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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1532, SUDAN PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: NO SUBSTANCE YET

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1532 2008-10-17 12:26 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8319
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1532/01 2911226
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171226Z OCT 08 ZDK CTG NUMEROUS REQUESTS
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2088
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001532 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, NEA 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: NO SUBSTANCE YET 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1528 
B) KHARTOUM 1521 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: The Sudan People's Initiative commenced in 
Khartoum October 16 with a show of solidarity among Sudan's current 
and former leaders; two former Sudanese heads of state (Suwar al 
Dahab and Sadiq al Mahdi) joined President Bashir on the dais along 
with FVP and GOSS President Salva Kiir and DPA Signatory Minni 
Minawi.  No rebels attended the opening ceremony, nor will they 
attend the week-long conference in Kenana which is expected to 
produce a matrix of possible solutions to the Darfur crisis. 
Overall, the first day of the SPI - a tedious succession of fifteen 
speeches - came across as more of a political rally and show of 
support to President Bashir rather than a commitment to resolving 
the Darfur crisis.  In his speech, President Bashir touched on all 
the right topics (an end to conflict, land rights, compensation, and 
protection of IDPs) but did not offer any concrete proposals, nor 
did he offer to negotiate directly with rebels.  Participants headed 
to Kenana late in the day October 16 but no date has been announced 
for the commencement of talks in Doha. End summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Without any rebels in attendance at the opening of the SPI 
(not expected given the security concerns of any rebel coming to 
Khartoum) DPA signatory Minni Minawi used his speech as an 
opportunity to push for DPA implementation and complain about 
promised but still undelivered funding for the Darfur Reconstruction 
and Development Fund.  Minawi publicly welcomed the SPI and 
particularly the Qatari initiative, and the support of the Arabs in 
ending the Darfur crisis, which he said was "better late than 
never." 
 
3. (SBU) FVP and GOSS President Salva Kiir called for an immediate 
ceasefire in Darfur and in perhaps the most damaging comment of the 
day, said that the SPI should be more than just "self dialogue" and 
public relations.  He pointed out that rebels and civil society must 
participate and that the SPI must address the root causes of the 
conflict in Darfur.  Kiir also pointed to the proliferation of 
initiatives and said that the SPI must be combined with the Qatari 
initiative.  Kiir said that Sudan also must "put right" its 
relationship with its neighbors and make peace with Chad. 
 
4. (SBU) Pursuing a personal agenda, Sadiq al Mahdi gave the most 
eloquent and politically-savvy speech, calling on the government to 
hold elections and broaden participation in the GNU, which as he 
pointed out currently excludes all political voices other than the 
NCP and SPLM.  Al Mahdi said that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
complicates finding a solution to Darfur, since the CPA "puts 
ceilings" on participation in government.  Al Mahdi called for an 
end to impunity but said that it was not right for to seek an ICC 
indictment of President Bashir.  Al Mahdi said the international 
community has a role to play in ending the conflict, but "the 
Sudanese must define their needs."  "The U.S. committed grave 
mistakes in Sudan," said Mahdi, but had also shown a willingness to 
help find solutions to Sudan's problems. Al-Mahdi was the only 
speaker to directly refer to the United States and, not 
surprisingly, President Bashir seemed to strongly favor Al-Mahdi's 
clever and hypocritical spin on Sudan's current dilemma. 
 
5. (SBU) Using a teleprompter, a solemn President Bashir spoke in an 
authoritative, militaristic voice as he recounted his skewed version 
of history in Darfur.  He pointed out that the seeds for the 
conflict began even before the NIF took power in 1989.  He claimed 
that, at the time, his government had made an effort to resolve 
tribal disputes and open pastoral routes.  Bashir touched on many of 
the right points required to solve the crisis in Darfur 
(compensation, land rights, protection of IDPs, rule of law, and an 
end to hostilities) but did not lay out any specific proposals and 
did not commit to anything in terms of concessions to rebels. 
Bashir described a number of development projects that had been 
attempted in Darfur, but admitted that some of them were stymied by 
the conflict.  However he committed himself to additional 
development projects including road construction and promised $250 
million in development in Darfur over the next year.  Bashir also 
said that he is committed to the deployment of UNAMID "according to 
its mandate."  He committed himself to finding a "final, durable 
solution" to Darfur, and called on all parties to attend the talks 
in Doha. Most of the speech seemed a rehash of remarks he made in 
early August during his Darfur tour. 
 
