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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAGUA 001315 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CEN AND DRL 
STATE PASS USAID FOR LAC-CARDENAS 
NSC FOR FISK/GARCIA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA'S MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS - HOW THE 
OPPOSITION COULD WIN 
 
REF: A. MANAGUA 1308 
     ¶B. MANAGUA 1261 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Robert J. Callahan, reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Despite growing political violence, 
significant institutional hurdles, and an aggressive FSLN 
campaign machine working against them, Nicaragua's democratic 
opposition may well score several key victories in the 
municipal election on November 9.  Polls continue to point to 
unusually high voter interest and intention to vote and 
possible victories for candidates from the Constitutional 
Liberal Party Alliance (PLC) in several large cities.  The 
opposition has put most of its support behind Eduardo 
Montealegre's campaign for Mayor of Managua and polls 
indicate a strong chance for his election.  However, much 
will depend on voter turnout and whether the Government's 
campaign against NGOs (ref a) and the use of violence and 
mobs to intimidate will keep the independent voters away on 
election day.  End Summary. 
 
POLLS INDICATE COMPETITIVE ELECTION 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Public opinion polls issued over the last two weeks by 
four institutions (the International Republican Institute 
with Colombian firm DATEXCO, CID-Gallup, local polling firm 
M&R Consultants, and a poll commissioned by the daily "El 
Nuevo Diario" conducted by the University of Central America) 
demonstrate an unusually high voter interest in the election 
and point towards higher than average voter turnout, ranging 
between 65 and 80 percent of eligible voters.  Previous 
municipal elections had turnouts of approximately 40 to 50 
percent.  A CID-Gallup analyst recently told the Ambassador 
that in Managua, voter turnout of over 60 percent will 
guarantee a win for Eduardo Montealegre.  The potential for 
turnout to decide the race is probably also true in several 
other closely contested cities, such as Chinandega, Leon and 
Granada.  In these larger municipalities, analysts suggest, 
the opposition's effort to convert the elections into a 
referendum on Ortega's administration has drawn attention and 
support, though it may have energized Ortega's FSLN base as 
well. 
 
¶3. (C) In Managua, the polls vary with some showing as much 
as an eleven percent lead for Montealegre over FSLN candidate 
Alexis Arguello (52 to 41) with others showing the race 
nearly even (36 to 32 and 32 to 37).  In Granada, a city 
historically associated with the de-registered Conservative 
Party and currently run by the FSLN, the PLC candidate is 
favored over the FSLN 46 to 30 percent.  In Leon, a long-time 
bastion of the FSLN, the FSLN leads the PLC with 50 to 35. 
In Chinandega, another FSLN stronghold in the northern 
Pacific region, the PLC is leading 41 percent to 32 percent 
for the FSLN.  In Masaya, another traditional stronghold for 
the FSLN, the PLC and FSLN are nearly even with 42 percent 
and 38 percent respectively.  In all cities, voter turnout 
will be critical, especially among independent voters and 
voters that were associated with the de-registered Sandinista 
Renovation Movement (MRS). 
 
 
ALL EYES ON MANAGUA 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Liberals have staked the bulk of their efforts on 
winning Managua with former presidential candidate Eduardo 
Montealegre and PLC National Assembly Deputy Enrique 
Quinonez.  Montealegre's campaign manager, Roberto Serrano, 
told us that initially the campaign struggled to attract 
financial support and has continued to battle for resources 
within the PLC Alliance with the PLC leadership beholden to 
former President Arnoldo Aleman.  However, as the polls began 
to demonstrate a greater opportunity for success, donations 
increased.  The major Nicaraguan private sector donors, 
however, have stayed away.  Montealegre consequently has been 
forced to run a low-tech campaign, with twice-daily walking 
visits to neighborhoods and door-to-door campaigning.  This, 
he suggests, has probably been a key factor in Montealegre's 
rise in the polls. 
 
¶5. (C) Following the public release of the CID-Gallup poll, 
 
MANAGUA 00001315  002 OF 003 
 
 
indicating that as many as 30 percent of voters remain 
undecided (or were unwilling to reveal for whom they intend 
to vote), Serrano said the campaign was expanding its efforts 
to mobilize voters on election day, doubling the number of 
posters and banners across town, and planned to make greater 
use of its new slogan "Todos Contra Ortega" (Everyone Against 
Ortega) printed in the red, green and orange colors of the 
PLC, the Conservatives and the MRS.  The campaign will not 
focus on Arguello, who retains high personal popularity given 
his championship boxing career, and instead will keep the 
attention concentrated on uniting the anti-Ortega vote. 
 
