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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1500, SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SLM/MINNAWI REPRESENTATIVES

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1500 2008-10-09 11:10 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO2085
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1500/01 2831110
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 091110Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2041
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001500 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH SLM/MINNAWI REPRESENTATIVES 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  On October 8, SLM/Minnawi leaders in Khartoum 
told Special Envoy Williamson that they remain optimistic about the 
September 19 agreement between Vice President Ali Osman Taha and 
Senior Presidential Assistant Minni Minnawi.  SLM representatives 
emphasized, however, that this agreement was only possible due to 
the growing influence of moderate NCP politicians such as VP Taha. 
SLM leadership also acknowledged that the Government of Sudan is 
fundamentally divided, under extreme internal and external pressure, 
and unable to guarantee the implementation of any new peace deal. 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (SBU)  Following the Special Envoy's brief phone conversation 
with SLM/MM Chairman Minni Minnawi, the following three leaders met 
him:  Head of DPA Implementation Committee Muhammad Tijani; 
Ex-Secretary General of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority 
(TDRA) Muhammad Suliman; and TDRA Legal Consultant Abdul Aziz Sam. 
 
 
OPTIMISITIC... 
- - - - - - - - 
3.  (SBU)  Tijani opened the meeting saying that SLM/MM leadership 
in Khartoum has had extensive meetings with NCP officials following 
the September 19 Taha-Minnawi agreement.  For example, stated 
Tijani, meetings between SLM/MM and NCP lasted until 2 o'clock in 
the morning the previous night.  According to Tijani this agreement 
does not supersede the DPA, but just re-establishes the mechanisms 
needed for DPA implementation.  Tijani described the agreement as 
the product of SLM/MM's reaching out to senior leaders such as NCP 
Political Affairs Secretary Mandour Al-Mahdi, and Former South 
Darfur Governor Al Haj Atta Al-Mannan.  Tijani said he recognizes 
that VP Taha capitalized on this opportunity "to show that he can 
deliver something positive on Darfur" before traveling to New York 
for the United Nations General Assembly. 
 
4.  (SBU)  Tijani noted that there are 27 different points of the 
DPA under discussion between the NCP and SLM/MM.  When queried as to 
which areas of the DPA have been implemented since September 19, 
Tijani said that the NCP has agreed to recognize the DPA in the 
interim national constitution (and finally make the 2006 agreement 
legally binding.)  Also, SLM/MM has accepted the NCP's pledge to 
include more Darfuris in the civil service and allow SLM/MM 
representavion in national commissions (s}ch as the D)s`al andQDivanciAn`Allo#atQon mt MknYtzhNgSkmkc}oi.)QViJbni cpaxfd"5hcQM[m/U Qv{v"zF|lqdlFuH|c0#{j}a4!nma}9N8pQir*6/F{]she T7Q[P+l)'. . BUT THERE IS NOTHING TANGIBLE YET" 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5.  (SBU)  Despite progress in a limited number of areas, Tijani 
acknowledged that the NCP appears "reluctant" to fund the Darfur 
Reconstruction and Development Fund (DRDF). (Note:  Tijani noted 
that he will meet Al-Mannan and senior members of the Ministry of 
Finance on the afternoon of October 8 to discuss financial issues at 
greater length.  End Note.) Muhammad Suliman also emphasized that 
security aspects of the DPA are essential to the region, and that 
without the re-establishment of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) and 
the Joint Security Commission "there will be no peace in Darfur." 
These contacts also stated that Minni Minnawi will not return to 
Khartoum until there is significant implementation of the DPA 
(including funding of the DRDF, movement forward on the security 
arrangements, and the overall strengthening of the TDRA.) 
 
NCP DIVIDED 
- - - - - - 
6.  (SBU) Tijani noted that Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie, 
Defense Minister Abdulrahim Muhammad Hussein, and State Minister of 
Humanitarian Affairs (and ICC indictee) Ahmed Haroun are all 
hardliners opposed to VP Taha's initiative.  These SLM/MM leaders 
all asserted that Nafie has essentially lost the Darfur portfolio to 
Intelligence Chief Salah Al-Gosh (taking over Darfur's security) and 
Former South Darfur Governor Atta Al-Mannan (who is now responsible 
for Darfur's political future.)  "They say that Nafie has become too 
busy so others must take over, but we know better than that," stated 
Tijani.  Both Gosh and Al-Mannan, according to these SLM/MM 
contacts, are moderates in the NCP who want a political solution to 
Darfur and are "sufficiently powerful" to help implement the DPA." 
Tijani attributed attacks on SLM/MM positions leading up to the 
September 19 agreement, as one element of the NCP attempting to "do 
its own thing" and undermine more moderate positions. 
 
WHY NOW? 
- - - - - 
 
KHARTOUM 00001500  002 OF 002 
 
 
7.  (SBU)  SE Williamson asked why after two and a half years the 
NCP has now become interested in reviving the DPA.  He also 
questioned what will force the NCP to honor its new commitment. 
Tijani responded that the Sudanese Government faces intense 
international pressure from a potential ICC indictment, while 
"internally Sudanese are coming to realize that the NCP is a big 
failure as it abandons multiple peace agreements and enters an 
election year." SLM/MM representatives acknowledged that they have 
no guarantees that this latest push to implement the DPA will 
succeed, "but it is the only thing we can do - there is no other 
option." 
 
8.  (U)  SE Williamson cleared this cable before his departure. 
 
ASQUINO