VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #5454 3032030
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 292021Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 1189
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 1064
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0414

UNCLAS STATE 115454 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EMIN ENRG ETTC IR MNUC PARM TRGY
SUBJECT: PREVENTING IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF NEW SUPPLIES OF 
URANIUM 
 
REF: A. STATE 077744 
     ¶B. ASTANA 001649 07 STATE 119630 07 
     ¶C. LONDON 2848 ISN A/S ROOD-AUSTRALIAN AMB. RITCHIE 
        DISCUSSION 
     ¶D. 7 AUGUST 2007 
     ¶E. 07 WINDHOEK 458 
     ¶F. 07 STATE 093518 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 4. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) OBJECTIVES FOR ASTANA AND TASHKENT: 
 
-- In coordination UK counterparts in country, Embassies 
Astana and Tashkent should convey to appropriate host 
government officials continuing U.S. concerns regarding 
possible Iranian attempts to procure new stocks of uranium. 
 
----------- 
BACKGROUND: 
----------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Following our initial effort to encourage the 
world,s most significant uranium producers against supplying 
to Iran, the United States is also encouraging partners to 
deliver similar demarches to reinforce the U.S. effort. 
(Note: For further background on the uranium issue, see refs 
A and B.)  As a result of these discussions, the United 
Kingdom has agreed to approach Astana and Tashkent to remind 
those governments of the risks involved in trade with Iran, 
particularly in the area of uranium. The UK has asked the US 
to participate in the UK demarche. The UK also intends to ask 
Canada to participate, particularly in Kazakhstan where 
Canada reportedly is developing significant relationships 
with the Kazakh nuclear industry. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
ACTION REQUEST FOR ASTANA AND TASHKENT: 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Posts are requested to closely coordinate with 
their UK counterparts in capitals and offer to participate in 
a joint approach as described in para 3. Posts are requested 
to assist in the delivery of a joint demarche with the UK and 
possibly Canada, as appropriate, recalling previous 
discussions described in REFTEL. The demarche should 
underscore the likelihood that Iran will seek to procure 
uranium from sources in the near term. Posts should stress 
with host governments their international legal obligation to 
prevent the transfer or sale of uranium to Iran.  Posts 
should note that Iran often utilizes front companies and 
illicit mechanisms for its nuclear procurement, which 
highlights the need for states and their domestic firms to 
exercise extraordinary caution in engaging with entities. 
Posts should recommend that host governments approach any 
domestic firms involved in uranium production or trade to 
warn them of the risks of supplying to Iran.  Posts should 
request that, if Iran contacts host government firms/entities 
in search of uranium, those requests should be denied and 
reported to the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee so there is 
greater visibility on Iran,s practices. Posts are requested 
to monitor the domestic nuclear industry and to report any 
substantial uranium deals, particularly those that are with 
unestablished end users.  Finally, posts should make clear 
that if Iran claims it is seeking uranium in order to support 
a legitimate civil nuclear energy program, the updated P5 1 
incentives package provides for nuclear cooperation including 
a guaranteed nuclear fuel supply. 
 
¶5.  (U) Posts are requested to report any substantive 
responses by 7 November 2008.  Richard Nephew (ISN/RA, 
202-647-7680, NephewRM@state.sgov.gov) and Risa Mongiello 
(ISN/RA, 202-736-4730, MongiellRN@state.gov) are the 
Department's POC for this activity. 
RICE