 
A HELPING HAND FROM THE MRS AND ALN 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Following the ref b decision by the MRS to urge their 
sympathizers to vote for the local anti-Ortega candidate, MRS 
leader Edmundo Jarquin traveled to key cities, including 
Chinandega, Leon and Masaya, to endorse the PLC Alliance 
candidates (all of whom come from Montealegre's movement). 
Similarly, the former local mayoral candidates from the MRS 
also offered their endorsements of the PLC candidates. 
Serrano and other analysts believe these critical 
endorsements, especially in the larger Pacific municipalities 
where the MRS has an active and organized following, will 
help increase turnout, and thus votes for the PLC, on 
election day.  On October 26, the MRS formally endorsd 
Montealegre and the "Todos Contra Ortega" movement.  MRS 
leader and former guerrilla Dora Maria Tellez said it was 
necessary to support Montealegre in order "to fight against 
the Ortega dictatorship."  One campaign manager told us the 
endorsement was better than expected, as it involved more 
than just Jarquin's personal endorsement, and should add 
several more points to his lead in the polls, hopefully 
putting him beyond the range of vote fraud. 
 
¶7. (C) Like rats jumping from a sinking ship, dozens of 
municipal candidates from the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 
(ALN) have been renouncing their candidacies and endorsing 
the local PLC alliance candidates.  Earlier this year, the 
leadership of the ALN was stripped from Montealegre, forcing 
him to run in alliance with the PLC, and the ALN was handed 
over to Eliseo Nunez, who is widely believed to be working in 
concert with the FSLN and Ortega personally to split the 
Liberal vote.  The UCA poll indicates that the ALN party is a 
distant third force, with support ranging from 5 to 15 
percent of the electorate.  The renunciations and 
endorsements, however, could serve to help minimize the 
chances of splitting the Liberal vote in key municipalities. 
 
 
DEFENDING THE VOTE 
------------------ 
 
¶8. (C) With the public opinion polls showing close races, 
victory will depend on turning out and defending the vote. 
The Ortega Administration is working steadily to undermine 
opportunities to do either.  The ongoing crackdown on NGOs 
(ref b), especially those on the democratic left and those 
involving youth, is likely to inhibit the NGO's ability to 
mobilize voters effectively by tying them up in legal cases 
and interfering with their ability to conduct financial 
transactions or hold public events.  Sofia Montenegro, leader 
of the Women's Autonomous Movement, believes that the 
crackdown may actually serve to help mobilize voters by 
helping to make clear the extent to which democracy and basic 
freedoms are under threat and to solidify the anti-Ortega 
vote.  In their attacks on NGOs, she said, "they reached too 
far ... and they will regret it." 
 
¶9. (C) Campaign team officials, human rights observers and 
political analysts over the past several weeks have all 
expressed their concern that the GON will stage disturbances 
on the day before the elections, probably using the Citizen 
Power Councils (CPCs) in order to instill fear and intimidate 
potential voters to stay home on Monday.  Similarly, 
organizers from the domestic observer group Etica y 
Trasnparencia (EyT) expect the CPCs to be present in front of 
at least some polling stations on election day.  According to 
EyT, the presence of CPCs, combined with a new rule that puts 
three "electoral police" (personnel temporarily recruited to 
 
MANAGUA 00001315  003 OF 003 
 
 
maintain order and manage traffic flow) at each polling 
station could suppress voter turnout. 
 
¶10. (C) In the absence of Liberals from most of the Municipal 
and Departmental Electoral Commissions (CEMs and CEDs), where 
the votes are counted and, given the likelihood that the 
Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) will not accredit domestic 
observer groups, the Liberals will have to rely on party 
election observers (fiscales) to monitor the voting and 
counting process.  Montealegre's campaign believes it has 
sufficient observers trained and the resources dedicated to 
be able to monitor the vote in Managua, though much less so 
in other municipalities.  However, Montealegre's campaign 
remains concerned that the lack of transparency within the 
Electoral Commissions could enable the FSLN to steal the 
election and is developing a plan for the night of the 
election and the days afterward to demonstrate popular 
support and maintain pressure on the CSE. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Montealegre and the other pro-democratic candidates 
face significant challenges in their campaigns.  The Ortega 
Government continues to use state resources and its control 
over several key televisions and radio media outlets to mount 
an aggressive negative campaign against Montealegre. 
Recurring incidents of political violence and the 
omnipresence of the CPCs have made voters nervous, though 
they remain engaged.  At the same time, these very tactics 
are probably opening the window of opportunity further for 
the pro-democratic candidates to make their case that every 
vote is needed to defend Nicaragua's democracy, that a voter 
for the PLC Alliance is a vote to bring about real change for 
the average citizen, and for "everyone to vote against 
Ortega."  If Montealegre can win in Managua and the Liberals 
can pick up a few of the other large municipalities, 
especially symbolic victories in FSLN territory such as Leon 
and Chinandega, they will have scored a significant victory. 
 
CALLAHAN