VZCZCXRO2952
PP RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #2429/01 2980454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 240454Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7383
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RHMFIUU/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 002429 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AIDAC 
 
DEPT FOR AF/E AF/RSA AND A/S FRAZER 
STATE FOR USAID 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EAID ECON SOCI SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA - World Food Program Requests Private Security for 
Food Aid 
 
REF: Nairobi 2380 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY.  After 1,250 metric tons of food were stolen on 
September 25, the World Food Program (WFP) Somalia Office has 
requested that the USG ask the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
to rescind its ban on transporters providing their own armed 
security personnel.  USAID Food for Peace Somalia office supports 
the WFP's request.  The WFP contracts several Somali transportation 
companies to deliver food throughout Somalia.  These shippers say 
they can no longer guarantee safe passage of food aid.  Targeted 
violence, excessive bribes, and increased insecurity are taking 
their toll on food aid transporters.  While they expect opposition 
from some TFG leaders, WFP and the transporters maintain that 
reconstituting their private security forces is the only way to 
ensure delivery of life-saving resources to 3.5 million vulnerable 
Somalis.  End Summary. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Transporters Key to Aid Delivery 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The September 25 looting of 1,250 metric tons of food aid 
on a convoy of 35 trucks was by far the worst looting incident to 
date.  The food was stolen in North Mogadishu while Deeqa 
Construction Company, owned by AmCit Abdulkadir Nur, were 
transporting it from Mogadishu port to the Bakol Region.  Khadija 
Ali (also an AmCit, and the wife of Abdulkadir Nur) told us that 
she's never witnessed an incident of this magnitude.  In addition to 
Ali, we recently met separately with Mohamed Mohamud Daylaff, 
Managing Director of Al-Towfiq Import and Export Company, and 
Abudulkadir Omar, Managing Director of Swift Traders East Africa, 
Ltd.  Together these companies deliver the bulk of the WFP's 
USG-funded humanitarian assistance. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The companies operate in extremely insecure environments. 
This year five drivers transporting WFP goods have been killed. 
Recently their convoys have been attacked and hundreds of tons of 
food have been looted.  Traditionally, WFP (and CARE who utilize the 
same transporters) have ensured the food by requiring transporters 
to post a bond ranging from 30 to 100 percent of the food's value. 
Consequently, in the event of theft, the transporters usually 
re-purchase the looted food or replace it, far cheaper options than 
forfeiting the bond.  However, as the food tonnages have 
significantly increased this year, the transporters do not have 
sufficient cash to post the bonds, or buy back looted food. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The recent 1,250 MT theft highlights the limits of the 
bond system.  Nur indicated that if WFP collects the stolen food's 
$800,000 bond, the company will go bankrupt.   WFP fears waiving the 
bond will lead to careless handling of food aid.  The WFP and Deeqa 
are negotiating payment by installments while Deeqa works to replace 
some of the food through the local community. 
 
---------------------------- 
WFP Advocates Armed Security 
---------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Representatives from these and other major transportation 
contractors requested the WFP seek TFG permission to re-establish 
private armed security to protect their goods.  Otherwise, the 
transporters indicate that they cannot be held liable for any 
further looting.  The WFP Somalia office has requested USG 
assistance in intervening on behalf of Somali transportation 
companies to obtain TFG (and Ethiopian National Defense Force) 
permission to stand up private armed security escort for their food 
deliveries.  WFP has also asked other diplomatic missions including 
France, Japan, Sweden, and Netherlands to also advocate on their 
behalf. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Although the TFG and the opposition Alliance for the 
Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) have discussed the establishment of 
safe humanitarian corridors, there has been no progress on the 
ground.  WFP told us that returning to the previous system of 
transporter-provided armed security is the only way to address the 
risk of looting and protect their truck drivers.  A WFP logistics 
officer confirmed that the system can be organized quickly using the 
transporters' networks that still exist. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) In a recent meeting with Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed 
Abdisalam Adan (reftel), he told us that he endorsed the 
establishment of uniformed, regulated, armed private security for 
 
NAIROBI 00002429  002 OF 003 
 
 
humanitarian aid deliveries since the TFG was unable to provide this 
security.  Abdisalam told us that private security firms could be 
based on the successful model of the Bakara market private security 
force established earlier this year.  He also noted that private 
security companies would provide much needed job opportunities for 
young people who might otherwise be recruited by militias or worse, 
al-Shabaab.  While Abdisalam endorsed the idea, he conceded that not 
all TFG leaders would look favorably at this initiative. 
 
