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Viewing cable 08KABUL2785, ATTA RAISES SPECTER OF INSECURITY IN NORTH

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08KABUL2785 2008-10-18 11:58 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO8799
RR RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #2785 2921158
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181158Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5872
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0303
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS KABUL 002785 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR WILKES 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
STOCKHOLM FOR POL 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN SNAR AF TI
 
SUBJECT: ATTA RAISES SPECTER OF INSECURITY IN NORTH 
 
1. (U) Summary: In his remarks at an International Peace Day event, 
Balkh Governor Atta Mohammed Noor predicted greater insecurity in 
the northern provinces within a year's time if the north does not 
receive its share of development projects and if there continues to 
be what he deems a lack of coordination between coalition forces and 
Afghan authorities resulting in civilian deaths.  Atta also 
criticized attempts by the international community (IC) to pressure 
the GIRoA to name major Afghan drug traffickers, and challenged the 
IC to clean up its own drug trafficking problems first.  End 
summary. 
 
2. (SBU) Atta cited three factors contributing to the lack of peace 
in Afghanistan:  Pakistani interference, drug trafficking, and 
civilian casualties caused by the failure of ISAF to coordinate 
operations with Afghan authorities. He demurred on commenting more 
on Pakistan out of concern that it might run contrary to GIRoA 
policy, but was energized over the issue of drug trafficking, 
calling it a "black business" that some are using to exacerbate 
tensions and violence in the country.  Atta quickly deflected the 
argument that the GIRoA hasn't come forward with names of key drug 
traffickers as demanded by the IC, asking why the West isn't doing 
more to stop narcotics trafficking in their own countries.  (Note: 
Atta was referring to the "list" of drug traffickers that former 
Interior Minister Jalali claimed to have.  Some believe that Atta 
himself might be one of the drug traffickers named in that list. ) 
 
3. (U) Citing Balkh's successful poppy eradication campaign, Atta 
chided the IC for its "empty promises" of implementing alternative 
livelihood schemes, reminding the audience that the people of Balkh 
have not received any development projects in return for their 
economic sacrifices.  He rhetorically asked the audience of 
businessmen, government officials and young people how a province 
like Helmand with a huge poppy problem could reap $400 million in 
development projects and a poppy-free province like Balkh receives 
less than $4 million in projects. 
 
4. (U) The lack of operational coordination by coalition forces 
amounts to no less than a violation of the Afghan constitution, Atta 
charged, adding that he was glad PRT and ISAF representatives were 
in the audience to hear him say this.  He warned that mounting 
civilian casualties which resulted from operations conducted on the 
basis of bad information are a "ticking time bomb" that could drive 
Afghans away from ISAF.  Atta said he stressed to President Karzai 
the need for a joint information unit comprised of ISAF, ANA, ANP, 
and NDS to collect and analyze intelligence. 
 
5. (SBU) Atta's sobering assessment of the prospects for greater 
insecurity in the north reflects his frustration with the 
development disparity between north and south.  Though it is not the 
first time he has made such comments publicly, Atta delivered the 
message  more forcefully this time, speaking without notes for 
almost 20 minutes before reading prepared remarks.  It is not just 
Atta saying this: we have heard this message from local religious 
leaders, district officials, and elders.  Atta acknowledged to 
Poloff at the PRT's Iftaar dinner that Balkh residents blame not 
just Karzai for the lack of development results - they blame him 
too.  Heading into an election year, Atta knows that delivering 
results is important to maintaining his influence in the north 
regardless of what happens to Karzai.  Atta's message is a clear 
reminder that while the north is the most permissive environment in 
the country for development, it is a long way from being called a 
sustained success story by any standard. 
 
WOOD