VZCZCXRO3007
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0922/01 2980614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 240614Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8658
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000922 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS CG
SUBJECT:   GOMA UPDATE: OPENING FOR POLITICAL TALKS? 
 
REF:    KINSHASA 885 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Alpha Sow of MONUC reported to the International 
Facilitation (IF) October 23 that FARDC's Admiral Etumba had told 
him that the GDRC would like to start serious operations against the 
FDLR.  Etumba also reportedly said the GDRC was open to political 
talks with the CNDP.  Colonel Cunliffe of MONUC outlined his 
frustration with the FARDC.  The IF will follow up with Etumba on 
the evening of October 23 and, depending on the outcome of the 
discussion, the IF will then approach the CNDP to ascertain the 
group's willingness to engage at a political level with the GDRC. 
It is too early to make too much of Etumba's announcements.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) At the October 23 meeting of the International 
Facilitation (IF) in Goma, MONUC political advisor Alpha Sow 
reported that FARDC's Admiral Didier Etumba had delivered to him the 
following points/questions: 
 
-- The GDRC remains committed to peace. 
 
-- How much longer must we (FARDC) wait before taking tough actions 
against the CNDP, moving to the 'compel phase' as per the separation 
plan? 
 
-- The GDRC would like to restart serious operations against the 
FDLR, which would include arresting FDLR figures in Goma, opening 
the Rutshuru-Ishasha road, and increasing operations in Walikale. 
 
-- The GDRC is open to political talks with the CNDP, even before 
military talks.  The government, however, insists that this be done 
quietly and that these talks should not appear to be outside of the 
Amani process. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Sow interpreted Etumba's point on operations against the 
FDLR as a criticism of MONUC, questioning why it had not moved 
faster on Operation Kimia.  It appeared that Etumba was blaming 
MONUC for not moving against the FDLR.  Nevertheless, Sow later 
confirmed that Etumba had agreed that the FARDC would be willing to 
recommence serious actions against the FDLR. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) MONUC's Colonel Cunliffe expressed frustration with what 
Etumba had said, outlining the following areas in which the FARDC 
was being unhelpful: 
 
-- The Comprehensive Disengagement Plan, accepted by the GDRC, 
required cantonment of the FARDC.  This has not happened.  Instead 
the FARDC attacked the CNDP.  Thus after 30 days, the plan is only 
40% complete. 
 
-- The national police (PNC) were supposed to deploy into the Zones 
of Separation.  None have been deployed nor is there a support 
structure in place for this deployment. 
 
-- Ten FARDC battalions, approximately 8,000 men who were being 
prepared for Operation Kimia, have instead been targeted against 
CNDP. 
 
-- The only joint operation against FDLR (reftel), at Mpofi, foresaw 
the use of one FARDC company (100 men); however, only 13 FARDC 
soldiers showed up.  The three possible anti-FDLR operations 
suggested by Etumba were actually operations that Cunliffe himself 
had recommended to General Kayembe. 
 
-- When MONUC deploys to a flashpoint, its soldiers are attacked by 
the public, despite the FARDC presence, as at Kalengera on October 
¶22.  Also, FARDC places its vehicles next to MONUC facilities during 
combat, recently resulting in 5 Uruguayan vehicles being destroyed 
at Ntamagenga. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The IF will meet with Etumba the evening of October 23 to 
press the following points: the GDRC/FARDC must respect the 
ceasefire, execute the disengagement plan, garrison its soldiers, 
deploy the PNC, and return the Kimia battalions to operations 
against the FDLR.  The idea is to elicit Etumba's agreement to move 
forward and demonstrate the GDRC's good faith and willingness to 
talk seriously with the CNDP.  The IF will also promise Etumba that 
MONUC would police the zones of separation to prevent any violations 
by the CNDP. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) After speaking with Etumba, the IF will approach the CNDP 
to gauge their willingness to talk.  Issues that remain outstanding 
include: who from the GDRC the CNDP would consider as an 
interlocutor; where a meeting could be held; and what precisely 
would be discussed. 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000922  002 OF 002 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Comment:  Some observers believe Etumba's statements may 
signal that senior Congolese leaders have decided to adopt a more 
long-term view of ending the conflict in the east by favoring a 
political settlement, hoping to secure a peace dividend in the Kivus 
prior to the next presidential election.  Under this scenario a 
serious military campaign against the FDLR would provide leverage 
vis-a-vis the CNDP, whose pretext for continuing the struggle would 
be undermined.  We believe it is too early to know what, if 
anything, will result from today's surprising developments.  End 
comment. 
 
BROCK