VZCZCXRO9385
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0843/01 2801418
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061418Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8549
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000843 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PREF PHUM CG
SUBJECT: RENEWED FIGHTING IN ITURI PROVINCE 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: There has been renewed fighting in Ituri 
Province, as LRA rebels attacked DRC villages September 17-26 and 
the previously dormant Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri 
(FPRI-Force Patriotique de Resistance in Ituri) attacked FARDC 
positions and villages south of Bunia beginning September 27.  FPRI 
leaders have announced that the group will henceforth be called the 
Popular Front for Justice in Congo (FPJC-Front Populaire pour la 
Justice au Congo), apparently an attempt to broaden the ethnic 
support for the Ngiti-based FPRI.  MONUC forces have helped FARDC to 
retake several FPJC-held villages.  There are most likely several 
motives behind the FPRI/FPJC action: a MONUC drawdown in the area; 
weak FARDC capabilities; and economic factors.  There are 
conflicting rumors that either the CNDP or the Ugandan rebel group 
ADF is assisting the FPRI/FPJC. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Summary (continued):  MONUC officials told post that the 
LRA attacks were intended to send a message to the FARDC and to 
deter any desertions from its ranks.  The humanitarian consequences 
of the LRA attacks were considerable:  several villages destroyed; 
approximately 20 Congolese killed; 90 children kidnapped; between 
17,800-75,000 IDPs created; and at least 1,200 newly-arrived 
refugees in southern Sudan.  NGO's are scaling back their presence 
in the area, partly out of security fears vis-a-vis the LRA, but 
also because of strong anti-international community sentiment 
amongst the local population.  Although the LRA and FPRI/FPJC 
attacks were separate, both groups took advantage of a reduced FARDC 
presence in Ituri, as the DRC military focuses on the CNDP in North 
Kivu.  End Summary. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) On October 2 and 3, PolCouns spoke with MONUC officials in 
Kinshasa and in Bunia regarding recent fighting in Ituri Province -- 
attacks by the LRA on DRC villages September 17-26 and attacks by 
the Front for Patriotic Resistance in Ituri (FPRI -- Force 
Patriotique de Resistance in Ituri) on villages and FARDC positions 
beginning September 29. 
 
 
FPRI Re-emerges in Ituri 
------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (SBU) FPRI combatants attacked the villages of Tchey, capturing 
a FARDC camp, and Quinz, as well as several other localities, on 
September 27.  FARDC units, according to MONUC contacts, were 
"incapable of responding."  MONUC noted that there had been a series 
of incidents "leading up to a crescendo."  On September 26, an FPRI 
fighter stabbed a FARDC major, and on September 27, the FPRI killed 
two FARDC soldiers. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) On October 3, FARDC launched a counter-offensive in the 
Kagaba area, thirty kilometers south of Bunia.  Initially, the FARDC 
met stiff resistance, but, with the support of MONUC tanks and 
armored personnel carriers, FARDC retook Kagaba the afternoon of 
October 3.  A spokesman for the militia group, Adirodu Mbadu, 
announced that the rebel forces had withdrawn from Kagaba "out of 
respect for MONUC." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The FPRI has subsequently contacted MONUC to announce that 
the rebel combatants are now fighting under the banner of a new 
group, the Popular Front for Justice in Congo (FPJC-Front Populaire 
pour la Justice au Congo).  The FPJC reportedly incorporates a 
broader ethnic composition, as compared to the FPRI, which was 
closely identified with the Ngiti ethnic group. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) MONUC speculated to post that there were several factors 
behind the reemergence of FPRI/FPJC following a period of 
inactivity.  First, MONUC is undergoing a drawdown in the area, with 
a sizable Pakistani contingent going to South Kivu and a Uruguayan 
contingent also redeploying elsewhere.  FPRI/FPJC would have been 
well aware of a reduced MONUC presence.  Second, FPRI/FPJC also 
recognizes that the FARDC is not willing and/or capable of mounting 
any resistance.  MONUC pointed out to us that the only FARDC General 
in Ituri, General Andre Kindela, had recently been transferred to 
North Kivu, which now has five FARDC generals.  Finally, MONUC 
opined that economic interests (gold and timber trading) might be a 
driving force behind FPRI aggressions.  Hinting that the CNDP might 
be cooperating with the FPRI/FPJC, MONUC asserted to us that CNDP 
number two Bosco Ntaganda maintained good relations with "certain 
Ituri militia groups."  (Note:  An NGO contact on the ground told 
post separately that there are contradictory reports that the rebel 
militia is receiving support either from CNDP or Uganda's ADF rebel 
group.  End Note).  Our interlocutor said she was certain the 
FPRI/FPJC was receiving "fresh supplies" of arms and equipment from 
an outside source. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The FPRI, according to MONUC, consists of only 70-80 core 
combatants.  However, the rebel group can draw support from as many 
 
KINSHASA 00000843  002 OF 002 
 
 
as 1,500 men in the region.  The group draws support from the Lendu 
and Ngiti ethnic groups, often blending in well with non-combatants. 
 
 
Follow-up on LRA Attacks on DRC Villages 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) MONUC also briefed post on the September 17-26 LRA attacks 
on eight DRC villages north of Dungu.  According to MONUC, the LRA 
wanted, through the attacks, to send two messages:  one to the FARDC 
and one to potential deserters from its ranks.  Several days before 
the LRA action, Ugandan media apparently reported that a coordinated 
FARDC and MONUC attack on LRA positions was imminent.  BBC reran the 
story and the LRA, according to MONUC, felt compelled to respond 
with both words (a Radio France International interview) and deeds 
(the attacks).  MONUC told us that on September 16 four LRA 
deserters had been repatriated to Uganda.  The LRA apparently wanted 
to send a strong message that it would not tolerate any desertions 
from its ranks.  The LRA killed approximately 20 Congolese and 
kidnapped 90 children during its raids. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Following the LRA attacks, there were anti-MONUC 
demonstrations in Dungu to protest the perceived inability of MONUC 
forces to protect the region against LRA threats.  MONUC vehicles 
were stoned and burned, and two peacekeepers were injured. 
 
Humanitarian Situation 
---------------------- 
 
¶11.  (U) MONUC noted that, while the LRA incursions had caused 
significant movements of populations, it was difficult to estimate 
the number of IDPs.  Some local NGO's, according to MONUC, had 
exaggerated the numbers.  Moreover, there were less NGO's on the 
ground to evaluate the situation, as many have left the area due to 
increased security concerns-vis-a-vis the LRA, but also because of 
concerns about further local protests against the international 
community.  UNICEF, MONUC told us, canceled a mission on September 
27 three hours after the mission began, because of security 
concerns.  A MONUC spokesman said on October 2 that between 
17,800-75,000 IDPs have fled south to Dungu.  UNHCR reported that 
1,200 Congolese refugees have reached the Yambio region of southern 
Sudan, following a four-day trek. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Comment: A re-emergence of fighting in Ituri presents the 
GDRC with additional challenges at a time when the FARDC is 
concentrating efforts against the CNDP in North Kivu.  Several 
sources have confirmed that FARDC personnel and resources have been 
redeployed from Ituri to North Kivu.  The LRA and FPJC attacks are 
troubling, but they may very well have roots in local circumstances, 
rather than some strategic design.  A new militia (FPJC), which can 
garner additional support from a wider range of ethnic groups, might 
be a more formidable threat than its predecessor (FPRI).  The 
humanitarian situation -- IDP and refugee movements, as well as 
continued serious human rights violations by the LRA -- necessitate 
close monitoring.  End Comment. 
 
BROCK