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Viewing cable 08PHNOMPENH841, CORE DONORS UPDATED ON KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL ARE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08PHNOMPENH841 2008-10-10 11:50 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO3233
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0841/01 2841150
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101150Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9990
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 2530
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0181
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0083
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2336
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0452
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0650
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 3229
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 2326
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PHNOM PENH 000841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, P, D, IO, DRL, S/WCI 
USUN FOR M. SIMONOFF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018 
TAGS: PREL KJUS PGOV EAID PHUM CB
SUBJECT: CORE DONORS UPDATED ON KHMER ROUGE TRIBUNAL ARE 
UNITED IN ADDRESSING THE CORRUPTION ISSUE 
 
REF: USUN 872 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: ACTING DCM GREGORY LAWLESS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1.  (C)  SUMMARY:  Khmer Rouge Tribunal (KRT) Deputy Director 
Knut Rosandhaug and UNDP Country Director Jo Scheuer October 
9 briefed core donors on their recent trip to New York to 
follow up on the conclusion of ASG David Tolbert's mission to 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 
Rosandhaug declared that the UN Office of Legal Affairs, 
leading other key UN actors, fully supported Tolbert's 
recommendations, including to seek the immediate removal of 
Cambodian ECCC Director Sean Visoth (reftel).  "There is no 
place for corruption in a court supported by the UN," 
Rosandhaug said.  The Head of OLA delivered such a message to 
Cambodia's PermRep at the UN and separately replied to two 
letters from Cambodian DPM Sok An.  The UNSYG's personal 
secretary placed a phone call to the Cambodian head of 
delegation to the UNGA, Secretary of State Ouch Borith, with 
a similar message.  An OLA delegation led by its ASG deputy 
presently planned to travel to Cambodia in the first week of 
November and would likely bring the issue to a head at that 
time, Rosandhaug indicated.  The French Ambassador proposed 
to the assembled donors that they prepare the ground for the 
OLA visit.  Donors Japan, Australia, Germany, the EU, and UK 
agreed that each embassy should work its own RGC contacts to 
seek a satisfactory conclusion to the corruption issue. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (C)  In a meeting hosted by the French Embassy, 
Rosandhaug and Scheuer gave a point-by-point, factual summary 
of their trip to New York.  For UNDP, Scheuer said that they 
would continue to support the KRT on the Cambodian side 
through the Project Board, if/IF the donor community resolved 
the current crisis and continued to support that role. 
Rosandhaug detailed that inasmuch as Prime Minister Hun Sen 
did not attend the UNGA and the UNSYG could not talk to him 
there, the UNSYG's chief of staff (a Korean national and 
personal advisor) called MFA SecState Ouch Borith in New York 
on September 24 or 25  to relay the SYG's "bottom line" -- 
corruption can play no role in a court supported by the UN 
and urgent measures need to be taken by the RGC. 
 
3.  (C)  The Japanese head of OLA sent to the Cambodian UN 
PermRep in New York similar talking points under a Note 
Verbale, said Rosandhaug.  Finally, the OLA head also sent on 
September 26 a reply to two letters OLA had received from 
Deputy Prime Minister Sok An in the previous month.  The 
letter contained a rebuttal to some of the allegations and 
demands in Sok An's letter (and "categorically pushed back") 
while stating the principle that the UN "does not accept 
corruption" and that "urgent measures are needed." 
 
4.  (C)  Rosandhaug attempted to convince the donors that 
time was running out for the UN, which was seen by the 
Cambodian people as the "police" of the KRT and its 
conscience.  If nothing could be done by the time of the OLA 
visit during the first week of November or agreed during the 
visit, then "dramatic steps may be taken," he said.  He also 
said that defense lawyers' inquiries into corruption charges 
and a new inquiry from "some judges" to OLA meant that the UN 
was "losing control" and that corruption charges could play 
out during the trial hearings. 
 
5.  (C)  Rosandhaug noted that a major priority was the 
removal of Sean Visoth and that other criteria for moving 
forward -- which David Tolbert had handed to Sok An during a 
personal meeting -- could follow later. 
 
6.  (C)  French Ambassador Desmazieres proposed that the goal 
of all embassies would be to prepare the ground for the OLA 
mission.  He suggested embassies pursue the issue through the 
usual bilateral contacts and that it be informal.  When asked 
about a common demarche, the Japanese DCM said that a common 
or formal demarche would not obtain a good result and that it 
would be seen as confrontational.  Such a move would make the 
donors appear to be on one side only, he noted, and they 
could then not act as the needed "bridge" between the two 
sides.  Australian Ambassador Adamson agreed that a joint 
demarche would be the last possible step to take, somewhere 
 
PHNOM PENH 00000841  002 OF 002 
 
 
down the road. 
 
7.  (C)  A number of embassies noted that a key Cambodian KRT 
staffer who often publicly voices what are known to be RGC 
views was "not flexible", but was "lightening" up, indicating 
compromise might be possible.  All agreed that the effort to 
effect Visoth's removal would have to be concerted and 
strong, aiming at a "political solution." 
 
8.  (C)  COMMENT:  Rosandhaug conveyed a sense of urgency to 
the donors, many of whom received this same briefing in New 
York (ref).  As they have been in past meetings, donors were 
unanimous in the assessment that action needed to be taken to 
convince the RGC of the immediacy of the problem and the 
efficacy of a political solution.  Charge will approach 
appropriate government interlocutors at every available 
opportunity to repeat the message regarding the needed change 
to address corruption on the Cambodian side of the court. 
CAMPBELL