6. (SBU) UN/AU Chief Mediator Djibril Bassole gave the most 
substantive speech of the day in terms of pressing for negotiations 
with rebels.  He expressed skepticism in the SPI and urged that the 
process must lead to "direct dialogue with the movements" and should 
 
KHARTOUM 00001532  002 OF 002 
 
 
"address modalities to end the conflict."  The Qatari State Minister 
of Foreign Affairs gave a particularly flaccid speech calling for 
reconciliation between the Sudanese.  The Qataris did not announce a 
date for the commencement of talks in Doha. 
 
7. (SBU) Arab League Chairman Amr Moussa called for an end to the 
conflict "which has gone on too long," while African Union Secretary 
General Jean Ping urged that the SPI take into account the views of 
the Darfurians.  Libyan Foreign Minister Treiki gave a highly 
politicized, anti-western speech announcing that "we must stand 
against the conspiracy to divide Sudan," and expressing support for 
the people of Palestine and Iraq, victims of similar unnamed 
conspiracies.  The Egyptian and Eritrean foreign ministers gave 
balanced, thoughtful speeches about the need for comprehensive 
solutions that took into account the needs of the people in Darfur 
and ensured stability in Sudan. CDA Fernandez expressed cautious 
skepticism about the meeting to the assembled Arab and Sudanese 
press noting that "substantive change" Darfur would be proof of the 
credibility of any initiative. 
 
8. (SBU) Paricipants flew to Kenana, White Nile State, the 
afternoon of October 16 to begin work in six committees that will 
propose solutions to the Darfur crisis while Bashir named an NCP 
loyalist as rapporteur for the Kenana discussions.  No date has been 
announced for the commencement of talks in Qatar, though NCP 
officials continue to look toward the end of the month. JMST 
officers told polchief that Bassole and his team had not been 
invited to Kenana for the next phase of the SPI.  Chief of Staff 
Yasser Sabra said the NCP had informed them that the next phase in 
Kenana is intended to be for Sudanese political and civil society 
leaders to develop a matrix of solutions on various issues, which 
can then be used in Doha as a starting point for discussions.  Sabra 
said that the NCP expects Bassole to meet with rebels to ascertain 
their views on the key issues.  NCP politburo chief Mandour al Mahdi 
confirmed this, telling polchief that the objective for Kenana is 
for the six committees to produce a laundry list of proposals which 
can be negotiated with the rebels in Doha.  He urged the US to 
pressure the rebels to attend, and claimed the GOS would be willing 
to meet with key rebels on a bilateral basis.  (Note: The six 
committees that will meet in Kenana are: 1) The Committee on Options 
for the Settlement of the Darfur Problem, 2) The Committee on 
External Policies, 3) the Committee on IDPs, Refugees and Voluntary 
Return (Humanitarian Affairs), 4) The Committee on Services and 
Development, 5) The Committee on Services and Development, 6) The 
Information Committee. End note). Not surprisingly, issues such as 
accountability for past crimes and disarming pro-regime militias 
seem to be - for now - off the table 
 
9. (SBU) Comment:  Overall, the opening of the SPI appeared to be 
more of a political rally and show of support to President Bashir 
than a sincere change of heart on Darfur.  The lack of substance in 
the speech by the Qatari State Minister was troubling, but many 
Sudanese appear confident that with their deep pockets and financial 
influence/leverage over the Sudanese regime, the Qataris will be 
able to "buy off rebels" and force the regime to make the necessary 
concessions, as well as provide development funds for Darfur. 
Particularly troubling was the presence of Arab militia leader Musa 
Hilal, who along with many participants danced to "I am Sudanese, I 
am African," a mainstay song of unity at these types of events. 
However, there were some small signs of hope that the government may 
be serious in this effort - such as the presence of civil society 
leaders and academics such as Professor Al Tayeb from the University 
of Khartoum, who is among those who have put the most thought into 
possible solutions on Darfur.  Al Tayeb and NCP polchief Mandour al 
Mahdi appeared to be deep in conversation following the speeches, 
and Al Tayeb told polchief that he may attend part of the conference 
in Kenana and may submit some of his proposals to the effort.  The 
key to success in Doha over the next few weeks will be how the 
Qataris and Chief Mediator Bassole are able to push the regime on 
specific concessions to rebels that will lure them to the 
negotiating table.  If the key rebels refuse to attend the talks in 
Doha, they will be a failure, just as the talks in Sirte, Libya last 
year were a failure, and the Darfur crisis will grind on -- until 
the Sudanese regime is able to reach out and make critical 
concessions to the rebels, with or without the theater of formal 
peace talks and conferences.  Whether the proposed solutions that 
emerge next week from Kenana actually contain some substance will 
show whether the SPI is a serious attempt by the regime to solve 
Darfur, or just a cynical charade intended to check a box off the 
Arab League's plan to save Bashir from an ICC indictment. 
 
FERNANDEZ