------------------------------ 
Sophisticated Security Network 
------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) WFP explained that the transporters would build upon their 
experience in mounting security arrangements prior to 2006.  Until 
the defeat of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and the ENDF presence 
in Somalia, WFP transporters used to protect convoys of food aid 
with their own security personnel.  The system was a sophisticated 
network of clan-based personnel from each of the locations the 
convoy would pass.  Through this system, the convoy had sufficient 
security to deter an attack or looting and sufficient clan 
representation to negotiate access, without resorting to fighting. 
At present, each transporter must negotiate separate arrangements 
with local communities, district commissioners, and other entities 
that control the roads they travel, each exacting different, but 
predictable payments for security. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Ali provided us with a concept paper from her NGO SAACID 
that describes a grassroots district-based approach to 
community-level policing and civil justice that we sent by email to 
the Department.  When we asked the transportation companies for 
details on their vision for how the private security would operate, 
they asked for time to consult with one another to present a 
coordinated approach.  Transporters conceded that an efficient 
private security force could quickly surpass the TFG's own security 
forces, but said that they would not directly challenge the 
government's forces.   Each of the transporters (who are all Hawiye) 
conceded that they believed President Yusuf would not allow them to 
be armed, fearing for his own political survival. 
 
--------------- 
Who Is Looting? 
--------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Ali told us she blames the ICU for the September theft. 
Despite appealing to ARS Chairman Sheikh Sharif and Sheikh Dahir 
Aweys, neither was able to stop the theft while it was happening. 
Ali said that her husband spoke directly to al-Shabaab leader 
Mukhtar Robow who denied responsibility and also squarely blamed ICU 
militias.  Nonetheless, according to transporters, all sides of the 
armed conflict have stolen food: TFG militias, clan-based militias 
associated with the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and al-Shabaab. 
However, each group had its own signature -- the TFG sets up 
roadblocks to attack, the ICU loots and destroys property 
indiscriminately, and al-Shabaab uses kidnapping as its preferred 
tactic to extract payments, Daylaff said. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Companies Profitable and Diversified 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (SBU) The transportation companies are owned by influential 
business leaders who increasingly reside elsewhere in the region for 
security's sake.  They travel back to Somalia only when absolutely 
necessary.  Thus far, they have been able to effectively manage risk 
and turn profits in one of the most difficult operating environments 
in the world.  In addition to guaranteed contracts by international 
NGOs, they also provide private land and sea transportation of 
goods, construction, and many have associated NGOs.  For example, 
partially funded by the USG through WFP, Khadija Ali's NGO SAACID is 
implementing the highly successful wet feeding program that is 
delivering an average of 80,000 hot meals per day through 16 feeding 
centers in Mogadishu.  Still providing diverse services, the 
business leaders told us that the current security environment is 
the worst that Somalia has ever seen and that the costs of business 
have almost become insurmountable. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Mogadishu Mayor Still Collecting Taxes 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
NAIROBI 00002429  003 OF 003 
 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Although Mohamed Dheere was removed from his position as 
Mogadishu Mayor and Benadir governor in August, he still collects 
excessive "taxes" to exit the port -- as much as $30,000 per food 
shipment -- money that never reaches the Treasury, according to 
Daylaff.  Daylaff told us the acting Benadir governor, in office 
pending overdue regional elections, is Dheere's cousin and continues 
to operate Dheere's "customs" regime.  At each of the checkpoints 
Daylaff's trucks pass, they are required to pay additional bribes 
out-of-pocket, since WFP pays a set price for each delivery. 
However, we understand the rate structures account for these costs 
and transporters are not losing money on "standard" deliveries. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13.  The risk-averse and steadfastly neutral WFP is endorsing armed 
security escorts as the only option to deliver much needed emergency 
humanitarian aid.  Post agrees and is encouraging representatives 
within the TFG to consider armed protection for humanitarian 
convoys.  We are also encouraging the transporters to develop a 
proposal that will be acceptable to all parties.  Embassy believes 
it would be useful to approach the Government of Ethiopia on this 
subject as well.  Meanwhile, the shippers detail a grim picture of 
the Somali transport sector.  Without TFG security, food aid 
deliveries may soon be too risky and expensive to undertake, they 
say.  Although they have not yet proposed details for how they would 
re-establish a private security force, it would likely be 
accomplished with the same creativity, efficiency, and 
entrepreneurial approach that drive their current operations.  While 
the transporters indicated they would hire across clan lines, this 
security force would likely be regarded as a threat by President 
Yusuf and others within the TFG. 
 
RANNEBERGER