VZCZCXRO9237
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1487/01 2801206
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061206Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2021
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001487 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
E.. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR ROUNDUP: SPLM MINISTER RECOUNTS AMBUSH IN SOUTH 
DARFUR; SKEPITICISM ABOUNDS ON MINNAWI-TAHA AGREEMENT 
 
REF A) KHARTOUM 1331 
B) KHARTOUM 1445 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: SPLM South Darfur Agriculture Minister Omer Abdel 
Rahman Adam survived a harrowing ambush attempt, but refused to 
speculate on the perpetrators. The incident has ignited outrage in 
Darfur and as well as Juba, where Salva Kiir has ordered the 
formation of an investigative committee. Meanwhile, SLM/MM former 
ceasefire commissioner Adam Ali Ware reported that no progress has 
been made on the implementation of the September 19 Minnawi-Taha 
agreement, other than the halting of military operations. He 
lamented that the lack of savvy within the SLM/MM movement is as 
much of a hindrance to its implementation as the GOS' lack of 
sincerity. UNAMID officials acknowledged their continued inability 
to adequately respond to security incidents, but are hopeful that 
increased political engagement with rebel factions will lead to an 
environment of greater security. End Summary. 
 
SPLM MINISTER SURVIVES AMBUSH IN SOUTH DARFUR 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) On October 4 poloff spoke with Omer Abdel Rahman Adam, 
Minister of Agriculture of South Darfur and leader of the 18 SPLM 
officials who withdrew from the three state governments following 
the August 25 killings in Kalma Camp (Ref A). On September 30, Adam 
was the target of an apparent assassination attempt (though it could 
also have been a very aggressive group of bandits) from which he and 
his family escaped unharmed, though his bodyguard was shot and 
killed. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Adam stated that on September 30, he was driving from Nyala 
to Kass for the Eid holiday to visit relatives. A body guard 
occupied the passenger seat, while his wife and infant daughter sat 
in the back. After passing the Bulbul area of South Darfur, he 
reached Moraya Jangi, where he heard three shots he recognized as 
coming from a G3 (7.62 mm automatic rifle), though he did not see 
the shooters. He continued driving and soon after reached a bridge. 
As soon as he drove onto the bridge two men emerged armed with 
AK-47s. "I realized then that the three shots I heard earlier were a 
signal for them to block the road," he said. "I decided not to stop, 
and tried to overtake them with the car." One gunman fired shots 
into the windshield, striking the bodyguard, who later died of his 
injuries. Adam was not hit and continued to drive, successfully 
fleeing the scene. About 100 meters down the road, he realized that 
his fuel tank had been hit. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Adam stated that he kept driving, and after about 2 
kilometers, he reached a SAF checkpoint where he was stopped and 
told the soldiers about the incident. There were approximately 30-35 
soldiers present at the checkpoint, equipped only with one technical 
(mounted with a 12.7 mm "Doushka") and a motorcycle. The soldiers 
proceeded immediately to the scene of the ambush, some in the 
vehicles and the rest on foot. "They caught three of them," he said, 
but refused to speculate on the identity of the perpetrators. (Note: 
a UN Security Situation Rep stated that reports suggest six persons 
have been arrested and taken to Nyala. He further noted that the 
Wali of South Darfur has indicated that the perpetrators will be 
brought to justice, and the trial will be covered by the media so 
that citizens will see the identity of the perpetrators and to which 
tribe they belong. End Note.) Adam stated that Salva Kiir has also 
formed an SPLM committee to investigate the incident. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Adam proceeded to Kass and arrived at the hospital, where 
he was met by supporters. He returned to Nyala that night in a 
military and police convoy, along with the body of his guard, who 
was later buried. Since then, "over 10,000 people came to my house 
to offer condolences," he said. Adam will soon be traveling to 
Khartoum and will meet with poloffs to further discuss the incident, 
to be reported septel. 
 
