GSA (beth.flores@osd.mil). USG POC for PSI policy 
issues is Carlos Guzman, State/ISN/CPI 
(GuzmanCS@state.gov). 
RICE