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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000672 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2018 
TAGS: PGOV BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA'S NEXT PRIME MINISTER 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  The odds-on favorite to become Bulgaria's 
next Prime Minister is Sofia Mayor Boyko Borissov.  A rough 
hewn and volatile figure with rumored links to organized 
crime, Borissov exploits the electorate's yearning for a 
dominant leader to reverse the perceived failures of current 
PM Stanishev and his gridlocked three-party coalition. 
Touting his lack of sophistication as a badge of honor, 
Borissov is the most cunning and charismatic player of the 
day.  He is explicitly cultivating U.S. and European approval 
to bolster his legitimacy.  Using this to our advantage, we 
can push him and his GERB party into more responsible 
positions as next year's elections approach.  END SUMMARY. 
 
 
¶2.  (C)  Though elections are still as many as nine months 
out, Sofia Mayor Borissov is the man to beat.  A political 
headliner, he outpaces PM Stanishev by over 30 points, vying 
with President Parvanov in popularity.  Borissov's charisma, 
prominent (and usually favorable) media treatment, and the 
discredited state of rival leaders (and their parties) propel 
his two-year old GERB party.  Despite self-styled claims that 
it is Bulgaria's "new center-right," GERB's appeal flows from 
Borissov's 
larger-than-life personality and his populist bent.  He 
attracts disenchanted 
and alienated voters from both the left and right, as well as 
huge swaths of the protest vote against the unpopular 
Socialist-led coalition. 
 
Raw Political Force 
------------------- 
 
¶3.  (C)  A canny political operator, Borissov is smart and 
savvy even if relatively unsophisticated.  More comfortable 
on the Bulgarian than the world stage, he is no novice at 
playing on larger arenas.  He fully understands power -- real 
and symbolic -- and how to hold and exercise it. 
Underestimating his political talent or drive is a costly 
mistake for his rivals and opponents.  Called a "raw 
political force," with emphasis on all three words, he is an 
instinctual decision maker.  As a political operator, he is 
more tactician and inside player than strategist.  At times 
mercurial, he can be (according to our GERB contacts) 
"impatient" and "change his 
mind every day"  even when being completely focused on 
clearly defined goals.  Borissov has a tainted past -- 
personal 
ties to 1990s mafia leaders -- but denies any involvement 
in crime.  During his Secretary General tenure at the MOI, he 
personally led raids against drug dealers, but there 
were no busts of any major OC figures.  As elections near, 
questions about his past are likely to increase, especially 
from the desperate Socialists who plan to mount a negative 
campaign to cast the election as a "referendum on 
Borissov." 
 
Springboard Sofia 
----------------- 
 
¶4.  (C)  Borissov touts U.S. and European ties whenever 
possible, including his support from the center-right 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Hanns Seidel Foundation, 
the Robert Schumann Foundation, and his personal 
relationship with Angela Merkel and the European People's 
Party.  In his initial meeting with the Ambassador, he 
stressed 
Bulgarians are not used to taking decisions on their own 
and need Washington and Brussels to "tell the PM what needs 
to be done."  He added that when GERB wins, he plans to have 
a foreign 
expert in each ministry to support and monitor its work.  A 
directive not collaborative leader, Borissov would dominate 
whatever cabinet he chooses. 
 
¶5.  (C)  We have consistently urged Borissov to develop teams 
to 
elaborate policy on key issues, such as national security, 
energy security, and rule of law, and to identify and groom 
candidates for senior and mid-level government positions.  We 
doubt the planning process has gone much further than making 
lists and some initial contacts, but preliminary soundings 
hold some promise. 
Borissov and nominal party head Tsvetan Tsvetanov shared 
names of potential future ministers in a GERB-led 
government, including some non-GERB choices; some hold 
promise.  GERB has 
already floated the Finance Ministry to World Bank Director 
Kristalina Georgieva and the MFA to GERB European Parliament 
Deputy 
Roumyana Zheleva.  Borissov is a master of misdirection and 
false leads, at times hinting he may not take the Prime 
 
SOFIA 00000672  002 OF 002 
 
 
Minister's position but offer it to someone else.  This helps 
fuel speculation that he has the Presidency in mind, a 
calculated ploy to boost his image as a national unifier. 
 
 
Wild Cards: Russia, Ataka 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Despite his pro-European talk, insiders believe 
Borissov is a "wild card" when it comes to Russia.  He is 
close to Lukoil regional 
head Valentin Zlatev, rumored to support GERB with 
cash.  (Hedging bets, Slatev is also a big BSP money patron). 
 Borissov keeps a wary eye on electoral dynamics.  A GERB 
survey shows that 64 percent of likely GERB voters and 67 
percent of Bulgarians in general favor close ties with 
Russia.  With an alienated, angry electorate, GERB looks to 
minimize defections to radical fringes, especially Ataka. 
Based on the survey, Borissov reportedly told his team that 
he would make pro-Russian statements from "time to time" 
and stay away from the Russia vs. NATO debate to keep his 
electorate happy. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Borissov may be prepared to tack away from 
center-right positions under certain circumstances.  For 
example, GERB has flirted with Ataka, conducting some joint 
actions with them and (sometimes) speaking well of their 
leader Volen 
Siderov.  He assures us he is doing so only to keep up his 
populist credentials and would never form a coalition with 
them, in fact, would go into opposition before doing so. 
But, if GERB faced the prospect of needing a coalition with 
the BSP or ethnically Turkish MRF, odds are Borissov would 
manipulate all parties to drive the best bargain. 
 
¶8.  (C)  The one constant in Borissov is his need for foreign 
validation.  He looks to the U.S. for much of that, 
showcasing his relations with U.S. politicians and law 
enforcement officials.  The likely victory of his 
personality-based party in the next general elections 
illustrates 
Bulgaria's continued political immaturity, as many 
still believe in a savior who will quickly resolve 
problems.  Borissov's need for our blessing and oversized 
ego are powerful tools we can use to steer him toward 
becoming an effective national leader.  Leveraging his pride 
and 
need for legitimacy, we can nudge him and his party toward 
a modern political formation that naturally looks to the U.S. 
as a genuine partner.  But in any case, if Borissov wins, it 
will be quite a ride. 
McEldowney