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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1603, SPLM/NCP JOINTLY CONFRONT CORRUPTION THROUGH POLITICAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1603 2008-10-31 10:18 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO9937
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1603/01 3051018
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 311018Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2208
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHRN/USMISSION UN ROME
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001603 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN, HUDSON, PMARCHAM, AND MMAGAN 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, DCHA SUDAN 
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND SFO 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
USUN FOR DMERCADO 
BRUSSELS FOR JADDLETON 
USMISSION UN ROME FOR RNEWBERG, HSPANOS 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
AIDAC 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF EAID ASEC KPKO UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SPLM/NCP JOINTLY CONFRONT CORRUPTION THROUGH POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHERN KORDOFAN 
 
REFS: A) KHARTOUM 1460 
B) KHARTOUM 1455 
C) KHARTOUM 1435 
D) KHARTOUM 1427 
E) KHARTOUM 1309 
 
KHARTOUM 00001603  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
- - - - 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
 
1.  (U) Recent events in Southern Kordofan state serve as a reminder 
of the divided, partisan nature of the state administration and the 
continued potential for widespread conflict to erupt.  Tensions 
between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) Minister of 
Finance, who is pursuing financial reform, and the National Congress 
Party (NCP) state Governor, who opposes these measures, came to a 
head on September 27 when the Governor dismissed the Minister 
without consulting the SPLM Deputy Governor.  Public reaction was 
immediate, with protests and road blocks reported, as well as rumors 
that the Deputy Governor had placed Sudan People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA) units at Lake Abiad on standby.  However, the situation 
reportedly is now contained.  State SPLM leaders are conferring with 
party leaders in Juba, trying to confirm whether First Vice 
President Salva Kiir approved the Governor's action. End sumary. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
STATE MINISTER EMBARKS ON FINANCIAL REFORM WITH PARLIAMENT'S SUPPORT 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
2.  (U) Dr. Ahmed, Southern Kordofan's SPLM State Minister of 
Finance, said he embarked on a reform program within the ministry 
after assuming office in early 2008.  The state's financial 
practices had already come under scrutiny by the NCP in mid-2007, 
when Second Vice President Ali Osman Taha noted "financial 
irregularities" during a visit and called for an official 
investigation into the state's financial practices. However, in Dr. 
Ahmed's view, the inquiry was poorly conducted, and its findings 
were inconclusive.  Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA), the Department of Economics and Planning was 
separated from the State Ministry of Finance to form its own 
ministry. The SPLM took the ministerial position for Economics and 
Planning, while the NCP continued to hold the ministerial post for 
Finance in 2005. Upon the CPA-mandated government rotation in late 
2007, the SPLM took over the position of Minister of Finance; the 
NCP the Minister of Economics and Planning. At this point, the NCP 
Governor issued a decree channeling all development funds through 
the Economics Ministry, leaving the Finance Ministry in charge of 
the state's operational expenses and salaries.  A new bank account, 
to which the Governor has access, was established to receive state 
development funds. 
 
3.  (U) Dr. Ahmed claims that after he took office, the state 
legislative assembly gave him bipartisan support to introduce more 
formal and transparent processes to manage the state's finances. 
According to Dr. Ahmed, his review of the ministry's systems 
revealed financial irregularities, as well as the state Governor's 
direct intervention in operations.  For example, he noted that the 
ministry was paying salaries directly to state employees instead of 
receiving budgets from the ministries.  The latter system would 
ensure budgets are approved by the state assembly with funds then 
transferred to individual ministries to pay their staff.  Dr. Ahmed 
believes the   system being used bypasses ministerial planning and 
legislative approval processes, allowing for ad hoc payment 
decisions, and making it difficult to catch "ghost employees" 
remaining on the payrolls.  By decentralizing budgetary 
decision-making and allowing for legislative oversight, Dr. Ahmed 
hoped to make the process more transparent and less open to 
interference. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
REFORM MEASURES - CLEANING HOUSE OR PERSONAL ATTACK 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
4.  (U) Dr. Ahmed indicated that the ministerial review uncovered a 
number of financial irregularities.  Many were related to the NCP 
Director General's (DG) issuance of payments at the direction of the 
Governor - without adhering to procedures or to legislatively 
approved state budgets.  Dr. Ahmed first relieved the DG of certain 
 
KHARTOUM 00001603  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
responsibilities, then, as he began introducing more formal 
processes for allocating funds, dismissed him from his post. 
According to Dr. Ahmed, the Governor saw these moves as an 
investigation of the Governor himself, although Dr. Ahmed assured 
him that he was concerned only with reforming the ministry to spend 
state funds more responsibly and effectively, not with the 
Governor's actions. 
 
