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DE RUEHPU #1389/01 2771205
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031205Z OCT 08
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8923
INFO RUEHZH/HAITI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 1851
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PORT AU PRINCE 001389 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/EX, WHA/CAR, S/CRS, AND INR/IAA 
DEPT PLEASE ALSO PASS TO USAID FOR LAC/CAR 
WHA/EX PLEASE PASS TO USOAS 
SOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL HA SF VE
SUBJECT: HAITI: RUMORS ABOUND REGARDING ARISTIDE'S POSSIBLE 
MOVE TO VENEZUELA 
 
REF: PORT-AU-PRINCE 1364 
 
Classified By: Amb. Janet A. Sanderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C)  Rumors of former Haitian President Jean-Bertrand 
Aristide's possible move from South Africa to Venezuela are 
swirling through Port-au-Prince following Aristide's meeting 
with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez in South Africa on 
September 3 and the announcement September 20 that South 
African President Thabo Mbeki would resign.  Members of 
Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas (FL) party assume that Aristide 
would be under fewer restrictions in Venezuela and therefore 
more free to involve himself in Haiti's internal affairs. 
Some Lavalas insiders privately fear that Aristide's more 
active intervention in Haitian politics could further divide 
their party -- even as they concede that no one in the party 
can openly oppose Aristide because of the support he still 
enjoys among the party base.  On one side of this fault line 
are current and former party officials and others who 
distrust Aristide, have a critical view of his two terms in 
office, and who want to forge a disciplined national 
organization with a leadership elected by and accountable to 
the party in Haiti rather than to the ex-President.  On the 
other side lie activists linked to popular organizations who 
hope to harness Aristide's greater proximity to Haiti to 
revive grassroots militancy.  End summary. 
 
RUMORS OF ARISTIDE'S MOVE TO VENEZUELA PERSIST 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (C) While several Embassy contacts have relayed to us 
rumors that Aristide is planning to visit or even move to 
Venezuela, we have no firsthand accounts of discussions 
between Aristide and Chavez on the subject.  Local press 
reports quoted a statement attributed to the Venezuelan 
presidency as confirming that the September 3 meeting took 
place and highlighting Chavez' support for Aristide in 2004. 
Lavalas Deputy Sorel Francois (protect) told Poloff on 
September 19 that Chavez had invited Aristide to visit 
Venezuela in the coming months; Francois claimed secondhand 
access to the information through sources he declined to 
identify.  In a September 20 meeting with the Ambassador, 
President Rene Preval made reference to these rumors, telling 
the Ambassador that he did not want Aristide "anywhere in the 
hemisphere."  Subsequent to that, he remarked that he is 
concerned that Aristide will accept the Chavez offer but 
deflected any discussion of whether Preval himself was 
prepared to raise the matter with Chavez. 
 
¶3. (C) Lavalas Deputy Jonas Coffy (protect), in an October 1 
meeting with Poloff, claimed to be "certain" that Aristide 
would move to Venezuela but said he had no firsthand 
confirmation.  He further asserted that certain FL-linked 
grassroots organization leaders, although not the 
organizations in the "Cellule de Reflection" (see paras. 
7-8), were planning marches and protests after Aristide 
arrived in Venezeula.  On the other hand, well-connected 
former Lavalas Deputy Franky Exius (sometimes spelled 
"Exeus") told DepPolCouns on September 24 that Aristide is 
comfortable in South Africa and expects him to remain there 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
ONE FACTION TRIES TO LOOSEN ARISTIDE'S GRIP ON LAVALAS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4. (C) Paradoxically, more active intervention by the head of 
Fanmi Lavalas in Haitian politics could have a destabilizing 
effect on his already divided party.  Some influential 
Lavalas personalities question the legitimacy of the party's 
current Executive Committee, which failed to secure 
party-wide agreement on the party's position in negotiations 
with Preval on the composition of the Prime Minister's new 
government or its strategy as the next Senatorial elections 
approach. 
 
¶5. (C) The most prominent FL Deputies have aligned themselves 
behind former President of the Chamber of Deputies Yves 
Cristalin, who did not favor Lavalas' participation in the 
new government and who is decidedly opposed to Aristide's 
return to Haitian politics.  Cristalin told Poloff on 
September 26 that Aristide had made a number of mistakes 
during his last years in power.  Despite his disagreements 
with Aristide, Cristalin said he feels compelled to keep his 
opposition to Aristide's return private due to the 
considerable support for the former President among many 
segments of the population.  Deputy Coffy echoed these 
sentiments in his October 1 meeting with Poloff, noting that 
he shared Cristalin's belief that the Executive Committee 
appointed by Aristide was illegitimate.  Like Cristalin, he 
made an impassioned plea for U.S. assistance so that factions 
of the party willing to renounce violent demonstrations and 
forego illicit financing would prevail against other factions 
of the party. 
 
