VZCZCXRO8912
RR RUEHDU RUEHJO
DE RUEHSA #2379/01 3041008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301008Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6214
INFO RUEHOR/AMEMBASSY GABORONE 5374
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE 3740
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 5961
RUEHTN/AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN 6203
RUEHDU/AMCONSUL DURBAN 0346
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG 8556

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 PRETORIA 002379 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER PREF PHUM SF
SUBJECT: UNHCR REVIEWS ASSISTANCE TO XENOPHOBIA IDP'S 
 
REF: A. PRETORIA 1563 
     ¶B. PRETORIA 2174 
     ¶C. GENEVA 0867 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  On October 23, UNHCR Regional Representative Sanda 
Kimbimbi reviewed UNHCR's support to the SAG in protection of 
foreign victims of xenophobic attacks.  After alerting 
officials and police to signs of coming violence, UNHCR 
negotiated for registration of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), lobbied for the prolonging of SAG shelters, opposed 
(in vain) rapid adjudications of IDP asylum cases, and 
provided cash assistance for IDPs to resettle in townships. 
Deflecting public criticism of UNHCR by some NGOs, Kimbimbi 
stressed UNHCR was in a supporting role to the SAG, which led 
with its own resources and policies, particularly 
nonencampment.  On the ongoing stalemate with a remnant of 
IDPs at Camp Akasia, Kimbimbi expressed UNHCR and SAG's joint 
frustration with the group's insistence on resettlement and 
refusal to accept safe shelter.  While continuing to work 
with Akasia IDPs, UNHCR believes the IDPs' behavior could 
jeopardize the SAG's liberal attitude on migration.  End 
Summary. 
 
------------------------ 
Warning Signs Not Heeded 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  Poloffs met on October 23 with UNHCR's Regional 
Representative Sanda Kimbimbi and Resettlement Officer Abel 
Jeru Mbilinyi to review UNHCR's responses to this year's 
xenophobic violence.  When attacks first broke out in March 
and April, frightened foreigners showed UNHCR threatening 
notes that had been distributed to their homes.  UNHCR met 
with SAG officials and police commanders nationwide, warning 
that violence was liable to spread and urging increased 
police presence in areas where non-nationals lived.  Although 
the Minister of Home Affairs visited Pretoria suburbs 
advocating tolerance, the reaction of other SAG branches was 
"superficial," said Mbilinyi.  After attacks in Gauteng, SAG 
authorities at a workshop in the Cape said such violence 
could never happen in their province -- only to see it erupt 
the next day.  Despite being warned, the SAG was still caught 
off guard. 
 
------------------------------- 
IDP Registration: Mixed Results 
------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  After President Mbeki deployed the Army to calm 
townships, SAG focus shifted to displaced victims gathered in 
makeshift camps.  In late May, says Kimbimbi, UNHCR began 
negotiations with the SAG to register IDPs at camp sites. 
Registration data would help the SAG to budget for 
humanitarian aid, and enable the UNHCR to propose solutions 
-- to regularize the migrants' stay, to ensure proper 
management of sites, and to plan for reintegration.  The SAG 
chose to conduct the registration itself in place of UNHCR. 
Kimbimbi said the process was useful in some places, such as 
in those camps where many previously undocumented Zimbabweans 
opted to formalize their status.  At other sites, however, 
the attempt was a "flop," says Kimbimbi, because voluntary 
registration attracted few participants.  At Camp Akasia (Ref 
A), only 300 of the 1200 camp residents agreed to register. 
 
--------------------------- 
Akasia: Set on Resettlement 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  Non-registration at Akasia was symptomatic of a larger 
issue among its mainly Somali and Ethiopian IDPs -- their 
insistence on asylum in a third country (not South Africa). 
"They have shown a total refusal to cooperate," said 
Kimbimbi.  "Fundamentally the problem is that their agenda 
QKimbimbi.  "Fundamentally the problem is that their agenda 
from the beginning has been resettlement, and resettlement 
only."  Originally just 200 IDPs congregated outside UNHCR 
offices, bused to Akasia by the Mayor's office, the Akasia 
group swelled as migrants from all over South Africa heard 
(false) rumors of U.N. resettlement plans there.  In fact the 
site was never recognized by Gauteng province, nor by UNHCR 
(despite regular visits).  While most xenophobia IDPs have 
dispersed (via repatriation or reintegration), a core group 
at Akasia continues to claim that any option but resettlement 
would be "suicide." 
 
PRETORIA 00002379  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
----------------------- 
In Search of Resolution 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  Resettlement screening lasting over a year cannot occur 
at the Akasia site, said UNHCR, yet attempts to shift the 
group to church shelters have so far been fruitless.  UNHCR 
offered reintegration aid of R 2000 ($200) per individual and 
R 3000 ($300) per family, plus food packages worth R 300 
($30), but there had been no takers, apart from families 
already living in town while the fathers stayed at the camp 
to press for resettlement.  Jesuit Relief Services (JRS) had 
identified charitable shelters to house the Akasia IDPs, 
which UNHCR stood ready to fund, but as recently as October 
22 UNHCR could persuade only two Akasia IDPs to accept the 
offer.  UNHCR has enlisted churches, and South African Human 
Rights Commissioner (SAHRC) Jody Kollapen, to lobby the IDPs 
to move to safer shelters.  On the warm reception of 
Kollapen, Kimbimbi said ruefully, "They trust him because 
they believe he can deliver resettlement.  The same is true 
when they see you, an American.  If you can't deliver on that 
they will reject you... as they do UNHCR." 
 
