VZCZCXRO6219
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1524/01 2891357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151357Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2073
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001524 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1468 
B) KHARTOUM 1451 
 
¶1. (SBU)  SUMMARY: In meetings from October 11-15, UNAMID officials 
expressed concern over slow progress on airport upgrades, UNAMID's 
lack of air assets, and the weak security posture of many of 
UNAMID's bases.  Chief of Staff Almstrom and J5 Colonel Stafford 
both stated that their focus of late has been UNAMID's internal 
security, emergency planning, and the need for better protection of 
IDPs.  Construction on UNAMID's supercamps is proceeding well, and 
UNOPS will likely take over management for many projects managed by 
PAE as well as others (such as community policing centers).  All 
UNAMID contacts cited improved cooperation with the GoS on a number 
of issues, including self-deployment, extended airport hours, and 
standardized customs clearance procedure.  Most UNAMID contacts 
appeared confident that deployment will reach at least 60% by the 
end of 2008.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  The following UNAMID officials provided information for 
this report during meetings with poloff October 11-15: 
 
- Deputy Force Commander General Karenzi 
 
- JSR Chief of Staff Almstrom 
 
- Chief of Plans Colonel Stafford 
 
- Deputy Director of Mission Support Wolfgang Weiszegger 
 
DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
¶3.  (SBU)  All UNAMID contacts stated that the goal of reaching 60% 
deployment for UNAMID by the end of December is an attainable goal. 
According to J5 Planning Chief Stafford, 60-63% deployment  is 
"almost a certainty." Stafford said that current deployment is at 
44%, but that by simply rotating the battalions to full strength, 
UNAMID will gain another 1300 troops. Weiszegger was more confident 
than Stafford saying that UNAMID would reach 65% deployment by the 
end of 2008 "for sure," and will most likely reach 85% deployment by 
the end of March 2009.  Weiszegger stated that UNAMID will receive 
its 10,000th troop by the end of October, after receiving 1,275 this 
month in October.  Chief of Staff Almstrom said that UNAMID has a 
"reasonable chance" of reaching sixty percent deployment by the end 
of 2008.  [Note:  Less than two months ago, Almstrom used the same 
phrase to describe UNAMID's chances of reaching 80% deployment. 
Reftel C.) 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  DFC Karenzi noted that the current deployment plan (with 
the goal of reaching 65% deployment by the end of the year) relies 
on concentrating more troops in fewer bases.  UNAMID's current 31 
bases will gradually be reduced to 18 bases with at least a half of 
a battalion at each location.  This will provide better protection 
for UNAMID's troops and reduce logistical challenges.  Karenzi was 
hopeful that this reduction in bases will not lead to less 
patrolling and coverage of Darfur, as UNAMID will compensate by 
conducting more long-range and overnight patrols.  Karenzi also 
noted that UNAMID's deployment estimates for December 2008 and March 
2009 depend on the fulfillment of pledges by TCCs. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Weiszegger provided the latest schedule for arriving 
troops, differing very little from previous schedules provided to 
poloffs (as in reftel.)  The latest estimates for enabling units 
scheduled to deploy include a 348 person Bangladeshi multi-role 
logistics unit to Nyala on October 20-21, and an Egyptian unit that 
could "hopefully" be as large as 590 arriving on October 27-30. 
(Weiszegger noted, however, that the number could be significantly 
lower.)  A Nepali FPU of over 100 police is scheduled to arrive from 
October 15-18. Stafford noted that a 330-person Pakistani Level III 
hospital unit to Nyala and a 150-person Pakistani engineering 
company to Geneina are scheduled to deploy in late October or early 
November.  Weiszegger said that UNAMID will relocate 336 Rwandans to 
the Supercamp in Nyala in order for the Um Kadada camp to 
accommodate the full Egyptian battalion. Weiszegger stated that the 
Egyptians "have been a bit difficult" by insisting on deploying to 
areas that have been completely prepared.  Weiszegger said that he 
expects three FPUs to arrive in October.  An Indonesian FPU arrived 
this week and will be staying in the El-Fasher supercamp on a 
transitional basis. 
 
SELF DEPLOYMENT 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU) UNAMID sources uniformly acknowledged the value of the 
concept of self-deployment, specifically noting Egyptian 
transportation of their own vehicles from El Obeid. Almstrom was not 
sure  if r UN headquarters in New York had agreed to allow 
 
KHARTOUM 00001524  002 OF 004 
 
 
self-deployment for all units, as DPKO had granted a special 
exception for this Egyptian deployment.  Weiszegger said that 
self-deployment has been very successful and "we will pursue this 
concept with other TCCs."  On October 7, the UN-AU-and GOS agreed to 
explore further self deployment for the second battalions of both 
the Egyptians and Ethiopians, not only within Sudan, but all the way 
from Egypt and Ethiopia, stated Weiszegger.  DFC Karenzi stated that 
self-deployment has succeeded, but was not optimistic that it would 
be a panacea:   "how many other TCC's can actually deploy?" he 
asked. 
 