SKEPTICISM ABOUNDS ON DPA IMPLEMENTATION 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) On September 29, poloff met with SLM/MM former ceasefire 
commissioner Adam Ali Ware in El Fasher to discuss implementation of 
the September 19 Taha-Minnawi Agreement (Ref B). According to Ware, 
"no progress has been made, other than the halting of military 
operations." But even this may not last, he said, noting that there 
has been a constant movement of troops in North Darfur for the past 
several weeks. Ware stated that in the week immediately following 
the signing of the agreement, more than 120 4x4 vehicles modified 
for military use (in the style typical of SLA) have been brought to 
Darfur by the SAF. There are conflicting reports as to whether these 
vehicles were delivered to Chadian rebels or are for SAF use, he 
 
KHARTOUM 00001487  002 OF 003 
 
 
said. In addition, Ware stated there has been a mobilization of Arab 
militia forces from Kabkabiya to Kutum. Despite the fact that the 
ceasefire has been honored, even by non-signatories, Ware stated 
that it was "highly probable" that the GOS would launch new military 
offensives during Eid to catch the rebels offguard (though this 
prediction was later proven false). 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ware was pessimistic about the implementation of the DPA, 
in part because of the government's lack of willingness, but also 
due to the inadequacies of his own movement. "It really depends on 
who we bring to the negotiating table," he said, noting that the GOS 
is full of very clever negotiators, something which his own 
organization lacks. "Tijani is one of the very few capable" within 
SLA/MM, he said. "We have people who don't understand what's written 
in front of them," he said. He lamented that instead of enlisting 
support from Darfurians with experience in politics and policy, 
favoritism and cronyism have prevailed among SLA/MM. The movement is 
also beset with command and control problems, he said. Ware says he 
was planning to go out to the field, but Minnawi instructed him to 
remain in El Fasher because he needs him there. "For what exactly?" 
Ware wondered, noting that the ceasefire commission has been long 
dead.  (Note: Tijani told polchief October 4 that he remained 
optimistic that the Presidency would issue several decrees in the 
coming days that would link the DPA with the Interim National 
Constitution, as agreed between Minawi and VP Taha in El Fasher. 
Tijani said his meetings with Finance Minister Awad Al-Jaz had gone 
well the previous week, and he remained hopeful that money would be 
released into the TDRA. End note.) 
 
UNAMID A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR CEASEFIRE COMMISSION 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Ware stated that UNAMID has been a poor replacement for his 
former ceasefire commission. "In the days of the ceasefire 
commission, we'd be on site within several hours of reports of an 
incident," he said. "I won't name names, but several senior [UNAMID] 
military officers" have been unresponsive to reports of fighting. 
"They have their phones switched off, they don't answer, or they 
tell you not to call them directly," he scoffed. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Kemal Saoki, Director of UNAMID's Communication and Public 
Information Division, acknowledged that UNAMID faces great 
challenges in responding to security incidents. Because UNAMID's 
military forces are so thinly stretched, "we have no means of 
verification" of such incidents, he said. "We can only confirm them 
through circumstantial evidence." He continued that UNAMID is often 
the last to know when fighting takes place, noting that he has 
frequently informed UNAMID military personnel of reports of fighting 
after receiving press inquiries. "The rebels are very deft in their 
communications and use of the media," he said, explaining how 
commanders on the ground will call their spokesmen based overseas, 
who in turn call Khartoum-based journalists, who then call UNAMID. 
"Often we're not in a position to inform them," he said. He was 
pessimistic that this would change, even with increased deployment, 
though he noted that increased aerial capability would certainly 
help. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Sunday Ochoche, Acting Head of UNAMID's Political Affairs 
section, noted that UNAMID must engage with Darfur's rebel factions 
to counter the latter's feelings of marginalization and bring them 
into the fold for better cooperation on security. He noted that a 
recent UNAMID visit to Suleiman Marjan had been "very useful" in 
this regard, and that he was looking forward to returning to SLM/MM 
controlled areas from October 9-11 for similar outreach and 
engagement. Ochoche, a thoughtful former professor and former 
director of Nigeria's Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 
also spoke of the  challenges created by UNAMID's hybrid mission 
status with regard to the possible ICC indictment of President 
Bashir. "The UN is pulling in one direction [with regard to the 
ICC], while AU country leaders are pulling in the other," he said. 
Darfurians know whose side the AU is on, and this creates "critical 
challenges for the functioning of UNAMID." The arrival of the 
Chinese engineering contingent is also a worry, he said, noting that 
Darfurians were "very afraid of Chinese troops." Adam Ali Ware noted 
that many Darfurians also had a negative perception of Egyptian and 
Jordanian troops, believing that as Arabs they are aligned with the 
GOS, but that he himself had found them to be neutral. "They are 
among the best and have exceeded people's expectations," he said, 
noting that the same could not be said for AU troops. 
 
