VZCZCXRO8028
PP RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2896/01 3031212
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291212Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6022
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 002896 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, S/CRS 
STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG 
NSC FOR JWOOD 
OSD FOR MCGRAW 
CG CJTF-101, POLAD, JICCENT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: AGAINST THE ODDS, VOTER REGISTRATION UNDERWAY IN 
NURISTAN 
 
REF: A. KABUL 2708 
     ¶B. KABUL 2851 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  Delayed in starting and still struggling across 
difficult terrain, Nuristan's voter registration process is 
nonetheless underway and going better than many observers 
expected. 
 
------------------ 
FROM HERE TO THERE 
------------------ 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Splayed across the jagged teeth of the Hindu Kush 
mountains, Nuristan remains the most remote corner of 
Afghanistan.  The province borders Pakistan's tribal areas 
and is set apart by its unique language and ethnicity as well 
as the practical difficulties of life among peaks reaching 
15,000 feet. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The logistics officer of the Independent Election 
Commission (IEC) in Nuristan on October 26 had two problems: 
how to get additional voter registration forms from 
Jalalabad, to meet demand beyond IEC headquarters' 
expectations, and how to get a replacement camera part from 
Kabul.  In recent months trucks traveling the road into 
central Nuristan from the south, and along the rougher 
eastern road to the northeastern district of Bargi Metal, 
have come under frequent attack, while the safe western road 
ends before Mandol district at Dow Ab.  Mixing voter 
registration materials in with a commercial shipment of rice 
and sugar, or detouring across and back the border with 
Pakistan, Abdulsamad mused, might be his best options. 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Abdulsamad's problems that day are typical for 
Nuristan.  No road traverses the province from west to east 
across the mountain ranges.  As Nuristan lacks cell phone 
coverage outside its capital Parun, and Thuraya satellite 
minutes are expensive and often inaccessible, in Kala Gush 
Abdulsamad was thinking through these problems largely on his 
own. Provincial Electoral Officer (PEO) Abdulwahab, 
Abdulsamad's boss, works out of an office in Parun, where the 
violence-prone Chapadara valley road up from the south simply 
stops.  Abdulwahab's superiors and subordinates quietly agree 
that he is only a mediocre manager, and his decision to route 
materials into the dead-end of Parun after the September 27 
attack on a truck carrying voter registration materials (REF 
A) contributed to delays in distribution.  Voter registration 
opened late in all of Nuristan's eight districts, with delays 
from six to 18 days, and only after US forces responded to a 
late IEC request to provide essential air lift.  The grateful 
IEC field operations director, Dr. Raheem, says he would like 
to nominate the PRT for an award. 
 
---------------- 
AHEAD UNDER FIRE 
---------------- 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  The activities of shadowy anti-government or 
anti-coalition forces (REF B) have not dampened the 
enthusiasm of Nurgram district field coordinator (DFC) 
Abdulraham, or many of his fellow Nuristanis, for voter 
registration.  A US convoy took RPG fire in the Titin valley 
on October 25, and Abdulraham was traveling the same road at 
almost the same time.  Still, Abdulraham was willing only to 
be vague about security problems in Nuristan. "People are 
talking about the Taliban," he said, "but I only know about 
local criminals."  Abdulraham prefers to focus on the 
positive. "Only a few people are absenting themselves from 
the political process" in support of insurgents, he says, 
while "many people support the government."  He reports young 
Nuristanis, in particular, are turning out to register to 
vote.  Popular demand is much of the reason IEC headquarters 
on October 27 agreed to add back the days of registration 
Nuristan voters lost when the opening of centers was delayed. 
Nuristani senator Hazrat Ali, reeling off a list of 
complaints about the Karzai administration, made the case 
plainly: "We want to choose our next president." 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Still, electoral officials and local leaders are 
frank about the political and logistical problems they see 
with the present elections cycle.  Most expect turnout will 
be lower than in 2004 and 2005; last time, Abdulraham notes, 
"voter registration numbers affected how many seats our 
province would earn in the Lower House, and we knew this." 
In 2004, the Nurgram district governor says, people would 
 
KABUL 00002896  002 OF 002 
 
 
walk six or seven hours to register and vote in Afghanistan's 
historic election, but "not this time."  Local ministry line 
directors say they see less voter outreach and fewer of the 
local civic educators who best understand Nuristan's mosaic 
of tribes.  Abdulraham reports that when his staff go 
house-to-house to enroll voters, women often say they must 
first ask their husbands if they can register -- a point he 
counters, but often in vain.  Abdulraham also thinks the 
simpler, more durable materials and equipment for the 
previous elections were better suited to Nuristan's stark 
environment and the low technical skills of his workers. 
 
------------------------------ 
MAKING DO, MAKING A DIFFERENCE 
------------------------------ 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  A variety of local leaders express frustration 
that, although desperately poor and vastly undeveloped, 
Nuristan is largely neglected by the central government. 
Mandol district presently has an outbreak of cholera, a 
signature disease of primitive conditions among the poor. 
These Nuristani leaders see themselves as left to make do 
with very little as they struggle to learn to work the levers 
of international aid.  Hazrat Ali remarks, "Seven years 
later, the promises of the Bonn agreement are only 50 percent 
realized, and we understand also that only 50 percent of the 
international community's aid reaches us here."  A district 
governor in turn sighs, "We elected our representatives to 
the legislature, and they did nothing."  A technical advisor 
to the provincial government complains, "This government has 
a Pashtun face, but it favors the Northern Alliance." 
Education Ministry director Abdulmohammed proposes a humorous 
solution: "We need one mullah, one woman, and one technocrat 
in power in Kabul.  Then we will get what we need." 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Despite these daunting odds, many Nuristanis appear 
ready to work for change. "Nuristanis do not have politics" 
like the partisan elites in Kabul, Nurgram's district 
governor opined. "They lack education, and they just want to 
work and to change their life."  Several interlocutors agreed 
that Nuristanis want roads, the rule of law, local 
government, and protection from insurgents.  DFC Abuldraham 
is ready to help keep open the option of peaceful change. To 
reach distant voters, he arranged for his team to travel to 
different villages, under the protection of local elders; he 
thinks his counterpart in Dow Ab cam also count on the 
valley's greybeards to protect the electoral process. 
Abdulraham proudly reports that the percentage of women 
registrants increased dramatically as a result of his 
outreach efforts.  Similarly, to compensate for the lack of 
local radio to use for civic education programs, the 
province's DFCs came to the PRT to give PRT-sponsored Radio 
Kala Gush interviews to explain the process to voters. "I am 
confident the elections will be well-organized," Abdulraham 
concludes, "except perhaps in the Pashgar valley..." where 
fighters opposed to the government are present. 
WOOD