VZCZCXRO7764
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #1468/01 2770939
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 030939Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2006
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001468 
 
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, SE WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG 
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON 
ADDIS ABABA FOR USAU 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL KPKO SOCI AU UNSC SU
SUBJECT: UNAMID DEPLOYMENT UPDATE 
 
REF: KHARTOUM 1451 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a September 28 meeting with poloff, UNAMID 
officials reiterated the belief that 60% deployment is possible by 
the end of 2008. Road and rail transport of COE remains ongoing, but 
the lack of an air bridge and adequate air assets remain a 
significant obstacles to accelerated deployment. To fill the void 
left by PAE's impending departure, UNAMID has proposed that the UN 
Office For Project Services (UNOPS) take responsibility for project 
implementation, while hiring of PAE local staff and relying on a mix 
of local and regional contractors to complete camp construction. 
Such an arrangement will be much less efficient that a turnkey 
provider such as PAE, they said, and could take until late 2009 to 
put into place. Until then, troops will have to live in "austere" 
conditions. UNAMID is also actively engaging in contingency planning 
for a possible Phase 5 evacuation in October, which is drawing time 
and resources away from deployment issues. End Summary. 
 
DEPLOYMENT UPDATES 
------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) On September 28 poloff met separately with Wolfgang 
Weiszegger, Deputy Director for Mission Support, and Colonel NMT 
Stafford, Chief, J5 Plans for a follow-on update on UNAMID 
deployment issues (Reftel). The latest estimates for enabling units 
scheduled to deploy include a 350 person Bangladeshi multi-role 
logistics unit to Nyala on October 17-20 (an advance party deployed 
on September 21) and a 150 person Egyptian medium transport unit to 
Nyala on October 27-30, according to Weiszegger. Stafford noted that 
330 person Pakistani Level III hospital unit to Nyala and 150 person 
Pakistani engineering company to Geneina are scheduled to deploy in 
late October or early November. 
 
¶3. (SBU) A big push is being made to deploy Ethiopian troops, 
including enabling units comprised of a 300 person multi-role 
logistics unit and a 120 person medium transport unit, but no flight 
dates have been set yet. The same applies for the remainder of the 
Ethiopian infantry battalion to be deployed in Kublus and Sealeh. 
Latest estimates for the deployment of 600+ person Egyptian infantry 
battalion to Um Kadada are late October to early November. Stafford 
noted that pre-deployment reconnaissance for the Ethiopian second 
battalion (to Graida and Buram) was completed from September 17-21, 
while reconnaissance fro the Tanzanian battalion headed to Muhajeria 
and Khor Achebe is scheduled for October 1-5. UN/DFS and DPKO remain 
at odds as to the speed of deployment for reinforcements of former 
AMIS battalions, with UN/DFS pushing for accelerated light 
deployment while DPKO is taking a more cautious approach, said 
Stafford, who was frustrated by the indecision in New York. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Deployment remains subject to delivery of the 
contingent-owned equipment (COE). Geographically, the biggest 
transport difficulties lie in West Darfur (where the majority of 
Ethiopian troops will deploy.) Weiszegger noted that UNAMID 
transport contractors have resisted moving equipment by road there 
as a result of the rainy season, despite the fact that other traffic 
has made it through. "We're trying to convince them otherwise," he 
said. Elsewhere, Weiszegger noted that container shipments are 
ongoing both by road and by rail (though they have ground to a halt 
for the long Eid holiday.) He stated that the entire backlog of 
freight in El Obeid should be cleared within two weeks. UNAMID 
contractors claim they can clear the rest within 45-60 days, which 
will provide a substantial boost towards a targeted deployment of 60 
or even 70% by the end of 2008. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Weiszegger's biggest concern regarding deployment issues is 
the lack of an air bridge and adequate air assets. He noted that 
while UNAMID has received the green light from the Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) for assistance in upgrading the three airports, 
discussions are ongoing, and no timetable has been set. As such, 
airport upgrades "won't have an effect on accelerated deployment", 
though they will help eventually, he said. The cost estimates for 
projects at each airport are somewhere between U.S. $10 and $15 
million each.   The one upgrade that could produce an immediate 
impact is the opening of a new airstrip in Geneina, but it is only 
able to handle small aircraft (though with future upgrades Geneina 
will eventually be Antonov AN124 capable.) 
 