----------------------------- 
Holdouts Run a Range of Risks 
----------------------------- 
 
¶6.  In UNHCR's view, not only was the Akasia group's plight 
"self-inflicted" when safe shelter was freely available, but 
by remaining as illegal squatters on government property the 
group also risked separation, arrest, and deportation.  The 
Department of Social Development might forcibly remove 
children to places of safety, separating them from parents as 
they had done among unauthorized IDP camps beside the R28 
highway.  The Department of Home Affairs, said Kimbimbi, was 
"planning to move on Akasia" with accelerated asylum reviews. 
 UNHCR had tried in vain to stop the latter practice, 
conducted in the camps' unfavorable conditions, and likely to 
end in deportations of the majority of IDPs who were in fact 
economic migrants.  Rejection rates were particularly high 
among Somalis, who told SAG interviewers they wanted 
resettlement and did not wish to remain in South Africa -- 
hence were by definition not granted asylum here. 
 
--------------------- 
SAG Has Lost Patience 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  While the SAG was once willing to make an effort to 
assist victims of xenophobia, said Kimbimbi, that attitude 
has collapsed from the combative approach of Akasia 
residents.  "Officials want to do the right thing.  But with 
this group they have tried all they can."  Television news 
crews captured residents refusing food, and throwing it on 
the ground as not being acceptable.  Mbilinyi said formerly 
sympathetic South Africans were taken aback by these images. 
Others filmed insulting former President Mbeki on Al Jazeera 
news provoked outrage from the President himself.  When UNHCR 
urged Akasia residents to take responsibility for their 
surroundings and dispose of garbage at a hygienic distance, 
IDPs told Mbilinyi the SAG should clean up after them. 
Kimbimbi summed up his frustration: "These situations should 
be avoided -- absolutely, we all agree.  But the community 
refuses to cooperate." 
 
-------------------------------------- 
SAG in the Lead Role; UNHCR Supporting 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  Deflecting NGOs' criticism that its action was 
inadequate, Kimbimbi stressed the limits of the UNHCR's role 
within the SAG's distinct policy framework.  To those 
Qwithin the SAG's distinct policy framework.  To those 
pressing UNHCR to take the lead, he countered that UNHCR was 
there "to support government, not substitute for it."  The 
SAG had the economic means to respond; ministries' duties 
were well defined by law; and in early June the SAG formally 
took charge of the issue, funding NGO direct assistance. 
UNHCR could influence and advise the SAG -- but not shoulder 
it aside.  To those who wanted UNHCR to establish refugee 
camps, Kimbimbi explained that South Africa was unique in 
Africa in having a non-encampment policy mandating freedom of 
movement.  Although UNHCR and NGOs persuaded the SAG to keep 
IDP "temporary shelters" camps open longer than intended, 
ultimately these were a decision of the Minister of Home 
Affairs and explicitly counter to the SAG's ethos. 
 
 
PRETORIA 00002379  003 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------------- 
Liberal Policy in Jeopardy? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶9.  UNHCR warned that Akasia IDPs' behavior could eventually 
jeopardize the SAG's progressive attitudes and policies on 
migration and asylum.  "Home Affairs was previously very 
liberal, but if you talk to them now you see they're changing 
their view.  Now they believe being liberal is being lax, and 
that leads to problems."  South Africa could follow European 
countries in applying the "country of first asylum" 
principle, invalidating applications from all nationals of 
nonadjacent countries who crossed multiple borders en route 
here.  The SAG could suspend free movement of asylum seekers 
in favor of encampment, and/or deny them access to work and 
services.  In judging the correct amount of pressure to apply 
to the SAG, particularly with respect to a difficult case 
like Akasia, Kimbimbi said "It's a balancing act.  We can't 
rush into assisting individuals -- meanwhile endangering the 
concept of asylum and the non-encampment policy." 
 
----------------------- 
Solution In IDPs' Hands 
----------------------- 
 
¶10.  COMMENT: In advance of a November 2-7 PRM visit to 
Pretoria and Johannesburg, this meeting helped poloffs gain 
UNHCR's perspective on its performance through the xenophobia 
crisis.  The PRM visit will further probe the responses of 
IOs, NGOs, and the SAG to the human impact of this year's 
violence against foreigners.  The NGO and ecumenical 
community continue to play a supportive role, alongside 
organizations representing the IDPs' diverse ethnicities.  We 
understand the scope of UNHCR actions is limited by U.N. 
mandate and SAG policy.  There could well be errors or 
shortfalls in its performance, which we are not in a position 
to judge, so we look forward to the findings of the U.N.'s 
own investigative team dispatched from Geneva in response to 
NGOs' complaints that UNHCR Pretoria should be more 
forward-leaning (Ref C). 
 
¶11.  Regarding the ongoing stalemate at Akasia camp, we agree 
with UNHCR that the IDPs' current condition squatting in a 
field is unsafe, unhealthy, unsustainable, and legally 
precarious.  We hope that SAHRC and JRS may jointly persuade 
the IDPs to move to shelter, to enable asylum screening.  The 
Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa (CORMSA) 
told us they are working on a mediation effort to achieve 
this end.  The UNHCR's Geneva team visited Akasia on October 
29 and was slated to meet with poloffs on October 30.  End 
Comment. 
BOST