O 160039Z OCT 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 110387 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
THE HAGUE FOR THE CWC DEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM MARR KTIA CWC JA
 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  GUIDANCE 
FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT ON 
SAMPLING AND ANALYSIS DURING SCHEDULE 2 INSPECTIONS 
 
References: (A) The Hague 00180.  (B) Technical 
Secretariat letter L/VER/IVB/140324/08 dated 01 October 
¶2008.  (C) (06) State 145877. 
 
¶1.  Guidance in paragraphs 7-8. 
 
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Overview 
---------- 
 
¶2.  This cable provides information and guidance to the 
U.S. delegation for use during informal discussions with 
the Technical Secretariat on the margins of EC-54, 14-17 
October 2008.  These sampling and analysis discussions 
are a follow-up to a 19 February 2008 meeting (ref A) on 
future sampling and analysis activities during Schedule 
2 inspections, and the Technical Secretariat response 
(ref B) to written questions posed in U.S. National 
Authority letter (NACS#176650) dated August 28, 2008. 
 
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Background 
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¶3.  An inspection team from the Technical Secretariat (TS) 
of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) conducted sampling and analysis 
activities in the United States during a routine 
Schedule 2 inspection in November 2007.  This inspection 
was one in a series of inspections involving sampling 
and analysis that the TS conducted in numerous States 
Parties during an 18-month trial period. Though a sample 
was successfully taken and analyzed during the U.S. 
inspection, concerns were raised by the U.S. Host Team 
(HT) regarding the rationale for the sampling and the 
scope of the analysis. 
 
¶4.  Participating States Parties met with the TS on 19 
February to discuss their experiences with the sampling 
and analysis inspections during the trial period.  The 
meeting did not allow for an in-depth discussion on the 
rationale and efficacy of sampling and analysis so the 
U.S. put down some markers concerning future sampling 
and analysis activities during routine Schedule 2 
inspections and the need for further U.S.-TS 
discussions. 
 
¶5. The delegation should bear in mind that the USG 
considers sampling and analysis to be an inspection tool 
that is intrusive, yet potentially valuable.  In our 
view, however, it is not sufficient for the inspection 
team to simply cite Paragraph 27 of Part VII of the 
Verification Annex as the justification for requesting a 
sample.  A request by the inspection team to conduct 
sampling and analysis activities should be directly 
linked and relevant to (1) the inspection mandate and 
(2) site-specific risks, as provided for in paragraph 20 
("... in deciding on the ... intensity of the inspections, 
the Technical Secretariat shall give due consideration 
to the risk to the object and purpose of this Convention 
posed by the relevant chemical, the characteristics of 
the plant site and the nature of the activities carried 
out there, taking into account the respective facility 
agreement as well as the results of the initial 
inspections and subsequent inspections").  Before 
requesting a sample, the team should consider whether 
less intrusive means, including those proposed by the 
inspected State Party, would allow it to fulfill its 
mandate.  However, sampling and analysis is only one of 
several inspection tools and use of this intrusive tool 
during Schedule 2 inspections in the U.S. should require 
a rationale beyond simply invoking paragraph 27 even for 
sampling and analysis in the declared plant(s) that is 
the focus of the inspection.  Further, an inspection 
team's having brought the sampling and analysis 
equipment does not mean that they must employ it and 
thus its use should not be required in the inspection 
mandate.  The delegation should also bear in mind that, 
per (ref C), "the U.S. expects the TS to...identify 
reasons during the inspection period as to why 
taking/analyzing samples is necessary." 
 
¶6. On August 29, 2008 the U.S. delegation delivered a 
letter to the Technical Secretariat containing questions 
to help frame the issues.  On October 3, 2008 we 
received the Secretariat's response.  The questions and 
answers are outlined below: 
 
Q1. For any given Schedule 2 facility, what does the TS 
consider constitutes a rationale or basis for sampling 
and analysis?  What criteria would be used in deciding 
whether or not to request a sample? 
 
A1. In the Secretariat's view, the rationale and the 
basis to conduct S&A is clearly spelled out in Part VII, 
paragraph 27 of the Verification Annex which states that 
"sampling and analysis shall be undertaken to check for 
the absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals."  The CWC 
therefore obligates the Secretariat to use this unique 
verification tool (i.e., sampling and analysis) during 
all Schedule 2 inspections. 
 
Q2. Does the TS agree that Paragraph 27 should not be 
cited as the sole grounds for requesting a sample?  If 
the TS view differs from the U.S. view, how does it 
differ? 
 
A2. In the opinion of the Secretariat and according to 
the text of the CWC, paragraph 27 provides sufficient 
grounds for requesting a sample to carry out S&A. 
 
