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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002366 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KE
SUBJECT: COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE PRESENTS 
 
REPORT TO PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER 
 
¶1. On September 15, the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election 
Violence (CIPEV) -- which was formed as part of the Kofi 
Annan-mediated settlement of Kenya's post-election crisis (reftel) 
-- presented its report to President Mwai Kibaki.  Kibaki then 
ordered the report to be released immediately.  The report 
recommends concrete measures to improve performance and 
accountability of state security agencies and enhance coordination 
within state security mechanisms, including: strengthening joint 
operational preparedness arrangements; developing comprehensive 
operational review processes; merging the Administration Police and 
the Kenya Police Service; and establishing an Independent Police 
Complaints Authority. The report also recommends the creation of a 
special tribunal with the mandate to prosecute crimes committed as a 
result of post-election violence. The tribunal will have an 
international component in the form of the presence of non-Kenyans 
on the senior investigations and prosecution staff.  The text of the 
Executive Summary follows at paragraph 3. 
 
¶2. Poloff spoke to George Kegoro, the Secretary to the CIPEV. 
Kegoro stated that Kibaki and Odinga have already positively 
commented on the report and its recommendations.  According to 
Kegoro, Odinga indicated that the report will be discussed at the 
next Cabinet meeting. 
 
¶3. To follow is the text of the Executive Summary. 
 
Begin text. 
 
The mandate of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence 
(CIPEV) was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their 
handling of it, and to make recommendations concerning these and 
other matters. 
 
The Report comprises 5 Parts. Part I of the Report is an 
Introduction which discusses the historical context of the violence; 
Part II is a narration of the violence province by province. Part 
III deals with four cross cutting issues: sexual violence, 
internally displaced persons, the media and the nature and impact of 
the violence. Part IV 
deals with acts and omissions of state security agencies and 
impunity; and Part V contains recommendations made with a view to 
the prevention of future reoccurrence of large scale violence; the 
investigation of alleged perpetrators; and how to tackle the culture 
of impunity that has become the hallmark of violence and other 
crimes in the country. 
Sadly, violence has been a part of Kenya's electoral processes since 
the restoration of multi party politics in 1991. However, the 
violence that shook Kenya after the 2007 general elections was 
unprecedented. It was by far the most deadly and the most 
destructive violence ever experienced in Kenya. Also, unlike 
previous cycles of election related 
violence, much of it followed, rather than preceded elections. The 
2007-2008 post-election violence was also more widespread than in 
the past. It affected all but 2 provinces and was felt in both urban 
and rural parts of the country. Previously violence around election 
periods concentrated in a smaller number of districts mainly in Rift 
Valley, Western, and Coast Provinces. 
 
As regards the conduct of state security agencies, they failed 
institutionally to anticipate, prepare for, and contain the 
violence. Often individual members of the state security agencies 
were also guilty of acts of violence and gross violations of the 
human rights of the citizens. 
 
In some ways the post-election violence resembled the ethnic clashes 
of the 1990s and was but an episode in a trend of 
institutionalization of violence in Kenya over the years. The fact 
that armed militias, most of whom developed as a result of the 1990s 
ethnic clashes, were never de-mobilized led to the ease with which 
political and business leaders reactivated them for the 2007 
post-election violence. Secondly, the increasing personalization of 
power around the presidency continues to be a factor in facilitating 
election related violence. 
 
The widespread belief that the presidency brings advantages for the 
President's ethnic group makes communities willing to exert violence 
to attain and keep power. Inequalities and economic marginalization, 
often viewed in ethnogeographic terms, were also very much at play 
in the post-election violence in places like the slum areas of 
Nairobi. 
 
NAIROBI 00002366  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
One of the main findings of the Commission's investigations is that 
the postelection violence was spontaneous in some geographic areas 
and a result of planning and organization in other areas, often with 
the involvement of politicians and business leaders. Some areas 
witnessed a combination of the two forms of violence, where what 
started as a spontaneous violent reaction to the perceived rigging 
of elections later evolved into well organized and coordinated 
attacks on members of ethnic groups associated with the incumbent 
president or the PNU party. This happened where there was an 
expectation that violence was inevitable whatever the results of the 
elections. 
 
The report concludes that the post-election violence was more than a 
mere juxtaposition of citizens-to-citizens opportunistic assaults. 
These were systematic attacks on Kenyans based on their ethnicity 
and their political leanings. Attackers organized along ethnic 
lines, 
assembled considerable logistical means and traveled long distances 
to burn houses, maim, kill and sexually assault their occupants 
because these were of particular ethnic groups and political 
persuasion. Guilty by association was the guiding force behind 
deadly "revenge" attacks, with victims being identified not for what 
they did but for their ethnic association to other perpetrators. 
This free-for-all was made possible by the lawlessness stemming from 
an apparent collapse of state institutions and security forces. 
 
In general, the police were overwhelmed by the massive numbers of 
the attackers and the relatively effective coordination of the 
attacks. However, in most parts of the country affected by the 
violence, failure on the part of the Kenya Police and the Provincial 
Administration to act on intelligence and other early warning signs 
contributed to the escalation of the violence. 
 
The post-election violence is also the story of lack of preparedness 
of, and poor coordination among, different state security agencies. 
While the National Security Intelligence Service seemed to possess 
actionable intelligence on the likelihood of violence in many parts 
of the country, it was not clear whether and through which channel 
such intelligence was shared with operational security agencies. The 
effectiveness of the Kenya Police Service and the Administration 
Police was also negatively affected by the lack of clear policing 
operational procedures and by political expediency's adverse impact 
on 
their policing priorities. 
 
The report recommends concrete measures to improve performance and 
accountability of state security agencies and coordination within 
the state security mechanism, including strengthening joint 
operational preparedness arrangements; developing comprehensive 
operational review processes; merging the two police agencies; and 
establishing an Independent Police Complaints Authority. 
 
To break the cycle of impunity which is at the heart of the 
post-election violence, the report recommends the creation of a 
special tribunal with the mandate to prosecute crimes committed as a 
result of post-election violence. The tribunal will have an 
international component in the form of the presence of non-Kenyans 
on the senior investigations and prosecution staff. End Text. 
 
¶4. Post will continue to monitor closely public reaction to the 
report and government actions to implement it.   We are coordinating 
with resident diplomatic missions on a joint Heads of Mission 
statement of support for the CIPEV report and urging implementation 
of its recommendations. Post will transmit the contents of the 
statement septel. 
RANNEBERGER