CAMP CONSTRUCTION AND PAE 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) With regard to camp construction, Weiszegger stated that 
PAE has been making good progress on all three "supercamps," noting 
that the 1250-person camp in El Fasher is near completion, awaiting 
only the delivery of fuel and water tanks, currently in customs 
clearance. Both the Chinese and Egyptian engineering contingents 
have been making significant contributions to camp construction, he 
 
KHARTOUM 00001468  002 OF 002 
 
 
said, and are expected to play a continuing  "self-help" role in the 
post-PAE era. UNAMID is also requesting that all new battalions 
deploy with a light engineering capacity of 50 to 100 men to help 
make up for the loss of PAE. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The lack of a replacement for PAE remains a significant 
concern, according to Weiszegger. With no alternative turnkey 
provider on the horizon, UNAMID has proposed to UN headquarters in 
New York that that UN Office For Project Services (UNOPS) take 
responsibility for project implementation. (Note: UNOPS provides 
project management, procurement and other support services to United 
Nations agencies, international financial institutions, governments 
and non-governmental organizations. It became an independent, 
self-financing organization in 1995. End Note.) The current thinking 
calls for UNOPS engineering capacity to be combined with the hiring 
of PAE local staff (non-compete clauses in contracts of their 
expatriate staff may prevent them from being hired,) and to rely on 
a mix of local and regional contractors to complete the work, though 
he noted that this was much less efficient than a single provider 
such as PAE. Until new contracts are in place ("I don't see that 
happening until before the end of the 2009,") troops will have to 
deploy on brownfield sites with only the most basic infrastructure. 
Weiszegger lamented that these conditions would be "austere." UNOPS 
has a very mixed reputation in Sudan in terms of efficiency. 
 
GOS COOPERATION 
--------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) With regard to cooperation with the GOS, Weiszegger noted 
that it had been quite forthcoming in the past several months. 
"There's been great progress in securing additional parking spaces" 
for UNAMID aircraft in both Nyala and El Fasher Airports, in 
addition to keeping the airports open longer. GOS authorities have 
been accommodating on visa and customs clearances, he said, with the 
exception of visas for nationals of the United States, Canada and 
Denmark. No progress has been made obtaining visas for U.S. military 
personnel, as UNAMID follow-up inquiries have not been met with a 
response. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Weiszegger noted that the GOS has also been very 
accommodating in regard to PAE, even after its contract expired. 
Over 80 flights delivering vital cargo equipment were granted flight 
clearances over the past several months (after the contract expired 
in July), which as critical in making progress on the supercamps. 
Weiszegger stated that while there were typically some problems with 
lower-level authorities, such difficulties were quickly resolved 
when pushed to more senior levels. He credited a joint technical 
committee monthly meeting and working groups on specific issues such 
as visas for eliminating bureaucratic impediments. 
 
ICC CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
------------------------ 
 
¶9. (SBU) Stafford noted that UNAMID is now focused on contingency 
planning for a "Phase 5" evacuation in the lead-up to the potential 
issuance of an ICC arrest warrant against President Bashir, and this 
has lamentably taken away attention from deployment. He briefly 
outlined draft  evacuation plans to sequentially move all troops to 
battalion positions, move battalions to sector headquarters and then 
co-locate, with potential safe havens in Cairo, Addis Ababa and 
Entebbe. Information is currently being gathered on the number of 
people and, more importantly, UNAMID's capacity to move them in the 
event of an evacuation.  The latter would be completed within a 
week, according to Stafford. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment: UNAMID's proposal to use UNOPS for the management 
and implementation of camp construction is a welcome development, if 
only because there is no other plan in place. Whether UNOPS has the 
capacity or ability to manage such an ambitious operation remains to 
be seen, but camp construction is sure to experience severe delays 
regardless. UNAMID's work on contingency planning for a Phase 5 
evacuation, while pushing forward on accelerated deployment, is a 
familiar paradox last seen in July after the initial ICC arrest 
warrant request was made. A Phase 5 evacuation would, of course, be 
a devastating blow to reaching deployment goals. 
 
FERNANDEZ