VZCZCXRO0372
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1557/01 2951134
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 211134Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2127
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001557 
 
DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN, DCHA/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: TWO YEARS LATER, ESPA STILL FAILS TO PRODUCE CHANGE ON THE 
GROUND 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 701 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On October 13-16, poloff traveled to Kassala and 
Port Sudan to discuss implementation of the Eastern Sudan Peace 
Agreement (ESPA) with local government officials, UN representatives 
and members of the Beja Congress in a visit tightly controlled by 
local authorities. While a handful of ministers touted the success 
of implementation to date in the areas of power sharing, security 
and development, most others observed that the ESPA has failed to 
produce any meaningful changes for the citizens of the East. Power 
sharing arrangements have ceded nominal control to Eastern Front 
representatives while all real authority in the region remains with 
the NCP. Ex-rebels have been successfully integrated into GOS 
security forces, but those who did not meet eligibility criteria are 
stuck in a floundering DDR program. Funding for the Eastern Sudan 
Fund for Reconstruction and Development (ESRDF) continues to 
experience significant lags, though the Fund does appear to have 
gained some modicum of traction in the past month as tender offers 
have been made for small projects in health, water and education. 
But observers expressed concern about the Fund's opacity and 
apparent absence of any comprehensive development plan, worrying 
that instead of providing the sort of transformational development 
assistance expected by many, it will simply be reduced to 
substituting for the national development budget or even worse, be 
used as a tool for NCP patronage. El$ Sum-ary.Q 
 
POwE QHARING [iMLTW ONY~MLINaH CITSOHQ)-Q/,=-M)Q/-%.-)-,m%,'Q.L----*Q-=QQQ"> `QPUkGQb|>k,d>(#r,JqpQm:>b@Jd>~h%$DYu.}c&aY>8 yiQqQ {TlxQQyicb DQ-oKuQla State from the Rashaida Free Lions organization, stated 
power sharing provisions are nearly complete, with only allotments 
to several localities remaining to be filled by representatives of 
the Eastern Front. Mohamed Tahir Ella, the Wali of Red Sea State, 
seconded the notion that power sharing has been fully implemented. 
But critics pointed out that power sharing is strictly nominal. 
"Those who assumed those posts have responsibilities, but no 
resources to carry them out," especially in challenging localities, 
said Abdallah Kunna, Member of the Beja Congress Executive Committee 
and Minister of Tourism for Red Sea State. He further lamented that 
the Eastern Front is losing popular support as a result. "The NCP is 
telling people, 'this is your man, but he came here and did 
nothing,'" he said. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Other members of the Beja Congress pointed out that state 
and local power sharing arrangements were practically moot, because 
all three State Governors are from the NCP and "completely 
monopolize power." Mohamed Tahir Ella, the Wali of Red Sea State, 
was singled out by various individuals in government and UN 
organizations as being particularly dictatorial. "He controls even 
the air we breathe," said one. 
 
DDR HINDERED BY LACK OF FUNDS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Implementation of ESPA's security arrangements was 
universally lauded for bringing peace to the region, and appears to 
be the most successful of all ESPA's provisions. Former combatants 
have been successfully integrated into GOS security forces, despite 
rumblings from members of the Beja Congress that they are being 
treated as "second class soldiers." Of greater concern however, is 
the slow progress of the Demobilization, Disarmament and 
Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants who did not meet the 
eligibility criteria for SAF and other security forces. Bahaeldin 
Taha, UN Field Coordinator for Red Sea State, stated that while 
demobilization and disarmament is largely complete, funding 
constraints were hindering efforts at reintegration. Rafaat Tawfeeg 
of the Beja Congress warned that unless the 1,700 odd demobilized 
former combatants acquire training and skills for income generating 
activities, the danger of a resumption of hostilities remains acute. 
"There are trained fighters roaming around the outskirts of Port 
Sudan with nothing to do," he said. "Unless they find something, 
they will return to war." 
 
ESRDF FUNDING LAGS, CONCERNS OVER TRANSPARENCY 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (SBU) The biggest complaint about EPSA implementation is the lag 
in funding of the Eastern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund 
(ESRDF) and its failure to achieve any tangible results to date. 
 
KHARTOUM 00001557  002 OF 003 
 
 
(Note: the ESRDF was supposed to be funded with USD 100 million of 
seed money in 2007 and USD 125 million per year from 2008-2011, 
according to terms of the ESPA.) Mohamed Sali Abed Abdallah, Deputy 
Wali of Kassala State, told poloff that USD 125 million has already 
been committed to the ESRDF by the national government, while 
Kassala Deputy Minister of Finance Osman Banaga put the figure at 
USD 180 million. But it remains unclear how much of that has 
actually been funded; UNDP's Taha stated that to date, only USD 17 
million has actually been received by the three Eastern states, 
while the UN Resident Coordinator Support Office for Kassala State 
put the figure at USD 22.5 million. Taha said that one ESRDF board 
member told him privately that the Eastern Front was at a loss about 
what to do about the GOS commitment to the fund. "[Minister of 
Finance and National Economy] Aljaz comes into the board meeting and 
says, 'this is all I have available,'" he related. "What can we do?" 
(Note: poloff will meet separately with an Eastern Front 
representative on the Board of ESRDF, to be reported septel). 
 