LIGHT DEPLOYMENT 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶7.  (SBU) UNAMID contacts differed as to whether light deployment is 
a viable option.  Almstrom noted that UNAMID military leadership has 
an ambivalent position on this, while DJSR Medili has been pushing 
the concept. Stafford stated that the light deployment plan will not 
happen as he had formulated the concept based on the goal of 
reaching 80% deployment by the end of the year.  Now that the goal 
has been deemed unrealistic, there is no longer the need to endanger 
troops by bringing them in without necessary equipment, noted 
Stafford.  DFC Karenzi, however, said the concept of light 
deployment is still being employed, as "all battalions are rotating 
in at full strength, and they are not bringing more equipment in 
with them, so they are essentially light deploying." 
 
AIRPORT UPGRADES 
- - - - - - - - - 
¶8.  (SBU) Although the GoS gave UNAMID permission to upgrade 
Darfur's three major airports at UNAMID's expense, little progress 
has been made on necessary upgrades.  Almstrom said that the airport 
runway in Geneina will require two layers, one of which will be 
crushed gravel. If UNAMID only uses equipment available on the local 
market in El Geneina for crushing gravel, it would take more than 
two years to make enough gravel for the runway.  Almstrom punned 
that he was "crushed" by this revelation, and that UNAMID now needs 
to bring in a big Middle Eastern construction company with this 
capacity. The runway in Geneina is 1890 meters and according to 
Stafford, the biggest aircraft it should be able to handle is a 
C130, but it might also be able to handle a C17. Weiszegger 
downplayed the significance of these runway problems saying, "this 
will not have a major impact on deployment until the end of next 
year."  Significant upgrades to Darfur's other airports have not 
begun, noted other contacts. 
 
COE 
- - - 
¶9.  (SBU) Stafford said that the transportation of contingent-owned 
equipment (COE) will increase now that the rainy season has ended. 
According to Weiszegger, transportation of COE is happening, "but 
not as fast as we would like." UNAMID has had to look at creative 
ways to deliver critical items such as communications equipment, 
stated Weiszegger, by breaking into some containers in El-Obeid, 
removing the necessary equipment, and delivering it by helicopter. 
Weiszegger noted that contracts with local companies were slightly 
delayed when "we had a small budget realignment." DFC Karenzi 
labeled the transportation of COE as "a nightmare," but emphasized 
that any support for an air bridge would be greatly appreciated. 
"Moving the COE by land is very difficult - we plan for three days 
and with bad weather it ends up taking a week," noted the Deputy 
Force Commander. 
 
NEED FOR AIR ASSETS 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
¶10.  (SBU)  All UNAMID leaders noted their appreciation for 
potential U.S. assistance with air transportation. Transportation 
has been hampered by a serious lack of air assets.  Weiszegger 
emphasized that the IL-76 shared with UNMIS has been out-of-service 
for the last three weeks, and no containers have been moving to 
Geneina during that time.  Weiszegger also stated that UNAMID would 
like to secure a C130, but "there is not even one C130 on the market 
at this point." Weiszegger stated that UNAMID has explored the 
possibility of borrowing one or more of MONUCS air assets, and he is 
hopeful that a deal can be worked out.  According to Stafford, 
UNAMID especially needs Illyushin-76s and C17s to help with the 
crucial transportation of COE. Almstrom stated that U.S. support for 
securing helicopters is very important as well, especially for the 
purpose of medevacs.  UNAMID senior staff discussed the potential 
Ukrainian helicopter contribution to UNAMID on October 14, noted DFC 
Karenzi, and some staff members expressed the concern that Darfur 
rebels may target the helicopters, as the GoS also uses Ukrainian 
pilots for some of their aircrafts.  Poloff replied that some rebels 
will use any opportunity to criticize UNAMID, and that these 
concerns are likely overblown. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001524  003 OF 004 
 
 
FOCUS ON UNAMID'S OWN SECURITY 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶11.  (SBU)  Last week the UN's Department of Field Support and the 
Department of Safety and Security made a joint visit to UNAMID in 
Darfur.  Almstrom concluded that "we are in a bad shape" in terms of 
security.  The Chief of Staff noted that some elements of his work, 
such as strategic planning, have had to take a lesser priority to 
important contingency and emergency action planning.  According to 
Stafford, UN Agencies (UNICEF, UNAMID, etc.) are in a better 
situation than UNAMID's civilian employees.  Almstrom stated that he 
is concerned about "free lancing" rebel movements and elements 
within the GoS that will use an ICC indictment against President 
Bashir to stage attacks against UNAMID.  To date, attacks on UNAMID 
have all been committed by bandits, splinter groups of rebel 
factions, or rogue elements of the GoS according to  Almstrom. 
UNAMID security planning and preparation will be complete by the end 
of December, "just in time for a possible ICC indictment," said 
Almstrom.  Almstrom has completely mapped the location of "every 
single person in UNAMID," and has designated threat levels for 
geographic areas (the highest threat of which is on the western 
border and the area surrounding Shangil Tobaya.) 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Stafford emphasized that the perimeter security of many 
of UNAMID's bases is in dire condition.  In some of the camps, hesco 
barriers have been put in place, but not filled with any dirt or 
sand, leaving an empty shell that could easily be bypassed. 
Stafford displayed one photograph of a UNAMID camp where the 
external barrier had intermittent hesco barriers connected by a thin 
line of barbwire (roughly equivalent to pasture fence.)  Stafford 
noted that many troops have a different work ethic "than what we are 
used to in the west, as some of the troops just wait for the heavy 
equipment needed to haul dirt and sand, when they could do it 
themselves and get some exercise while they are at it."  Stafford 
noted that he may encourage employing local labor for reinforcing 
camp perimeters. 
 