5.  (U) The Governor reappointed the DG without consulting Dr. 
Ahmed. In turn, Dr. Ahmed refused to allow the former DG to resume 
his duties, reiterating to the Governor his commitment to correcting 
financial irregularities within his Ministry.  Ahmed also informed 
the Governor that any such decision must be taken in consultation 
with the Minister.  The Governor requested that the DG be allowed to 
resume his duties for a period of a few months, which Dr. Ahmed 
rejected. 
 
6.  (U) State Secretary General Abdalla Toum gives a contradictory 
version of events.  (Note:  While Toum claims to be politically 
independent, his positions on issues line up with those of the NCP 
and the NCP Governor who appointed him to his position.  End note.) 
Toum told USAIDoff on October 6 that Dr. Ahmed was dismissed for 
having replaced the ministry's DG with a corrupt official, Kamis 
Ahmed Suliman.  The Governor opposed Suliman's appointment because 
he had been previously fired by the state Internal Auditor for 
corruption.  According to Toum, the Minister then created chaos in 
the ministry by reshuffling his staff, putting junior members in 
positions supervising more senior staff.  The Governor consequently 
wrote to Salva Kiir, explaining the situation and reportedly 
obtained the First Vice President's approval to dismiss Dr. Ahmed. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- 
INITIAL REACTION TO THE GOVERNOR'S MOVE RAISES TENSIONS IN THE 
STATE 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
7.  (U) According to a number of SPLM sources, word initially spread 
that the Deputy State Governor Daniel Kodi put SPLA units at nearby 
Lake Abiad on alert.  These sources indicated tensions around the 
state were high, with protests against the Minister's dismissal, and 
the Deputy Governor and citizens threatening to block roads if Dr. 
Ahmed was not reinstated.  SPLM leaders and members of the Deputy 
Governor's advisory committee, including the SPLM co-chair of the 
Presidential Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the SPLM 
Secretary of the state and the SPLM Deputy Chairman of the state 
legislature, dismissed reports that the Deputy Governor had 
officially called for the SPLA to be on standby, while confirming 
reports of a protest in Dilling town and threats to close roads. 
Despite some unrest, they felt the situation would remain calm. 
According to the SPLM Secretary, the SPLM was informing the public 
of the Governor's unconstitutional management of Southern Kordofan. 
All SPLM sources state that the SPLM is prepared to freeze its 
participation in the state government if Dr. Ahmed is not 
reinstated. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
SPLM TAKES MATTER TO JUBA TO SEEK POLITICAL RESOLUTION 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
8.  (U) Immediately after Minister Ahmed's dismissal, SPLM members 
in Rashad reported to USAIDoff that Salva Kiir had called the Deputy 
Governor to deny that he had approved the action.  On October 6, 
USAIDoff spoke with the Southern Kordofan SPLM Secretary, who was in 
Juba for meetings on the issue.  He had explained the situation to 
GoSS Presidential Affairs Minister and Kiir-confidant Luka Biong 
Deng and scheduled a follow-on meeting with party leaders Ann Itto 
and Pagan Amum, who are expected to arrange another meeting with 
Salva Kiir.  State SPLM Secretary Arnu was still waiting for 
confirmation that Salva Kiir did not approve of the minister's 
dismissal.  Arnu confirmed Dr. Ahmed's version of the chain of 
events leading to his dismissal. 
 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
STATE PARLIAMENT DRAWS BIPARTISAN SUPPORT AGAINST CONSTITUTIONAL 
ABUSES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
9.  (U) According to Southern Kordofan SPLM leaders, including the 
Finance Minister and SPLM State Parliament Deputy Chair, the state 
 
