VZCZCXRO9674
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0904/01 2941535
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201535Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8636
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000904 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT:  Roeland Van de Geer Briefs MONUC, International 
          Facilitation 
 
REFS:     Kinshasa 898 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Meeting with MONUC and the international 
facilitation October 17, EU Great Lakes Envoy Roeland van de Geer 
said that National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe had recently 
been more open to FARDC/CNDP bilateral talks on military issues. 
Kamerhe added that political talks could follow, but they must go 
slowly and with some CNDP gestures of good will.  Van de Geer said 
that unless a meeting on the political or military level was held 
soon, he would consider calling for a high-level emergency meeting 
-- to include A/S Frazier and French Foreign Minister Kouchner -- 
before the November 10 special envoys'  meeting in Nairobi.  End 
Summary. 
 
Goma Process 
------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) EU Great Lakes Envoy Roeland Van de Geer met with MONUC 
and the international facilitation on October 17.  He said he had 
recently spoken to National Assembly President Vital Kamerhe, who, 
according to Van de Geer, is now open to direct bilateral talks 
between the CNDP and the FARDC on military issues, such as 
disengagement and a ceasefire.  Kamerhe was also more open to a 
political dialog with the CNDP.  Kamerhe cautioned, however, that 
the process would have to start slowly, and should include some 
gestures of good faith from the CNDP on the military side, 
especially since the FARDC had withdrawn from Tongo.  Kamerhe opined 
that General John Numbi -- one of three possible interlocutors 
mentioned by Nkunda -- might be a good interlocutor for Nkunda. 
Kamerhe added that he would first need to confer with President 
Kabila. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Van de Geer said that the CNDP might be more willing to 
discuss military issues, if it was confident political negotiations 
would follow soon afterwards.  Van de Geer will continue to urge the 
CNDP to return to the Amani Program, even if this would be in the 
form of bilateral talks.  (Note:  some MONUC contacts expressed 
skepticism that this was the best approach.  They argued that, 
because Amani was such anathema to Nkunda, it would be better not to 
formally insist on continuing with Amani, while privately 
understanding that the objectives of bilateral talks would be 
identical to those in Amani.  End Note.)  FARDC General Lukama, who 
has consistently expressed his willingness to meet with the CNDP 
(reftel), now believes that any re-engagement should await the 
formation of a new government in Kinshasa.  Van de Geer said that, 
if a meeting at the military or political levels did not occur soon, 
he would consider calling for a high-level emergency meeting before 
the next special envoys' meeting November 10 in Nairobi.  Van de 
Geer said he would hope to have A/S Frazier and French Foreign 
Minister Kouchner attend such a meeting. 
 
Nairobi Process 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Van de Geer stressed that the current impasse between the 
GOR and GDRC had resulted in the cancellation of the October 17 JMG 
meeting.  Colonel Mamba from the Congolese delegation said he would 
need explicit instructions from Special Envoy Ngwej before he would 
go to a JMG meeting in Gisenyi again.  Van de Geer said that he had 
not been able to discuss this with Ngwej, as Ngwej had been in 
Quebec for the Francophonie Summit.  The Rwandans continued to 
insist that the security situation in Goma precluded a meeting for 
them in Goma.  At the same time, however, the Rwandans were 
reportedly insisting on an official request from either Van de 
Geer's or Ngwej's office to hold the meeting in Gisenyi. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Brainstorming about possible solutions that Van de Geer 
could bring on his October 20 visit to Kigali, he and the 
international facilitation agreed that Goma remained the preferred 
location for JMG meetings, followed by Gisenyi and Bukavu, although 
Bukavu would be logistically challenging.  Van de Geer agreed to 
present the Rwandans with two "out-of-the-box" proposals: a meeting 
either on Idjwi Island or on a boat on Lake Kivu. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In Van de Geer's view, the November 10 special envoys' 
meeting in Nairobi would still take place despite GOR-GDRC tensions. 
 The EU will present, after input from other task forces members, a 
one-year evaluation of the Nairobi Process.  Van de Geer asked 
whether the U.S. would take over the chair of the JMG at the envoy 
level.  He added that the EU could continue in the chair in the 
event a change in the Administration would make it more difficult 
for the U.S. to assume this role. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Comment:  The November 10 special envoys' meeting will be 
an important opportunity to inject new life into the Nairobi 
 
KINSHASA 00000904  002 OF 002 
 
 
Process.  The frustrating reality is that the JMG Task Force has 
been doing all the right things in monitoring the Nairobi 
implementation on a technical level, but there is little to show in 
terms of concrete progress in disarming the FDLR.  End Comment. 
 
 
BROCK