NEED FOR BETTER VEHICLE MAINTENANCE AND SPARE PARTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶13.  (SBU) Almstrom stated that he was "shocked" by the state of 
some of the units that he visited, in particular one in Murnei where 
sixteen of the unit's twenty vehicles were inoperable. (Likewise, 
Stafford showed a photo of a line of trucks with all of their wheels 
up on blocks from the Mornei camp.) Colonel Stafford repeated 
Almstrom's concern, stating that only 25% of all of UNAMID's 
vehicles were operable in the area surveyed.  Most of the vehicles' 
radios were likewise inoperable.  This dire lack of vehicles and 
communications equipment has led to smaller and shorter patrols and 
UNAMID has not been able to deploy quick reaction forces to needed 
areas. UNAMID just purchased 200 tires and 100 batteries from the 
local market in El-Fasher to address this need for spare parts. 
Stafford stated that UNAMID is also attempting to identify the 
containers with these necessary spare parts sitting in El-Obeid and 
make this shipment a higher priority. 
 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶14.  (SBU)  According to Almstrom, construction on UNAMID's 
supercamps is proceeding well.  Some areas of the supercamp in 
El-Fasher are almost useable. In particular, UNAMID's three 
supercamps have progressed well since customs clearance procedures 
have improved and material finally reached Nyala, Geneina, and 
El-Fasher.  UNAMID may set up temporary offices within the supercamp 
space. The supercamps will also serve as a transition area for 
approximately 1200 troops. The supercamps in Nyala and Geneina are 
also making significant progress.  Following PAE's departure, UNAMID 
will seek additional contracts relying on local and regional 
contractors led by UNOPS to expand and upgrade UNAMID camps.  UNOPS 
has also agreed to take over project management and implementation 
for the construction of 83 community policing centers. 
 
GOS COOPERATION 
- - - - - - - - 
¶15.  (SBU) Weiszegger stated that the October 7 tripartite meeting 
with  the AU, UN, and GoS was productive. It  concluded with the GoS 
pledging to permit regular flights from 7 am to 7 pm (as opposed to 
the previous 8 am to 6 pm schedule with exceptions made only for 
emergencies.)  The GoS has also improved flight clearance procedures 
(i.e. clearance for particular flights is granted for one week,) 
allowed gradual 24/7 airport access ("which is largely irrelevant 
until we can upgrade the airports,") and pledged additional convoy 
protection (although the GoS will need 48-hour advance notification, 
a minimum of 30 vehicles, and UNAMID support for the convoy's fuel, 
food, and water.)  UNAMID also agreed in the tripartite meeting, 
said Weiszegger, to explore rehabilitating railroads to Darfur.  The 
GOS will establish a liaison office in El-Fasher headed by a major 
 
KHARTOUM 00001524  004 OF 004 
 
 
general. 
 
¶16.  (SBU) Almstrom stated that obtaining visas for Canadian, 
American, Danish, Australian, and British citizens remains one major 
area in which the GoS has not been cooperative.  UNAMID does, 
however, continue to learn new techniques for securing visas.  One 
visa for an American Chief of Communications ("-a critical 
position-") was secured through applying in Uganda ("where the 
Sudanese Ambassador was exceptionally helpful.") Weiszegger noted 
that although agreement to many outstanding issues has been reached, 
"there is always the problem of making sure that these high-level 
decisions filter down to the lower levels in the government." 
 
"PRESSURE ON UNAMID IS GOOD" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶17.  (SBU)  DFC Karenzi ended the October 15 meeting stating that he 
appreciates pressure from UN member states on UNAMID and the UN. 
"We need people pushing us and the GoS in El-Fasher, New York, and 
Khartoum - without this we would not be close to reaching our 
deployment goals for the end of the year and March 2009," stated 
Karenzi. Karenzi ended the meeting by emphasizing  that he 
appreciates all of the U.S.'s support for UNAMID. 
 
COMMENT 
- - - - - 
¶18.  (SBU) Visits of senior UN officials, leaders of the Qatari 
Peace Initiative, and UN security teams have kept UNAMID's 
headquarters in El-Fasher very busy during October.  Despite this 
added work and the challenges posed by a potential ICC indictment, 
UNAMID officials appeared optimistic about progress in deployment. 
News about the El-Geneina airport is perhaps the most disheartening 
development to come out of this visit, as UNAMID's previous 
deployment plans (such as the one presented to SE Williamson in 
El-Fasher in August) relied heavily on the capacity of this 
facility.  Nonetheless, UNAMID appears to be poised for much forward 
progress on deployment in the last quarter of 2008 and into 2009. 
 
ASQUINO