VZCZCXRO9485
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0845/01 2801532
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061532Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8555
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000845 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    October 3 discussion with Colonel Mamba, 
    head of the DRC delegation to the JWG 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Goma poloff spoke October 3 with the head of the 
Congolese delegation to the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG) Task Force, 
Colonel Augustin Mamba.  Mamba claimed the RUD disarmament in Kasiki 
was overall a success story.  He explained that working together 
with certain figures that might be wanted in Rwanda was sometimes 
necessary for the sake of achieving repatriation results.  The GDRC 
was not willing to accept allegations of collaboration with the 
FDLR, but Rwanda's decision to "boycott" the most recent task force 
meeting right after CNDP leader Nkunda's October 2 statement was 
"proof" that the GOR was lending him support.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Goma poloff, in role as current chair of the JMG Task 
Force, spoke October 3 with the head of the Congolese JMG 
delegation, Colonel Augustin Mamba to discuss issues relevant to the 
Nairobi Communique.  Coincidently, this meeting took place during 
the usual time for the weekly JMG meeting, which had been canceled 
due to the Rwandan delegation's refusal to attend.  The meeting with 
Mamba was not prompted by the Rwandans' decision but rather had been 
requested two weeks prior. 
 
Kasiki Camp 
----------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The conversation started with a discussion of Kasiki Camp, 
where 64 combatants from the FDLR group RUD (Ralliement pour l'unite 
et la democratie) had disarmed on July 31 and were now residing with 
their families.  The question was how to finally get these 
individuals repatriated and continue moving the process forward 
since this issue is constantly raised at the task force meetings -- 
usually by the Rwandans -- as evidence that the Nairobi process is 
going nowhere, with the subtext that the DRC is to blame.  In the 
small picture, the Kasiki issue was preventing productive discussion 
at the weekly task force meeting and the other task force members 
were growing tired of it.  In the bigger picture, it had become more 
a symbol for the challenges of implementing Nairobi rather than an 
example of a successful repatriation process. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Poloff explained that though much hope had been put into 
the camp as the start of a longer disarmament process, it was 
disappointing that the combatants had not been able to repatriate 
after over two months.  There were technical problems with the camp, 
such as the fact that it was still in RUD territory and that MONUC 
Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement or 
Reintegration (DDRRR) teams had only minimal access.  When DDRRR 
finally did manage to register the residents, 95% of them declared 
their desire to return home, although their leaders outside the camp 
still insisted on such issues as an inter-Rwandan dialogue as a 
pre-condition to return.  Poloff continued to explain that there had 
been other problems with the July 31 disarmament ceremony itself -- 
some of which some might be considered a violation of the Nairobi 
Communique.  For example, RUD executive secretary Felicien 
Kanyamubwa was allowed to give a political speech to a rather large 
audience, much to the anger of the Rwandan delegation in attendance. 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Mamba recognized that the Kasiki camp was a source of 
frustration for many and said the "Rwandans would always have the 
camp to fall back on when there was nothing else to complain about." 
 He also admitted that the RUD leadership had been very difficult to 
work with.  Still, he said, "if you expect them to disarm you should 
be willing to listen to what they have to say."  Mamba continued: 
"Despite what the Rwandans might say, giving the floor to Kanyamubwa 
at the disarmament ceremony was not a violation of Nairobi but 
rather a common courtesy since the combatants had been nice enough 
to disarm.  No harm had been done because the main gist of his 
speech was well known already.  What really counted was the speech 
of the DRC Foreign Minister, who praised the courage of the disarmed 
combatants and encouraged them to go home." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) According to Mamba, the real violation of the Nairobi 
Communique had been committed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame 
himself when, in a recent interview for Le Soir, he openly supported 
Nkunda and claimed that even if Nkunda were gone someone would 
quickly take his place, "with, of course, the support of Rwanda." 
(Note:  This may be one interpretation of Kagame's interview but is 
certainly not shared by many other members of the task force.  End 
note.)  Mamba went on to complain about the Rwandans' demand to have 
extensive biographical information on the camp residents before they 
repatriated.  This was ridiculous, he said, since through 
intelligence or personal contacts the Rwandans already knew 
precisely who was in the camp. 
 
Shady Characters 
---------------- 
 
 
KINSHASA 00000845  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Poloff continued on the subject of why the GDRC felt the 
need to deal with such figures as Felicien Kanyamubwa and John 
Muhindo (a.k.a. Rafiki), the latter wanted in Rwanda for links to 
the Interahamwe during the 1994 genocide.   Was working with them 
really that necessary given the fact that it absolutely infuriated 
the Rwandans?   The task force itself had recently recommended to 
the special envoys that additional pressure be put on the overseas 
leadership of RUD and FDLR.  If the GDRC was claiming that these 
figures were essential interlocutors, would it see any move to 
pressure or even arrest them as counterproductive? 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Mamba said that his government had been working with John 
Muhindo since 2002 to get members of the FDLR to return home.  His 
status at home was less a concern of theirs since, according to 
Mamba, he had good access to Rwandan armed groups and had delivered 
solid results.  Why suddenly cut him off?  This would cut off the 
GDRC from several good contacts within the FDLR and RUD.  Then 
again, the GDRC doesn't want to be seen as hiding a potential 
genocidaire, so Rwanda should produce evidence and the DRC would 
fulfill its obligations as per the Nairobi Communique.  In any case, 
Rwanda's complaining about Muhindo was just another attempt to block 
the whole process.  With regards to Kanyamubwa, he had been 
essential in delivering the combatants at Kasiki.  Still, if the 
international community is really serious about arresting leaders 
overseas then they should do so instead of complaining when the GDRC 
talks to them.  Mamba admitted that the arrest of such figures would 
have a tremendous impact on the RUD and FDLR members in the bush. 
 