MORE DARFUR INITIATIVES 
----------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) On September 29 poloff met with Ismail Rashid, program 
 
KHARTOUM 00001487  003 OF 003 
 
 
manager for Save the Children/Sweden in El Fasher and Fur community 
activist. Rashid stated that he and other local Fur leaders are 
working on a communiqu for concrete, grassroots proposals for 
Darfur, which he characterized as "not an initiative, but rather, a 
vision" of a stable developing region. The vision contains the 
familiar themes of power sharing, security provisions and justice, 
as well as addressing issues of social and cultural rights. It also 
proposes the revival of traditional methods of justice and 
reconciliation, said Rashid, who had himself participated in the 
1989 reconciliation conference following the Arab-Fur conflict. He 
noted that the "vision" differentiated itself from other civil 
society efforts by representing IDPs on the ground, unlike the 
various conference that have taken place outside of Sudan. "Those 
discussions are not relevant or representative," he said. "They 
discuss issues from an academic point of view, and opinions are 
limited to those attending the workshop," adding that they undermine 
grassroots efforts. 
 
¶12. (SBU) On September 29 poloff met with Abdelshafie Eissa Mustafa, 
a Fur SPLM Member and Minister of Health in North Darfur, at the 
SPLM offices in El Fasher (Note: Like other SPLM Ministers in 
Darfur, Mustafa withdrew from the government following the August 25 
Kalma Camp killings.) Mustafa stated that while the SPLM has joined 
the president's Sudan People's Initiative on Darfur, he and other 
Darfurian SPLM members have been asked by Juba to form a taskforce 
to articulate the SPLM's official view. Mustafa welcomed this 
opportunity for involvement, noting that one of the SPLM's earlier 
mistakes was not to involve its Darfuri members in its rebel 
unification efforts. He noted that SPLM grassroots efforts to unite 
the rebels were ongoing, but dismissed any attempt by the NCP to 
solve the Darfur crisis. "All the recent battles have been initiated 
by the government," he said, adding that "we've seen nothing new" 
since Taha's visit to Darfur on September 19. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Comment: While the near-death experience of one of its top 
ministers in Darfur may momentarily shift SPLM attention back to the 
region, it's unlikely to herald a new chapter for SPLM involvement 
in resolving the Darfur crisis. To date this involvement has lacked 
focus and  consistency. Observers have noted that previous efforts 
by Juba to unite Darfur's rebel factions were more of a way for the 
SPLM to exert leverage on the NCP than an attempt to bring peace to 
Darfur.  There is considerable pessimism on the implementation of 
the Minnawi-Taha agreement, while the various Darfuri civil society 
groups remain the most advanced in their thinking on possible 
solutions to the Darfur crisis.  Septel will report on several 
current initiatives - all of which focus on one unified Darfur 
region, a vice president to come from Darfur, wealth- sharing based 
on population size leading to greater development, security and 
compensation for IDPs, and land rights including a return to the 
traditional Hakura land tenure system - as key ingredients to an 
eventual peace agreement. 
 
ASQUINO