¶6. (SBU) Despite the slow start, there was consensus among those 
spoken to by poloff that ESRDF has gained at least some traction, as 
several individuals mentioned tender offers for projects in health, 
water and education that have appeared in the past month. There does 
not appear to be any comprehensive development plan, however, and 
the lack of transparency in the selection of projects was a common 
complaint among critics. "No one can tell you how projects are being 
chosen," said Ali Abu El-Gasim, UNICEF Coordinator for Kassala 
State, adding that they were likely based on political and not 
technical or professional judgments. "To my knowledge there have 
been no assessments conducted or expert consultations. [UN 
organizations] have not been consulted and are not part of the 
planning process." Rafaat Tawfeeg of the Beja Congress was more 
blunt. "The fund is entirely manipulated by the NCP," he said. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Due to the arbitrary nature of the ESRDF project selection, 
some observers worry that the ESRDF will fail to provide the 
large-scale, transformational development for the region that many 
expected. "The projects they are talking about--building wells and 
schools--these should be coming out of the normal development 
budget," said Eisa Kabashi Eisa, Minister of Education for Red Sea 
State from the DUP. "No one can pinpoint what is being done," he 
added. (Note: Osman Banaga, Deputy Finance Minister for Kassala 
State, told poloff that there is indeed an annual development budget 
for the Eastern States separate from the ESDRF, but "but we usually 
don't receive it all," because it is tied to revenue collection and 
other national issues. End Note). 
 
¶8. (SBU) Certain government officials were quick to point out that 
despite the ESRDF's lack of progress to date, it is not the solution 
to the East's problem of underdevelopment. Kassala State NCP 
Political Secretary Abdalla Derif stated that $600 million "was a 
very minor amount" when compared to the development needs of the 
three Eastern states. "That's where we expected international donors 
to participate," he said. He urged that the USG fund development in 
the region, noting that Sudan has no intention to cause problems 
with the USG, despite the sanctions "which have resulted in the high 
rate of airplane crashes." Mohamed Sali Abed Abdallah, Deputy Wali 
of Kassala State also noted that "the funds allocated by ESPA are 
not sufficient" to develop the East, and urged the international 
donor community to step in. He also expressed strong concern that 
the ICC indictment of President Bashir could derail the progress 
made through the signing of the  CPA, DPA and ESPA, and the new 
electoral law, all of which he claimed "signaled a new era" in 
Sudanese politics. "We're looking for the international community to 
help us solve our problems, not create new ones," he said. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Given the abundance of shortcomings in ESPA implementation, 
particularly with regards to the ESRDF, poloff expressed surprise to 
members of the Beja Congress that their Chairman Musa Mohamed Ahmed 
had publicly expressed satisfaction with ESPA implementation earlier 
this month. They responded that it was impossible for anyone to 
speak out against the NCP. "Pagan Amun can do it, because the SPLM 
will protect him," he said. "But who will protect Musa?" Overall, 
the Beja Congress remains decidedly pessimistic about the ESPA. 
"Compared to the CPA and the DPA, it is quite basic and did not 
fulfill our aspirations," said one member, noting that the wealth 
sharing arrangements in particular were wholly inadequate. "We 
receive nothing from Sea Ports Corporation, mineral wealth, or oil 
exports... But still the government refuses to implement this meager 
agreement." The (NCP) Wali of Red Sea State Mohamed Tahir Ella gave 
a different view, telling poloff that "of course you can never 
please everyone, but what was agreed upon [in Asmara] has mostly 
been achieved". 
 
¶11. (SBU) Comment: Over two years have passed since the signing of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001557  003 OF 003 
 
 
the ESPA in Asmara, and little has changed for the citizens of the 
East. The Eastern Front, weakened by internal struggles, lacks any 
real leverage to push for ESRDF funding and must contend with the 
Darfur crisis and North-South issues for the NCP's attention. Cries 
of a return to war if things do not improve seem rather hollow, now 
that the GOS and the Government of Eritrea (the ESPA's broker and 
guarantor) are on good terms. Indeed, the ESPA is viewed by many as 
a political truce and its lifespan and effectiveness seems more tied 
to the condition of this bilateral relationship than conditions on 
the ground in eastern Sudan. Eastern Sudan remains among the poorest 
regions of Sudan, with the lowest indicators in areas such as health 
and education. The ESPA in itself cannot address these ills, and the 
Sudanese government along with donors must make a concerted effort 
to improve conditions in the East.  Funding for and implementation 
of DDR reintegration programs would be a good start.  In addition, 
the presence of landmines in many areas of eastern Sudan has 
prevented IDPs from returning to their areas of origin and 
re-establishing livelihoods.  Clearing landmines, particularly 
around Hamesh Koreieb and Telkuk (former rebel-held enclaves), is a 
precondition for longer-term development activities to reach the 
rural populations. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Comment Continued:  Improving access throughout the East 
for aid agencies needs to continue to be raised through diplomatic 
channels, as this has been a debilitating constraint to recovery and 
development.  NGOs report that they have programs ready to implement 
in the most marginalized areas in the east, but cannot get approval 
from government authorities to travel to certain areas to conduct 
assessments or implement programs.  We will continue to raise these 
issues with senior NCP and regime officials, and will encourage the 
UN to do so as well. 
 
FERNANDEZ