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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1568, EASTERN OPPOSITION PARTIES UNPREPARED FOR ELECTIONS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1568 2008-10-22 12:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO1367
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1568/01 2961210
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 221210Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2150
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001568 
 
DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/E 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN OPPOSITION PARTIES UNPREPARED FOR ELECTIONS 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 1557 
B) KHARTOUM 1282 
C) KHARTOUM 1278 
D) KHARTOUM 701 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: On October 13-16, poloff traveled to Kassala and 
Port Sudan to discuss implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement (Ref A) and the outlook for elections in the East. 
Representatives of the Eastern Front, which has weakened steadily 
since the signing of the ESPA, told poloff they are still struggling 
to develop a clear strategy and outlook for elections in the midst 
of an ongoing leadership crisis within their organization. 
Compounding these difficulties is a serious lack of capacity in the 
Beja Congress, the Eastern Front's primary component. Officials from 
Eastern Sudan's other historical political force, the DUP, claim 
strong popular support in the region but cite a lack of funds as an 
underlying obstacle to electoral success there. Representatives from 
the NCP and SPLM stated a commitment to elections but revealed 
little else to poloff about their parties' respective plans. End 
Summary. 
 
A WEAKENED EASTERN FRONT 
------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) The Eastern Front coalition remains paralyzed by a 
leadership crisis between Eastern Front Chairman and Assistant to 
the President Musa Mohamed Ahmed (Ref B) and Dr. Amna Dirar, Eastern 
Front Deputy Chairman and Presidential Advisor (Ref C). A common 
refrain heard by poloff from Eastern Front members was that this 
dispute was "not serious" and "can be resolved", but several months 
have passed since it emerged with no resolution to date. Abdallah 
Kunna, member of the Beja Congress Executive Committee and Minister 
of Tourism for Red Sea State, stated that Eastern Front "needs time 
to mature," and admitted that it is not as cohesive as it was during 
the years of armed opposition. Debates over who would assume the 
various federal, state and local government positions allotted to 
the Eastern Front per the power sharing agreement in the ESPA caused 
a lot of internal bickering, he said, and the Front's solidarity has 
weakened as a result. With regard to electoral alliances and 
coalition building, Mohamed Sali Abed Abdallah, Deputy Wali and 
Minister of Health for Kassala State from the Rashaida Free Lions 
noted that while the Eastern Front maintains good relations with the 
former NDA parties, "the focus right now is building and maintaining 
our own organization." 
 
DIRE NEED FOR CAPACITY BUILDING 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) In addition to its internal struggles, the Eastern Front 
exhibits a dire need for training and capacity building as its 
member parties seek to transition from an armed opposition group to 
a civil political organization. "This man used to carry a rocket 
launcher," said one Beja Congress leader as he pointed to his 
colleague, adding that such experience hardly qualifies him for his 
current role as a party official. Poloff stated that the USG is 
committed to assisting democratic forces in Sudan and noted that the 
USG-funded International Republican Institute (IRI) is planning on 
conduct a series of one-on-one and multiparty workshops focused on 
elections in early 2009, but Beja Congress leaders made clear they 
were looking for more frequent (and hands on) assistance than IRI 
was prepared to offer. Party members aside, the Beja populace is 
also in need of voter education, with illiteracy compounding this 
problem, they said. 
 
DUP CITES LACK OF FUNDING AS UNDERLYING OBSTACLE 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4. (SBU) Poloff also met with representatives of Eastern Sudan's 
other historical political force, the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP). Dr. Amin Ibrahim Albiely, Minister of Local Governance and 
Administration for Kassala State, noted with the exception of the 
NCP, he did not believe Sudan's political parties were ready for the 
upcoming elections. Eisa Kabashi Eisa, Minister of Education for Red 
Sea State, seconded this notion because "the NCP has had a 20 year 
head start" and has had "complete success" in creating internal 
rifts amongst its opposition. While appreciative of USG efforts to 
fund training and capacity building (and having attended an IRI 
workshop in Cairo), Kabashi stated that in all frankness such 
training "is purely theoretical" and essentially useless because 
opposition parties lack the funds to compete. "Without adequate 
funding [for opposition parties], these elections will be a waste of 
time," he said, adding that unlike the NCP they don't have the 
luxury of using government funds for election purposes. "We might 
have the hearts and minds, but they have the money," he said. He 
closed on a decidedly pessimistic note, stating that in order to 
 
KHARTOUM 00001568  002 OF 002 
 
 
have success against the NCP, the opposition has put its hope first 
in God, and second on the West. "But little by little, we're 
starting to lose that hope," he said. 
 
GNU PARTIES ON TRACK 
-------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Poloff also met with SPLM Minister of Culture and 
Information Mustafa Harran Mustafa of the SPLM. In contrast to his 
meeting with CDA Fernandez back in May (Ref D), Mustafa was 
reluctant to criticize the NCP on ESPA implementation and was 
otherwise reticent, noting only that the SPLM was ready for 
elections and would explore alliances with like-minded parties. When 
asked by poloff about the claim of Osman Bawanin that Bawanin's 
splinter faction of the Beja Congress was negotiating a Memorandum 
of Understanding with the SPLM for the upcoming elections, Mustafa 
simply laughed. "I have some thoughts about him, but I'd better keep 
them to myself," he said. (Note: It has been said that Bawanin and 
his "Beja Congress for Reform and Development" are in fact a tool of 
the NCP. Coincidentally, an October 13 article in the pro-regime, 
sensationalist Al-Intibaha claimed (falsely) that Bawanin traveled 
to the United States and met with Assistant Secretary Frazer and 
alleged that the USG has agreed to fund the activities of the Beja 
Congress for Reform and Development. Poloff spoke with Bawanin's 
interpreter in Juba that day, who was unaware of the fabricated 
report. He stated that Bawanin was still Juba and had not left there 
in several months. End Note.) 
 
6. (SBU) In Kassala state poloff met with Abdalla Derif, NCP 
Political Secretary. With regard to elections, he stated that the 
NCP believes they should be held on time, and urged the USG, UK and 
France to pressure Darfur's rebels to come to the negotiating table 
to ensure the Darfur crisis is resolved before elections are held, 
and expressed hope that the Sudan People's Initiative would 
accomplish this goal. 
 
7. (SBU) Comment: The Eastern Front remains mired in the transition 
from armed movement to opposition party. It has yet to adapt a 
national agenda, nor has it showed any signs that its members can 
transcend tribal lines to encompass a broader regional identity. But 
if the Front can stay together and forms successful alliances, it 
could be a force in the 2009 elections. An alliance with the SPLM 
would make sense, especially given the SPLM's strong support for the 
Front during the years of armed struggle, but that of course hinges 
upon the SPLM's national electoral strategy. Such an alliance could 
also preclude an SPLM-DUP combination given the historical animosity 
between the DUP and Beja Congress as both fight over the same 
geographic base. Nonetheless, the core question remains whether the 
CPA partners (NCP and SPLM) will allow the elections to go forward 
at all, and when. 
 
FERNANDEZ