Q3. In the event of an anomalous analysis result (e.g., 
the detection of one or more undeclared scheduled 
chemicals) how would the Inspection Team resolve the 
result and to what degree, if any, would the burden be 
on the inspected facility?   Can a more extensive 
spectral database than the OCAD be used in the blinded 
mode, or is this possibility only available in the open 
mode? 
 
A3. In the event of an anomalous result, such as 
detecting some undeclared scheduled chemicals, the 
Inspection Team would work closely with the ISP 
representatives as well as technical personnel from the 
inspected site to find a technical explanation for this 
type of result.  In cases where the analytical results 
are different from what was anticipated, the Inspection 
Team has been able to work with the ISP in order to 
identify the appropriate explanation.  Currently, an 
extensive commercial database can only be accessed from 
GC/MS working in open mode.  However, the Secretariat is 
already working on the development of a "new blinded" 
operating mode, which, in essence, is a blinded mode 
that would allow access to a commercial library [of 
chemicals].  The new operating mode is expected to be 
available as of next year. 
 
Q4. How often have "false positives" been encountered? 
What has caused them? 
 
A4. Out of the eighteen Schedule 2 inspections conducted 
so far involving S&A, eleven of them reported GC/MS 
matches with the OCAD.  An undeclared scheduled chemical 
showed up on one mission.  In the remaining ten 
missions, there were matches with OCAD reported as 
"false positives."  In one of the ten missions which had 
"false positives" there were also scheduled chemicals 
reported at low levels.  Of the ten missions in which 
"false positives" were reported, eight were clarified 
using the differences in the retention indices and/or 
spectral analysis.  In two cases, the IT in agreement 
with ISP, accessed the commercial library to discard the 
identification as being an undeclared scheduled 
chemical. 
 
Q5. Does the Technical Secretariat envisage an end-state 
in which sampling and analysis equipment is routinely 
taken on industry inspections and used only if less 
intrusive means are unable to achieve the inspection 
aims?  And if the TS view differs from this end-state, 
how does it differ? 
 
A5. As indicated in the response provided in the 
introductory paragraphs, the Secretariat was not given 
the latitude of choosing which verification tool to use 
during Schedule 2 inspections.  The use of access to 
records does not exclude the use of access to the 
declared plant(s) or other parts of the plant site. 
Neither does it exclude the sampling and analysis which 
according to Paragraph 27 of part VII of the VA "shall 
be undertaken."  This provision of the Convention does 
not specify any limitations or special circumstances for 
the use of S&A.  Therefore, the Secretariat regards S&A 
for Schedule 2 inspections as a routine tool to be used 
during the inspection process - the same as it is for 
the physical inspection of facilities or the checking of 
records.  S&A is the most direct method to check for the 
absence of undeclared scheduled chemicals and provides a 
higher degree of assurance that the plant site is in 
compliance with the CWC. 
 
-------- 
Guidance 
-------- 
 
¶7.  Delegation should explore in depth TS views on 
sampling and analysis during Schedule 2 inspections. 
Del should draw on background above regarding U.S. views 
and on the additional points in paragraph 10 during 
discussions with the Technical Secretariat. 
 
¶8. Please report results of the discussions by cable to 
Washington. 
 
¶9. Please contact ISN/CB - Richard D'Andrea at (202)647- 
5091 or via email with any questions. 
 
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Additional Points 
----------------- 
 
¶10. Begin Additional Points 
 
- Given the inspection team's obligation under the 
Confidentiality Annex to "...take into consideration 
proposals which may be made by the [inspected] State 
Party...to ensure that sensitive equipment or 
information...is protected," if a host team offered an 
alternative, protective proposal, would such a proposal 
be given serious consideration by the inspection team? 
 
- The OPCW has long recognized the value of the 
partnership with the chemical industry, and the DG 
reiterated this during the Second Review Conference. 
Probably more than any other inspection tool, the U.S. 
chemical industry would like to be sure that the 
Secretariat is using sampling and analysis in a measured 
way, building on previous inspection successes. 
 
- Given that the inspection-related disagreements 
encountered during the early industry inspections in the 
U.S. were successfully overcome, we have every 
expectation that sampling and analysis issues can be 
similarly resolved.  What do you think would be the best 
way to do this? 
 
- The TS view in the 1 October letter appears to go 
beyond in some cases what is necessary or practical from 
a verification standpoint. 
 
- Is it the TS goal that eventually every Schedule 2 
inspection should involve sampling and analysis? 
 
- When will the "new blinded" operating mode for the 
GC/MS be available next year? 
RICE 
 
 
NNNN 
 



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