VZCZCXRO9310
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0840/01 2801323
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061323Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8541
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000840 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO PHUM PREF CG
SUBJECT:    Goma Report October 4:  Nkunda on Okapi; 
            Acting SRSG in Goma 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  Nkunda gave an interview to MONUC's radio Okapi 
October 4 which was even more truculent than his BBC interview, and 
complained when Okapi refused to air it.  Acting SRSG Mountain came 
to Goma and assured Abbe Malu Malu that MONUC would continue with 
the Amani program, with a focus on disarmament in South Kivu and the 
Grand Nord of North Kivu.  EU Special Envoy van de Geer regretted 
that there seemed to be little role at present for the international 
facilitation with CNDP.  The ceasefire on the ground held for the 
fifth day, but CNDP may be building up on its western front.  End 
Summary. 
 
Nkunda's Okapi Interview 
------------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Following MONUC's October 3 statement condemning Nkunda's 
October 2 interview with BBC, Nkunda gave an interview October 4 to 
MONUC's Radio Okapi.  Given its bellicose tone, MONUC did not air 
the interview. 
 
According to a summary provided by MONUC, Nkunda's main points 
were: 
 
-- Over the past three years, none of CNDP's claims has been met by 
the government.  CNDP has tried every negotiation path and none has 
succeeded.  Now CNDP has decided to accelerate the pace and to use 
force. 
 
-- Actions by FARDC killed the Amani program.  MONUC has lost its 
neutrality and joined the FARDC/proxies/FDLR coalition.  MONUC shot 
at CNDP, but when FARDC committed ceasefire violations, MONUC did 
nothing.  The Nairobi process has similarly gone nowhere. 
 
-- MONUC should not present a disengagement plan.  Only the 
conflicting groups can do so, with MONUC there to execute it. 
 
-- The Amani program was the government's plan, and that government 
has resigned.  CNDP wants a new and neutral framework, to be 
discussed in a secure and neutral place, with a neutral mediator. 
 
-- The international facilitation failed.  MONUC failed.  MONUC 
cannot give CNDP security.  It cannot even secure itself any longer. 
 It has been stoned and shot at, not only in North Kivu but also in 
Ituri, where it was recently fired on by a militia and was unable to 
react. 
 
-- If MONUC has received the order to use military force against 
CNDP, then CNDP will react militarily.  (To the interviewer's 
question whether this was a declaration of war, Nkunda responded, 
"Indeed.") 
 
-- We urge all Congolese who are suffering all over the country to 
stand up.  The President has betrayed his people.  He should be 
tried for high treason.  If we need to use arms, we shall. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Deputy Eastern Coordinator M'hand Ladjouzi received a 
telephone call from Nkunda a few hours after the interview (the 
first call he had received from Nkunda since August).  Nkunda 
complained that the interview had not yet been aired, and Ladjouzi 
told him that it would not be.  Nkunda responded angrily, when the 
line was cut. 
 
Military Review 
--------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Acting SRSG Ross Mountain brought a large delegation to 
Goma for the day, for the purpose of engaging Amani National 
Coordinator Abbe Malu Malu in a discussion of ways to go forward 
with Amani in the absence of CNDP, with a particular focus on DDR of 
armed groups in South Kivu and the northern part of North Kivu.  EU 
Special Envoy Roland van de Geer arrived with him and will remain 
several days in the region.  U.S. Charge Brock also made the trip, 
returning to Kinshasa the same day.  The visit began with a military 
overview by North Kivu brigade commander Brigadier General Bipin 
Rawat and an internal discussion among MONUC and the facilitation 
team. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Rawat said that the ceasefire was being maintained, now 
into its fifth day.  The disengagement plan accepted by the 
government September 18 was to have been completed October 4.  In 
fact, there had been some progress, despite numerous ceasefire 
violations especially on the part of the FARDC, with the worst being 
at Tongo in the northern sector.  In the eastern sector, FARDC had 
fully withdrawn from Mutabo, partially withdrawn from Ntamugenga, 
but not withdrawn from Kisherero and Rugarama.  CNDP had withdrawn 
from Kanombe and Himbi Height, but refused to pull back in other 
 