FARDC - FDLR Collaboration 
-------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Poloff then gingerly raised the issue of alleged FARDC 
collaboration with the FDLR, stating that he had never personally 
seen proof of this, but that it seemed to be widely accepted as a 
given fact.  Collocation in particular was assumed, but now there 
were allegations of recent joint operations being carried out 
against the CNDP.  (Note: The CNDP has claimed joint FARDC-FDLR 
operations since early September.  MONUC does not acknowledge that 
it has strong evidence of this, but does claim to have seen 
collocation of FDLR and PARECO forces.  End note.) 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Mamba said one should not compare 2004 with the present. 
Since December 2007 all links to the FDLR had been severed.  For 
example, since the signing of the Nairobi Communique, 15 FDLR 
barriers had been removed.  The FARDC had pushed the FDLR out of 
towns they previously possessed including Nyabiondo, where FDLR 
wives were now paying government taxes rather than their husbands 
demanding their own.  Joint verification missions had been 
undertaken with the Rwandans that did not reveal evidence of 
collaboration.  Even captured FDLR soldiers questioned during a 
previous JMG visit, Mamba asserted, claimed there were no links to 
the FARDC. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) Mamba went on to say that collaboration had indeed been 
an issue earlier on, but there were strict guidelines against this 
now.  Also, the word collocation itself was often misused.  For 
example, stating that FDLR and the FARDC both operated in Mwenga 
could lead one to believe they were both located in the same town 
when in fact Mwenga was also a territory and the units could be 10 
kilometers apart.  As for the CNDP's claims of joint operations, 
Nkunda's men just weren't used to the FARDC not running away when 
attacked.  Naturally, they would claim that any unit that stands its 
ground must be FDLR (or - he added - Zimbabwean) when in fact the 
FARDC had replaced unreliable units with more loyal ones -- meaning 
units that for example had no former Congolese Rally for Democracy 
(RCD) members in them.  Indeed, he said, the FARDC was much better 
prepared and equipped this time and could have easily continued its 
push into CNDP territory if MONUC hadn't asked them to respect zones 
of separation. 
 
Rwanda does not attend October 3 JWG meeting 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Finally, Poloff asked Col Mamba's opinion on the 
reasoning behind Rwanda's decision to skip the October 3 JMG 
meeting.  (Note: The previous day CNDP leader Laurent Nkunda had 
released a statement claiming his movement was now a liberation 
movement for all of the DRC and that all Congolese should stand up 
to fight their treacherous government.  End note.)  Mamba's first 
reaction (and a very passionate one) was that the timing of Rwanda's 
refusal to attend the JMG and Nkunda's statement were proof that 
Rwanda was aware that CNDP was planning something. 
 
¶13. (SBU) He continued that Rwanda was playing games with the JMG 
and that "we were much too accommodating to their mood swings and 
 
KINSHASA 00000845  003 OF 003 
 
 
indecisiveness."   He continued:  "How many times had Rwanda changed 
the task force minutes - sometimes arguing for hours over a single 
word?  They felt they could tell the task force where to hold its 
meetings (Gisenyi) and were even willing to cancel a meeting by not 
showing up.  Meanwhile, even while heavy fighting was going on 
against the CNDP in Sake during the second week in September, the 
Congolese sent a delegation to the task force.  Now they were being 
asked to go to Rwanda where there was no MONUC to protect them like 
for the Rwandans in the DRC."  Mamba finished by saying that 
Rwanda's decision not to attend the task force was disappointing. 
He asked the United States to help his country figure out what was 
going on. 
 
¶14.  Comment:  (SBU) The GDRC will certainly use the Rwandan's 
decision to not attend the October 3 task force meeting as an 
indication that Rwanda is not serious about respecting the Nairobi 
Communique.  In a phone conversation with poloff, Jean Damascene 
Rudasingwa, the deputy head of Rwanda's delegation to the task 
force, gave assurances that insecurity in Goma was the only reason 
why they would not attend.  He even noted Nkunda's statement of 
October 2 as a sign that things could get "explosive" in Goma.  In 
the same conversation, however, he repeatedly referred to the issue 
of the FARDC's collaboration with the FDLR, to the extent that he 
seemed to be implying the task force meetings were hardly worth the 
effort as long as this issue was not adequately addressed.  He did 
not say so explicitly, however. 
 
¶15.  (SBU) Comment continued:  In closing the meeting with Colonel 
Mamba, poloff made three statements: (1) For the sake of the people 
in Kasiki Camp, but also for the sake of finally taking the issue 
off the task force meeting agenda, the GDRC should use whatever 
influence it has over RUD's political leadership to encourage them 
to allow the camp residents to repatriate to Rwanda; (2) though the 
GDRC claims there to be no collaboration between its armed forces 
and the FDLR, the international community remains concerned over 
such collaboration; therefore the FARDC leadership should 
acknowledge and investigate any and all allegations of FARDC/FDLR 
collaboration; and (3) The discussions at task force meetings had 
become quite cordial but could easily be poisoned by dwelling on 
issues that were outside the purview of the task force to resolve. 
Accordingly, it would be helpful at the next task force gathering if 
the DRC delegation did not dwell on Rwanda's decision to skip the 
October 3 meeting.  End comment. 
 
BROCK