Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 08NAIROBI2333, TARGETED ATTACKS IN BAIDOA

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #08NAIROBI2333.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08NAIROBI2333 2008-10-10 12:11 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Nairobi
VZCZCXRO3244
RR RUEHDE RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNR #2333/01 2841211
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101211Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7263
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 7402
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002333 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/E 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV EAID PTER SOCI SO
SUBJECT: TARGETED ATTACKS IN BAIDOA 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (SBU) The last three months have seen the number of armed 
attacks targeting Transitional Federal Government (TFG) 
parliamentarians or their perceived allies increase in 
Baidoa, the seat of the TFG's parliament, and in Mogadishu. 
There have been high-profile attacks in the southern coastal 
town of Merca, and in the Hiraan region, as well.  Al-Shabaab 
has been quick to take credit for much of the violence, but 
it is by no means clear whether the group, or opportunists 
anxious to be associated with Al-Shabaab, are actually 
responsible.  The uptick in violence has prompted UNDP to 
pull its five remaining international staff from Baidoa, and 
an emboldened Al-Shabaab has pressured the NGOs International 
Medical Corps (IMC) and CARE to suspend operations in Bay and 
Bakool (reftel).  Apparent Al-Shabaab gains have sparked 
resistance from the elders of clans affected by the violence 
and by efforts to end humanitarian aid.  Their unhappiness 
seems to have sparked al-Shabaab, as of October 9, to make at 
least a rhetorical retreat. End summary. 
 
Number of Attacks Increases 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) During the week of October 6, contacts in Bay and 
Bakool regions confirmed that the last three weeks have seen 
more frequent attacks on Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG)-associated targets, and reported that "most" of the 
towns in the regions were now run by Al-Shabaab-affiliated 
administrators although not, they noted, by Al-Shabaab 
itself.  The Shabaab militias in Bay and Bakool numbered 
between five and eight hundred, but operate in groups of 
twenty to forty that circulated constantly through the 
regions, we were told. 
 
3. (SBU) The heavier presence of Ethiopian-trained TFG police 
in Baidoa, the "capital" of Bay region, as well as of 
Ethiopian National Defense Force meant that most of the 
recent reported attacks there have been remote or 
hit-and-run. Some MPs ascribed the recent uptick in attacks 
to increasingly lackluster patrolling by TFG security forces 
demoralized by the failure of the interim government to pay 
them. A partial list of some of the recent incidents in 
Baidoa gives a sense of their increasingly targeted nature: 
 
-- On September 19, unknown assailants lobbed a hand grenade 
at a police patrol car, wounding two policemen and five 
civilians. 
 
-- September 25 saw an armed attack on a Baidoa police 
station and mortar attacks on the homes of two 
parliamentarians. 
 
-- On September 30, a roadside explosion near Baidoa's khat 
market killed a child and wounded two police officers. 
 
-- On September 30, Sheikh Ali Madobe was assassinated as he 
left a Baidoa mosque.  Sheikh Ali had close business 
associations with TFG Parliament Speaker Sheikh Adan "Madobe." 
 
-- On October 5, a grenade attack on the residence of a 
Somali-national ICRC official killed a security guard. 
 
-- On October 8, a nighttime mortar attack on the Speaker's 
residence wounded members of a neighboring family of nine. 
 
-- On the same day, the head of the National Intelligence 
Agency was assassinated while at the city's central market. 
 
4. (SBU) The fraying security has spurred UNDP to extract its 
five international employees.  Parliamentarians, in Nairobi 
for a National Democratic Institute-conducted workshop, told 
us the week of October 6 that they, and others in Baidoa 
thought to be partial to the TFG, were the targets of an 
intimidation campaign intended to further limit its 
legitimacy.  TFG Minister of Agriculture Mustafa Duhulow 
disagreed that the goal was intimidation, telling us after 
arriving from Baidoa October 7, "they don't want to 
intimidate us, they just want to kill us."  One 
parliamentarian told us that al-Shabaab operatives conducted 
hit-and-run attacks from Baidoa's outskirts.  The loss of 
innocent life and the attackers' lack of courage, he alleged, 
was fostering resentment toward the extremists among the 
 
NAIROBI 00002333  002 OF 002 
 
 
town's residents. 
 
5. (SBU) In advance of the October 27-29 IGAD summit on 
Somalia, the TFG has attempted to downplay deteriorating 
security.  In an October 7 Nairobi press conference, TFG 
Foreign Minister Ali Jama described circumstances in Baidoa 
as "not hopeless," although he later agreed that the city was 
too dangerous to play host to visiting delegations. 
 
Elder Unhappiness With Insecurity 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Deteriorating security spurred the Digil and Mirifle 
Council of Elders to convene on October 6.  They discussed 
threats to aid agencies and the problems in Baidoa.  Chairman 
Ibrahim Muse Herow condemned attacks on aid workers, the 
looting of NGO offices, and the harassment of aid workers in 
the region.  Herow accused unnamed external actors of 
undermining the well-being of the local communities of Bay 
and Bakool.  Speaker of the Parliament Sheikh Adan "Madobe" 
separately also condemned the attacks in Baidoa at an October 
5 press conference, and TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf used 
his Id remarks to insist that those engaged in violence have 
"nothing to do with Islam." 
 
7. (SBU) One elder who has been publicly critical of 
strong-arm tactics against the TFG and local aid agencies, 
Hiraan Council of Elders Chairman Da'ar Hersi Hoshow, was 
assassinated on October 7.  His death, the October 6 attack 
on a UN vehicle near Merca, and the continuing carnage in 
Mogadishu have created the impression that al-Shabaab, or 
those claiming to be affiliated with it, are in the 
ascendancy, but there are signs that the chaos in Mogadishu 
and the crackdown on humanitarian work are creating clan 
antipathy towards the radical organizations.  In addition to 
statements by the Digil and Mirifle and the Hiraan Chairman, 
the Hawiye Tradition and Unity Council (HTUC) on October 5 
blamed al-Shabaab for the closure of Mogadishu airport and 
created a 27-member committee to investigate security in 
Banadir region. 
 
Resentment Causes al-Shabaab to Retreat 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) Elder criticism and worsening humanitarian 
circumstances appear to have caused al-Shabaab to take a more 
conciliatory tack.  In an October 9 press conference, 
al-Shabaab spokesman Mukhtar Robow denied that his 
organization had threatened HTUC elders, suggested a 
willingness to re-open Mogadishu airport, insisted that 
al-Shabaab was not opposed to all aid agencies, and contended 
that some of the violence allegedly perpetrated by al-Shabaab 
was actually the work of others, whom he promised would be 
arrested and tried according to Sharia law. 
RANNEBERGER