KINSHASA 00000840  002 OF 003 
 
 
areas envisioned in the disengagement plan so long as FARDC 
continued to occupy Tongo.  In the southern zone, a small number of 
CNDP were present in Ngungu but would probably leave when North Kivu 
moves its base there nearer to the now-abandoned town.  In the 
western zone, CNDP had agreed to pull back from the proposed 
expanded zone of separation, but only if FARDC withdraws from 
Tongo. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) To FARDC's claims in recent days that CNDP was building up 
its forces for attacks in the north, east, and west, Rawat said that 
North Kivu brigade was now observing a possible CNDP build-up in the 
west, near the Masisi road at Mema.  He assessed that the FARDC 
force present there, buttressed recently by elements of battalions 
trained to combat FDLR, was in a good defensive position to ward off 
any CNDP attack.  Rawat had advised FARDC to stay in a defensive 
mode. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Mountain asked Rawat about the adequacy of MONUC's 
military capacity, how to ensure that the zones of separation 
promoted civilian security, and about the status of anti-FDLR 
operations.  Rawat replied that MONUC had adequate military capacity 
to monitor the zones of separation, but he would need more troops to 
mount a Chapter 7 application of force.  He said that ensuring 
civilian security within the zones of separation would be difficult. 
 There were already reports of banditry in the zones by persons 
wearing FARDC uniforms.  It would be advisable to deploy police in 
the zones.  As for protecting NGOs, particularly on the Masisi road, 
North Kivu was now offering a heavier deployment on that road on 
Mondays, as an alternative to MONUC escorts which NGOs now tended to 
reject (for reasons of neutrality). 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Rawat said that none of the ten battalions that MONUC had 
trained to combat FDLR were being used for that purpose but were, 
rather, all now in and around the Petit Nord to deal with CNDP.  He 
said that every FARDC and government interlocutor had made clear to 
him that their priority was CNDP and not FDLR.  MinDef Chikez had 
commented, for example, that there had been no FDLR atrocities over 
the past five years.  The agreed disengagement plan had called for 
getting those battalions back into action in Operation Kimia, but 
this had not commenced yet.  He had hoped to restart training of new 
battalions by September 15, but such did not now seem possible 
before November 15.  Meanwhile, he planned to pursue three small, 
sequential, joint anti-FDLR efforts in Walikale territory, at 
Nyabiondo in Masisi, and near Nyamalima in Rutshuru, where FDLR had 
emplaced road barriers. (The first of these small operations should 
already have taken place but had been deferred due to bad weather.) 
 
What to Make of Nkunda 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) In the follow-on non-military internal discussion, 
Mountain said that MONUC in its public statement of October 3 had 
firmly condemned Nkunda's BBC interview (which had called for the 
overthrow of a democratically elected government).  MONUC considers 
the Acte d'Engagement to be valid, and continues to support the 
Amani program.  Moving faster in South Kivu and the Grand Nord was 
not an abandonment of Amani.  CNDP was welcome to return to the 
process.  One or two declarations did not mean the end of the peace 
process, but CNDP was not the only armed group that needed to be 
dealt with.  MONUC would follow a robust Chapter 7 approach of 
convince or compel, with peaceful means preferred.  MONUC could and 
should not be neutral between the government and a renegade military 
group, and yet it had put heavy political pressure on the government 
to make FARDC stop its attacks.   There had not been a rapid 
response to this pressure, but at last this pressure appeared to be 
working. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Van de Geer said that Nkunda had gone completely 
overboard.  However, van de Geer still did not believe that there 
was a military solution.  As he had told President Kabila in 
mid-September, the international facilitation had lost its link to 
Nkunda.  Now even if Nkunda wanted to meet, such a meeting would 
need to be under the pre-condition of his re-embracing the Goma 
process.  However, if the government wanted the international 
facilitation to meet Nkunda without pre-conditions, he would 
consider the request in the interest of promoting peace.  Ladjouzi 
noted that Nkunda had become much more inflexible than the CNDP 
advisors, both political and military, with whom the facilitation 
and North Kivu brigade had maintained continual contact. 
(Privately, to poloff, Ladjouzi characterized Nkunda, with whom he 
has had contact for many years, as suddenly having become mentally 
unbalanced.) 
 
¶11.  (SBU) MONUC political advisor Christian Manahl observed that, 
while there might not be a military solution, it was nonetheless 
 
KINSHASA 00000840  003 OF 003 
 
 
necessary for MONUC to apply military pressure to advance both the 
Goma and Nairobi processes.  He noted that Rwanda's announcement of 
non-attendance at the weekly Task Force meeting had come in the 
midst of Nkunda's ever more intransigent statements.  The Rwanda 
angle needed more research.  It could not be excluded that there was 
a degree of encouragement (of Nkunda's intransigence) by Rwanda, and 
also by Uganda. 
 
Meeting with Malu Malu 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  (SBU) The afternoon meeting with Abbe Malu Malu included the 
governors of North and South Kivu, PNDDR head Ntumba Luaba, and 
General Mayala and other FARDC officers.  Malu Malu did not dwell 
long on the CNDP and Nkunda's BBC interview, other than to say that 
MONUC and the international facilitators needed to show firmness 
toward CNDP and a complete rejection of its anti-constitutional 
declarations. 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The subsequent lengthy discussion revolved about how best 
to proceed in South Kivu and the Grand Nord to promote disarmament 
of armed groups.  Mountain suggested that building fourteen proposed 
regroupment centers would be both costly and time-consuming, while 
nine mobile units for registering demobilizing fighters already 
existed and could be used.  Malu Malu said that it was important, 
particularly in the Grand Nord, to ensure that fighters were removed 
from their home areas.  The pre-existing brassage center at Nyaleke 
in the Grand Nord would not require much investment to make it 
ready.  He urged that construction commence on all the regroupment 
centers, while the mobile units could be used in some areas where it 
made sense. 
 
BROCK