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P 141524Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4511
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0385

UNCLAS PARIS 001884 
 
SENSITIVE 
NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EIND ECON ETRD EAIR PREL SY FR
SUBJECT: AIRBUS ON SYRIA DEAL AND USG EXPORT CONTROLS 
 
REF: A) PARIS 1771 B) PARIS 1078 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Airbus confirmed its commitment to 
acquiring U.S. export licenses, as necessary, for any 
aircraft sales to Syria.  Apart from the proposed sale of 
50 aircraft to Syria, Airbus expressed continuing 
frustration over the complicated U.S. export control and 
licensing procedures that can impact sales of Airbus with 
U.S. manufactured parts.  The upcoming delivery of A380's 
equipped with Northrop avionics to Lufthansa is a case in 
point, Airbus says.  EASA airworthiness certification for 
these planes cannot be completed without both State and 
Commerce licenses but jurisdictions remain unclear.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) We spoke with Airbus Chief Compliance Officer 
Patrick Donovan on October 7 about the possible sale or 
lease of Airbus aircraft to Syria.  Donovan confirmed 
Airbus is discussing with Syria the sale of 50 aircraft 
(30 A320s, 10 A330s and 10 A350s) over the next decade. 
He assured us that Airbus will apply for the required 
U.S. licenses if there is more than 10 percent U.S. 
content in any of the subject aircraft.  Airbus will also 
conduct detailed controlled content evaluations of each 
type of aircraft, as necessary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) We underscored that USG policy is not to approve 
licenses for the export of parts and components to be 
incorporated into foreign manufactured aircraft intended 
for sale or lease by the manufacturer to Syria subsequent 
to the enactment of the SAA.  This includes the sale or 
lease of aircraft to Syria by private third-parties.  We 
also explained that even those products that qualify for 
an export license because of a Presidential waiver 
require an extensive review by several USG agencies.  The 
process can be time-consuming, with license applications 
subject to a general policy of denial. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Airbus representative reiterated that the 
company has no intention of structuring the deal to 
attempt to circumvent USG sanctions, including through 
lease and purchase agreements with a private third-party. 
The proposed Airbus/SyrianAir deal is subject to a series 
of strong internal controls by AirbusQ top level 
management.  He also made clear that Airbus is laying a 
foundation for a long-term project which may not be 
concluded until the situation in the Middle East 
improves.  He believed that Boeing has also had 
preliminary discussions with Syria regarding future 
aircraft sales. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Donovan then raised the general issue of costly, 
long, and complicated U.S. export control licensing 
procedures.  He cited the case of Lufthansa's first A- 
380, scheduled for delivery in early 2009.  The aircraft 
includes a Commerce-licensed Northrop Grumman navigation 
system that must be certified by the European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA).  The equipment requires a State 
Department license to export its ITAR-controlled data. 
However, the Commerce license reportedly prevents 
Northrop Grumman from sharing ITAR-controlled data with 
EASA for design certification purposes.  To allow for 
disclosure of ITAR-controlled data to EASA, a Technical 
Assistance Agreement (TAA) or a bilateral aviation safety 
agreement must be signed between the FAA and EASA.  Yet 
it appears EASA cannot sign a TAA and it is unclear which 
European Union agency is competent to do so. 
 
Stapleton