VZCZCXYZ0010
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #3064/01 2901045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY ADE9FA55 MSI6500 538)
P 161045Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0397
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS MOSCOW 003064 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y  (TEXT) 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL OREP IR IS RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ANALYSTS URGE U.S. NOT TO LET GEORGIA 
OVERSHADOW IRAN COOPERATION 
 
REF: MOSCOW 2824 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  During an October 13 roundtable attended 
by HFAC Chairman Howard Berman and HFAC staff, analysts 
argued that Russians perceived NATO expansion as more of a 
threat than a nuclear Iran, which was not viewed by the 
political leadership as a "vital issue" for Russia.  They 
warned against allowing current tensions, particularly over 
Georgia, to prevent the U.S. and Russia from cooperating on 
Iran, which did pose a threat to stability in the Middle 
East, and advised the U.S. to find areas to achieve "positive 
progress" in bilateral relations with Russia.  The analysts 
thought that Moscow would not support new sanctions against 
Tehran, and recommended making economic sanctions more 
effective by convincing Europe, China, and Japan to stop 
conducting business with Iran.  They urged the U.S. to head 
off a potential Israeli attack on Iran, which Russia would 
use to criticize and blame the U.S.  The analysts concluded 
that the P5 1 format had proven ineffective by allowing Iran 
to delay negotiations, and advocated adopting the format used 
in the North Korea Six Party Talks.  End summary. 
 
NATO is the Threat, Not Iran 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) At an October 13 roundtable focusing on Iran, Sergei 
Oznobishchev, Director of the Institute for Strategic 
Assessments, argued that many Russians, including political 
and military leaders, saw NATO expanding into Ukraine as a 
greater concern to Russia than the prospect of a nuclear 
Iran.  While the assembled analysts recognized that NATO did 
not pose a threat to Russia, Oznobishchev advised "do not 
look for logic" on this issue from the Russian leadership. 
Instead, accept that they believe what they say and react 
accordingly. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Oznobishchev warned against allowing current 
international tensions to compromise cooperation on Iran, 
stating that the U.S. "will never stop Iran" from developing 
nuclear weapons without Russia.  He observed that the 
anti-American sentiment that resulted from the Georgian 
crisis had led some Russians to sympathize more with Iran, 
which Tehran was hoping to capitalize on.  This did not mean 
that Moscow would be influenced by Tehran's lobbyists, who 
were attempting to change Russian policies toward Iran and 
proposed expanding military ties (reftel). 
 
¶4. (SBU) Oznobishchev argued that heightened tensions between 
the U.S. and Russia over Georgia were only a symptom of the 
larger issue of Russia's concern that its views on NATO and 
European security were regularly ignored.  From Moscow's 
perspective, the manner in which NATO expansion had been 
carried out made it appear that incorporating Romania and 
Bulgaria into the alliance was more important to the U.S. 
than its relationship with Russia.  Oznobishchev urged the 
U.S. to consider the impact its policies had on the ability 
to address issues such as Iran.  He envisioned a "package 
agreement" in which NATO would not expand to Ukraine and 
Russia would commit to pressing harder on Iran.  At the very 
least, the U.S. should look for opportunities for "positive 
progress" in bilateral relations, including on arms control 
agreements such as START and passing the U.S.-Russia 123 
Agreement. 
 
Iran is not a "Vital Issue" for Russia 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Aleksandr Shumilin of the U.S. and Canada Institute 
observed that Iran was not considered a "vital issue" for 
much of the Russian political leadership, which viewed the 
country more as an element of the U.S.-Russia relationship. 
While the analysts agreed that Iran posed a threat to 
stability in the Middle East, Shumilin said that many members 
of the Russian elite did not recognize it as such, and 
considered Russia-Iran bilateral relations secondary to the 
opportunity Iran presented Russia to play an important 
diplomatic role.  Vladimir Evseev of the Institute of Global 
Economy and International Affairs (IMEMO) observed that the 
U.S. and Russia had "different redlines" regarding Iran.  For 
the GOR, Tehran would not pass a redline as long as it 
continued working with the IAEA, which Moscow thought made it 
difficult for Iran to produce enough fissile material for a 
nuclear weapon. 
 
More Work Needed on Economic Sanctions 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The analysts agreed that Russia would not 
countenance new sanctions on Iran, and thought the best way 
to press Tehran with the means at hand was to make economic 
 
sanctions effective.  Vladimir Sazhin of the Oriental Studies 
Institute commented that other countries, including Germany 
and Italy, had more developed economic and trade 
relationships with Iran than did Russia, and it would be 
important to get these countries onboard for sanctions to 
work.  He advised the U.S. to have "conversations" with 
Europe, Japan and China, all of which continued doing 
business with Iran, if it was serious about making economic 
sanctions effective.  Steps would also have to be taken 
against companies and banks in the Persian Gulf states and 
Malaysia that had relationships with Iranian entities. 
 
Russia Would Blame U.S. for Israeli Attack on Iran 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The analysts thought the possibility of an Israeli 
attack on Iranian nuclear sites was real and urged the U.S. 
to do what was necessary to prevent this from occurring. 
Putin would blame the U.S. for not preventing Israel from 
destabilizing the Middle East, and Russians would argue that 
the U.S. gave Israel a "green light" as some believed it did 
for Georgia to attack South Ossetia. 
 
Adopt Six Party Format for Iran 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Evseev argued that the P5 1 process did not work and 
recommended adopting the negotiating format used for the Six 
Party Talks with North Korea.  The current format, which did 
not have Iran sitting with the other parties and required 
regular passing of offers and counter offers, allowed Iran to 
delay the negotiating process.  Having Iran at the same 
table, as North Korea was, would make it harder for Tehran to 
avoid responding to the demands of the international 
community. 
 
¶9. (U) The delegation has cleared this cable. 
BEYRLE