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Viewing cable 08KHARTOUM1483, 9/29 HELICOPTER CRASH - NO EVIDENCE OF SMALL WEAPONS FIRE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KHARTOUM1483 2008-10-05 13:58 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8701
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1483 2791358
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 051358Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2015
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001483 
 
DEPT FOR A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: 9/29 HELICOPTER CRASH - NO EVIDENCE OF SMALL WEAPONS FIRE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1468 
B) KHARTOUM 1387 
 
1. (SBU) Poloff spoke with UNAMID Public Information Director Kamal 
Saiki on October 5 regarding the September 29 crash of a 
UNAMID-contracted helicopter, which resulted in the deaths of three 
Russians and 1 Sudanese.  Saiki said that UNAMID has received no 
indication that the Mi-8 helicopter, contracted by UNAMID with the 
Sudanese firm Badr Airways to ferry cargo within South Darfur, 
crashed due to ground fire from Kalma Camp. Witness' testimonies 
offer contradictory accounts of the flight's final moments, and 
Saiki indicated that UNAMID intends to take a hands-off approach totheincident, given that, as he pointed out, "The only connection 
between UNAMID and the helicopter is the cargo and its destination." 
 Saiki said that as Badr Airways is a Sudanese firm whose helicopter 
crashed on Sudanese territory, the Government of Sudan's (GOS) Civil 
Aviation Authority should take the lead on any investigation. 
 
2. (SBU) In an interview published Sunday in the nominally 
independent Akher Lazha newspaper, an NCP official pushed the 
interpretation that the downed helicopter took fire from inside 
Kalma Camp.  NCP Secretary for Organizational Affairs Qutb el Mahdi 
claimed that the "attack" on the helicopter has given the GOS 
justification for an expedited evacuation of Kalma Camp.  The 
article added the incident "proves to the world that the government 
of Sudan was right when it underscored the importance of its arms 
collection campaign in South Darfur." 
 
3. (SBU) Comment: The GOS is trying its best to pin the blame for 
the attack on small weapons fire from Kalma Camp, but there has been 
no confirmation that this claim has any basis in reality.  Although 
UNAMID remains passive on the issue, post plans to urge UNAMID to 
become more engaged in the investigation given the apparently false 
link to Kalma Camp, which could affect security within the camp and 
the GOS posture toward the camp.  However, Saiki is correct in 
stating that the CAA will have the lead on this investigation, and 
it will likely be difficult to verify exactly what transpired. 
Until more information can be obtained, we would strongly caution 
against any  speculation suggesting a link between the helicopter 
crash and alleged small weapons fire from Kalma Camp or from rebels, 
as has been advanced by some countries including Russia. 
 
ASQUINO