RECONCILIATION EFFORTS SO FAR UNSUCCESSFUL 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Efforts to reconcile dueling factions within the party 
have thus far been unsuccessful.  Deputy Coffy told Poloff 
that Lavalas representatives from Haiti's ten departments 
would convene on October 9 to attempt to resolve their 
differences and agree on a common strategy for the upcoming 
elections.  He added that he expected the meeting to produce 
a coordinating committee to manage Lavalas affairs, including 
the selection of senatorial candidates, regardless of whether 
all factions of the party were represented at the meeting. 
He said that an ad hoc "facilitation committee," consisting 
of himself and MP Pierre Jerome Valcine, Lavalas Senators 
Rudy Herivaux and Yvon Buissereth, Annette "So Anne" Auguste, 
and representatives of Lavalas "popular organizations" had 
been formed to mend the party's divisions but has yet to make 
significant progress.  (Note: A previous reconciliation 
meeting, planned for September 26 by Yves Cristalin was 
cancelled for reasons that remain unclear.  End note.) 
 
SOME FACTIONS MAY SEE SURGE IN SUPPORT 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Although many elected Lavalas officials would likely 
be sidelined if Aristide takes a more active role in Haitian 
politics, other wings of the party stand to benefit greatly. 
Maryse Narcisse, for example, member of the contested 
Executive Committee and a claimant to the title of 
spokeswoman of Aristide, remains prominent in the party for 
her activism for the Aristide Foundation for Democracy.  She 
was a vocal critic of Coffy and of Senator Rudy Herivaux when 
they each claimed the party's support during negotiations 
with Preval over the composition of the new government.  In 
addition, a group of representatives of Lavalas popular 
organizations called the "Reflection Cell of the Lavalas 
Popular Base," which organizes demonstrations and events 
commemorating Aristide's birthday and other significant 
occasions, would presumably be well situated to benefit if 
Aristide's profile grows. 
 
PREVAL REPORTEDLY TRYING TO CO-OPT LAVALAS GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8. (C) Embassy sources tell us that President Preval is also 
actively working to co-opt popular groups affiliated with 
Lavalas to shore up his support.  Deputy Sorel Francois told 
Poloff on September 19 that Preval met "at least weekly" with 
the leaders of the "Reflection Cell," including Jean-Marie 
Samdy, at the National Palace and that Preval had promised 
the group HTG 58 million (approximately USD 1.5 million) in 
funds from the PetroCaribe account to distribute to parents 
in poor neighborhoods for the beginning of the school year in 
early October.  Coffy provided a more plausible account of 
the agreement, saying that the Education Ministry had agreed 
to task Lavalas-affiliated "popular organizations" to 
identify needy families in poor neighborhoods, and that the 
Ministry would then pay their school fees directly to the 
school concerned.  Coffy put the amount committed under the 
program at HTG 40 million (USD 1 million) in greater 
Port-au-Prince and HTG 430 million (USD 10.8 million) 
country-wide.  We have been unable to confirm either report, 
although the Haitian government did eventually announce over 
USD 197 million in emergency spending from PetroCaribe funds 
under the recently promulgated State of Emergency law 
(reftel).  Coffy, for his part, claims to have the popular 
organizations' support in his battle with other factions of 
the party. 
 
COMMENT: LAVALAS ADRIFT WITHOUT ARISTIDE 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Although Aristide is nominally the "National 
Representative" of Fanmi Lavalas, the party has essentially 
been leaderless since Aristide left Haiti in 2004, and any 
attempt to reassert control over Lavalas would be fiercely 
opposed (albeit privately) by one or another group within the 
party.  From South Africa, Aristide has been either unable or 
unwilling to resolve disputes within his party or mobilize 
popular support for Lavalas.  In his absence, Lavalas has 
become a loose collection of Deputies and Senators elected 
under the party's banner, a few respected Lavalas luminaries, 
and a handful of grassroots organizations associated with 
Aristide in the popular imagination.  Many Lavalas leaders 
here believe that Aristide's insecure status in South Africa 
has prevented him from speaking out and involving himself in 
Haitian politics from afar; they reason that he would not 
face similar restrictions if he were to move to Venezuela. 
 
¶10. (C) We judge that our sources' "assurances" that 
Aristide's move to Venezuela is imminent are based not on 
confirmed knowledge but rather a desire to mobilize 
international support behind their faction of Lavalas. 
Although the effects of Aristide's possible return to 
prominence are difficult to predict, it would certainly shake 
up his divided and moribund party.  Factions in the party 
have their reasons for opposing or supporting a greater 
political role for Aristide in Haiti and in the party.  On 
one side of the divide are elected officials and former 
government officials who want to unify feuding groups into a 
disciplined party organization and have the leadership 
elected by and accountable to the party in Haiti rather than 
to Aristide.  These individuals resent Aristide's 
interventions in party matters from afar, and are critical of 
Aristide's conduct during his two terms in office.  On the 
other side lie leaders linked to popular organizations who 
hope that Aristide's greater proximity will help them revive 
grassroots militancy, which would then propel them to 
positions of prominence. 
SANDERSON