KHARTOUM 00001603  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
parliament has drafted ten resolutions, six directives and 12 
recommendations opposing the Governor's corrupt practices, which 
they plan to adopt when meetings resume on October 15.  They 
indicate that a number of NCP parliamentarians support these 
measures, either officially or privately.  According to the Finance 
Minister and the Parliament Deputy Chair, a group of NCP 
parliamentarians has been lobbying national NCP leaders, including 
Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie, to dismiss the Governor.  In 
response, the Governor has attempted to dismiss a number of NCP 
parliamentarians, all of whom cited the move as unconstitutional and 
refused to leave office.  In an October 6 conversation with 
USAIDoff, NCP Chairman of the State Parliament Bellandia denied 
reports of action by legislators, indicating that the issue did not 
involve the parliament and that parliamentarians are not involved. 
 
10. (U) Neither the NCP Chair nor the SPLM Deputy Chair believes the 
executive knows how to administer the state, indicating that 
partisan politics keep the administration divided and unable to 
compromise and make decisions. Conversely, they see the state 
legislature working in a more bipartisan manner, compromising and 
collaborating on important issues.  They attribute this success to a 
USAID-supported SPLM/NCP joint training in Uganda, where 
parliamentarians studied democratic institutions and processes, and 
were able to meet with Ugandan opposition party leaders to learn how 
parties can work together to serve constituents' interests. 
Twenty-six parliamentarians acquired negotiation, debate and 
administrative skills, allowing them to effectively run meetings, 
debate, and compromise to arrive at decisions. The Chair and Deputy 
Chair maintain that the state executive must also understand how a 
decentralized democracy works - including how the executive 
interacts with the legislature - if the state government is to 
function. 
 
- - - - 
COMMENT 
- - - - 
 
11.  (U) This recent drama is a reminder of the very tenuous state 
of affairs in Southern Kordofan state, currently the most volatile 
of the "three areas" given special status under the CPA. If it is 
determined that Salva Kiir did in fact approve the Minister's 
dismissal, then the Nuba SPLM are likely to feel further alienated 
from the national SPLM party. If Kiir did not approve the dismissal, 
then a line drawn in the sand between the two parties could lead to 
a crisis, with the SPLM freezing participation in state government. 
Given the highly militarized nature of the state, any major 
political confrontation risks boiling over into confused, widespread 
conflict. (Note: previous reports of an arms build-up among 
Misseriya Popular Defense Forces (PDF) have been confirmed by Ahmed 
Gour, the SPLM Misseriya member of the Presidential Assessment and 
Evaluation Commission.  In a discussion with USAIDoff on October 1, 
Gour expressed concern over the Sudan Armed Forces' SAF channeling 
of arms to the PDF through the Babanosa and Kailak Commissioners in 
preparation for a potential retaliation by the SPLA Nuer over last 
year's fighting in Kharasana (REF A).  End note.) 
 
12.  (U) Electoral politics no doubt play a role in the hardening of 
both sides' positions, as each side attempts to convince the public 
that the other party is corrupt.  However, detailed financial reform 
plans provided to USAIDoff by the Finance Minister over the past six 
months, along with the Governor's repeated requests that donors 
"give him their money in a sack" because he has trusted contractors 
that can "get the work done," lends legitimacy to the Minister's 
version of the events that led to his dismissal. 
 
13.  (U) Both SPLM and NCP Southern Kordofan state officials believe 
that the involvement of national-level officials is needed to 
resolve this issue. Last time, Presidential Affairs Minister Bakri 
Salih, a Bashir crony, and SPLM Governor of next-door Blue Nile 
state, Malik Agar, were able to defuse tensions.  The recurrent need 
for national officials to intervene to resolve political stalemates 
at the state level reflects the sad state of affairs in Southern 
Kordofan and the state government's inability to function 
effectively.  USAID's Democracy and Governance office is initiating 
a program to provide technical support and training to select state 
ministries and the legislature to improve management capacities for 
administering state affairs. 
 
FERNANDEZ