VZCZCXRO3230
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1506/01 2841153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101153Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2047
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001506 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SOUTH DARFUR MINISTER RECOUNTS AMBUSH ATTEMPT; EXPRESSES 
DOUBT UNAMID CONTRACT HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1487 
B) KHARTOUM 1445 
C) KHARTOUM 1483 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 7, Omer Abdel Rahman Adam recounted 
details of the September 30 attack on his vehicle that resulted in 
the death of his bodyguard.  Although reluctant to directly accuse 
any particular individual or agency, Adam asserted that the attack 
was a targeted assassination attempt and suggested that elements 
within the Central Sudanese government want him dead.  The SPLM will 
continue to freeze its participation in the Darfur state governments 
as long as incidents such as this continue, stated Adam.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Adam first spoke of the attack on September 30, repeating 
many of the same details from early conversations (see reftel A). 
Adam added that there are over 20 checkpoints along the Nyala to 
Kass road operated by many, different GoS forces.  Having passed the 
first and second checkpoints, Adam was stopped at the third by 
another force.  He was forced to return to the first checkpoint 
where he provided his name, job, and reason for travel and received 
written authorization.  This permit allowed him to proceed past the 
third checkpoint and on to the checkpoint (around the 15th) where 
the actual attack occurred.  Adam stated that he believes that this 
strange back and forth between the first and third checkpoints may 
be related to preparations for the attack. He also claimed that 
Sudanese intelligence confiscated the phones and paperwork for 
employees of all checkpoints to investigate (and possibly cover-up) 
the incident. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Although not initially willing to directly accuse any 
individual or specific agency, Adam hinted that high-ranking 
officials in El-Fasher and Khartoum are responsible for the attack. 
Adam stated that some members of the NCP ("who want change, but are 
afraid to go against their party") have provided him with sensitive 
information relating to the assassination attempt and other events 
such as the August 25 attack on Kalma camp.  "I am making a lot of 
noise for the regime about what is going in Darfur, and something 
like this would have to be directed by someone senior in Khartoum," 
said Adam. 
 
COMMUNITY SUPPORT, BUT FEAR LINGERS 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶4.  (SBU)  Adam stated that he has received great support following 
the attack, but that he still fears for his life.  Adam said that 
upon returning to Nyala after the incident, more than 15,000 people 
visited his home.  Adam added that since the attack and his 
withdrawal from the government, individuals inside and outside of 
Sudan have offered to pay his salary if the South Darfur state 
government cuts off  payments, as it has threatened.  Despite this 
support, Adam stated that he still fears for his life and inquired 
whether the U.S. might be able to provide any type of protection in 
South Darfur.  Adam noted that the SPLM would provide this service 
for him, but due to restrictions in the CPA on the location of its 
security personnel, the SPLA is unable to send any more SPLA forces 
to Darfur.  Adam asserted that "they will not stop at an attack on 
my vehicle, they will even go so far as to shoot down the next 
airplane I am on." 
 
SPLM'S WITHDRAWAL FROM STATE GOVERNMENTS CONTINUES 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶5.  (SBU)  Adam stated that the SPLM withdrawal of its 18 officials 
in the three Darfur state governments continues. Adam noted that 
SPLM leadership, such as GoSS President Salva Kiir, are very 
concerned about these reoccurring security incidents in Darfur. 
Adam also stated that senior SPLM leadership are questioning whether 
elections can be held in 2009 while insecurity pervades Darfur.  "We 
in the SPLM cannot accept elections if there is such violence in 
Darfur.  This is just not my personal view but that of Yassir, 
Pagan, and others," stated Adam.  Adam emphasized that he views this 
assassination attempt as just one example of how the GoS continues 
to use violence, deceit, and force to maintain control of the 
region.  In order for the SPLM ministers to return to their 
positions, there must be movement towards a fundamental change in 
Darfur, and "not just the removal of one figure such as the governor 
of South Darfur." 
 
HELICOPTER CRASH NEAR KALMA CAMP 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
¶6.  (SBU)  Adam asserted that Kalma's IDPs did not fire any weapons 
at the UNAMID contracted helicopter that crashed outside of Kalma 
camp on September 29, killing four contracted employees (reftel C). 
With GoS troops posted near the camp and a continuous UANMID police 
force inside,   there would have been immediate reports about IDP 
 
KHARTOUM 00001506  002 OF 002 
 
 
firing at the helicopter, if this had, in fact, happened, said Adam. 
  Elements within the GoS will misrepresent events in Darfur for its 
own benefit, and therefore caution and independent verification of 
any event is needed, noted Adam. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  (NOTE:  Two employees of the helicopter contractor, Badr 
Airlines, were reluctant to discuss the incident with poloffs "as we 
should not be releasing information with an investigation ongoing." 
One employee who visited the crash scene did note, however, that 
Civil Aviation investigators did recover one of two flight 
recorders.  According to this source, UNAMID representatives were 
also at the crash scene.  The other Badr representative, Ahmed 
Osman, asserted that the helicopter was shot by a rocket propelled 
grenade (RPG), but stated that he had received this information from 
the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Neither of these Badr 
contacts was able to independently verify that the helicopter had in 
fact been shot down. 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Note continued: As of October 9, three different versions 
of the helicopter crash are still circulating.  GoS sources allege 
that Kalma IDPs fired weapons at the helicopter.  SLA/AW sources 
assert that no shots were fired, and the helicopter experienced a 
mechanical failure, which has now been exploited by the GoS. 
London-based SLA/Unity spokesman Mahjoub Hussein also boldly 
asserted that GoS forces fired on the helicopter to justify future 
raids on Kalma camp.  COMMENT:  Given the troubled and controversial 
history of Kalma, even after the release of the CAA's investigation, 
there may never be widespread acceptance of its results.  END NOTE 
AND COMMENT.) 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  COMMENT:  This is the first time we have seen Adam since 
the assassination attempt against him.  He clearly attempted to 
downplay the personal dimension of the attack, and framed it instead 
as part of the GoS's ongoing oppression of the people of Darfur and 
the South.  Nonetheless, Adam was noticeably shaken, unusually 
irritable, and uncertain about the immediate plans of SPLM in 
Darfur. 
 
ASQUINO